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MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE  OF  INSANITY. 


TREATISE 


MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 


By    I.     E,  A  Y,     M.D. 


FOURTH   EDITION,   WITH  ADDITIONS. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,    BROWN    AND    COMPANY 

18  60. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1660,  by 

LITTLE,  BROWN  AND  COMPANY, 

In  the  Clerk's  OiSce  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 


CAJi  bridge: 
Allen  and  Farnham,  Printers. 


w 

600 


PREFACE 


TO     THE    FIRST    EDITION. 


• 
Few,  probably,  whose  attention  has  not  been  particularly 
directed  to  the  subject,  are  aware  how  far  the  condition  of 
the  law  relative  to  insanity  is  behind  the  present  state  of  our 
knowledge  concerning  that  disease.  While  so  much  has 
been  done,  within  a  comparatively  short  period,  to  promote 
the  comfort  of  the  insane,  and  so  much  improvement  has 
been  effected  in  the  methods  of  treating  their  disorder,  as  to 
have  deprived  it  of  half  its  terrors,  it  is  both  a  curious  and 
a  melancholy  fact,  that  so  little  has  been  accomplished 
towards  regulating  their  personal  and  social  rights,  by  more 
correct  and  enlightened  principles  of  jurisprudence.  While 
nations  are  vying  with  one  another  in  the  excellence  of 
their  public  establishments  for  the  accommodation  of  this 
unfortunate  class  of  our  fellow  men,  and  physicians  are 
every  year  publishing  some  instance  of  an  unexampled  pro- 
portion of  cures,  we  remain-  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  wis- 
dom of  our  predecessors  in  every  thing  relative  to  their 
legal  relations.  This,  no  doubt,  is  mainly  the  fault  of  medi- 
cal men  themselves,  who  have  neglected  to  obtain  for  the 
results  of  their  researches,  that  influence  on  the  law  of  insan- 
ity, which  they  have  exerted  on  its  pathology  and  therapeu- 

•  A* 


Vi  -         PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION. 

tics.  In  general  treatises  on  legal  medicine,  this  branch  of 
it  has  always  received  a  share  of  attention ;  but  the  space 
allotted  to  it  is  altogether  too  limited  to  admit  of  those 
details  which  can  alone  be  of  any  really  useful  service ;  and 
it  is  one  of  those  branches  on  which  the  author  is  usually  the 
least  qualified  by  his  own  experience,  to  throw  any  addi- 
tional light.  Insanity  itself  is  an  affection  so  obscure  and 
perplexing,  and  the  occasions  have  now  become  so  frequent 
and  important  when  its  legal  relations  should  be  properly 
understood,  that  an  ampler  field  of  illustration  and  discus- 
sion is  required^or  this  purpose,  than  is  afforded  by  a  solitary 
chapter  in  works  of  this  description. 

Notwithstanding  the  great  prevalence  of  insanity  in  Great 
Britain,  and  the  vast  amount  of  property  affected  by  legal 
regulations  and  decisions  respecting  it,  yet  the  English  lan- 
guage does  not  furnish  a  single  work  in  which  the  various 
forms  and  degrees  of  mental  derangement  are  treated  in 
reference  to  their  effect  on  the  rights  and  duties  of  man. 
Dr.  Haslam's  tract  on  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to 
Insanity  (1807),  which  was  republished  in  this  country  in 
1819  by  Dr.  Cooper,  in  a  volume  of  tracts  by  various  Eng- 
lish writers  on  different  subjects  of  medical  jurisprudence, 
though  abounding  in  valuable  reflections,  is*  altogether  too 
brief  and  general,  to  be  of  much  practical  service  as  a  book 
of  reference.  Among  a  few  other  works  more  or  less  directly 
concerned  with  this  subject,  or  in  which  some  points  of  it 
are  particularly  touched  upon,  the  Inquiry  concerning'  the 
Indications  of  Insanity  (1830),  by  Dr.  Conolly,  late  Professor 
in  the  London  University,  is  worthy  of  especial  notice  in 
this  connection,  for  the  remarkable  ability  and  sound  judg- 
ment with  which  all  its  views  are  conceived  and  supported. 
Though   not  entirely  nor  chiefly  devoted  to  the  legal  rela- 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION.  Vll 

tions  of  the  insane,  yet  the  medico-legal  student  will  find  his 
views  of  insanity  enlarged  and  improved  by  a  careful  peru- 
sal of  it ;  and  every  physician  will  do  well  to  ponder  the  sug- 
gestions contained  in  the  chapter  on  the  "  Duties  of  medical 
men  ivhen  consulted  concerning;  the  state  of  a  patient's  mind.''' 
In  the  Judgments  of  Sir  John  Nicholl  (contained  in  Hag- 
gard, Phillimore,  and  Addams's  Reports),  in  the  Ecclesias- 
tical Courts,  which  in  their  jurisdiction  of  wills  have  fre- 
quent occasion  to  inquire  into  the  effect  of  mental  diseases 
on  the  powers  of  the  .mind,  are  also  to  be  found,  not  only 
some  masterly  analyses  of  heterogeneous  and  conflicting  evi- 
dence, but  an  acquaintance  with  the  phenomena  of  insanity 
in  its  various  forms,  that  would  be  creditable  to  the  practical 
physician,  and  an  application  of  it  to  the  case  under  con- 
sideration, that  satisfies  the  most  cautious  with  the  correct- 
ness of  the  decision. 

In  Germany  this  branch  of  legal  medicine  has  received  a 
little  more  attention,  and  in  a  work,  entitled.  Die  Psycologie 
in  ihren  Havptanwendungen  av.f  die  Ptechtspflege  [Psychology 
in  its  chief  Applications  to  the  Administration  of  Justice),  by 
J.  C.  Hoffbauer,  a  Doctor  of  Laws  and  Professor  in  the 
University  of  Halle,  and  published  in  1809,  we  had,  till 
quite  recently,  the  only  complete  and  methodical  treatise  on 
insanity  in  connection  with  its  legal  relations.  It  bears  the 
impress  of  a  philosophical  mind  accustomed  to  observe  the 
mental  operations  when  under  the  influence  of  disease ;  it 
contains  a  happy  analysis  of  some  states  of  mental  impair- 
ment ;  its  doctrines  are  generally  correct,  and  in  many 
instances  in  advance  of  his  own,  and  even  of  our  time. 
Hoffbauer,  however,  not  being  a  practical  physician,  was 
less  disposed  to  consider  insanity  in  its  pathological  than  in 
its  psychological  relations,  and  consequently  has  attached 


viii  PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION. 

too  little  importance  to  its  connection  with  physical  causes, 
and  to  the  classification  and  description  of  its  different  forms 
by  means  of  which  they  may  be  recognized,  and  distin- 
guished from  one  another.  It  is  also  too  deeply  imbued 
.with  the  peculiar  metaphysical  subtleties  in  which  his  coun- 
trymen are  so  fond  of  indulging  to  suit  the  taste  or  con- 
venience of  the  English  reader.  It  has  been  translated  into' 
French  by  Dr.  Chambeyron,  with  many  valuable  notes  by 
Esquirol  and  Itard. 

In  France,  M.  Georget  has  cultivated  this  field  of  inquiry 
with  a  success  proportioned  to  his  indefatigable  zeal  and 
diligence ;  and  his  various  writings  will  ever  be  resorted  to 
by  future  inquirers,  as  they  have  been  by  the  author  of  the 
present  work,  as  to  a  fund  of  original  and  interesting  infor- 
mation. Having  long  been  devoted  to  the  study  of  insanity, 
and  especially  to  the  observation  of  the  manners  and  charac- 
ter of  the  insane,  he  was  peculiarly  well  qualified  to  treat 
this  subject  in  a  spirit  corresponding  to  the  present  condition 
of  the  science.  His  work  entitled,  Des  Maladies  mentales 
considSrees  dans  leurs  rapports  avec  la  legislation  civile  et 
criminelle  (1827),  is  an  admirable  manual,  and  though  but  a 
humble  brochure,  it  yet  abounds  with  valuable  information, 
and  is  pervaded  by  sound  and  philosophical  views.  In  his 
Examen  medical  des  proces  criminels  des  nomnies  Feldtman, 
Leg-er,  Lecovffe  (1825),  and  his  Discussion  medico-legale,  sur 
la  Folic  (1826),  as  well  as  a  sequel  to  the  last,  entitled, 
Nouvelle  discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie  (1828),  he  has 
collected  accounts  of  numerous  criminal  trials  in  which 
insanity  was  pleaded  in  defence  of  the  accused,  and  has 
taken  the  occasion  to  discuss  the  many  important  questions 
to  which  they  give  rise.  In  the  course  of  these  discussions 
there  is  scarcely  a  dark  or  disputed  point  in  the  whole  range 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION.  IX 

of  the  subject,  which  he  has  not  examined  with  great  abil- 
ity ;  and  if  he  has  not  always  settled  them  satisfactorily  to 
the  unprejudiced  inquirer,  he  has  at  least  afforded  him  the 
means  of  forming  more  clear  and  definite  views. 

On  becoming  aware  of  the  deficiency  in  our  medical 
literature,  of  works  on  insanity  considered  exclusively  in  its 
legal  relations,  it  was  the  author's  first  thought  to  make  a 
translation,  either  of  HofFbauer's  or  Georget's  work,  but  con- 
sidering that  the  numerous  notes  which  would  be  required  in 
order  to  bring  it  up  to  the  present  state  of  the  science,  and 
adapt  it  to  our  own  laws,  would  prove  inconvenient  and 
embarrassing  to  the  reader,  besides  not  fully  accomplishing 
the  object,  he  was  induced  to  abandon  this  project,  and,  as 
the  only  means  of  fairly  developing  the  subject,  to  prepare 
an  original  work,  —  original  strictly  in 'plan  and  in  many  of 
its  general  views  only, — for  the  materials  have  been  neces- 
sarily drawn,  in  a  great  degree,  from  other  sources  than  the 
author's  own  experience.  The  main  object  which  he  pro- 
posed to  himself  was,  to  establish  the  legal  relations  of  the 
insane  in  conformity  to  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge 
respecting  their  disease.  In  furtherance  of  this  object,  he 
has  given  a  succinct  description  of  the  different  species  of 
insanity,  and  the  characters  by  which  they  are  distinguished 
from  one  another,  so  that  the  professional  student  may  have 
some  means  of  recognizing  them  in  practice ;  and  thence 
deducing,  in  regard  to  each,  such  legal  consequences  as  seem 
warranted  by  a  humane  and  enlightened  consideration  of 
all  the  facts.  He  is  well  aware  that  he  has  presented  some 
views  that  will  not,  at  first  sight,  meet  with  the  cordial  assent 
of  all  his  readers.  He  can  only  say  in  justification,  that  they 
have  appeared  to  him  to  be  founded  on  well-observed,  well- 
authenticated  facts,  and  that  as  such,  it  was  an  imperative 


X  PREFACE  TO   THE  FIRST  EDITION. 

duty  required  by  the  claims  of  humanity  and  truth,  to  pre- 
sent them  in  the  strongest  possible  aspect.  Before  being 
condemned  for  substituting  visionary  and  speculative  fancies, 
in  the  place  of  those  maxims  and  practices  which  have  come 
down  to  us  on  the  authority  of  our  ancestors,  and  been  sanc- 
tioned by  the  approval  of  all  succeeding  times,  he  hopes  that 
the  grounds  on  which  these  alleged  fancies  have  been  built, 
will  be  carefully,  candidly,  and  dispassionately  examined. 
Of  the  manifold  imperfections  of  his  work,  no  one  can  be 
more  sensible  than  the  author  himself;  but  if  it  succeed 
in  directing  attention  to  the  subject  and  putting  others  on 
the  track  of  inquiry,  it  will,  at  the  very  least,  have  been  fol- 
lowed by  one  beneficial  result. 

March  20,  1838. 


PREFACE 

TO    THE    FOUETH    EDITION. 


Since  the  first  edition  of  this  work  was  published,  no  part 
of  Medical  Jurisprudence  has  received  so  much  attention, 
in  one  way  or  another,  as  that  which  relates  to  Insanity. 
During  that  period  have  appeared  several  works  especially 
devoted  to  it,  among  which  that  of  our  own  countrymen, 
Wharton  and  Stille,  possesses  superior  merits,  while  the  cases 
in  which  it  has  been  discussed  in  English  and  American 
courts,  greatly  outnumber  the  whole  amount  of  those  which 
had  been  previously  recorded.  In  preparing  the  present  edi- 
tion of  this  work,  however,  it  has  formed  no  part  of  my  pur- 
■pose  to  notice  all,  or  a  considerable  number  of  such  cases, 
but  I  have  rather  sought,  by  means  of  some  additions  pru- 
dently made,  to  indicate  the  progress  of  the  science,  to  sup- 
ply important  omissions,  and  to  place  some  views  in  a 
stronger  light.  I  take  the  opportunity  to  state,  that  an 
increased  practical  acquaintance  with  the  subject,  while  it 
has  occasionally  led  me  to  more  precision  and  accuracy  of 
statement,  has  not  weakened  my  belief  in  those  doctrines 
which  have  been  regarded  as  peculiar  to  this  work.  On  the 
contrary,  every  year's  experience  has  only  strengthened  the 
conviction,  that  much  of  the  common  law  relative  to  insan- 
ity, whatever  other  support  it  may  have,  has  no  foundation 
in  the  facts  of  science. 

Providence,  March  1,  1860. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Preliminary  Views         ...  1 


CHAPTER  I. 

Mental  Disease  in  General 75 

CHAPTER  n. 
Idiocy .        .79 

CHAPTER  m. 
Imbecility 84 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Legal  Consequences  of  Mental  Deficiency  .        .        .        .110 

CHAPTER  V. 
Pathology  and  Symptoms  of  Mania 137 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Intellectual  Mania 162 

Sec.  I.    General  Intellectual  Mania 162 

Sec.  n.  Partial  Intellectual  Mania       .        .        .        .        ,         .169 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Moral  Mania 177 

Sec.  I.    General  Moral  Mania 182 

Sec.  II.  Partial  Moral  Mania 203 

B 


XIV  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  YIII. 

Legal  Coxsequexces  of  Maxia •      .        .    256 

Sec.  I.    Legal  Consequences  of  Intellectual  Mania     .         .         .257 
Sec.  IL  Legal  Consequences  of  Moral  Mania      ....     285 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Dementia 320 

CHAPTER    X. 
Legal  Coxsequexces  of  Demextia 329 

CHAPTER  XL 
Febrile  Delirium 345 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Legal  Coxsequexces  of  Delirium 350 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Apoplexy  axd  Paralysis  with  their  Legal  Coxsequexces     356 

CHAPTER  XI Y. 
Duration  axd  Curability  of  Ixsaxity 364 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Lucid  Ixtervals 371 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
Simulated  Ixsaxity 387 

CHAPTER   XVII. 
Concealed  Ixsaxity 420 

CHAPTER   XVm. 
Epilepsy  and  its  Legal  Coxsequexces     .        .        .        ...    429 

CHAPTER    XIX. 
Suicide 439 


CONTENTS.  XV 

CHAPTER    XX. 
Legal  Coxsequexces  of'Simcide 448 

CHAPTER    XXI. 

SOMXAMBULISM ,  .  .      454 

CHAPTER   XXH. 
Legal  Coxsequexces  of  Somnambulism   ......    461 

CHAPTER   XXIH. 

Simulated  Somnambulism    .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .    464 

CHAPTER   XXiy. 
Somnolentia 471 

CHAPTER   XXV. 

Effect  of  Ixsanity  on  Evidence 477 

CHAPTER   XXVL 
Drunkenness 491 

CHAPTER   XXVn. 
Legal  Consequences  of  Drunkenness 504 

CHAPTER   XXVHL 

LSTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION  .  .  .  .      >     .  .  .      538 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 
Duties  of  Medical  Witnesses 564 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


[the  figures  refer  io  the  sectioxs.] 


Abbot,  State  v.                         41,  560 

Allnut,  Regina  v.  303 

Allis  V.  Billings  305 

Arnold,  Rex  v.  14 

Attorney-General  v.  Parnther  380 

Bagstef  V.  Portsmouth  7 

Bainbrigge,  Doe  d.  Bainbrigge  609, 

612 

Barnsley,  Ex  parte  5 

Barrett  et  als.,  Brooks  et  als.  v.  4G0 

Barton,  Regina  v.                    299,  303 

Beavan  v.  McDowell  7 

Beals  V.  See  7 

Beckwith  f.  Sydebotham  Gil 

Bell,  Fenwick  u.  611 
Bellingham,  Rex  v.        16,  20,  21,  37 

Bender,  State  v.  41 

Billings,  Allis  v.  305 

Birdsell,  United  States  v.  546 

Boen,  Gates  v.  7 

Bonsall,  Leman  v.  352 

Bonsall  v.  Chancellor  7 

Borrodaile  v.  Hunter  464 

Breasted  v.  Farmers'  Loan  Co.  464 

Brogden  v.  Brown  352 

Brooks  et  als.  v.  Barrett  et  als.  460 

Browning  v.  Read  269 

Bullock,  State  v.  536 

Burrows  v.  Burrows  460 

B utterly  v.  Darling  263 

Camroux,  Molton  v.  7 

Carrol,  Rex  v.  536 

Cartwright  v.  Cartwright  390 

Chambers  v.   Queen's  Proctor,  280, 

392,  460 

Chancellor,  Bonsall  v.  7 

Clark,  State  v.  41 

Clark  V.  Fisher  368 


C'ark,  Dew  w.  22,  23,  275 

C  ift  V.  Schwabt  '  464 

Commonwealth  i>.  McDonough  538 
i\  Rogers  41,303,607 
V.  Tirrell  483 

Cory,  State  v.  41 

Cranmer,  Ex  parte  5 

Croft  V.  Day  368 

Cruft,  Medway  y.  129 

Cruse,  Regina  v.  536 

Darling  v.  Butterly  263 

Day,  Croft  v.  6 

Dennett  &  wife  v.  Dow  338 

Desilver's  Estate  7 

Dew  V.  Clark  22,  23,  275 

Doe  d.  Bainbritrge  v.  Balnbriirge  609, 

612 
Donellan,  Rex  v.  620 

Dow,  Dennet  &  wife  v.  338 

Drew,  United  States  v.  543 

Driver,  White  v.  392 

Duffield  V.  Robeson  460 


Evans  v.  Knight 


352 


Fall,  State  v. 

536 

Farlef*,  King  &  Thwaits  v. 

368 

Farmers'  Loan  Co., 

Breasted 

V. 

464 

Fenwick  v.  Bell 

611 

Ferrers,  Earl,  Rex 

i\ 

180 

Fisher,  Clark  v. 

368 

Fordham,  Scruby  &  Finch  v. 

12 

392 

Francis,  Regina  v. 

609 

Freeman,  People  v. 

41 

303 

Frere  v.  Peacock 

303 

Fyler,  People  v. 

41 

Gates  V.  Boen 

.7 

Gibson,  Regina  v. 

42 

XVIU 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Greenwood  v.  Greenwood 

274 

Mudway  v.  Croft 

129 

Gvindley,  Rex  v. 

53G 

Murrav 

,  Regina  v. 

553 

Groom  &  Thomas  v.  Thomas  & 

Myers," 

Turner  v. 

269 

Thomas 

392 

Nesbitt 

,  Malton  V. 

611 

Hadfield,  Rex  v.                   15,  26,  29  | 

Nottidge  V.  Ripley 

586 

Haile  v.  State 

536 

• 

Hall  (,'.  Warren 

389 

Offord, 

Rex  n. 

20,  26 

Harrison,  KindlesiJe  v. 

337 

Oxford 

,  Regina  v. 

26,  35 

Harrison  v.  Rowan 

345 

Oakes, 

In  re 

586 

Hathorne  v.  King 

435 

Hisxijinson,  Regina  v. 

13,  26 

Parish, 

probate  of  will 

368 

Hill';  Regina  v. 

504 

Parnth 

er,  Attorney-General 

V.       380 

Hix  V.  Whittemore 

388 

Pate,  Regina  v. 

286,  303 

Holmes,  in  re 

5 

Patterson,  Regina  v. 

555 

Holmes,  United  States  v. 

41 

Peacock,  Frere  v. 

303 

Holyland,  Ex  parte 

427 

Peet,  1 

lice  V. 

7 

Hunter,  Borrodaile  v. 

464 

People 

V.  Freeman 
V.  Fyler 

41,  303 
41 

Ingram  v.  Wyatt 

566 

V.  Kleim 
V.  Thurston 

41,  303 
41 

Jackson  v.  King 

120 

Pirtle  V.  State 

536 

Jackson,  Regina  v. 

494 

Portsmouth,  Bagster  v. 

7 

Johnson  v.  Moore 

276 

Portsmouth  v.  Portsmouth 

87,  121 

Prescott,  State  v. 

107,  622 

Keirsted,  Livingston  v. 

495 

Kindleside  v.  Harrison 

337 

Queen's  Proctor,  Chambers 

V.      280, 

King  &  Th waits  v.  Farley 

368 

392,  460 

King,  Jackson  v. 

120 

Kingman,  Mitchell  v. 

7 

Read, 

Browning  v. 

269 

Klein),  People  v. 

41,303 

Regina 

V.  AUnut 

303 

Kneply,  State  v. 

41 

V.  Barton 

299,  303 

Kjiight,  Evans  v. 

352 

V.  Cruse 
V.  Francis 

536 
609 

Lawrence,  United  States  v. 

41 

V.  Gibson 

42 

Layton,  Regina  v. 

378 

V.  Higginsoa 

13,  26 

Lcighton,  Ex  parte 

265 

V.  Hill 

504 

Leman  v.  Bonsall 

352 

V.  Jackson 

494 

Lispenard,  Stewart  v. 

92 

V.  Layton 

378 

Livingston  v.  Keirsted 

495 

V.  McNaughton      2 

7,  36,  37, 
609 

Mai  ton  V.  Nesbitt 

611 

V.  Milligan 

491 

]Mar.sh  v.  Tyrrel 

368 

V.  jNIonkhouse 

536 

^Lartin,  Rex  i\ 

56,  29 

V.  Murray 

553 

^IcAdam  v.  AV'alker 

12 

V.  Oxford 

26,  35 

McCants  v.  State 

536 

V.  Patterson 

555 

LIcDonough  V.  Commonwealth      538 

V.  Pate 

286,  303 

^Ic  Do  well  ('.  Beavan 

7 

IK  Simson 

551 

]\Ic(ilue  V.  United  States  41 

,  552,  608 

V.  Stokes 

26,  303 

McNaughton,  Regina  v.     27,30,37, 

V.  Thomas 

536 

609 

V.  AV'atson 

551 

Milligan,  Regina  v. 

491 

Rex  V. 

Arnold 

10,  17 

Mitchell  c.  Kingman 

7 

t\ 

Bellingham          16, 

20,  21,  37 

!Molton  ('.  Camroux 

7 

V. 

Carroll 

536 

Monkhonse,  Regina  v. 

536 

i\ 

Donellan 

620 

Moore,  Johnson  v. 

276 

V. 

Ferrers,  Earl 

180 

Mosler,  State  v. 

415 

V. 

Grindley 

53G 

TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XIX 


Rex?'.  Hadtield  15,  26,  29 

V.  Martin  26,  29 

V.  Offord  20,  26 

V.  Thomas  536 

Rice  V.  Feet  7 

Ripley,  Nottidge  v.  586 

Robeson,  Dnffield  v.  460 

Roaers,  Commonwealth  v.     41,  303, 

607 

Rowan,  Harrison  v.  344 

Schwabt  V.  Clift  464 

Schwartz,  State  v.  504 

Seruby  &  Finch  v.  Fordham    12,  392 

See,  Beals  v.  7 

Shaw  V.  Thackeray  529 

Simson,  Regina  v.  551 

Sloo,  State  r.  41 

Smith,  State  v.  41 

Spencer,  State  v.  41,  303 

State  V.  Abbot  41,  560 

V.  Bender  41 

V.  Birdsell  546 

V.  Bullock  536 

V.  Clark  41 

V.  Cory  41 

V.  Fall  536 

State,  Haile  v.  536 

State  V.  Mc Cants  536 

V.  Hosier  .        41 

State,  Pirtle  v.  536 

State  V.  Prescott  107,  622 

V.  Schwartz  504 

V.  Sloo  41 

i\  Smith  41 

V.  Spencer  41,  303 

State,  Swan  v.  536 


State  V.  Wilson  41,  545 

r.  Windsor  41 

Swan  V.  State  536 

Sydebotham,  Beck  with  v.  Oil 

Thackeray,  Shaw  v.  529 
Thomas   &   Thomas,    Groom    & 

Thomas  v.  392 

Thomas,  Rex  i\  536 

Thurston,  People  v.  41 

Tirrell,  Commonwealth  v.  483 

Turner  v.  Myers  269 

Tyrrel,  Marsh  v.  368 

United  States  v.  Drew  543 

V.  Holmes  41 

r.  Lawrence  41 
r.  McGlue41,552,  608 

Yancleve,  Stevens  &  wife  v.  344 

Walker,  Mc  Adam  I'.  12 

War<],  Weaver  v.  263 

Waring  v.  Waring  279 

Warren,  Hall  v.  389 

Watson,  Rcirina  v.  551 

Weaver  v.  VVard  263 

Webster  r.  Woodford  7 

White  V.  Wilson  274 

V.  Driver  392 

Whittemore,  Hix  v.  388 

Wilson,  White  v.  274 
Wilson,  State  v.                         41,  545 

Windsor,  State  v.  41 

Woodford,  'Webster  v.  7 

AVyatt,  Ingram  v.  8  7 


MEDICAL     JURISPEUDENCE 


INSANITY. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS. 

Statutes  were  framed  and  principles  of  law  laid  down, 
regulating  the  legal  relations  of  the  Insane,  long  before 
physicians  had  obtained  any  accurate  notions  respecting 
their  malady;  and,  as  might  naturally  be  supposed,  error  and 
injustice  have  been  committed  to  an  incalculable  extent 
under  the  sacred  name  of  law.  The  actual  state  of  our 
knowledge  of  insanity,  as  well  as  of  other  diseases,  so  far 
from  being  what  it  has  always  heretofore  been,  is  the  accu- 
mulated result  of  the  observations  which,  with  more  or  less 
accuracy  and  fidelity,  have  been  prosecuted  through  many 
centuries,  under  the  guidance  of  a  more  or  less  inductive  phi- 
losophy. In  addition  to  the  obstacles  to  the  progress  of 
knowledge  respecting  other  diseases,  there  has  been  this  also 
in  regard  to  insanity,  that,  being  considered  as  resulting  from 
a  direct  exercise  of  Divine  power,  and  not  from  the  operation 
of  the  ordinary  laws  of  nature,  and  thus  associated  with 
mysterious  and  supernatural  phenomena  confessedly  above 
our  comprehension,  inquiry  has  been  discouraged  at  the  very 
threshold,  by  the  fear  of  presumption,  or,  at  least,  of  fruitless 
labor.  To  this  superstition  we  may  look  as  the  parent  of 
many  of  the  false  and  absurd  notions  that  have  prevailed 

1 


^  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

relative  to  this  disease,  and  especially  of  the  reckless  and 
inhuman  treatment  once  universally  bestowed  on  its  unfortu- 
nate subjects.  Instead  of  the  kindness  and  care  so  usually 
manifested  towards  the  sick,  as  if  it  were  a  natural  right  for 
them  to  receive  it;  instead  of  the  untiring  vigilance,  the 
soothing  attention,  the  lively  solicitude  of  relatives  and 
friends  ;  the  patient,  afflicted  with  the  severest  of  diseases, 
and  most  of  all  dependent  for  the  issue  of  his  fate  on  others, 
received  nothing  but  looks  of  loathing,  was  banished  from  all 
that  was  ever  dear  to  him,  and  suffered  to  remain  in  his 
seclusion  uncared  for  and  forgotten.  In  those  receptacles 
where  living  beings,  bearing  the  image  and  superscription  of 
men,  were  cut  off  from  all  the  sympathies  of  fellow  men,  and 
were  rapidly  completing  the  ruin  of  their  spiritual  nature, 
there  were  scenes  of  barbarity  and  moral  desolation,  which 
no  force  of  language  can  adequately  describe.  The  world 
owes  an  immense  debt  of  gratitude  to  the "  celebrated  Pinel 
who,  with  an  ardor  of  philanthropy  that  no  discouragement 
could  quench,  and  a  courage  that  no  apprehension  of  danger 
could  daunt,  succeeded,  at  last,  in  removing  the  chains  of  the 
maniac,  and  establishing  his  claims  to  all  the  liberty  and 
comfort  which  his  malady  had  left  him  capable  of  enjoying. 
With  the  new  aspect  thus  presented,  of  the  moral  and  intel- 
lectual condition  of  this  portion  of  our  race,  the  medical 
jurisprudence  of  insanity  became  invested  with  an  interest, 
that  has  led  to  its  most  important  improvements. 

§  2.  In  all  civilized  communities,  ancient  or  modern,  some 
forms  of  insanity  have  been  regarded  as  exempting  from  the 
punishment  of  crime,  and  under  some  circumstances  at  least, 
as  vitiating  the  civil  acts  of  those  who  are  affected  with  it. 
The  only  difficulty,  or  diversity  of  opinion,  consists  in  deter- 
mining who  are  really  insane,  in  the  meaning  of  the  law, 
which  has  been  content  with  merely  laying  down  some  gen- 
eral principles,  and  leaving  their  application  to  the  discretion 
of  the  judicial  authorities.  Inasmuch  as  the  greatest  possi- 
ble variety  is  presented  by  the  mental  phenomena  in  a  state 
of  health,  it  is  obvious,  that  profound  study  and  extensive 
observation  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  nature  of  man  can 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  3 

alone  prevent  us  from  sometimes  confounding  them  with  the 
effects  of  disease.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  an  almost  self- 
evident  proposition,  that  a  certain  knowledge  of  the  mind  in 
its  healthful  state,  is  an  essential  preliminary  to  the  attain- 
ment of  correct  ideas  concerning  its  diseased  manifestations. 
If,  in  addition  to  this,  it  is  considered,  that  opinions  on  the 
nature  of  insanity,  viewed  solely  in  the  light  of  a  disease, — 
of  a  derangement  of  the  physical  structure,  —  have  been  con- 
stantly changing  for  the  better,  it  follows  of  course,  that  its 
legal  relations,  which  should  be  determined  in  some  measure 
by  our  views  of  its  nature,  ought  to  be  modified  by  the 
progress  of  our  knowledge.  That  much  of  the  jurisprudence 
of  insanity  in  times  past,  should  bear  marks  of  the  crude  and 
imperfect  notions  that  have  been  entertained  of  its  pathologi- 
cal character,  is  not  to  be  wondered  at;  but,  it  is  a  matter  of 
surprise,  that  it  should  be  adhered  to,  as  if  consecrated  by 
age,  long  after  it  has  ceased  to  be  supported  by  the  results  of 
more  extensive  and  better  conducted  inquiries.  It  is  to  be 
feared,  that  the  principles  laid  down  on  this  subject  by  legal 
authorities,  have  been  viewed  with  too  much  of  that  rever- 
ence which  is  naturally  felt  for  the  opinions  and  practices  of 
our  ancestors ;  and  that  innovations  have  been  too  much 
regarded,  rather  as  the  offspring  of  new-fangled  theories,  than 
of  the  steady  advancement  of  medical  science.  "  We  own," 
says  one  of  them  with  commendable  candor,  "  that  we  can- 
not attribute  the  fuss  that  has  been  made  about  monomania 
during  the  last  two  years  to  any  new  lights  that  have  been 
thrown  on  the  nature  or  structure  of  the  mind.  We  are  far 
more  inclined  to  ascribe  it  to  that  sickly  humanity  for  which 
our  juries  have  latterly  become  proverbial,  and  which  gen- 
erally has  crept  more  into  fashion  than  quite  becomes  the 
sturdy  manliness  for  which  our  countrymen  have  long  been 
celebrated.  Our  fathers  and  grandfathers  troubled  their 
heads  but  little  with  such  subtleties  in  criminal  proceedings ; 
if  their  practice  was  less  remarkable  for  its  humanity,  it  cer- 
tainly was  more  distinguished  by  good  sense  than  our  own."  ^ 

^  Sir  George  Stephen.    Juryman's  Guide. 


4  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDEXCE   OF  INSANITY. 

Who  shall  measure  the  extent  of  that  feeling  in  the  commu- 
nity, expressed  in  this  honest  avowal  of  a  preference  for  the 
good  old  times  when  the  plea  of  insanity  was  seldom  heard, 
and  an  Old  Bailey  judge,  undisturbed  by  the  interference  of 
counsel,  could  comfortably  try  and  sentence  to  the  gibbet 
some  half  dozen  offenders,  in  a  single  morning  ?  In  their 
zeal  to  uphold  the  wisdom  of  the  past,  from  the  fancied  dese- 
crations of  reformers  and  theorists,  the  ministers  of  the  law 
seem  to  have  forgotten  that,  in  respect  to  this  subject,  the 
real  dignity  and  respectability  of  their  profession  are  better 
upheld,  by  yielding  to  the  improvements  of  the  times,  and 
thankfully  receiving  the  truth  from  whatever  quarter  it  may 
come,  than  by  turning  away  with  blind  obstinacy  from  every 
thing  that  conflicts  with  long-established  maxims  and  decis- 
ions. In  the  course  of  the  review  proposed  to  be  taken  of 
the  principles  that  have  regulated  the  civil  and  criminal 
responsibilities  of  the  insane,  the  reader  will  have  constant 
opportunity  to  witness  the  influence  of  the  spirit  above  con- 
demned ;  and  be  inclined,  perhaps,  to  consider  it  as  the  source 
of  that  striking  difference,  presented  by  the  sciences  of  law 
and  medicine,  in  the  amount  of  knowledge  they  respectively 
evince  on  the  subject  of  insanity. 

§  3.  Legislators  and  jurists  have  done  little  more,  than 
merely  to  indicate  some  of  the  most  obvious  divisions  of  in- 
sanity, without  undertaking  any  thing  like  a  systematic  clas- 
sification of  its  various  forms.  In  the  Roman  law,  the  in- 
sane, or  dementes^  are  divided  into  two  classes ;  those  whose 
understanding  is  weak  or  null,  mente  capti,  and  those  who 
are  restless  and  furious,  furiosi.  The  French  and  Prussian 
codes  make  use  of  the  terms  demence,  fiirew,  imbecillitSi 
withdut  pretending  to  define  them.  The  English  common 
law  originally  recognized  but  two  kinds  of  insanity,  idiocy 
and  lunacy,  the  subjects  of  which  were  designated  by  the 
term,  non  compotes  mentis,  which  was  used  in  a  generic 
sense,  and  meant  to  embrace  all  who,  from  defect  of  under- 
standing, require  the  protection  of  the  law.  An  occasional 
attempt  has  been  made  by  jurists,  to  attach  some  definite 
ideas  to  these  terms,  and  to  point  out  the  various  descrip- 


PKELIMINARY   VIEWS.  O 

tions  of  persons,  to  whom  they  may  be  applied.  Lord  Coke 
says,  there  are  four  kinds  of  men,  who  may  be  said  to  be 
710)1  compotes  mentis  :  — - 1.  An  idiot,  who,  from  his  nativity, 
by  a  perpetual  infirmity  is  nan  coinpos ;  2.  He  that  by  sick- 
ness, grief,  or  other  accident,  wholly  loseth  his  memory  and 
understanding  ;  3.  A  lunatic  that  hath  sometimes  his  under- 
standing, and  sometimes  not,  aliquando  gaudet  lucidis  inter- 
vcdlis ;  and  therefore  he  is  called  non  compos  mentis,  so  long 
as  he  hath  not  understanding ;  4.  He  that  by  his  own  vicious 
act  for  a  time  depriveth  himself  of  his  memory  and  under- 
standing, as  he  that  is  drunken.^ 

§  4.  Nothing  can  show  more  plainly  how  imperfect  were 
the  notions  of  the  early  law-writers  concerning  insanity, 
than  this  classification  of  insane  persons,  and  their  attempts 
to  define  the  several  classes.  An  idiot  is  defined  to  be  a  per- 
son who  cannot  count  or  number  twenty  pence,  or  tell  who 
was  his  father  or  mother,  or  how  old  he  is,  so  as  it  may 
appear  that  he  hath  no  understanding  of  reason,  what  shall 
be  for  his  profit  or  what  shall  be  for  his  loss;  but  if  he  have 
sufficient  understanding  to  know  and  understand  his  letters, 
and  to  read  by  teaching  or  information,  he  is  not  an  idiot.^ 
Now  the  truth  is,  that  many  of  those  whose  idiocy  is  unques- 
tionable, are  capable  of  attaining  the  kind  of  knowledge 
herein  specified,  by  means  of  the  ordinary"  intercourse  with 
men,  or  of  special  teaching.  The  entire  loss  of  memory  and 
understanding,  attributed  to  the  second  class,  is  observed 
only  as  a  sequel  to  madness  or  some  other  disease,  or  as  the 
result  of  some  powerful  moral  causes ;  so  that  if  this  is  to  be 
considered  an  essential  character  of  madness,  by  much  the 
larger  proportion  of  madmen  will  be  altogether  excluded 
from  this  classification  ;  for,  instead  of  wholly  losing  their 
understanding,  they  are  for  the  most  part  perfectly  rational 
on  some  topics,  and  in  some  relations  of  life ;  and  a  little 
effort  is  frequently  necessary,  in  order  to  detect  the  fact  of 
the  understanding  being  at  all  impaired.     Judging  from  the 

^  Coke's  Littleton,  247  a. 

2  1  Fitzherbert,  Natura  Brevium,583,  ed.  1652. 
1* 


6  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  IXSANITY. 

almost  exclusive  use  of  the  terra  lunacy,  and  the  frequent 
reference  to  lucid  intervals,  the  intermittent  character  of  mad- 
ness was  either  more  common,  some  hundreds  of  years  since, 
or,  which  is  more  probable,  in  consequence  of  the  general 
belief  in  its  connection  with  lunar  influences,  this  intermission 
was  imagined  to  occur  far  oftener  than  it  really  did.  This 
certainly  is  a  more  reasonable  explanation,  than  the  idea  that 
the  course  of  nature  has  changed,  so  that  lucid  intervals, 
which  were  once  of  the  most  common  occurrence  in  insanity, 
are  now  among  its  rarest  phenomena. 

§  5.  Common  sense  and  a  tolerable  share  of  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  time,  if  fairly  exercised,  would  probably  prevent, 
in  practice,  any  grossly  improper  application  of  these  theo- 
retical principles  ;  but,  in  civil  cases,  the  law,  though  not  dis- 
posed to  gauge  the  exact  measure  of  men's  intellects,  has 
sometimes  insisted  on  technical  distinctions,  that  have  little 
foundation  in  nature  or  reason.  Originally,  commissions  of 
lunacy  were  granted  for  the  purpose  of  inquiring  whether 
the  individual  were  either  an  idiot  ex  nativitate,  or  a  lunatic, 
in  Coke's  meaning  of  the  term,  and,  in  consequence  thereof, 
incapable  of  governing  himself  and  managing  his  worldly 
affairs.  The  injustice  of  leaving  beyond  the  protection  of  the 
law,  that  larger  class  of  insane,  who,  though  neither  idiots  nor 
lunatics,  labor  under  more  or  less  mental  derangement,  led  to 
a  change  in  the  form  of  the  writ,  by  which  the  phrase 
unsound  mind  was  used  for  the  purpose  of  embracing  all 
others,  who  were  considered  proper  objects  of  a  commission. 
What  is  the  precise  meaning  of  this  term,  it  is  not  easy  to 
gather  from  the  observations  of  various  high  legal  authorities 
who  have  attempted  to  fix  its  meaning.  It  seems  to  be 
agreed,  that  it  is  not  idiocy,  nor  lunacy,  nor  imbecility,  but 
beyond  this  all  unanimity  is  at  an  end.  Lord  Hardwicke 
held,  that  unsoundness  of  mind  did  not  mean  mere  weakness 
of  mind,  but  a  depravity  of  reason  or  a  want  of  it.^  Lord 
Eldon  once  referred  to  the  case  of  a  person  advanced  in 
years,  "  whose  mind  was  the  mind  of  a  child,"  and  observed, 

'  Ex  parte  Barnsley,  3  Atkyns,  168. 


PRELBimARY  VIEWS.  7 

that,  "  it  was,  therefore,  in  that  sense,  imbecility  and  inability 
to  manage  his  affairs,  which  constituted  unsoundness  of 
mind."  ^  The  same  high  authority  had  observed  on  a  pre- 
vious occasion,  that  "  the  court  had  thought  itself  authorized 
to  issue  the  commission  de  lunatico  inqnirendo,  provided  it  is 
made  out,  that  the  party  is  unable  to  act  with  any  proper 
and  provident  management ;  liable  to  be  robbed  by  any  one ; 
under  that  imbecility  of  mind,  not  strictly  insanity,  but  as  to 
the  mischief,  calling  for  as  much,  protection  as  actual 
insanity."  ^  Mr,  Amos,  late  professor  of  Medical  Jm-ispru- 
dence  in  the  London  University,  has  said,  that  "the  term 
unsoundness  of  mind,  in  the  legal  sense,  seems  to  involve 
the  idea  of  a  morbid  condition  of  intellect,  or  loss  of  reason, 
coupled  with  an  incompetency  of  the  person  to  manage  his 
own  affairs."  ^  Whatever  it  may  signify,  it  has  always  been 
insisted  on,  that  the  return  of  the  commission  must  state  the 
incapacity  or  inability  of  the  party  to  manage  his  affairs  to 
be  evidence  of  its  existence,  in  order  that  the  party  may  have 
the  protection  of  the  law.  If  the  jury  are  unwilling,  from 
what  they  see,  to  infer  the  presence  of  a  mental  condition,  to 
which  the  highest  dignitaries  of  the  law  have  declined  fixing 
a  precise,  intelligible  meaning,  then  the  inquisition  is  quashed. 
The  feelings  of  dread  and  disgust,  with  which  madness  has 
been  generally  contemplated,  have  often  deterred  juries,  act- 
ing under  a  commission,  from  returning  a  verdict  of  unsound 
mind,  which  has  become  equivalent  to  insanity ;  either  from 
a  disinclination  to  embarrass  the  family  with  an  odious  dis- 
tinction, or  because  the  individual  was  not  really  unsound  in 
the  popular  acceptation  of  the  term,  though  his  mental  facul- 
ties might  have  been  so  far  enfeebled  by  old  age,  or  sickness, 
or  congenital  causes,  as  to  render  him  absolutely  incapable  of 
conducting  himself  or  his  affairs,  —  a  fact  which  they  have 
sometimes  returned.  These  attempts  to  change  the  ordinary 
course  have  never  succeeded,  the  court  having  in  every  case 
required  the  verdict  to  be  in  the  words  of  the  inquisition,  or 


^  Haslam :  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  33C. 

'^  8  Vesey,  66.  ^  London  Medical  Gazette,  viii.  19. 


8  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ill  equipollent  words.  "  It  is  settled,"  says  Lord  Eldon,  "  that 
if  the  jury  find  merely  the  incapacity  of  the  party  to  manage 
his  affairs,  and  will  not  infer  from  that  and  other  circum- 
stances unsoundness  of  mind,  though  the  party  may  live 
where  he  is  exposed  to  ruin  every  instant,  yet  upon  that  find- 
ing the  commission  cannot  go  on."  ^  The  consequence  is, 
that  the  afflicted  party  must  either  forego  the  protection  of 
the  law,  or  fix  upon  his  family  a  sort  of  stigma  of  the  most 
disagreeable  and  onerous  description.  When  it  is  considered 
how  many  are  the  cases,  where  individuals  are  incapacitated 
from  managing  their  affairs,  simply  from  that  impairment  of 
the  mind  so  common  in  old  age,  or  mere  defect  of  memory, 
the  other  powers  remaining  sound,  it  is  a  little  surprising, 
that  no  effectual  measures  halve  been  taken,  to  render  the 
operation  of  the  law  less  imperfect  and  unequal.  It  is  not 
easy  to  see  the  ground  of  the  extreme  repugnance  displayed 
by  the  English  courts,  towards  any  return  that  does  not  assert 
the  mental  unsoundness  of  the  affected  party,  unless  it  may  be 
some  obstacle  thereby  thrown  in  the  course  of  the  subsequent 
proceedings.  The  object  of  the  commission  is,  to  ascertain 
whether  or  not  the  party  in  question  is  incapable,  by  reason 
of  mental  infirmities,  of  governing  himself  and  managing  his 
affairs  ;  and  if  they  so  find  him,  it  certainly  is  irrelevant  to 
any  useful  purpose,  to  connect  this  inability  as  an  effect  with 
any  particular  kind  of  insanity,  whether  expressed  in  com- 
mon or  technical  language.  Indeed,  to  require  a  jury  to 
infer  explicitly  unsoundness  of  mind  from  inability  to'  man- 
age affairs,  which  is  of  itself  sufficient  evidence  of  all  the 
mental  unsoundness  that  is  required  for  practical  purposes, 
and  reject  their  return  if  they  do  not,  would  seem  exceed- 
ingly puerile,  were  it  not  strictly  professional.  In  Ex  parte 
Crannicr,'^  where  the  jury  pronounced  the  party  in  their  ver- 
dict, "  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind  as  to  be  incapable  of  the 
general  management  of  his  affairs,"  Lord  Chancellor  Erskine 
gives  some  reasons  for  finding  fault  with  the  terms  of  the 
verdidt,  and  directing  the  inquisition  to  be  quashed.     "  The 

1  19  Vesey,  286.  -  12  Vesey,  406. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  9 

verdict,"  he  says,  "  does  not  state  distinctly  that  he  is  inca- 
pable ;  but  that  he  is  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind,  that  he 
is  not  equal  to  the  general  management  of  his  affairs."  The 
very  word  incapable^  it  is  true,  is  not  used,  but  the  words 
"  not  equal "  are  surely  of  equivalent  meaning ;  and  it  is  not 
.easy  to  conceive,  how  a  clearer  or  stronger  idea  of  a  person's 
incapacity  can  be  conveyed,  than  to  pronounce  him  "  not 
equal  to  the  management  of  his  affairs."  "  How  can  I  tell," 
he  asks,  "  what  is  '  so  far  debilitated  in  his  mind  that  he  is 
not  equal  to  the  general  management  of  his  affairs  ?  '  "  He 
certainly  could  not  tell  the  precise  quantity  of  mind  left,  but 
even  if  the  party  had  been  returned  non  compos,  and  therefore 
unequal  to  the  management  of  his  affairs,  it  is  not  quite 
obvious,  how  any  more  definite  notion  on  this  point  would 
have  been  conveyed.^ 

§  6.  The  business  of  the  jury  in  these  cases  is,  to  ascertain 
whether  the  individual  is  mentally  capable  of  managing  his 
affairs ;  and  this  is  a  duty,  which,  generally  speaking,  they 
are  able  to  perform  with  tolerable  correctness.  But  what  can 
be  more  irrelevant  to  the  object  in  view,  or  more  remote  from 
the  ordinary  circle  of  their  reflections,  than  the  additional 
duty  of  deciding  whether  his  mental  impairment  has  gone 
far  enough,  to  bear  being  designated  by  the  technical  phrase- 
ology, unsoundness  of  mind  ?  When  it  is  recollected,  too, 
that  the  members  of  these  juries  are  mostly  uneducated  men, 
and  but  few  of  them  at  all  acquainted  with  the  force  of  legal 
or  medical  distinctions,  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  such  a 
return  is  always  the  recorded  opinion  of  unbiased,  under- 
standing minds.  Indeed,  the  inconvenience  and  injustice  of 
this  proceeding  have  been  so  strongly  felt,  as  to  have  led  to 
the  repeated  expression  of  a  wish,  that  its  defects  were  reme- 

'  In  a  recent  case,  the  inquisition  was  quashed  by  Lord  Lyndhurst,  be- 
cause the  verdict  of  the  jury  said  too  much,  instead  of  too  little,  namely : 
"  that  the  party  was  not  a  lunatic,  but  partly  from  paralysis  and  partly  from 
old  age,  his  memory  was  so  much  impaired,  as  to  render  him  incompetent  to 
the  management  of  his  affairs,  and  consequently  that  he  was  of  unsound 
mind,  and  had  been  so  for  two  years."  In  re  Holmes,  4  Russel's  Chancery 
Eeports,  182. 


10  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

died  by  the  action  of  the  legislature.  That  it  should  still 
continue  in  a  country,  where  it  is  linked  in  with  a  system, 
whose  foundations  are  in  the  very  constitution  of  the  govern- 
ment, is  perhaps  not  strange ;  but,  that  it  should  be  used  in 
some  of  our  own  States  which  are  untrammelled  by  such 
considerations,  is  certainly  an  anomaly  in  legislation. 

§  7.  This  is  not  the  only  instance  where  the  principles  of 
common  sense  and  common  justice,  which  ought  to  regulate 
the  legal  relations  of  the  insane,  have,  with  astonishing 
inconsistency,  been  strangely  disregarded  in  the  maxims  of 
the  common  law.  While  theoretically  it  requires  that  con- 
tracts, to  be  valid,  should  spring  from  a  free  and  deliberate 
consent,  it  refuses  to  suffer  the  party  himself  to  avoid  them 
on  the  plea  of  lunacy,  in  accordance  with  an  ancient  maxim, 
that  no  man  of  full  age  shall  be  allowed  to  disable  or  stultify 
himself;  though  at  the  same  time,  it  does  allow  his  heirs,  or 
other  persons  interested,  to  avail  themselves  of  this  privilege.^ 
Thus,  a  person  who  recovers  from  a  temporary  insanity 
before  the  return  of  an  inquisition,  has  no  remedy  at  law  or 
in  equity  for  the  most  ruinous  contracts  that  he  may  have 
entered  into  while  in  that  condition,  except  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  though,  after  his  death,  his  heirs  may  have  them  set 
aside  by  establishing  the  fact  of  lunacy  alone.  Well  may  a 
distinguished  jurist  exclaim,  that  "it  is  matter  of  wonder  and 
humiliation,  how  so  absurd  and  mischievous  a  maxim  could 
have  found  its  way  into  any  system  of  jurisprudence,  pro- 
fessing to  act  on  civilized  beings."  ^  It  arose,  no  doubt,  in 
part,  from  erroneous  notions  of  the  nature  of  insanity,  and 
partly  from  apprehensions,  not  well  founded,  of  the  conse- 
quences, that  might  follow  the  admission  of  the  plea  of 
lunacy  in  avoidance  of  contracts.  Within  a  few  years,  how- 
ever, the  English  courts  have  almost  entirely  disregarded  the 
ancient  maxim, ^  and  in  this  country,  it  has  long  since  lost  its 


1  2  Blackstone,  295. 

*  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity  Jurisprudence,  §  225. 
'  Barjster  v.  Earl  Portsmouth,  Chitty  on  Contracts,  256  ;  Gates  v.  Boerif 
2  Strick.  1104. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  11 

authority  altogether.^  Indeed,  there  now  seems  to  be  a  strong 
disposition  to  run  to  the  opposite  extreme.  We  cannot  but 
think  that  the  ends  of  justice  would  be  better  obtained,  if  no 
general  rule  at  all  were  adopted,  and  every  case  decided  on 
its  own  merits.  Where  the  insanity  of  one  of  the  parties  is 
perfectly  well  known  to  the  other,  or  might  have  been  so  by 
the  exercise  of  ordinary  sagacity,  a  contract  between  them, 
except  for  the  necessaries  of  life  or  comforts  and  luxuries 
suitable  to  his  wealth  or  station,  should  obviously  be  held 
invalid,  because  the  insane  party  is  deprived  by  the  act  of 
Providence  of  his  natural  share  of  discernment  and  foresight. 
It  often  happens,  however,  that  a  person's  insanity  is  not  gen- 
erally known  and  is  not  very  apparent,  and,  in  such  cases,  if 
it  can  be  proved,  that  the  contract  is  a  fair  and  reasonable 
one  on  the  face  of  it,  and  was  entered  into  in  perfect  hon- 
esty and  good  faith,  he  certainly  should  not  be  permitted  to 
stultify  himself,  in  order  to  escape  its  performance.  Neither 
does  his  death  or  interdiction  so  change  the  case,  as  to  render 
it  proper  for  his  heirs  or  guardians  to  do  that  which  he  could 
not  do  for  himself.  Much  as  the  law  is  bound  to  protect  the 
interests  of  the  insane,  it  is  no  less  requisite  to  protect  those 
who  deal  with  them,  unacquainted  with  their  mental  condi- 
tion. It  as  often  happens,  that  the  same  party  suffers  from 
the  avoidance  of  the  contract,  as  that  the  insane  or  his  heirs 
do  from  its  validity;  and  nothing  can  be  more  clearly  unjust, 
than  the  application  of  a  maxim  or  general  rule  that  favors 
only  the  interests  of  the  unsound  party .^ 

§  8.  Though  little  of  this  pertinacious  adherence  to  merely 
technical  distinctions  is  observed,  in  the  application  of  the 
law  to  criminal  cases,  yet  there  is  much  of  the  same  respect 


1  Webster  v.  Woodward,  3  Day,  90  ;  Eice  v.  Peet,  15  Jolins.  503  ;  MiicTi- 
ell  V.  Kingman,  5  Pickering,  431. 

^  Since  this  paragraph  was  written  (1838),  decisions  of  both  English  and 
American  courts  have  been  in  conformity  to  the  principles  there  expressed. 
Beavan  v.  M'Dowell,  24  English  Eep.  48G ;  9  Wells  H.  and  G.  309  ;  Afol- 
ton  V.  Camroux,  4  Exch.  17  ;  Beals  v.  See,  10  Barr,  56;  DesUver's  Est.  5 
Eawle,  11 ;  Bonsall  v.  Chancellor,  5  Wharton,  R.  37. 


12  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

for  antiquated  maxims,  that  have  little  else  to  recommend 
them  but  their  antiquity,  and  are  so  much  the  more  perni- 
cious in  their  application,  as  the  interests  of  property  are  of 
less  importance  than  reputation  and  life.  It  by  no  means 
follows,  that  a  person  declared  to  be  7ion  co7npos  by  due  pro- 
cess of  law,  is  to  be  considered,  on  that  account  merely,  to 
be  irresponsible  for  his  criminal  acts.  This  is  a  question 
entirely  distinct,  and  is  determined  upon  very  different  views 
of  the  nature  of  insanity,  and  of  its  effects  on  the  operations 
of  the  mind  ;  and,  here  it  is,  that  the  lawyer  encroaches  most 
on  the  domain  of  the  physician.  The  first  attempt  to  point 
out  precisely  those  conditions  of  insanity,  in  which  the  civil 
and  criminal  responsibilities  are  unequally  affected,  was  made 
by  Lord  Hale.  "  There  is  a  partial  insanity,"  says  he,  "  and 
a  total  insanity.  The  former  is  either  in  respect  to  things, 
quoad  hoc  vel  illud  insanire.  Some  persons  that  have  a  com- 
petent use  of  reason,  in  respect  of  some  subjects,  are  yet 
under  a  particular  dementia^  iu  respect  of  some  particular 
discourses,  subjects,  or  applications,  or  else  it  is  partial  in 
respect  of  degrees ;  and  this  is  the  condition  of  very  many, 
especially  melancholy  persons,  who  for  the  most  part  dis- 
cover their  defect  in  excessive  fears  and  griefs,  and  yet  are 
not  wholly  destitute  of  the  use  of  reason ;  and  this  partial 
insanity  seems  not  to  excuse  them,  in  the  committing  of  any 
offence  for  its  matter  capital;  for,  doubtless,  most  persons 
that  are  felons  of  themselves  and  others,  are  under  a  degree 
of  partial  insanity,  when  they  commit  these  offences.  It  is 
very  difficult  to  define  the  invisible  line  that  divides  perfect 
and  partial  insanity;  but  it  must  rest  upon  circumstances 
duly  to  be  weighed  and  considered  both  by  judge  and  jury, 
lest  on  the  one  side  there  be  a  kind  of  inhumanity  towards 
the  defects  of  human  nature;  —  or,  on  the  other  side,  too 
great  an  indulgence  given  to  great  crimes."  ^  So  strongly 
was  this  celebrated  jurist  possessed  with  the  idea,  that  it  is 
the  strength  and  capacity  of  the  mind  only  that  are  affected 
by  insanity,  that  he  has  actually  founded  upon  it  a  test  of 

^  Pleas  of  the  Crown,  30. 


PKELIMINARY   VIEWS.  13 

criminal  responsibility.  "  Such  a  person,"  says  he,  "  as  labor- 
ing under  melancholy  distempers,  hath  yet  ordinarily  as  great 
understanding  as  ordinarily  a  child  of  fourteen  years  hath,  is 
such  a  person  as  may  be  guilty  of  treason  or  felony."  As  if 
the  only  difference  between  sanity  and  insanity  were  pre- 
cisely that  which  is  made  by  difference  of  age,  and  as  if  there 
could  be  two  things  more  unlike  than  the  mind  of  a  person 
"  laboring  under  melancholy  distempers,"  and  that  of  a  child 
fourteen  years  old. 

§  9.  The  doctrines  thus  dogmatically  laid  down  by  Lord 
Hale,  have  exerted  no  inconsiderable  influence  on  the  judicial 
opinions  of  his  successors ;  and  his  high  authority  has  often 
been  invoked  against  the  plea  of  insanity,  whenever  it  has 
been  urged  by  the  voice  of  philanthropy  and  true  science. 
If,  too,  in  consequence  of  the  common  tendency  of  indul- 
gence in  forced  and  unwarrantable  constructions,  whenever 
a  point  is  to  be  gained,  his  principles  have  been  made  to 
mean  far  more  than  he  ever  designed,  the  fact  impressively 
teaches  the  importance  of  clear  and  well-defined  terms,  in 
the  expression  of  scientific  truths,  as  well  as  of  enlarged, 
practical  information,  relative  to  the  subjects  to  which  they 
belong.  In  the  time  of  this  eminent  jurist,  insanity  was  a 
much  less  frequent  disease  than  it  now  is,  and  the  popular 
notions  concerning  it  were  derived  from  the  observation  of 
those  wretched  inmates  of  the  mad-house,  whom  chains  and 
stripes,  cold  and  filth,  had  reduced  to  the  stupidity  of  the 
idiot,  or  exasperated  to  the  fury  of  a  demon.  Those  nice 
shades  of  the  disease  in  which  the  mind,  without  being 
wholly  driven  from  its  propriety,  pertinaciously  clings  to 
some  absurd  delusion,  were  either  regarded  as  something 
very  different  from  real  madness,  or  were  too  few,  too  far 
removed  from  the  common  gaze,  and  too  soon  converted  by 
bad  management  into  the  more  active  forms  of  the  disease, 
to  enter  much  into  the  general  idfea  entertained  of  madness. 
Could  Lord  Hale  have  contemplated  the  scenes  presented  by 
the  lunatic  asylums  of  our  own  times,  we  should  undoubt- 
edly have  received  from  him  a  very  different  doctrine,  for  the 
regulation  of  the  decisions  of  after  generations. 
2 


14  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  10.  Until  quite  recently,  the  course  of  practice  in  the 
English  criminal  courts  has  been  in  strict  conformity  to  the 
principle  laid  down  by  Hale,  that  partial  insanity  is  no  excuse 
for  the  commission  of  illegal  acts.  For  instance,  in  the  trial 
of  Arnold,  in  1723,  for  shooting  at  Lord  Onslow,  Mr.  Justice 
Tracy  observed,  "  that  it  is  not  every  kind  of  frantic  humor, 
or  something  unaccountable  in  a  man's  actions,  that  points 
him  out  to  be  such  a  madman,  as  is  exempted  from  punish- 
ment: it  must  be  a  man  that  is  totally  deprived  of  his  under- 
standing and  memory,  and  doth  not  know  what  he  is  doing, 
no  more  than  an  infant,  than  a  brute,  or  a  wild  beast,  such  a 
one  is  never  the  object  of  punishment."  ^  This  is  but  the 
echo  of  Lord  Hale's  doctrine,  and  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  show  how  faithfully  the  principles  were  applied.  Arnold 
seems  to  have  been  of  weak  understanding  from  his  birth, 
and  to  have  led  an  idle,  irregular,  and  disordered  life,  some- 
times unequivocally  mad,  and  at  all  times  considered  exceed- 
ingly strange,  and  different  from  other  people  ;  one  witness 
describing  him  as  a  strange,  sullen  boy  at  school,  such  as  he 
had  never  seen  before.  It  was  testified  by  his  family  and  his 
neighbors,  that  for  several  years  previous,  they  had  considered 
and  treated  him  as  mad,  occasionally  if  not  always,  although 
so  little  disposed  to  mischief,  that  he  was  suffered  to  be  at 
large.  Contrary  to  the  wishes  of  his  friends,  he  persisted  in 
living  alone  in  a  house  destitute  of  the  ordinary  conveniences; 
was  in  the  habit  of  lying  about  in  barns  and  under  hay-ricks ; 
would  curse  and  swear  to  himself  for  hours  together ;  laugh 
and  throw  things  about  the  house  without  any  cause  what- 
ever, and  was  much  disturbed  in  his  sleep  by  fancied  noises. 
Among  other  unfounded  notions,  he  believed  that  Lord  Ons- 
low, who  lived  in  his  neighborhood,  was  the  cause  of  all  the 
tumults,  disturbances,  and  wicked  devices  that  happened  in 
the  country,  and  his  thoughts  were  greatly  occupied  with  this 
person.  He  was  in  the  ha^it  of  declaring,  that  Lord  Onslow 
sent  his  devils  and  imps  into  his  room  at  night  to  disturb  his 
rest,  and  that  he  constantly  plagued  and  bewitched  him,  by 

^  8  HarjTrave's  State  Trials,  322. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  15 

getting  into  his  belly  or  bosom,  so  that  he  could  neither  eat, 
drink,  nor  sleep,  for  him.     He  talked  much  of  being  plagued 
by  the  Bollies  and  Bolleroijs ;  he  declared  in  prison  it  was 
better  to  die  than  live  so  miserably,  and  manifested  no  com- 
punction for  what  he  had  done.    Under  the  influence  of  these 
delusions,  he  shot  at  and  wounded  Lord  Onslow.     The  proof 
of  insanity  was  strong  enough,  but  not  that  degree  of  it,  which 
the  jury  considered  sufficient  to  save  him  from  the  gallows, 
and  he  was  accordingly  sentenced  to  be  hung.     Lord  Onslow 
himself,  however,  thought  differently  ;  and,  by  means  of  his 
intercession,  the  sentence  was  not  executed,  and  Arnold  was 
continued  in  prison  for  life.     It  is  clear  that  the  court  recog- 
nized that  class  of  madmen  only,  as  exempted  from  the  penal 
consequences  of  crime,  whose  reason  is  completely  dethroned 
from  her  empire,  and  who  are  reduced  to  the  condition  of  an 
infant,  a  brute,  or  a  wild  beast.     If  it  be  true,  as  the  court 
said,  that  such  are  never  the  objects  of  punishment,  though  it 
neglected  to  state  that  they  are  never  the  objects  of  prosecu- 
tion, the  converse  must  be  equally  true,  that  those  not  exactly 
in  this  condition  can  never  avoid  punishment  on  the  plea  of 
insanity.     It  appears,  then,  that  the  law  at  that  time  did  not 
consider  an  insane  person  irresponsible  for  crime,  in  whom 
there  remained  the  slightest  vestige  of  rationality  ;  though  it 
did  then,  and  has  ever  since  deprived  him  of  the  management 
of  himself  and  his  affairs,  and  vitiates  his  civil  acts,  even  when 
they  have  no  relation  to  the  delusions  that  spring  from  his 
madness.     That  the  progress  of  science  and  general  enlight- 
enment has  produced  no  improvement  of  the  law  on  this  sub- 
ject, is  abundantly  shown  in  the  strong  declarations  of  Sir 
Vicary  Gibbs,   when    attorney-general    of  England,  on   the 
trial  of  Bellingham,  in  1812.     "A  man,"  says  he,  "may  be 
deranged  in  his  mind,  —  his  intellects  may  be  insufficient  for 
enabling  him  to  conduct  the  common  affairs  of  life,  such  as 
disposing  of  his  property,  or  judging  of  the  claims  which  his 
respective    relations  have  upon   him ;    and  if  he  be  so,  the 
administration  of  the  country  will  •take  his  affairs  into  their 
management,  and  appoint  to  him  trustees  ;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  such  a  man  is  not  discharged  from  his  responsibility  for 


16  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

criminal  acts."  ^  Lord  Erskine  had  previously  given  the  same 
doctrine  the  sanction  of  his  authority,  in  his  celebrated  speech 
in  defence  of  Hadfield.  "  I  am  bound,"  he  says,  "  to  admit 
that  there  is  a  wide  distinction  between  civil  and  criminal 
cases.  If,  in  the  former,  a  man  appears,  upon  the  evidence, 
to  be  non  compos  mentis,  the  law  avoids  his  act,  though  it 
cannot  be  traced  or  connected  with  the  morbid  imagination 
which  constitutes  his  disease,  and  which  may  be  extremely 
•partial  in  its  influence  upon  conduct;  but,  to  deliver  a  man 
from  responsibility  for  crimes,  above  all,  for  crimes  of  great 
atrocity  and  wickedness,  I  am  by  no  means  prepared  to  apply 
this  rule,  however  well  established  when  property  only  is 
concerned." 

§  11.  That  a  person,  whom  the  law  prevents  from  manag- 
ing his  own  property,  by  reason  of  his  mental  impairment, 
should,  in  respect  to  criminal  acts,  be  considered  as  possess- 
ing all  the  elements  of  responsibility,  and  placed  on  the  same 
footing  with  men  of  the  soundest  and  strongest  minds,  is  a 
proposition  so  strange  and  startling,  that  few,  uninfluenced 
by  professional  biases,  can  yield  to  it  unhesitating  assent,  or 
look  upon  it  in  any  other  light,  than  as  belonging  to  that 
class  of  doctrines  which,  while  they  may  be  the  perfection  of 
reason  to  the  initiated,  appear  to  be  the  height  of  absurdity 
to  every  one  else.  Georget,  an  able  French  writer  on  the 
legal  relations  of  the  insane,  in  commenting  on  the  speech  of 
M.  de  Peyronnet  who,  in  the  trial  of  Papavoine,  had  adduced 
the  passage  above  extracted  from  Lord  Hale,  in  support  of 
his  own  views,  expresses  his  astonishment  and  indignation, 
that  such  a  sentiment  should  ever  have  been  uttered,  least  of 
all,  quoted  with  approbation,  in  a  French  court  of  justice,  by 
the  chief  law-oflicer  of  the  government.  "  Can  we  help  won- 
dering," he  exclaims,  "  at  these  sentiments  of  Lord  Hale,  who 
seems  to  make  more  account  of  property  than  life.  No 
excuse  for  the  unfortunate  man  who,  in  a  paroxysm  of  mad- 
ness, commits  a  criminal  offence,  while  civil  acts  are  to  be 
annulled,  even  when  th^  have  no  relation   to   the  insane 

^  Colllnson  on  Lunacy,  657. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  17 

impressions  that  might  have  influenced  his  conduct."  ^  The 
language  of  the  law,  virtually  addressed  to  the  insane  man, 
is,  your  reason  is  too  much  impaired  to  manage  your  prop- 
erty ;  you  are  unable  to  distinguish  between  those  measures 
which  would  conduce  to  your  profit  and  such  as  would  end 
in  your  ruin,  and  therefore  it  is  wisely  taken  altogether  from 
your  control ;  but  if  under  the  influence  of  one  of  those 
insane  delusions  that  have  rendered  this  step  necessary,  you 
should  kill  your  neighbor,  you  will  be  supposed  to  have  acted 
under  the  guidance  of  a  sound  reason  ;  you  will  be  tried,  con- 
victed, and  executed  like  any  common  criminal  whose  under- 
standing has  never  been  touched  by  madness.  As  for  any 
physiological  or  psychological  ground  for  this  distinction 
between  the  legal  consequences  of  the  civil  and  criminal  acts 
of  an  insane  person,  it  is  in  vain  to  look  for  it.  That  the 
mind,  when  meditating  a  great  crime,  is  less  under  the  influ- 
ence of  disease,  and  enjoys  a  more  sound  and  vigorous  exer- 
cise of  its  powers,  than  when  making  a  contract,  or  a  will, 
few,  probably,  will  be  hardy  enough  to  affirm  ;  and  yet  the 
practice  of  the  law  virtually  admits  it.  The  difference,  if 
there  be  any,  would  seem  to  be  all  the  other  way.  In  the 
disposal  of  property,  the  mind  is  engaged  in  what  has  per- 
haps often  exercised  its  thoughts ;  the  conditions  and  conse- 
quences of  the  transaction  require  no  great  mental  exertion 
to  be  comprehended;  and  there  may  be  nothing  in  it,  to 
deprive  the  mind  of  all  the  calmness  and  rationality  of  which 
'it  is  capable.  Now  criminal  acts,  though  abstractly  wrong, 
may  under  certain  circumstances  become  right  and  meritori- 
ous ;  and  if  the  strongest  and  acutest  minds  have  sometimes 
been  perplexed  on  this  point,  what  shall  we  say  of  the  crazy 
and  distorted  perceptions  of  him,  whose  reason  shares  a  divi- 
ded empire  with  the  propensities  and  passions  ?  Most  mani- 
acs have  a  firm  conviction  that  all  they  feel  and  think  is  true, 
just,  and  reasonable  ;  and  nothing  can  shake  their  convictions. 
The  contracts  of  the  insane  are,  in  many  cases,  declared  to 
be  invalid,  and  are  set  aside,  in   courts  of  equity,  on    the 

^  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  8. 

2* 


18  MEDICAL  JTJRISPRIIDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

gi-ound  of  fraud;  in  accordance  with  an  established  principle 
that  the  parties  to  a  contract  must  be  capable  of  giving  their 
deliberate  and  rational  consent,  the  power  of  doing  which  is 
destroyed  by  mental  derangement.^  In  point  of  mental  sound- 
ness they  must  be  equal,  and  common  justice  requires,  that 
the  insane  man,  in  his  dealings  with  his  fellow  men,  should 
be  protected  from  the  effect  of  his  disorder.  Even  in  the 
simplest  transaction,  it  is  supposed  that  the  insane  party 
may  not  be  able  to  discern  all  the  circumstances  that  may 
conduce  to  his  advantage,  and  may  not  act  as  if  his  mind 
were  perfectly  sound.  But  it  remains  to  be  proved  that,  in 
the  commission  of  a  criminal  offence,  he  has  more  clearly 
apprehended  its  abstract  nature,  its  relations  to  the  injured 
party,  and  its  consequences  to  himself,  than  he  would  all  the 
circumstances  attending  a  contract ;  if,  therefore,  he  have  not 
acted  rationally,  but  under  the  influence  of  a  disordered  mind, 
he  ought  to  be  no  more  responsible  for  the  former  than  for 
the  latter. 

§  12.  A  distinction  is  also  made  between  civil  and  crim- 
inal cases,  in  regard  to  evidence  respecting  the  state  of  the 
party's  mind.  In  the  former,  proof  drawn  from  the  nature  of 
the  act  in  question  is  sometimes  paramount  to  all  others, 
and,  in  the  absence  of  others,  admitted  to  be  alone  conclu- 
sive ;  while,  in  the  latter,  to  seek  to  prove  the  existence  of 
insanity  from  the  character  of  the  act,  would  be  viewed  as 
nothing  less  than  a  begging  of  the  question.  "  If  a  lunatic 
person,"  says  Swinburne,^  "  or  one  that  is  beside  himself  at 
sometimes  but  not  continually,  make  his  testament,  and  it  is 
not  known  whether  the  same  were  made  while  he  was  of 
sound  mind  and  memory  or  no,  then  in  case  the  testament  be 
so  conceived,  as  thereby  no  argument  of  phrensy  or  folly  can 
be  gathered,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  same  was  made 
during  the  time  of  his  calm  and  clear  intermissions,  and  so 
the  testament  shall  be  adjudged  good,  yea,  although  it  cannot 
be  proved  that  the  testator  useth  to  have  any  clear  and  quiet 

1  Story's  Commentaries  on  Equity  Jurisprudence,  §  227. 
'  Of  Testaments  and  Last  Wills,  Part  II.  Section  3. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  19 

intermissions  at  all,  yet,  nevertheless,  I  suppose  that  if  the 
testament  be  wisely  and  orderly  framed,  the  same  ought  to  be 
accepted  for  a  lawful  testament."  Sir  John  NichoU  has  ob- 
served, that  where  there  is  no  direct  evidence  of  the  time,  or, 
consequently,  of  the  deceased's  state  of  mind  at  the  time,  of 
the  act  done,  recourse  must  be  had  to  the  usual  mode  of 
ascertaining  it  in  such  cases  —  which  is  by  looking  at  the  act 
itself  "  The  agent  is  to  be  inferred  rational,  or  the  contrary, 
in  such  cases,  from  the  character  broadly  taken  of  his  act."  ^ 
So,  on  the  other  hand,  "  in  the  case  of  a  person  who  is  some- 
times sane  and  sometimes  insane,  if  there  be  in  it  a  mixture 
of  wisdom  and  folly,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  same  was 
made  during  the  testator's  phrensy,  even  if  there  be  but  one 
word  sounding  to  folly."  ^  If,  then,  testamentary  dispositions 
that  conflict  with  the  natural  distribution  of  property  and 
the  known  and  expressed  intentions  of  the  testator,  yea,  if 
they  contain  but  one  word  "  sounding  to  folly,"  are  to  be  held 
as  sufficient  evidence  of  unsound  mind,  in  doubtful  cases, 
why,  when  an  atrocious  crime  is  shown  to  be  motiveless, 
unnatural,  in  opposition  to  the  habits,  feelings,  and  principles 
of  the  whole  past  life,  and  unfollowed  by  any  conscious- 
ness of  guilt,  should  not  this  act  be  considered  as  equally 
strong  proof  of  unsoundness  of  mind?  Why  is  it,  that 
instead  of  being  thus  considered,  it  actually  avails  the  ac- 
cused nothing;  the  character  of  the  act,  in  the  last  resort, 
being  too  often  explained,  on  the  supposition  of  an  inherent 
ferocity  and  thirst  for  blood,  which  no  considerations  can 
restrain;  even  in  the  face  of  totally  different  dispositions, 
indicated  by  the  whole  tenor  of  his  life  ? 

§  13.  In  still  another  respect  is  there  a  wide  difference 
between  civil  and  criminal  cases.  While  the  statute  book  of 
England  teems  with  enactments  regulating  the  confinement 
and  custody  of  the  insane,  and  hedging  them  around  with 


*  Scruby  and  Finch  v.  FordJiam  and  others,  1  Addams,  74.  See  also,  1 
Phillimore,  90;  McAdam  v.  Walker,  1  Dow,  178,  for  a  recognition  of  tlie 
same  principle. 

=  Swinburne,  Part  11.  §  3,  pi.  16. 


20  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

checks  and  safeguards,  the  relations  of  insanity  to  the  crim- 
inal law  have  been  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of  courts. 
An  instance  of  unjust  confinement  is  sufficient  to  arouse  the 
whole  community,  and  lead  to  prosecution,  and  penalties  of 
the  severest  kind ;  but  year  after  year  have  persons  of  doubt- 
ful sanity  ended  their  lives  on  the  gibbet,  without  one  voice 
being  raised  in  reprobation  of  the  barbarity.  On  the  9th  of 
August,  1843,  a  man  named  Higginson  was  arraigned  for 
the  murder  of  his  son,  a  little  boy.  There  were  two  counts 
in  the  indictment,  one  charging  him  with  burying  him  alive, 
and  the  other  with  fracturing  his  skull.  Something  being 
said  about  the  mode  of  the  murder,  the  prisoner  spoke  out  in 
a  very  audible  voice,  "  I  buried  him  alive."  He  had  no  coun- 
sel and  made  no  defence.  Some  suspicion  of  his  sanity 
being  expressed,  the  court  requested  that  any  one  who  knew 
any  thing  of  the  prisoner  in  that  respect,  would  come  forward 
and  testify.  Whereupon  two  officers  of  the  prison,  one  of 
whom  had  been  a  school-fellow  of  the  prisoner  and  known 
him  ever  since,  testified  that  he  was  of  "  very  weak  intellect," 
and  the  surgeon  of  the  prison  also  testified  that  he  was  of 
"  very  weak  intellect,  but  capable  of  distinguishing  right  from 
wrong."  In  the  charge  to  the  jury,  the  court,  Mr.  Justice 
Maule,  said,  that  if  the  prisoner  knew  right  from  wrong,  he 
was  responsible  for  his  acts,  although  he  was  of  weak  intel- 
lect. He  was  found  guilty  and  executed.^  Now  observe  the 
reverse  of  the  picture.  In  that  same  year,  1843,  a  female 
patient  in  one  of  the  best  asylums  in  Scotland,  sent  a  letter 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Home  Departmenl,  Sir  James  Gra- 
ham, complaining  of  false  imprisonment,  in  a  very  ingenious, 
plausible  manner,  and  requesting  inquiry  into  her  case  — 
such  a  letter,  in  fact,  as  those  in  charge  of  hospitals  are  in 
the  habit  of  seeing  every  day.  Her  appeal  was  immediately 
answered,  and  so  much  importance  was  attached  to  the  case, 
that  the  lord  advocate  of  Scotland,  Mr.  Alison,  the  historian, 
was  directed  to  go  down  himself,  see  the  woman,  and  make 
a  thorough  inquiry  into  the  matter.     We  have  never  heard 


1  Re(j.  V.  Higginson,  I  Car.  &  Kir.  129. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  21 

that  the  home  secretary  or  anybody  else,  troubled  himself 
about  the  fate  of  Higginson. 

§  14.  Notwithstanding  that  Lord  Hale's  doctrine  was 
cited  with  approbation  by  M.  de  Peyronnet  (§  11),  yet,  by 
the  French  penal  code,  madness,  without  limit  or  condition, 
exempts  from  the  punishment  of  criminal  acts.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  law  is,  that  "  there  is  no  crime  nor  offence  when 
the  accused  was  in  a  state  of  madness  at  the  time  of  the 
action."  ^  The  existence  of  insanity  once  established,  the 
accused  is,  by  the  spirit  of  the  law,  acquitted.  This  inten- 
tion has  sometimes  been  near  being  defeated,  in  consequence 
of  the  great  liberty  allowed  to  French  juries,  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  phraseology  of  their  verdict,  in  which  they  may 
declare,  if  they  choose,  not  whether  the  accused  was  guilty 
or  not  guilty,  sane  or  insane,  but  whether  or  not  the  act  was 
committed  volvnlarily?  A  verdict  of  this  kind,  in  an  instance 
mentioned  by  Georget,  led  to  a  curious  result,  in  the  hands 
of  men  who  were  not  indoctrinated  in  the  subtleties  of  meta- 
physics. The  fact  of  insanity  having  been  given  to  the  jury 
for  decision,  they  returned  that  the  accused  acted  volijntarihj 
and  with  premeditation ;  and,  secondly,  that  he  was  insane  at 
the  time  of  committing  the  act.-^  This  verdict,  so  consistent 
in  reality,  but  so  utterly  contradictory  in  a  legal  sense,  was 
received  by  the  court  and  understood  to  mean,  that  the 
accused  possessed  the  will  of  a  madman,  a  merely  animal 
will  which  excludes  legal  culpability.  Had  not  the  last  ques- 
tion been  raised,  the  accused,  though  mad,  would  have  been 
condemned  to  death.*     It  seems  evident,  that  the  legislator, 


'  II  n'y  a  nl  crime  ni  delit  lorsque  le  prevenu  etait  en  etat  de  demence  au 
temps  de  Taction.     Art.  C4. 

-  Special  verdicts  in  criminal  cases  are  quite  common  in  France. 

^  Des  maladies  mentales,  100. 

*  It  is  one  of  those  metaphysical  subtleties,  so  prevalent  on  the  subject  of 
insanity,  that  the  acts  of  an  insane  mind  are  involuntary.  It  certainly  can  be 
of  little  practical  consequence,  -what  epithet  is  applied  to  the  acts  of  a  mind 
admitted  to  be  insane  ;  though  it  seems  to  be  an  abuse  of  lanj^uage,  to  call 
any  act  involuntary,  -which  proceeds  from  a  person's  own  free  will.  True, 
the  exercise  of  the  will  may  be  greatly  influenced  by  the  condition  of  the 


22  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

in  framing  that  law,  was  impressed  with  the  difficulty  of 
drawing  the  line  between  general  and  joartial  insanity,  and  of 
estimating  the  quantity  of  reason  left  after  the  invasion  of 
this  disease,  and  therefore  determined  to  avoid  it  altogether 
by  recognizing  but  one  kind  of  insanity.  Though  not  pre- 
pared to  acquiesce  entirely  in  the  dispositions  of  this  enact- 
ment, yet  it  is  infinitely  preferable,  with  all  its  faults,  to  the 
English  practice  of  requiring  a  number  of  men,  who  may 
have  had  very  little  education  of  any  kind,  and  least  of  all, 
any  very  accurate  notions  of  the  influence  of  insanity  on  the 
operations  of  the  mind,  to  sit  in  judgment  on  the  measure  of 
a  man's  understanding,  and  decide  whether  or  not  he  had 
enough  of  reason  left  to  discern  the  nature  of  the  act  he  com- 
mitted. True,  mental  unsoundness  is  not  necessarily  incom- 
patible with  crime,  for  we  can  conceive  of  cases,  where  the 
criminal  act  is  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  influence  of  the 
reigning  delusion,  and  therefore,  as  far  as  that  is  concerned, 
the  offspring  of  a  sound  mind  ;  yet  we  must  acknowledge 
the  extreme  difficulty  of  establishing  this  fact,  and  the  cau- 
tion with  which  we  should  proceed  to  a  decision. 

§  15.    On  the  trial  of  Hadfield,  for  shooting  at  the  king  in 


mind,  even  to  such  an  extent  as  to  deprive  a  person  of  all  criminal  respon- 
sibility. But  this  does  not  necessarily  prove  the  act  to  be  involuntary, 
unless,  for  instance,  every  man,  who  commits  a  criminal  act  under  the  influ- 
ence of  strong  passions,  is  considered  as  acting  involuntarily.  The  objec- 
tion to  this  distinction  is,  that  it  is  used  as  a  test  in  the  decision  of  doubtful 
cases,  every  one  being  left  to  decide,  as  he  pleases,  what  acts  are  voluntary, 
and  what  involuntary.  A  curious  application  of  the  distinction  is  made  by 
Mr.  Shelford,  in  his  work  on  Lunatics  (Introduction,  p.  xlix.),  when  speak- 
ing of  suicide.  "  The  art  with  which  the  means  are  often  prepared,  and  the 
time  occupied  in  planning  them,  seem  to  mark  it  [suicide]  as  an  act  of  delib- 
erate volition  ]  but  the  acts  of  an  insane  mind  are  involuntary,  and  not  vol- 
untary ;  therefore,  the  question  must  always  revert  to  what  was  the  real 
condition  of  the  mind  when  suicide  was  committed."  If  the  preparation  for 
the  suicidal  act  be  so  indicative  of  that  volition  which  is  exercised  by  sound 
minds  only,  it  is  not  very  clear  by  what  process  of  logic,  from  these  two 
propositions  would  be  drawn  the  conclusion,  that  the  "  question  must 
always  revert  to  what  was  the  real  condition  of  the  mind  when  suicide  was 
committed." 


PKELIMINARY  VIEWS.  2S 

Drury  Lane  theatre,  in  1800,  there  occurred  for  the  first  time, 
in  an  English  criminal  court,  any  thing  like  a  thorough  and 
enlightened  discussion  of  insanity  as  connected  with  crime  ; 
and  the  result  was,  that  a  fatal  blow  was  given  to  the  doc- 
trines of  Lord  Hale  by  Mr.  Eskine  who  brought  all  the 
energies  of  his  great  mind  to  bear  upon  the  elucidation  of 
this  subject.!  In  accordance  with  these  doctrines,  the  attor- 
ney-general had  told  the  jury,  that  to  protect  a  person  from 
criminal  responsibility,  there  must  be  a  total  deprivation  of 
memory  and  understanding.  To  this  Mr.  Erskine  very  justly 
replied,  that  if  these  expressions  were  meant  to  be  taken  in 
the  literal  sense  of  the  words  —  which  however  he  did  not 
deny  —  "then  no  such  madness  ever  existed  in  the  world." 
This  condition  of  mind  is  observed  only  in  idiocy  and  fatuity, 
and  its  unhappy  subjects  are  never  made  accountable  to  the 
laws.  In  proper  madness,  on  the  contrary,  so  far  was  there 
from  being  a  total  deprivation  of  memory  and  understanding, 
that  "  in  all  the  cases  that  have  filled  "Westminster  Hall,"  said 
he,  "  with  the  most  complicated  considerations,  the  lunatics 
and  other  insane  persons  who  have  been  the  subjects  of  them, 
have  not  only  had  memory  in  mij  sense  of  the  expression  — 
they  have  not  only  had  the  most  perfect  knowledge  and 
recollection  of  all  the  relations  they  stood  in  towards  others, 
and  of  the  acts  and  circumstances  of  their  lives,  but  have,  in 
general,  been  remarkable  for  subtlety  and  acuteness.  Defects 
in  their  reasonings  have  seldom  been  traceable  —  the  disease 

^  One  reason  -why  the  criminal  law  of  Insanity  Las  undergone  so  little 
improvement  in  England  is,  probably,  that  the  accused,  not  having  been 
allowed  counsel  to  speak  in  their  defence,  except  in  trials  for  high  treason, 
the  officers  of  government  have  always  been  at  liberty  to  put  their  own  con- 
struction on  the  law,  and  urge  it  on  the  jury  as  the  only  correct  one,  without 
fear  of  being  contradicted  or  gainsayed.  Thus  the  old  maxims  have  been 
repeated,  year  after  year,  and  not  being  questioned,  their  correctness  has 
remained  undoubted,  both  in  and  out  of  the  legal  profession.  Can  any  one 
doubt,  that  had  those  insane  criminals  who  have  been  condemned  within  the 
last  half  century,  been  defended  by  an  Erskine,  many  of  them  would  have 
been  acquitted,  and  a  great  advance  made  In  the  law  of  Insanity,  that  would 
have  prevented  some  of  those  exhibitions  of  presumptuous  Ignorance,  which 
will  one  day  be  universally  regarded  with  feelings  of  disgust  and  pity  ? 


24  MEDICAL  JUmSPRUDEXCE    OF   INSANITY. 

consisting  in  the  delusive  sources  of  thouglit :  —  all  their 
deductions,  within  the  scope  of  their  malady,  being  founded 
on  the  immovable  assumption  of  matters  as  realities,  either 
without  any  foundation  whatever,  or  so  distorted  and  dis- 
figured by  fancy,  as  to  be  nearly  the  same  thing  as  their 
creation."  Instead  therefore  of  making  that  kind  of  insanity 
which  would  exempt  from  punishment  to  consist  in  the 
absence  of  any  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  he  lays  down 
delusion  as  its  true  character,  of  which  the  criminal  act  in 
question  must  be  its  immediate  unqualified  offspring.^  Here 
was  a  great  step  made  in  this  branch  of  medical  jurispru- 
dence, and  it  might  have  been  expected,  that  the  victory  thus 
gained  over  professional  prejudices  and  time-honored  errors, 
would  be  felt  in  all  subsequent  decisions.  But,  though  a 
fatal  blow  was  given  to  the  doctrine  that  such  insanity  only 
as  is  attended  by  total  deprivation  of  memory  and  under- 
standing, can  be  admitted  in  excuse  for  crime,  the  test  of 
responsibility  offered  by  Erskine  was  altogether  too  simple 
and  too  philosophical,  to  be  readily  adopted  by  minds  that 
delighted  in  subtleties  and  technicalities. 

§  16.  In  the  case  of  Bellingham,  for  instance,^  tried  for 
the  murder  of  the  Hon.  Spencer  Percival,  in  1812,  it  appeared 
from  the  history  of  the  accused,  from  his  own  account  of  the 
transactions  that  led  to  the  fatal  act,  and  from  the  testimony 
of  several  witnesses,  that  he  labored  under  many  of  those 

^  It  is  surprising  and  perfectly  unaccountable  that  Mr.  Erskine,  in  advert- 
ing to  the  case  of  Arnold  (§  10),  should  have  declared  "that  his  counsel 
could  not  show,  that  any  morbid  delusion  had  overshadowed  his  understand- 
ing !  "  If  it  were  no  delusion  in  Arnold  to  believe  that  Lord  Onslow  was  the 
cause  of  all  the  turmoils  and  troubles  in  the  country  —  that  he  bewitched  him 
in  particular  by  getting  into  his  belly  and  bosom,  and  sending  his  devils  and 
imps  into  his  room  to  prevent  his  rest ;  it  surely  was  none  for  Iladfield  to 
imagine  that  he  had  constant  intercourse  with  God  —  that  the  world  was 
about  to  come  to  an  end  —  and  that  he  was  to  sacrifice  himself  for  its  sal- 
vation, by  taking  away  the  life  of  another.  Either  the  able  advocate,  in  his 
zeal  for  his  client,  must  have  egregiously  deceived  himself  respecting  the 
facts  of  Arnold's  case,  or  liave  attached  some  ideas  to  delusion,  which  have 
never  entered  into  the  ordinary  conceptions  of  that  kind  of  belief. 

^  1  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  050. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  25 

strange  delusions  that  find  a  place  only  in  the  brain  of  a 
madman.  His  fixed  belief  that  his  own  private  grievances 
were  national  wrongs ;  that  his  country's  diplomatic  agents 
in  a  foreign  land  neglected  to  hear  his  complaints  and  assist 
him  in  his  troubles,  though  they  had  in  reality  done  more 
than  could  reasonably  have  been  expected  of  them ;  his  con- 
viction, in  which  he  was  firm  almost  to  the  last,  that  his 
losses  would  be  made  good  by  the  government,  even  after  he 
had  been  repeatedly  told,  in  consequence  of  repeated  applica- 
tions in  various  quarters,  that  the  government  would  not 
interfere  in  his  affairs  ;  and  his  determination,  on  the  failure 
of  all  other  means  to  bring  his  affairs  before  the  country, 
to  effect  this  purpose  by  assassinating  the  head  of  the  gov- 
ernment, by  which  he  would  have  an  opportunity  of  making 
a  public  statement  of  his  grievances  and  obtaining  a  triumph, 
which  he  never  doubted,  over  the  attorney-general ;  these 
were  all  delusions,  as  wild  and  strange  as  those  of  seven- 
eighths  of  the  inmates  of  any  lunatic  asylum  in  the  land. 
And  so  obvious  were  they,  that  though  they  had  not  the  aid 
of  an  Erskine  to  press  them  upon  the  attention  of  the  jury, 
and  though  he  himself  denied  the  imputation  of  insanity,  the 
government,  as  if  virtually  acknowledging  their  existence, 
contended  for  his  responsibility  on  very  different  grounds. 
Several  other  tests  of  this  condition  were  dwelt  upon  with 
unusual  earnestness,  and  unhesitating  confidence  in  their 
value,  and  as  they  have  generally  made  their  appearance,  on 
occasions  of  this  kind,  since  that  time,  it  may  be  well  to  ex- 
amine them  critically,  in  order  to  ascertain  to  how  much 
weight  they  are  really  entitled,  in  settling  the  question  of 
criminal  responsibility. 

§  17.  In  the  trial  of  Arnold,  already  noticed  (§  10),  the 
jury  were  directed  to  settle  it  in  their  own  minds,  whether 
the  accused  was  capable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong, 
good  from  evil,  and  if  they  concluded  that  he  was,  that  they 
must  return  a  verdict  of  guilty.  In  Bellingham's  case,  the 
attorney-general  declared,  "  upon  the  authority  of  the  first 
sages  in  the  country,  and  upon  the  authority  of  the  estab- 
lished law  in  all  times,  which  law  has  never  been  questioned, 

3 


26  "medical  jurisprudence  of  insanity. 

that  although  a  man  maybe  incapable  of  conducting  his  own 
affairs,  he  may  still  be  answerable  for  his  criminal  acts,  if  he. 
possess  a  mind  capable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong."  ^ 
Lord  Chief  Justice  Mansfield  who  tried  the  case,  echoed  the 
same  doctrine  in  his  charge  to  the  jury.  In  speaking  of  a 
species  of  insanity,  in  which  the  patient  fancies  the  existence 
of  injury,  and  seeks  an  opportunity  of  gratifying  revenge  by 
some  hostile  act,  he  says,  "if  such  a  person  were  capable,  in 
other  respects,  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  there  was 
no  excuse  for  any  act  of  atrocity,  which  he  might  commit 
under  this  description  of  derangement."  ^  Mr.  Russell,  in  his 
work  on  criminal  law,  includes  inability  to  distinguish  right 
from  wrong  among  the.  characters  of  that  grade  of  insanity 
which  exempts  from  the  punishment  of  crime.'^ 

§  18.  That  the  insane  mind  is  not  entirely  deprived  of 
this  power  of  moral  discernment,  but  on  many  subjects  is 
perfectly  rational  and  displays  the  exercise  of  a  sound  and 
well-balanced  mind,  is  one  of  those  facts  now  so  well  estab- 
lished, that  to  qviestion  it  would  only  betray  the  height  of 
ignorance .  and  presumption.  The  first  result,  therefore,  to 
which  the  doctrine  leads,  is,  that  no  man  can  ever  success- 
fully plead  insanity  in  defence  of  crime,  because  it  can  be 
said  of  no  one  who  would  have  occasion  for  such  a  defence, 
that  he  was  unable  in  any  case  to  distinguish  right  from 
wrong.  To  show  the  full  merits  of  the  question,  however, 
it  is  necessary  to  examine  more  particularly,  how  far  this 
moral  sentiment  is  affected  by,  and  what  relation  it  bears  to 
insanity.  By  that  partial  possession  of  the  reasoning  powers, 
which  has  been  spoken  of  as  being  enjoyed  by  maniacs  gener- 
ally, is  meant  to  be  implied  the  undiminished  power  of  the 
mind,  to  contemplate    some    objects    or   ideas  in  their  cus- 


*  Collinson  on  Lunacy,  657. 

*  This  opinion  was  delivered  scarcely  a  dozen  years  after  the  absurdity  of 
its  principles  had  been  so  happily  exposed  in  a  few  words,  by  Mr.  Erskine,  on 
the  trial  of  Iladfield.  What  a  comment  on  the  progress  of  improvement  in 
the  medical  jurisprudence  of  insanity  ! 

^  Russell  on  Crimes  and  Misdemeanors,  12. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  27 

tomaiy  relations,  among  which  are  those  pertaining  to  their 
right  or  wrong,  their  good  or  evil  tendency  ;  and  it  must 
comprise  the  whole  of  these  relations,  else  the  individual  is 
not  sane  on  these  points.  A  person  may  regard  his  child 
with  the  feelings  natural  to  the  paternal  bosom,  at  the  very 
moment  he  believes  himself  commanded  by  a  voice  from 
heaven  to  sacrifice  this  child,  in  order  to  secure  its  eternal 
happiness,  than  which,  of  course,  he  could  not  accomplish  a 
greater  good.  Our  belief  in  a  maniac's  soundness,  on  certain 
subjects,  is  founded  in  part  on  the  moral  aspect  in  which  he 
views  those  subjects ;  for  it  would  be  folly  to  consider  a  per- 
son rational  in  reference  to  his  parents  and  children,  while  he 
entertains  the  idea  that  it  would  be  doing  God  service  to 
kill  them ;  though  he  may  talk  rationally  of  their  characters, 
dispositions,  and  habits  of  life,  their  chances  of  success  in 
their  occupations,  their  past  circumstances,  and  the  feel- 
ings of  affection  which  he  has  always  cherished  towards 
them.  Before,  therefore,  an  individual  can  be  accounted 
sane  on  a  particular  subject,  it  must  appear  that  he  regards 
it  correctly,  in  all  its  relations  to  right  and  wrong.  The 
slightest  acquaintance  with  the  insane  will  convince  any  one 
of  the  truth  of  this  position.  In  no  school  of  logic,  in  no 
assembly  of  the  just,  can  we  listen  to  closer  and  shrewder 
argumentation,  to  warmer  exhortations  to  duty,  to  more  glow- 
ing descriptions  cf  the  beauty  of  virtue,  or  more  indignant 
denunciations  of  evil-doing,  than  in  the  hospitals  and  asy- 
lums for  the  insane.  And  yet  many  of  these  very  people 
may  make  no  secret  of  entertaining  notions  utterly  subversive 
of  all  moral  propriety;  and,  perhaps,  are  only  waiting  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  execute  some  project  of  wild  and 
cruel  violence.  The  purest  minds  cannot  express  greater 
horror  and  loathing  of  various  crimes  than  madmen  often  do, 
and  from  precisely  the  same  causes.  Their  abstract  concep- 
tions of  crime,  not  being  perverted  by  the  influence  of  dis- 
ease, present  its  hideous  outlines  as  strongly  defined,  as  they 
ever  were  in  the  healthiest  condition  ;  and  the  disapprobation 
they  express  at  the  sight  arises  from  sincere  and  honest  con- 
victions.     The  particular   criminal    act,   however,  becomes 


28  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

divorced  in  their  minds  from  its  relations  to  crime  in  the 
abstract;  and,  being  regarded  only  in  connection  with  some 
favorite  object  which  it  may  help  to  obtain,  and  which  they 
see  no  reason  to  refrain  from  pursuing,  is  viewed,  in  fact,  as 
of  a  highly  laudable  and  meritorious  nature.  Herein,  then, 
consists  their  insanity,  not  in  preferring  vice  to  virtue,  in 
applauding  crime  and  deriding  justice,  but  in  being  unable 
to  discern  the  essential  identity  of  nature  between  a  particu- 
lar crime  and  all  other  crimes,  whereby  they  are  led  to 
approve  what,  in  general  terms,  they  have  already  con- 
demned. It  is  a  fact,  not  calculated  to  increase  our  faith 
in  the  march  of  intellect,  that  the  very  trait  peculiarly  char- 
acteristic of  insanity,  has  been  seized  upon  as  a  conclusive 
proof  of  sanity  in  doubtful  cases;  and  thus  the  infirmity  that 
entitles  one  to  protection,  is  tortured  into  a  good  and  suffi- 
cient reason  for  completing  his  ruin. 

§  19.  If  this  power  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong  do 
really  indicate  soundness  of  mind,  it  may  be  justly  com- 
plained, that  the  qnestion  of  its  existence  is  never  agitated  in 
any  but  criminal  cases,  while  it  certainly  should  be  whenever 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  insane  are  to  be  invaded.  If  it 
is  proper  to  make  those  who  possess  this  power  responsible 
for  their  criminal  acts,  how  unjust  and  absurd  is  it  to  deprive 
them  of  their  liberty  and  seclude  them  from  their  customary 
scenes  and  enjoyments,  before  they  have  violated  a  single 
human  law.  Undoubtedly,  this  measure  is  conducive  to 
their  good,  by  taking  from  them  effectually  the  opportunity 
of  injuring  the  persons  or  property  of  themselves  or  others; 
and  so  it  would  be  for  every  other  unprincipled  and  reckless 
individual  who  bids  fair  to  be  a  pest  to  society.  But  if  it  is 
alleged,  that  the  latter  are  morally  free,  and,  therefore,  per- 
sonally free,  until  the  commission  of  some  overt  act,  it  may. 
be  replied,  that  the  former,  on  the  hypothesis  of  the  law, 
which  makes  moral  freedom  consist  in  the  power  of  distin- 
guishing right  from  wrong,  have  the  same  claim  to  immunity 
from  personal  restraint.  This  preposterous  distinction  be- 
tween civil  and  criminal  cases,  gives  rise  in  practice  to  one 
of  the  most  curious  and  startling  inconsistencies  that  human 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  29 

legislation  ever  presented.  While  the  mental  impairment  is 
yet  slight,  comparatively,  and  the  patient  is  quiet  and  peace- 
able, the  law  considers  him  incapable  of  managing  him- 
self or  his  worldly  affairs,  and  provides  him  with  a  guardian 
and  a  place  in  the  wards  of  a  hospital ;  but  when  the  dis- 
order has  proceeded  to  such  a  height  as  to  deprive  the  maniac 
of  all  moral  restraint,  and  precipitate  him  on  some  deed  of 
violence,  he  is  to  be  considered  as  most  capable  of  perceiv- 
ing moral  distinctions,  and,  consequently,  most  responsible 
for  his  actions  I 

§  20.  Of  late  years,  this  test  of  responsibility  has  been 
promulgated  with  some  important  qualifications.  A  disposi- 
tion to  disregard  the  old  landmarks  on  this  point  was  first 
clearly  manifested,  not  long  since,  by  Lord  Lyndhurst,  in 
the  case  of  Rex  v.  Offord.,  1831,  when  he  directed  the  jury 
to  acquit  the  prisoner,  if  satisfied,  "  that  he  did  not  know, 
when  he  committed  the  act,  what  the  effect  of  it,  if  fatal, 
would  be  with  reference  to  the  crime  of  murder ; "  ^  in  other 
words,  they  were  to  satisfy  themselves  before  acquitting  him, 
that  he  did  not  know  that  the  act  would  be  essentially  mur- 
der,—  that  crime  which  in  the  abstract  is  equally  abhorred 
by  the  sane  and  the  insane.  Still,  however,  this  is  not  suffi- 
cient, for  he  might,  like  Hadfield  and  many  others,  have 
recognized  the  wrong  and  illegality  of  the  act,  and  been  per- 
fectly conscious  of  its  consequences  to  himself,  while  he  felt 
impelled  to  its  execution  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  or  by  a 
strong  conviction  of  certain  great  ends  which  it  was  to  pro- 
mote, and  thus  have  acted  the  part,  if  the  expression  may  be 


^  5  Carrington  and  Payne,  168.  The  defendant,  in  this  case,  was  tried 
for  murder.  It  appeared  that  he  entertained  the  notion,  that  the  person 
■whom  he  shot  and  many  others  were  desirous  of  depriving  him  of  his  lib- 
erty, and  had  accordingly  conspired  together  to  accomplish  their  purpose, 
and,  under  the  influence  of  this  delusion,  he  would  abuse  people  whom  he 
met  in  the  streets,  though  wholly  unacquainted  with  them.  In  his  pocket 
was  found  a  paper  purporting  to  be  "  a  List  of  Hadleigh  Conspirators 
against  my  Life,"  in  which  he  had  enrolled  the  names  of  the  deceased  and 
his  family.  Several  medical  witnesses  who  heard  the  evidence,  deposed 
that  the  prisoner  was  affected  with  monomania. 

3* 


30  MEDICAL  JURISPRtJDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

allowed,  of  an  insane  Abraham  or  Brutus.     This  principle, 
therefore,  is  far  from  being  universally  applicable,  though  if 
it  had  been  admitted  in   the  case  of  Bellingham,  it  would 
have  produced  the  acquittal  of  that  unfortunate  man.     The 
criminal  act  which  he  committed  was  not  viewed  by  him  at 
all  as  one  of  murder,  any  more  than  the  killing  of  a  brute 
for  the  same  purpose,  but  merely  as  a  disagreeable  though 
justifiable  method  of  bringing  his  affairs  before  the  country, 
and  obtaining  redress  for  his  manifold  wrongs  and  sufferings. 
And  yet   Lord  Lyndhurst,  in  this  very  case,  expressed  his 
approbation  of  the  doctrines  laid  down  by  Lord  Chief  Justice 
Mansfield  on  the  trial  of  Bellingham,  —  doctrines  which  he 
had  found  it  necessary  here  to  modify,  in  order  that  they 
might  afford  to  an  innocent  man  the  protection  to  which  he 
was  entitled !     Mr.  Chitty  seems  inclined  to  proceed  a  step 
further  on  this  point.     "  The  substantial  question  presented 
to   the  jury,"    he   observes,   "is,  whether,  at   the   time   the 
alleged  criminal  act  was  committed,  the  prisoner  was  inca- 
pable of  judging  between  right  and  wrong,  and  did  not  then 
know  he  was  committing  an  offence  against  the  law  of  God 
and  of  nature."  1     By  some  late  Scotch  writers  on  criminal 
law,  this  test  of  responsibility  has  been  disapproved   of,  in 
still  more  explicit  terms.     Baron  Hume  disposes  of  it  in  the 
following  language :  "  Would  he  have  answered  on  the  ques- 
tion, that  it  is  wrong  to  kill  a  fellow-creature?  this  is  hardly 
to  be  considered  a  just  criterion  of  such  a  state  of  mind  as 
ought  to  make  him  answer  to  the  law  for  his  acts.     Because 
a  person  may  happen  to  answer  in  this  way,  who  is  yet  so 
absolutely  insane  as  to  have  lost  all  power  of  observation  of 
facts,  all  discernment  of  the  good  or  bad  intentions  of  those 
who  are  about  him,  or  even  the  knowledge  of  their  persons. 
Besides,  the  question  is  put  in  another  and  a  more  special 
sense,  as  relative  to  the  act  done  by  the  panel,  and  his  knowl- 
edge of  the  place  in  which  he  did  it.    Did  he  at  that  moment 
understand  the  evil  of  what  he  did  ?     "Was  he  impressed 


^  Medical  Jurisprudence,  354. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  31 

with  the  consciousness  of  guilt  and  fear  of  punishment?  — 
it  is  then  a  pertinent  and  a  material  question,  but  one  which 
cannot  be  rightly  answered,  without  "taking  into  considera- 
tion the  whole  circumstances  of  the  situation.  Every  judg- 
ment in  the  matter  of  right  and  wrong  supposes  a  case,  or 
state  of  facts  to  which  it  applies.  And  though  the  person 
may  have  that  vestige  of  reason  which  may  enable  him  to 
answer  in  the  general,  that  murder  is  a  crime,  yet  if  he  can- 
not distinguish  a  friend  from  an  enemy,  or  a  benefit  from  an 
injury,  but  conceives  every  thing  about  him  to  be  the  reverse 
of  what  it  really  is,  and  mistakes  the  ideas  of  his  fancy  in 
that  respect  for  realities,  those  remains  of  intellect  are  of  no 
sort  of  service  to  him  in  the  government  of  his  actions,  in 
enabling  him  to  form  a  judgment  as  to  what  is  right  or 
wrong  on  any  particular  occasion."  ^  From  all  this,  Hume 
draws  the  broad  conclusion,  that  the  judgment  of  right  and 
wrong  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  question  of  responsibility. 

§  21.  Mr.  Alison  lays  down  the  principle,  that  "  to  amount 
to  a  complete  bar  to  punishment,  the  insanity,  either  at  the 
time  of  committing  the  crime,  or  of  the  trial,  must  have  been 
of  such  a  kind  as  entirely  deprived  the  accused  of  the  use  of 
reason,  as  applied  to  the  act  in  question,  and  the  knowledge 
that  he  was  doing  wrong  in  committing  it."  ^  He  very  justly 
disapproves  of  the  law  as  laid  down  by  Chief  Justice  Mans- 
field, in  Bellingham's  case,  viz. ;  that  the  prisoner  was  ac- 
countable, because  he  could  distinguish  good  from  evil,  and 
knew  that  murder  was  a  crime ;  but  his  remark  respecting  it 
betrays  an  ignorance  of  insanity,  that  would  be  surprising, 
were  it  not  so  common  in  discussions  upon  this  subject. 
"  On  this  case,"  says  he,  "  it  may  be  observed,  that  unques- 
tionably the  mere  fancying  a  series  of  injuries  to  have  been 
received  will  not  serve  as  an  excuse  for  murder,  for  this  plain 
reason,  that,  supposing  it  true,  that  such  injuries  had  been 
received,  they  would  have  furnished  no  excuse  for  the  shed- 


^  Commentaries  on  tlie  Law  of  Scotland  respecting  Crimes,  i.  36. 
^  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Scotland,  etc.,  645. 


32  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ding  of  blood ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  such  an  illusion  as 
deprives  the  panel  of  the  sense  that  what  he  did  was  wrong, 
amounts  to  legal  insanity,  though  he  was  perfectly  aware 
that  murder  in  general  was  a  crime  ;  and,  therefore,  the  law 
appears  to  have  been  more  correctly  laid  down,  in  the  cases 
of  Hadfield  and  Bowler,  than  in  this  instance."  Whether 
the  insane  belief  have  reference  to  a  matter  of  fact,  or  to 
views  of  right  and  wrong,  it  ought  equally  to  be  regarded  as 
annulling  legal  responsibility.  If  a  single  step  in  the  reason- 
ing which  leads  to  the  commission  of  a  criminal  act  be  the 
offspring  of  insanity,  the  conclusion  must  necessarily  be 
vitiated  thereby.  If  this  be  the  law  by  which  maniacs  are 
to  be  tried,  few  will  escape  punishment  for  criminal  acts ; 
for,  in  by  far  the  greater  proportion,  such  acts  have  been  com- 
mitted in  consequence  of  a  fancying  of  injuries  received. 
One  man  kills  his  neighbor  whom  he  insanely  fancies  to 
have  joined  a  conspiracy  to  defraud  him  of  his  property  or 
his  liberty ;  or  for  having  insulted  and  exposed  him  to  scorn 
and  derision ;  or  for  standing  in  the  way  of  his  attaining  cer- 
tain honors  or  estates  ;  yet  the  insanity  is  not  to  excuse  him, 
unless  it  deprived  him  of  the  consciousness  that  he  was  doing 
a  wrong  act.  The  existence  of  the  delusion  is  obvious  and 
cannot  be  mistaken  ;  but  what  may  be  the  views  of  the 
maniac  respecting  the  moral  character  of  the  criminal  acts 
which  he  commits  under  its  influence,  can  never  be  exactly 
known ;  and,  therefore,  they  ought  not  to  be  made  the  crite- 
rion of  responsibility.  Even  if  the  party  himself  acknowl- 
edge that  he  knew  he  was  doing  wrong,  the  very  fact  of  his 
insanity  destroys  the  value  of  his  confession  which  is  no 
more  entitled  to  notice  than  his  most  incoherent  ravings. 
But  it  is  known,  that  one  of  the  most  striking  and  character- 
istic effects  of  insanity  on  the  mental  operations  is,  to  destroy 
the  relations  between  end  and  means,  —  between  the  object 
in  view  and  the  course  necessary  to  pursue  in  order  to  obtain 
it,  —  between,  as  in  the  cases  just  instanced,  the  fancied 
injury  and  the  measure  of  punishment  it  deserves.  It  was 
in  accordance  with  these  views,  that  Lord  Erskine  pro- 
nounced delusion  to  be  the   true   test  of  such  insanity  as 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  33 

exempts  from  punishment,  and  that  the  correctness  of  the 
principle  was  recognized  by  the  Court.  It  is  impossible, 
therefore,  to  divine  why  Mr.  Alison  should  say,  that  the  law 
was  more  correctly  laid  down  in  Hadfield's  case,  when  it  is  in 
direct  conflict  with  his  own  opinions.  Thus,  as  if  frightened 
by  their  own  temerity  in  overthrowing  one  ancient  landmark 
on  the  domain  of  error,  it  would  seem  as  if  these  writers 
were  anxious  to  compound  with  their  fears,  by  adhering  with 
unusual  pertinacity  to  all  the  rest.  The  radical  fault  of  this 
test  of  responsibility  lies  in  the  metaphysical  error  of  always 
looking  on  right  and  wrong  in  the  abstract,  —  as  things  hav- 
ing a  positive  and  independent  existence,  and  not  as  they 
practically  are,  mere  terms  expressing  the  relations  that  exist 
between  actions  and  certain  faculties  of  our  moral  nature. 
That  they  express  the  same  relations  in  nearly  all  men,  is 
because  nearly  all  men  possess  the  same  faculties  ;  but  when 
these  faculties  are  absent,  as  in  idiots,  or  when  their  action 
is  perverted  by  disease,  as  in  the  insane,  the  relations  of  right 
and  VvTong  arc  widely  different. 

§  22.  Another  trait,  which  has  been  greatly  relied  on  as 
a  criterion  in  doubtful  cases,  is  the  design  or  contrivance 
that  has  been  manifested  in  the  commission  of  the  criminal 
act.  That  it  should  ever  have  been  viev^'cd  in  this  light,  is 
an  additional  proof,  if  more  were  wanting,  of  the  deplorable 
ignorance  that  characterizes  the  jurisprudence  of  insanity  ; 
for  the  slightest  practical  acquaintance  with  the  disease 
would  have  prevented  this  pernicious  mistake.  The  source 
of  this  error  is  probably  to  be  found  in  the  fact,  "  that, 
among  the  vulgar,  some  are  for  reckoning  madmen,  those 
only  who  are  frantic  or  violent  to  some  degree;"^  the  vio- 
lence being  supposed  to  preclude  every  attempt  at  design, 
or  plan  of  operations.  In  the  trial  of  Bellingham,  the  attor- 
ney-general declared  that,  '•  if  even  insanity  in  all  his  other 
acts  had  been  manifest,  yet  the  systematic  correctness.,  with 
which  the  prisoner  contrived    the    murder,  showed   that  he 


^  Sir  John  Niclioll,  in  Dew  v.  Clarke  3  Addams,  441. 


34  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

possessed  a  mind,  at  the  time,  capable  of  distinguishing  right 
from  wrong."!  jj^  Arnold's  case  (§  10),  great  stress  was  laid 
on  the  circumstance  of  his  having  purchased  shot  of  a  much 
larger  size,  than  he  usually  did  when  he  went  out  to  shoot, 
with  the  design  then  formed  of  committing  the  murder  he 
afterwards  attempted.  Mr.  Russell  ^  recognizes  the  correct- 
ness of  the  principle,  and  lays  it  down  as  part  of  the  law  of 
the  land.  If,  however,  the  power  of  design  is  really  not  in- 
compatible with  the  existence  of  insanity,  this  pretended  test 
must  be  as  fallacious  as  that  already  adverted  to.  What 
must  be  thought  of  the  attainments  of  those  learned  authori- 
ties, in  the  study  of  madness,  who  see  in  the  power  of  sys- 
tematic design  a  disproof  of  the  existence  of  insanity  when, 
from  the  humblest  menial  in  the  service  of  a  lunatic  asylum, 
they  might  have  heard  of  the  ingenuity  of  contrivance  and 
adroitness  of  execution,  that  characterize  the  plans  of  the 
insane  ?  If  the  mind  continues  rational  on  some  subjects,  it 
is  no  more  than  what  might  be  expected,  that  this  rationality 
should  embrace  the  power  of  design,  since  a  person  could  not 
properly  be  called  rational  on  any  point,  in  regard  to  which 
he  had  lost  his  customary  ability  to  form  his  plans  and  de- 
signs for  the  future.  These  views  are  abundantly  confirmed 
by  every  day's  observation.  The  sentiment  of  cunning,  too, 
which  is  necessary  to  the  successful  execution  of  one's  pro- 
jects, holds  but  a  low  place  in  the  scale  of  the  mental  facul- 
ties—  being  a  merely  animal  instinct  —  and  is  oftentimes 
observed  to  be  rendered  more  active  by  insanity,  so  as  to 
require  the  utmost  vigilance  to  detect  and  defeat  its  wiles. 
One  who  is  not  practically  acquainted  with  the  habits  of  the 
insane,  can  scarcely  conceive  of  the  cunning  which  they  will 
practise,  when  bent  on  accomplishing  a  favorite  object. 
Those,  for  instance,  whose  madness  takes  a  suicidal  direc- 
tion, are  known  to  employ  wonderful  address  in  procuring 
and  concealing  the  means  of  self-destruction ;  pretending  to 


^  CoUinson  on  Lunacy,  657. 

"  Russell,  on  Crimes  and  Misdemeanors,  13. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  35 

have  seen  the  folly  of  then*  designs,  and  to  have  renounced 
them  entirely,  sending  away  their  attendants  after  thus  lulling 
them  into  security,  and,  when  least  expected,  renewing  their 
suicidal  attempts.  When  desirous  of  leaving  their  confine- 
ment, also,  the  consummate  tact  with  which  they  will  set 
suspicion  at  rest,  the  forecast  with  which  they  make  their 
preparations  for  escape,  and  the  sagacity  with  which  they 
choose  the  time  and  place  of  action,  would  do  infinite  credit 
to  the  conceptions  of  the  most  sound  and  intelligent  minds. 
Mr.  Haslam  has  related  a  case  so  strikingly  illustrative  of 
this  trait,  that  it  is  well  worth  extracting  in  this  connection. 
An  Essex  farmer,  after  having  so  well  counterfeited  recovery 
as  to  produce  his  liberation,  and  having  been  sent  back,  im- 
mediately became  tranquil,  and  remonstrated  on  the  injustice 
of  his  confinement.  "  Having  once  deceived  me,  he  wished 
much  that  my  opinion  should  be  taken  respecting  the  state 
of  his  intellect,  and  assured  his  friends  that  he  would  submit 
to  my  determination.  I  had  taken  care  to  be  well  prepared 
for  this  interview,  by  obtaining  an  accurate  account  of  the 
manner  in  which  he  bad  conducted  himself.  At  this  exami- 
nation, he  managed  himself  with  admirable  address.  He 
spoke  of  the  treatment  he  had  received  from  the  persons 
under  whose  care  he  was  then  placed,  as  most  kind  and 
fatherly  :  he  also  expressed  himself  as  particularly  fortunate 
in  being  under  my  care,  and  bestowed  many  handsome  com- 
pliments on  my  skill  in  treating  this  disorder,  and  expatiated 
on  my  sagacity  in  perceiving  the  slightest  tinges  of  insanity. 
When  I  wished  him  to  explain  certain  parts  of  his  conduct, 
and  particularly  some  extravagant  opinions,  respecting  cer- 
tain persons  and  circumstances,  he  disclaimed  all  knowledge 
of  such  circumstances,  and  felt  himself  hurt  that  my  mind 
should  have  been  poisoned  so  much  to  his  prejudice.  He 
displayed  equal  subtlety  on  three  other  occasions  when  I 
visited  him ;  although,  by  protracting  the  conversation,  he  let 
fall  sufficient  to  satisfy  my  mind  that  he  was  a  madman.  In 
a  short  time  he  was  removed  to  the  hospital,  where  he  ex- 
pressed great  satisfaction  in  beiijg  under  my  inspection. 
The  private  madhouse  which  he  had  formerly  so  much  com- 


36  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

mended,  now  became  the  subject  of  severe  animadversion  ; 
he  said  that  he  had  there  been  treated  with  extreme  cruelty, 
that  he  had  been  nearly  starved,  and  eaten  up  by  vermin  of 
various  descriptions.  On  inquiring  of  some  convalescent 
patients,  I  found  (as  I  had  suspected),  that  I  was  as  much 
the  subject  of  abuse  when  absent,  as  any  of  his  supposed  ene- 
mies, although  to  my  face  he  was  courteous  and  respectful. 
More  than  a  month  had  elapsed  since  his  admission  into  the 
hospital,  before  he  pressed  me  for  my  opinion  ;  probably  con- 
fiding in  his  address,  and  hoping  to  deceive  me.  At  length 
he  appealed  to  my  decision,  and  urged  the  correctness  of  his 
conduct  during  confinement  as  an  argument  for  his  liberation. 
But  when  I  informed  him  of  circumstances  he  supposed  me 
unacquainted  with,  and  assured  him  that  he  was  a  proper 
subject  for  the  asylum  which  he  then  inhabited,  he  suddenly 
poured  forth  a  torrent  of  abuse ;  talked  in  the  most  incoherent 
manner ;  insisted  on  the  truth  of  what  he  formerly  denied ; 
breathed  vengeance  against  his  family  and  friends ;  and  be- 
came so  outrageous  that  it  was  necessary  to  order  him  to  be 
strictly  confined.  He  continued  in  a  state  of  unceasing  fury 
for  more  than  fifteen  months."  ^  Even  the  purely  intellectual 
power  of  combining  a  series  of  acts  that  shall  accomplish  or 
eventuate  in  certain  results,  when  properly  carried  into  ex- 
ecution, seems  to  be  not  only  less  frequently  involved  in  the 
mental  derangement,  but  often  to  have  received  a  preternatu- 
ral degree  of  strength  and  activity.  Pinel  speaks  of  a  maniac 
who  endeavored  to  discover  the  perpetual  motion,  and,  in 
the  course  of  his  attempts,  constructed  some  very  curious 
machines.  Esquirol  has  given  the  case  of  a  mad  general, 
who,  though  laboring  under  great  mental  excitement  and 
disorder,  conceived  of  an  improvement  in  the  construction  of 
a  military  weapon,  and  made  a  drawing  of  the  same.  Hav- 
ing expressed  a  desire  to  have  a  model  of  it  cast,  and  given 
his  word  of  honor  that  he  would  go  only  to  the  founder's  and 
return  peaceably,  he  was  permitted  to  go.     He  went  on  foot 


Observations  on  Madness,  53. 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  37 

to  the  founder's,  gave  him  the  drawing,  requested  him  to  cast 
a  model  of  it,  and  passed  an  hour  in  the  shop,  without  the 
founder's  once  suspecting  that  he  was  dealing  with  a  maniac. 
On  leaving,  he  remarked  that  he  would  return  in  eight  days, 
as  he  did,  although  a  period  of  great  excitement  intervened 
during  that  time.  On  the  second  visit,  he  found  the  model 
executed,  and  gave  an  order  for  fifty  thousand  to  be  cast, 
which  was  the  only  circumstance  that  led  the  founder  to  sus- 
pect the  general's  disease.  It  is  observed  that  the  weapon 
thus  improved  was  subsequently  adopted  in  the  army.^  The 
plans  which  the  brain  of  a  maniac,  who  imagines  himself  a 
monarch,  is  perpetually  hatching  for  the  management  of  his 
kingdom,  will  bear  to  be  compared  with  the  political  schemes 
of  some  rulers  who  are  supposed  to  have  the  advantage  of 
sanity  on  their  side. 

§  23.  If,  then,  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  of  right 
and  wrong,  and  the  power  of  design,  are  to  be  considered  as 
fallacious  tests  of  responsibility,  notwithstanding  they  have 
proved  the  death  warrant  of  many  a  wretched  maniac,  let  us 
come  back  to  that  proposed  by  Erskine  —  delusion  —  and 
see  if  that  will  bear  a  more  rigid  scrutiny,  when  viewed  by  the 
light  of  modern  discovery .^  Now,  if  it  were  a  fact,  that  the 
reason,  or  to  speak  more  definitely,  the  intellectual  powers, 
are  exclusively  liable  to  derangement,  this  test  would  be  un- 
objectionable, and  would  furnish  an   easy  and  satisfactory 


^  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  190. 

^  The  use  of  this  test  of  irresponsible  insanity  has  been  sanctioned  by  the 
high  authority  of  Sir  John  NichoU,  in  the  case  of  Deio  v.  Clark,  3  Addams, 
79.  "  The  true  criterion,"  says  he,  "  the  true  test,  of  the  absence  or  pres- 
ence of  insanity,  I  take  to  be  the  absence  or  presence  of  what,  used  in  a 
certain  sense  of  it,  is  comprisable  in  a  single  term,  namely,  delusion."  "  In 
short,  I  look  upon  delusion  in  this  sense  of  it,  and  insanity  to  be,  almost,  if 
not  altogether,  convertible  terms."  "  On  the  contrary,  in  the  absence  of 
any  such  delusion,  with  whatever  extravagances  a  supposed  lunatic  may  be 
justly  chargeable,  and  how  like  soever  to  a  real  madman  he  may  either 
think  or  act  on  some  one,  or  on  all  subjects ;  still,  in  the  absence,  I  repeat, 
of  any  thing  in  the  nature  of  delusion,  so  understood  as  above,  the  supposed 
lunatic  is,  in  my  judgment,  not  properly,  or  essentially  insane." 

4 


38  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

clew  to  the  elucidation  of  doubtful  cases.^  But  it  must  not 
be  forgotten,  that  the  Author  of  our  being  has  also  endowed 
us  with  certain  moral  faculties,  comprising  the  various  senti- 
ments, propensities,  and  affections,  which,  like  the  intellect, 
being  connected  with  the  brain,  are  necessarily  affected  by 
pathological  actions  in  that  organism.  The  abnormal  condi- 
tion thus  produced  may  exert  an  astonishing  influence  on  the 
conduct,  changing  the  peaceable  and  retiring  individual  into 
a  demon  of  fury,  or,  at  the  least,  turning  him  from  the  calm 
and  quiet  of  his  lawful  and  innocent  occupations,  into  a 
career  of  shameless  dissipation  and  debauchery,  while  the 
intellectual  perceptions  seem  to  have  lost  none  of  their  ordi- 
nary soundness  and  vigor.  The  existence  of  this  form  of 
insanity  is  now  too  well  established,  to  be  questioned  by 
those  who  have  any  scientific  reputation  to  lose.  In  this 
the  most  deplorable  condition  to  which  a  human  being  can 
be  reduced,  where  the  wretched  patient  finds  himself  urged, 
perhaps,  to  the  commission  of  every  outrage,  and,  though  per- 
fectly conscious  of  what  he  is  doing,  unable  to  offer  the 
slightest  resistance  to  the  overwhelming  power  that  impels 
him,  the  responsibility  is  to  be  considered  as  not  affected. 


*  Even  Mr.  Erskine  himself  lias  furnished  an  exception  to  his  own  iiule,  in 
a  case  he  has  related  of  a  young  woman  indicted  for  murder,  who  was  acquit- 
ted on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though  it  was  not  pretended  that  she  labored 
under  any  delusion  whatever.  "  It  must  be  a  consolation,"  he  says,  "  to  those 
who  prosecuted  her,  that  she  was  acquitted,  as  she  is  at  this  time  in  a  most 
undoubted  and  deplorable  state  of  insanity  ;  but  I  confess,  if  I  had  been  upon 
the  jury  who  tried  her,  I  should  have  entertained  great  doubts  and  difficul- 
ties ;  for,  although  this  unhappy  woman  had  before  exhibited  strong  marks 
of  insanity  arising  from  grief  and  disappointment ;  yet  she  acted  upon  facts 
and  circumstances  which  had  an  existence,  and  which  were  calculated,  upon 
the  ordinary  principles  of  human  action,  to  produce  the  most  violent  resent- 
ment. Mr.  Errington  having  just  cast  her  off,  and  married  another  woman, 
or  taken  her  under  his  protection,  her  jealousy  was  excited  to  such  a  pitch, 
as  occasionally  to  overpower  her  understanding ;  but  when  she  went  to  Mr. 
Errinf^ton's  house  where  she  shot  him,  she  went  with  the  express  and  delib- 
erate purpose  of  shooting  him."  "  She  did  not  act  under  a  delusion,  that  he 
had  deserted  her  when  he  had  not,  but  took  revenge  upon  him  for  an  actual 
desertion."    Erskine's  Speeches. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  39 

because  no  delusion  is  present  to  disturb  and  distort  the  men- 
tal vision  !  In  short,  the  very  character  that  renders  this 
mental  disorder  more  terrible  than  all  others,  is  also  that 
which  is  made  to  steel  the  heart  against  the  claims  of  human- 
ity in  behalf  of  its  miserable  victim. 

§  24.  It  appears,  then,  that  as  a  test  of  responsibility,  delu- 
sion is  no  better  than  those  before  mentioned.  The  truth  is, 
there  is  no  single  character  which  is  not  equally  liable  to 
objection.  Jurists  who  have  been  so  anxious  to  obtain  some 
definition  of  insanity,  which  shall  furnish  a  rule  for  the 
determination  of  responsibility,  should  understand,  that  such 
a  wish  is  chimerical  from  the  very  nature  of  things.  Insan- 
ity is  a  disease,  and,  as  is  the  case  with  all  other  diseases,  the 
fact  of  its  existence  is  never  established  by  a  single  diagnos- 
tic symptom,  but  by  the  whole  body  of  symptoms,  no  par- 
ticular one  of  which  is  present  in  every  case.  To  distinguish 
the  manifestations  of  health  from  those  of  disease,  requires 
the  exercise  of  special  learning  and  judgment ;  and,  if  no  one 
doubts  this  proposition,  when  stated  in  reference  to  the  bow- 
els, the  lungs,  the  heart,  the  liver,  the  kidneys,  etc.,  what  suffi- 
cient or  even  plausible  reason  is  there,  why  it  should  be 
doubted  when  predicated  of  the  brain  ?  The  functions  of 
those  organs  proceed  with  the  regularity  and  sameness  of 
clock-work,  compared  wdth  the  ever-varying  and  unequal 
phenomena  of  this ;  and  yet  there  are  persons  who  assume  a 
magisterial  tone  in  writing  or  talking  of  the  latter,  who  would 
defer  to  a  tyro's  judgment,  in  whatever  concerns  the  others. 
If,  when  anxious  to  know  all  we  can,  respecting  a  disease  of 
the  lungs  or  stomach,  we  repair  to  those  who  have  a  high 
and  well-founded  reputation,  in  the  pathology  of  these  parts, 
why  adopt  the  converse  of  this  rule  in  regard  to  diseases  of 
the  brain  ?  No  reasonable  person  would  desire  to  set  up 
an  insuperable  barrier  between  the  domain  of  professional 
knowledge  and  that  of  common  sense  and  common  informa- 
tion ;  but  it  is  not  too  much  to  insist,  that  facts  established 
by  men  of  undoubted  competence  and  good  faith,  should  be 
rejected  for  better  reasons  than  the  charge  of  "groundless 
theory." 


40  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  25.  In  the  passage  taken  from  Lord  Hale  (§  8),  it  will 
be  observed,  that  he  considers  all  crime  to  be  the  offspring  of 
partial  insanity,  and  the  inference  he  meant  should  be  drawn 
from  it  is,  that  partial  insanity  furnishes  no  excuse  for  crime. 
It  is  a  curious  fact,  that  many  benevolent  people,  in  their 
desire  to  palliate  the  sins  of  criminals,  have  inculcated  the 
same  principle,  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  from  it  a  very 
different  inference.  Says  the  former:  crime  must  be  pun- 
ished ;  but  all  crime  proceeds  from  madness,  therefore  mad- 
ness furnishes  no  exemption  from  punishment.  Say  the  lat- 
ter: madmen  are  not  responsible  for  their  criminal  acts;  but 
madness  is  the  source  of  all  crime,  therefore  madmen  and 
criminals  are  equally  irresponsible  and  exempt  from  punish- 
ment. Which  of  these  two  precious  specimens  of  human 
subtlety  can  claim  the  triumph  of  absurdity,  it  would  not  be 
easy  to  determine.  Crime  is  not  necessarily  the  result  of 
madness,  not  even  when  perpetrated  under  the  excitement  of 
fierce  and  violent  passions ;  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  it 
is  never  so,  but  is  always  actuated  by  motives ;  insufficient 
it  may  be,  but  still  rational  motives,  having  reference  to 
definite  and  real  objects.  The  misfortune  which  the  crimi- 
nal is  going  to  avert,  the  interest  which  he  is  going  to  sub- 
serve, the  revenge  he  is  about  to  gratify,  the  insult  or  injury 
he  is  about  to  repay,  are  real  injuries  and  insults  and  inter- 
ests, however  much  they  may  be  exaggerated,  or  however 
disproportionately  small  they  iiiay  be  to  the  crime  they  pro- 
voke ;  and,  the  ends  to  be  obtained  by  the  criminal  act,  are 
real  and  have  an  appreciable  value.  In  the  most  violent 
transports  of  passion,  he  never  wholly  loses  his  knowledge  of 
the  true  relations  of  things.  The  person  whom  he  considers 
his  enemy,  or  the  author  of  the  insult,  is  really  such,  or  at 
least,  he  has  some  ground  for  believing  him  such;  and  with 
the  absence  of  the  object  of  his  passion,  disappears  the  inten- 
tion to  offend.  Violent  passions  may  weaken  the  judgment, 
and  diminish  its  power  of  control,  but  they  do  not  vitiate  the 
perceptions,  nor  deprive  the  mind  of  its  powers  of  compari- 
son. All  this  is  very  different  in  mental  derangement.  The 
causes  which  urge  the  insane  to  deeds  of  violence  are  gen- 


PRELBIINARY   VIEWS.  41 

erally  illusory  —  the  hallucinations  of  a  diseased  brain  —  or 
they  may  act  from  no  motive  at  all,  solely  in  obedience  to  a 
blind  impulse,  with  no  end  to  obtain,  nor  wish  to  gratify. 
Madness,  too,  is  more  or  less  independent  of  the  exciting 
causes  that  have  given  rise  to  it,  and  exists  long  after  those 
causes  have  been  removed,  and  after  the  paramount  wish  or 
object  has  been  obtained.  In  short,  madness  is  the  result  of 
a  certain  pathological  condition  of  the  brain,  while  the 
criminal  effects  of  violent  passions  merely  indicate  unusual 
strength  of  those  passions,  or  a  deficient  education  of  those 
higher  faculties  that  furnish  the  necessary  restraint  upon 
their  power.  It  is  admitted,  that  strong  passions  do  deprive 
the  individual  of  the  power  of  calmly  deliberating,  and  per- 
ceiving the  terrible  consequences  of  his  fury ;  and  legislators 
have  wisely  distinguished  homicide  committed  under  their 
influence,  from  deliberate,  premeditated  homicide,  by  visiting 
it  with  a  minor  degree  of  punishment.  In  drunkenness  the 
same  effect  is  sometimes  produced  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
amount  to  temporary  insanity ;  but  neither  does  this  any 
more  than  strong  passions  exempt  from  all  punishment ;  for 
the  plain  reason,  that,  in  both  cases,  the  impairment  of  moral 
liberty  is  the  voluntary  act  of  the  individual  himself,  and 
must  be  imputed  to  him  as  a  fault.  If  the  remarks  on  this 
point  may  seem  to  be  unnecessarily  prolix,  it  can  only  be  ob- 
served, by  way  of  excuse,  that  where  opinions  are  handed 
down,  as  they  are  in  law,  from  one  generation  to  another, 
they  attain  much  the  same  kind  of  value  that  is  possessed  by 
established  facts  in  natural  science,  and  exert  an  influence 
that  demands  for  them  a  degree  of  consideration  which  their 
intrinsic  merits  do  not  deserve. 

§  26.  Enough  has  been  said,  it  is  believed,  to  convince 
every  unprejudiced  reader  that,  in  Great  Britain,  the  law  of 
insanity,  especially  that  relative  to  criminal  cases,  is  still 
loose,  vacillating,  and  greatly  behind  the  present  state  of  our 
knowledge  of  that  disease.  If  we  carefully  examine  the  cases 
tried  within  the  last  hundred  years,  as  they  are  brought  to- 
gether in  the  various  treatises  on  lunacy  and  on  criminal  law, 
the  utmost  respect   for   authority  will  not  prevent  us  from 

4* 


42  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   0¥  INSANITY. 

observing  the  want  of  any  definite  principle  as  the  ground  of 
the  difference  of  their  results.  Amid  the  mass  of  theoretical 
and  discordant  speculations  on  the  psychological  effects  of 
insanity,  and  of  crude  and  fanciful  tests  for  detecting  its 
presence,  which  these  trials  have  elicited,  the  student  who 
turns  to  them  for  the  purpose  of  informing  his  mind  on  this 
branch  of  his  profession,  finds  himself  completely  disheart- 
ened and  bewildered.  Instead  of  inquiring  into  the  effect 
produced  by  the  peculiar  delusions  of  the  accused  on  his 
ordinary  conduct  and  conversation,  and  especially  of  their 
connection  with  the  criminal  act  in  question,  the  courts,  in 
these  cases,  have  been  contented  with  laying  down  meta- 
physical dogmas  on  the  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong,  of 
good  and  evil,  and  the  measure  of  understanding  still  pos- 
sessed by  the  accused.  One  principle  after  another  has  been 
successively  abandoned  and  resumed,  either  with  the  strangest 
disregard  of  consistency,  or  the  most  extraordinary  ignorance 
of  previous  decisions.  Thus,  the  old  maxim  that  insanity 
does  not  annul  criminal  responsibility  in  one  who  retains  the 
power  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  was  abandoned  in 
the  case  of  Hadfield,  reaffirmed  in  that  of  Bellingham  (1812), 
again  abandoned  in  the  trial  of  Martin  (1831),^  modified 
though  approved  of  in  the  same  year  by  Lord  Lyndhurst 
(1828),^  and  again,  in  the  year  (1837),  a  jury,  holding  in  their 
hands  the  life  of  a  fellow  man,  are  told  by  Mr.  Justice  Park, 
that,  as  regards  the  effect  of  insanity  on  responsibility  for 
crime,  "  it  is  merely  necessary  that  the  party  should  have  suffi- 
cient knowledge  and  reason  to  discriminate  between  rig-ht  and 
wrong-.^'  ^  Three  years  afterwards,  on  the  trial  of  Oxford  for 
shooting  at  the  Queen,  Lord  Chief  Justice  Denman  told  the 
jury,  "  that  the  question  for  them  to  decide  was,  whether  the 
prisoner  was  laboring  under  that  species  of  insanity  which 


^  Report  of  the  trial  of  Jonathan  Martin  for  setting  fire  to  the  York 
Minster. 

«  Rex  V.  Offord,  5  Car.  &  Tayne,  168. 

^  Trial  of  Greensmith,  noticed  in  Medico-Chirurg.  Review,  vol.  xxviii. 

86,  N.  s. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  43 

satisfied  them  that  he  was  quite  unaware  of  the  nature,  char- 
acter, and  consequences  of  the  act  he  was  committing,  or,  in 
other  words,  whether  he  was  under  the  influence  of  a  dis- 
eased mjndj  and  was  really  unconscious  at  the  time  he  was 
committing  the  act,  that  it  was  a  crime."  ^  Three  years  later, 
in  Reg-ina  v.  Higginson  (1843),  Mr.  Justice  Maule  said  to  the 
jury,  "  If  you  are  satisfied  that  the  prisoner,  at  the  time  of 
committing  the  offence,  was  so  insane  that  he  did  not  know 
right  from  wrong,  he  should  be  acquitted  on  that  ground. 
But  if  you  think  he  did  know  right  from  wrong,  he  is  re- 
sponsible for  his  acts,  although  of  weak  intellect."  ^  The  test 
was  again  held  up,  in  its  original  nakedness,  in  Reg-ina  v. 
Stokes  (1848),  where  the  court.  Baron  Rolfe,  said  that  "every 
man  is  held  responsible  for  his  acts  by  the  laws  of  his  coun- 
try, if  he  can  discern  right  from  wrong."  ^ 

§  27.  In  the  spring  of  1843,  a  Scotchman  named  Mc- 
Naughton,  met  in  one  of  the  streets  of  London,  Mr.  Drum- 
mond,  the  private  secretary  of  Sir  Robert  Peel,  and  shot  him 
dead  with  a  pistol.  For  some  time  previous,  he  had  enter- 
tained the  delusion  that  he  was  pursued  by  enemies  who 
followed  him  everywhere,  blasting  his  fame,  disturbing  his 
peace,  and  filling  him  with  intolerable  inquietude  ;  and  fan- 
cying his  victim  to  be  one  of  the  crew,  he  determined  to 
sacrifice  him.  His  insanity  was  not  obvious  at  sight,  he  had 
recently  transacted  business,  he  viewed  some  of  his  relations 
in  their  true  light,  and  behaved  with  much  propriety  in  the 
ordinary  intercourse  with  men.  He  was  defended  by  able 
and  zealous  counsel  who  brought  before  the  jury  the  more 
sound  and  humane  views  of  insanity  which  have  resulted 
from  modern  inquiry,  and  the  court  readily  favored  his 
acquittal.  The  community,  however,  were  far  from  being 
satisfied  with  this  result,  for  it  beheld  only  two  facts  in  the 
case,  —  a  worthy  man  had  been  shot  down  in  broad  day, 
and  without  provocation,  by  one  who  could  transact  business, 
discourse  correctly,  and  who  showed  no  very  obvious  symp- 


>  9  Carrington  &  Payne,  525.  ^  1  Car.  &  Kir.  129. 

3  3  Car.  &  Kir.  185. 


44  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

toms  of  insanity.  Participating  in  the  popular  feeling,  the 
house  of  lords  propounded  to  the  law-judges  certain  queries 
relative  to  the  law  of  England  on  the  subject  of  insanity  as 
a  defence  in  criminal  actions.  The  queries  implied  a  doubt 
of  the  correctness  of  the  doctrine,  that  delusion,  in  and  of 
itself  alone,  is  necessarily  an  exculpatory  plea,  and  seemed 
to  suggest  the  idea  that,  to  have  this  effect,  it  must  be 
accompanied  by  some  other  mental  disability.  They  were 
intended,  no  doubt,  to  obtain  an  authoritative  exposition  of 
the  law  that  should  settle  its  principles  and  regulate  the 
future  practice  of  courts.  They  wished,  indeed,  to  obtain 
from  the  judges  collectively  what  had  eluded  their  grasp 
individually,  —  a  general  expression  of  the  law  capable  of 
embracing  every  possible  case,  and  working  injustice  to  none. 
We  shall  see  whether  the  attempt  of  the  judges  fulfils  this 
high  object. 

§  28.  The  first  query  is,  "  What  is  the  law  respecting 
alleged  crimes  committed  by  persons  afflicted  with  insane 
delusions  in  respect  of  one  or  more  particular  subjects  or  per- 
sons ;  as,  for  instance,  where,  at  the  time  of  the  commission 
of  the  alleged  crime,  the  accused  knew  he  was  acting  con- 
trary to  law,  but  did  the  act  complained  of  with  a  view,  under 
the  influence  of  insane  delusion,  of  redressing  or  avenging 
some  supposed  grievance  or  injury,  or  of  producing  some 
supposed  public  benefit  ?  "  To  this  the  judges  reply  that, 
assuming  the  inquiry  "  to  be  confined  to  those  persons  who 
labor  under  such  partial  delusions  only,  and  are  not  in  other 
respects  insane,  they  are  of  the  opinion,  that  notwithstanding 
the  party  accused  did  the  act  complained  of,  with  a  view, 
under  the  influence  of  insane  delusion,  of  redressing  or  aveng- 
ing some  supposed  grievance  or  injury,  or  of  producing  some 
public  benefit,  he  is  nevertheless  punishable,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  crime  committed,  if  he  knew,  at  the  time  of 
committing  such  crime,  that  he  was  acting  contrary  to  law, 
by  which  expression  they  understand  their  Lordships  to 
mean,  the  law  of  the  land." 

§  29.    Had    the   principle    here   laid   down,   been    always 
strictly  followed,  it  is  very  certain  that  many  a  one  who  has 


PKELIMINARY   VIEWS.  45 

been  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  would  have  met 
the  fate  of  ordinary  criminals.  Hadfield  knew  —  so  far  as  a 
man  in  his  condition  may  be  said  to  know  any  thing  —  that 
in  shooting  at  the  king,  he  was  doing  an  illegal  act,  because, 
when  apprehended,  he  declared  that  his  life  was  forfeited, 
and  that  he  did  the  deed  for  this  very  purpose,  in  order  that 
by  his  own  death,  he  might  fulfil  some  great  end  to  which  he 
fancied  himself  to  have  been  called.  Martin,  who  burnt  the 
York  minster,  in  obedience  to  a  command  of  God,  ex- 
pected to  be  punished.  The  mental  disability  of  the  insane 
may  be  evinced,  not  in  failing  to  recognize  the  illegality  of 
their  acts,  but  in  considering  themselves  as  absolved  from  the 
obligations  of  the  law.  An  act  which  they  know  to  be  for- 
bidden, they  may  feel  constrained  to  commit  by  reasons  that 
transcend  all  law.  They  move  in  a  sphere  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  ordinary  motives  of  human  conduct,  and  are  a  law 
unto  themselves.  It  is  certainly  very  unreasonable  for  any 
one  to  believe,  that,  to  revenge  a  private  grievance,  or  secure 
a  public  benefit,  he  may  set  aside  all  law  and  take  any  and 
every  extreme  measure  that  may  seem  to  him  necessary  for 
the  purpose.  But  shall  we  be  guilty  of  the  absurdity  of 
expecting  an  insane  person  to  act  reasonably  in  reference  to 
his  delusions  ? 

§  30.  The  second  and  third  queries  are,  "  What  are  the 
proper  questions  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury,  when  a  person, 
alleged  to  be  afflicted  with  insane  delusion  respecting  one  or 
more  particular  subjects  or  persons,  is  charged  with  the  com- 
mission of  a  crime  (murder,  for  example),  and  insanity  is  set 
up  as  a  defence  ?  In  what  terms  ought  the  question  to  be 
left  to  the  jury,  as  to  the  prisoner's  state  of  mind  at  the  time 
when  the  act  was  committed  ?  " 

§  31.  The  judges  state  that  these  two  questions  can  be 
more  conveniently  answered  together,  and  their  reply  is,  that, 
"  to  establish  a  defence  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  it  must  be 
clearly  proved,  that  at  the  time  of  committing  the  act,  the 
party  accused  was  laboring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason 
from  disease  of  the  mind,  as  not  to  know  the  nature  and 
quality  of  the  act  he  was  doing,  or,  if  he  did  know  it,  that  he 


46  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

did  not  know  he  was  doing  what  was  wrong."  They  add, 
that  the  question  of  right  and  wrong  should  be  put  in  refer- 
ence to  the  particular  act  with  which  he  is  charged. 

§  32.  The  principle  of  responsibility  here  laid  down,  man- 
ifestly conflicts  with  that  promulgated  in  the  answer  to  the 
first  query.  An  insane  person  may  do  an  act  he  knows  to 
be  contrary  to  law,  because  he  thinks  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances of  the  case  render  it  right  for"  him  to  disregard  the 
law.  We  have  just  seen  that  Hadfield  admitted  that  he  had 
violated  the  law,  but  believed  he  was  right  in  so  doing,  .for 
the  sake  of  the  end  which  it  would  enable  him  to  accomplish. 
Tried  by  the  former  test,  he  would  have  been  convicted, 
while  by  the  latter  he  would  have  been  acquitted.  Without 
mentioning  ail  the  objections  to  which  this  test  of  responsi- 
.bility  is  liable,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  it  furnishes  no  protec- 
tion to  that  large  class  of  the  insane  who  entertain  no  specific 
delusion,  but  act  from  momentary  irresistible  impulses,  or 
diseased  moral  perceptions. 

§  33.  The  fourth  query  is,  "  If  a  person,  under  an  insane 
delusion  as  to  existing  facts,  commits  an  offence  in  conse- 
quence thereof,  is  he  thereby  excused  ?  "  To  this  the  judges 
reply,  that,  on  the  assumption  "  that  he  labors  under  partial 
delusion  only,  and  is  not  in  other  respects  insane,  he  must  be 
considered  in  the  same  situation  as  to  responsibility,  as  if  the 
facts,  with  respect  to  which  the  delusion  exists,  were  real. 
For  example,  if  under  the  influence  of  delusion,  he  supposes 
another  man  to  be  in  the  act  of  attempting  to  tal^  away  his 
life,  and  he  kills  that  man,  as  he  supposes,  in  self-defence,  he 
would  be  exempt  from  punishment.  If  his  delusion  was,  that 
the  deceased  had  inflicted  a  serious  injury  to  his  character 
and  fortune,  and  he  killed  him  in  revenge  for  such  supposed 
injury,  he  would  be  liable  to  punishment." 

^  34.  Such  a  remarkable  doctrine  as  this  can  have  sprung 
from  only  the  most  deplorable  ignorance  of  the  mental  opera- 
tions of  the  insane.  If  the  insane  person  really  believe  that 
his  neighbor  is  engaged  in  a  conspiracy  to  take  his  life,  he 
may  anticipate  the  blow  by  killing  him ;  but  if  he  merely 
believes  that  the  said  neighbor  has  inflicted  a  serious  injury 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  47 

on  his  character  or  fortune,'the  law  will  not  hold  him  guilt- 
less if  he  hurt  a  hair  of  his  head  I  This  is  certainly  very- 
plain,  and  it  must  be  the  fault  of  the  lunatic,  if  he  do  not 
understand  it.  It  is  very  reasonable,  too,  if  insane  men  would 
but  listen  to  reason.  This  doctrine  of  the  English  judges 
seems  to  be  essentially  that  of  Hoffbauer,  who  says  that  the 
acts  of  the  accused  should  be  judged,  precisely  as  if  he  were 
really  in  the  circumstances  he  imagined.  That  is,  if  he  fan- 
cies there  is  a  design  to  take  his  life,  he  may  take  life ;  if  he 
fancies  that  he  is  only  insulted  or  railed  at,  he  may  insult  or 
rail  in  turn  ;  if  he  fancies  his  neighbor  is  defrauding  him,  he 
may  say  hard  things  about  him  (taking  care  to  utter  no 
matter  libellous),  or  bring  against  him  a  suit  at  law.  This  is 
virtually  saying  to  a  man,  "  You  are  allowed  to  be  insane ; 
the  disease  is  a  visitation  of  Providence,  and  you  cannot  help 
it;  but  have  a  care  how  you  manifest  your  insanity;  there 
must  be  method  in  your  madness.  Having  once  adopted 
your  delusion,  all  the  subsequent  steps  connected  with  it, 
must  be  conformed  to  the  strictest  requirements  of  reason 
and  propriety.  If  you  are  caught  tripping  in  your  logic;  if  in 
the  disturbance  of  your  moral  and  intellectual  perceptions 
you  take  a  step  for  which  a  sane  man  would  be  punished, 
insanity  will  be  no  bar  to  your  punishment.  In  short,  hav- 
ing become  fairly  enveloped  in  the  clouds  of  mental  dis- 
order, the  law  expects  you  will  move  as  discreetly  and  cir- 
cumspectly as  if  the  undimmed  light  of  reason  were  shining 
upon  your  path." 

§  35.  The  principle  in  question  is  not  supported  by  our 
knowledge  of  the  psychological  effects  of  insanity,  and  can- 
not be  followed  out  without  working  great  injustice.  Mc- 
Naughton  did  not  suppose  that  Mr.  Drummond  or  any  one 
else  was  seeking  his  life,  but  that  his  fancied  enemies  fol- 
lowed him  about,  traducing  his  imputation  and  disturbing  his 
peace.  There  was  no  proof  that  he  apprehended  any  deadly 
injury,  and  yet  he  was  acquitted  with  the  approbation  of  the 
judge,  by  ivhom  this  principle  was  not  once  mentioned,  —  the 
very  Chief  Justice  Tindall  who  read  the  answers  of  the 
judges  to  the  Lords,  and  probably  had  the  principal  share  in 


48  .     MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

framing  them.  Oxford,  too,  who  shot  at  the  queen,  did  not 
imagine  that  he  had  sustained  any  personal  wrong  from  her 
or  any  one  else,  but  that  killing  the  queen  was  necessary  in 
order  to  accomplish  some  great  public  benefit.  Yet  he  was 
acquitted  with  the  approbation  of  the  court.  Lord  Denman, 
who  said  nothing  of  this  principle  in  his  charge  to  the  jury, 
though  he  joined  in  the  reply  to  the  queries  of  the  Lords. 

§  36.  It  is  beyond  our  power  to  conceive  how  this  prin- 
ciple can  be  reconciled  with  that  conveyed  in  reply  to  the 
second  and  third  queries.  Most  if  not  all  those  lunatics  who, 
like  McNaughton,  take  life  in  order  to  revenge  some  suppos- 
ed injury  to  their  character  or  fortune,  have  a  strong  belief 
that  they  are  doing  right.  Nothing  is  more  common  than 
for  the  insane  to  be  guilty  of  the  utmost  violence  towards 
persons  from  whom  they  fancy  they  have  received  only  some 
trivial  offence,  while  their  views  of  law  and  right  on  this 
point,  are  so  confused  and  perverted,  that  they  might  as  well, 
for  any  good  influence  they  exert,  be  obliterated  altogether. 
And  it  is  because  their  mental  perceptions  are  so  dull  and 
distorted,  that  they  do  not  proportion  their  measures  of  retal- 
iation by  the  same  rules  that  govern  sane  men.  But  now, 
it  seems,  the  state  of  the  person's  mind,  the  extent  of  the  mor- 
bid influence  of  the  disease  over  his  perceptions  of  truth  and 
right,  and  propriety,  and  the  degree  to  which  it  has  consigned 
him  to  the  dominion  of  delusion  and  passion,  are  no  longer 
to  be  considered  in  settling  the  extent  of  his  legal  responsi- 
bility, —  we  are  to  look  only  to  his  acts,  and  these  are  to  be 
judged  of  as  if  committed  by  perfectly  sane  men. 

§  37.  In  the  debate  which  sprung  up  in  the  house  of 
Lords,^  on  the  occasion  of  McNaughton's  trial,  the  distin- 
guished law-Lords  Lyndhurst,  Brougham,  Cottenham,  and 
Campbell,  expressed  their  views  on  the  general  question, 
furnishing  a  signal  illustrati(»n  of  the  inconsistency  and  con- 
tradiction which  we  have  charged  upon  the  opinions  of 
courts.     Lyndhurst,  in  referring  to  the  Hadfield  case,  quotes 


*  Hansard,  Ivii.  714. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS.  49 

the  following,  as  the  exposition  of  the  law  made  by  Erskine 
and  adopted  by  the  court.  "  When  a  nrian  is  laboring  under 
a  delusion,  if  you  are  satisfied  that  a  delusion  existed  at  the 
time  of  the  committal  of  the  offence  —  that  the  act  was  done 
under  its  influence  —  then  he  cannot  be  considered  as  guilty 
of  any  crime."  Subsequently,  he  restates  the  principle  in 
the  following  words  of  his  own  :  "  If  the  man  who  committed 
a  crime  was  insane  at  the  time  he  committed  it,  that  is  to 
say,  was  laboring  under  such  disease  of  the  mind  as  not  to 
know  whether  he  were  doing  right  or  wrong,  in  that  case,  he 
was  not  a  subject  for  a  criminal  trial."  The  fact  is,  that 
Erskine  neither  adopted  nor  approved  the  criterion  furnished 
by  knowing  right  from  wrong.  It  is  not  once  mentioned  in 
the  whole  course  of  his  speech  on  that  occasion,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  it  was  his  design  to  establish  a  very 
different  criterion,  or  test,  —  a  point  of  which  the  speaker 
seems  to  have  had  not  the  slightest  conception.  Lord 
Brougham  said,  "  he  could  conceive  the  case  of  a  human  be- 
ing, of  a  weakly  constituted  mind,  who  might,  by  long  brood- 
ing over  real  or  fancied  wrongs,  work  up  so  perverted  a  feeling 
of  hatred  against  an  individual,  that  danger  might  occur.  He 
might  not  be  deluded  as  to  the  actual  existence  of  injuries  he 
had  received,  but  he  might  grievously  and  grossly  exaggerate 
them,  and  they  might  so  operate  on  a  weakly  framed  mind 
and  intellect  as  to  produce  crime.  He  could  conceive  that 
the  Maker  of  that  man,  in  his  infinite  mercy,  having  regard 
to  the  object  of  his  creation,  might  deem  him  not  an  object 
for  punishment.  But  that  man  was  accountable  to  human 
tribunals  in  a  totally  different  sense.  Man  punished  crime 
for  the  purpose  of  practically  deterring  others  from  offending 
by  committing  a  repetition  of  the  like  act.  It  was  in  that 
sense  only  that  he  had  any  thing  to  do  with  the  doctrine 
of  accountable  and  not  accountable.  He  could  conceive  a 
person  whona  Deity  might  not  deem  accountable,  but  who 
might  be  perfectly  accountable  to  human  laws."  He  thought 
that  the  later  tests  of  responsibility,  such  as  knowing  good 
from  evil,  or  what  was  proper  or  wicked,  were  not  preferable 
to  the  old  one,  of  knowing  right  from  wrong;  and  yet  he 

5 


50  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

immediately  remarks,  that  sane  people  differ  in  their  views  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  though  he  knew  what  the  learned 
judges  meant  by  right  and  wrong,  he  was  not  sure  that  the 
public  at  large  did,  especially  juries.  He  blamed  the  court 
for  refusing  to  postpone  Bellingham's  trial,  in  order  that  his 
friends  might  procure  evidence  respecting  his  mental  con- 
dition. He  says,  "  affidavits  had  been  made  of  the  prisoner's 
family  having  been  tainted  with  insanity.  Affidavits  had 
been  produced  from  those  who  had  known  him  from  infancy 
of  his  having  been  insane.  Affidavits  were  offered,  showing 
a  prima  facie  case  of  mental  alienation."  But  he  adds  with 
wonderful  coolness,  "  no  man  doubted  that  the  result  of  the 
trial  would  have  been  precisely  the  same,  had  the  evidence 
been  adduced."  His  Lordship  cautions  courts  against  urging 
the  conviction  of  persons  who  entertain  delusions,  and  yet 
he  approves  of  the  conviction  of  Bellingham,  of  whose  de- 
lusions he  furnishes  additional  evidence  not  before  published. 
He  says,  on  the  authority  of  Mr.  Stephens  and  Mr.  Wilber- 
force  who  saw  him  after  the  trial,  that  "  Bellingham  had  no 
conception  that  he  had  done  any  thing  wrong ;  he  lamented 
the  death  of  Mr.  Percival ;  spoke  of  him  with  the  greatest 
respect,  and  even  esteem  for  his  character ;  said  that  no  man 
could  more  lament  that  such  a  thing  should  have  befallen 
that  gentleman,  than  he  did ;  that  nothing  could  be  more 
hard,  both  to  his  family  and  the  public  and  society  at  large  ; 
and  that  it  was  greatly  to  be  lamented.  '  Then,'  he  was 
asked,  '  why  did  you  do  the  deed  ?  '  '  Oh,  do  it,'  he  answered, 
'  that  was  perfectly  inevitable ;  there  was  no  wrong  at  all  in 
doing  it ;  he  could  not  help  thai' "  Lords  Lyndhurst  and 
Brougham  were  of  the  opinion,  that  from  the  time  of  Had- 
field's  case  to  the  present  day,  the  law  had  been  laid  down  by 
successive  courts  with  great  uniformity.  Lord  Campbell 
said  of  the  same  cases,  that  "there  was  a  wide  difference  both 
in  meaning  and  in  words,  in  their  description  .of  the  law." 
He  therefore  thought  that  an  authoritative  statement  of  the 
law  was  desirable,  though  he  had  just  before  declared  that 
"  the  law  of  England  on  this  subject  admitted  of  no  altera- 
tion."    To  say  that  a  thing  is  so  correct  as  to  admit  of  no 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  51 

alteration,  and,  in  the  next  breath  to  add,  that  there  is  needed 
an  authoritative  statement  of  what  that  thing  is,  indicates 
a  confusion  of  ideas  not  uncommon  in  discussions  on  this 
subject. 

§  38.  Nothing  can  more  clearly  show  how  completely  the 
authoritative  statement  of  the  English  judges  has  failed  to 
accomplish  its  purpose,  than  the  fact  that  in  subsequent  tri- 
als, the  result  seems  to  have  been,  as  much  as  ever,  a  matter 
of  accident  or  caprice,  rather  than  of  principles  well-settled 
and  clearly  understood.  Several  have  been  convicted  and 
executed,  in  spite  of  the  plea  of  insanity,  in  whom  the  mani- 
festations of  disease  were  far  more  abundant  than  in  some 
who  were  acquitted  under  the  same  plea.  As  they  involve 
no  new  principle,  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  our  present 
purpose,  to  bestow  upon  them  a  particular  notice.  Another 
writer  who  has  given  them  some  attention,  thinks  they  indi- 
cate both  uncertainty  and  injustice  in  the  operation  of  the 
criminal  law.  "  Either  some  individuals,"  he  says,  "  are  most 
improperly  acquitted  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  or  others  are 
most  unjustly  executed."  ^  A  more  correct  expression  of  the 
actual  fact,  could  not  be  given.  We  have  no  means  of 
knowing,  however,  how  far  the  verdict  of  the  jury  reflects  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  and  therefore  must  remain  in  doubt 
whether  this  remarkable  want  of  uniformity  is  to  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  growing  independence  of  the  former,  or  a  more 
lenient  construction  of  the  principles  which  have  hitherto 
governed  the  latter.  Some  of  it  is,  probably,  owing  to  an 
increasing  disposition  to  heed  the  opinions  of  experts,  and  a 
commendable  reluctance  to  convict  a  man  declared  by  com- 
petent authority  to  be  insane,  merely  on  the  strength  of  some 
metaphysical  tests  of  responsibility  laid  down  by  the  courts. 
Referring  to  the  cases  of  McNaughton,  Rogers,  Baker,  Free- 
man, Pate,  and  a  multitude  of  others,  ail  of  which  have 
occurred  within  fifteen  years  of  the  present  writing,  (1859), 
Dr.  Beck  declares  with  an  honest  plainness  that  looks  a  little 


^  Taylor,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  3d  Am.  Ed.  p.  642. 


53  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

like  sarcasm,  that  "  each  case  would  seem  to  be  tried  as  an 
individual  one,  without  establishing  or  strengthening  any 
great  or  leading  principles.  In  one  instance,  the  judge  stops 
the  trial;  in  another,  the  jury  disregard  his  directions;  now, 
the  testimony  of  physicians  is  taken  without  comment,  and 
the  verdict  is  given  accordingly  ;  then  again,  the  physician  is 
told  that  he  is  encroaching  on  the  judge  and  jury.  In  some 
instances,  the  doctrine  of  moral  insanity  rules  preeminent;  in 
others,  the  English  law  as  it  existed  in  the  time  of  Sir  Mat- 
thew Hale,  is  the  rule."  ^ 

§  39.  Notwithstanding  the  occasional  instances  of  ameli- 
oration in  the  English  law,  the  old  principle  that  some 
insane  men  are  proper  objects  of  punishment,  is  as  binding 
at  this  moment,  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  Lord  Hale.  It 
seems  to  be  almost  impossible  for  those  who  have  not  a  pro- 
fessional knowledge  of  insanity,  to  view  the  subject  in  the 
true  light.  The  popular  feeling,  mixed  unquestionably  with 
some  truth,  was  strongly  expressed  by  Lord  Brougham,  in 
the  debate  to  which  we  have  already  referred.  "  If,"  says  he, 
"  the  perpetrator  knew  what  he  was  doing,  if  he  had  taken 
his  precautions  to  accomplish  his  purpose,  if  he  knew,  at  the 
time  of  doing  the  desperate  act,  that  it  was  forbidden  by  the 
law,  that  was  his  test  of  sanity;  he  cared  not  what  judge 
gave  another  test;  he  should  go  to  his  grave  in  the  belief 
that  it  v^'as  the  real,  sound,  and  consistent  test."  That  some 
insane  persons  know  very  well,  that,  in  committing  their 
offences,  they  are  guilty  of  a  moral  and  legal  wrong,  and  that 
they  may  be  more  or  less  deterred  by  the  fear  of  punishment, 
are  propositions  that  cannot  be  denied.  The  fallacy  of  which 
the  courts  are  guilty,  consists  in  supposing  that  these  abstract 
propositions  may  be  safely  applied  to  particular  cases  by 
means  of  certain  criteria.  It  has  been  shown  that  these 
criteria  are  insufficient  for  the  purpose,  because  they  do  not 
cover  the  whole  ground,  and  are,  at  the  best,  but  a  begging 
of  the  question.     For  admitting  that  the  person  knew  he  was 


'  Medical  Jurisprudence,  i.  783  [Tenth  Edition]. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  53 

doing  wrong  and  contrary  to  law,  it  remains  to  be  proved 
that  this  knowledge  embraces  all  the  elements  of  responsibil- 
ity. The  real  question  at  issue  is,  why,  with  this  knowledge, 
he  should  commit  acts  Incompatible  with  his  natural  charac- 
ter and  disposition,  and  the  only  rational  answer  is  to  say, 
that  the  action  of  the  mental  powers  is  disturbed  by  the 
presence  of  disease.  Whatever  degree  of  intelligence  or  self- 
control  may  be  left,  there  still  remains  this  disturbing  ele- 
ment, the  precise  influence  of  which  never  can  be  safely  esti- 
mated. It  is  a  monstrous  doctrine  to  put  forth  in  a  civilized 
age,  that  a  man  hitherto  of  irreproachable  conduct  and  con- 
versation, shall  be  punished  for  any  criminal  act  he  may  com- 
mit, while  admitted  to  be  laboring  under  a  morbid  condition, 
the  tendency  of  which  is  to  distort  the  moral  perceptions  and 
destroy  the  healthy  balance  of  the  mental  faculties.  Whether 
Bellingham  and  McNaughton  knew  they  were  doing  an  act 
forbidden  by  the  law,  when  they  shot  down  unoffending  men, 
in  open  day,  is  a  question  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  pur- 
pose. What  we  want  to  know  is,  whether  they  would  have 
committed  the  outrage,  if  they  had  not  been  prompted  by 
delusions  which  were  the  effect  of  disease.  To  inflict  upon 
such  men  the  ordinary  consequences  of  crime,  is  virtually  to 
punish  them  for  being  diseased,  and  the  utmost  ingenuity  of 
logic  or  metaphysics  can  make  nothing  else  of  it.  Lord 
Brougham  intimates  that  he  had  been  much  annoyed,  if  not 
frightened,  by  a  class  of  persons  with  deranged  intellects,  who 
hover  around  the  courts  in  search  of  redress  foir  their  real  or 
fancied  wrongs,  and  he  believes  that  the  fear  of  punishment 
is  necessary  in  order  to  deter  them  from  actual  mischief. 
Now,  in  whatever  aspect  we  consider  the  case,  we  can  find 
no  support  for  such  a  doctrine.  The  punishment  of  one 
insane  person  would  not  deter  another  insane  person  from 
committing  a  criminal  act,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  lat- 
ter, not  regarding  himself  as  insane,  sees  in  it  no  application 
to  him  who,  as  he  believes,  is  in  a  state  of  perfect  health,  pur- 
suing a  right  and  lawful  object.  He  either  thinks  that  his  case 
is  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  and  that  he  is  about  to  do 
something  that  will  receive  universal  approbation,  or  that  he 

5* 


54  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

is  bound  by  solemn  obligation  to  do  the  act,  whatever  may- 
be the  consequences.  Nothing  can  move  strongly  illustrate 
the  popular  ignorance  respecting  insanity  than  the  proposi- 
tion, equally  objectionable  in  its  humanity  and  its  logic,  that 
the  insane  should  be  punished  for  criminal  acts,  in  order  to 
deter  other  insane  persons  from  doing  the  same  thing.  It 
supposes  that  an  insane  man,  McNaughton,  for  instance, 
while  meditating  homicide,  would  say  to  himself,  "  true,  I  am 
insane,  but  nevertheless,  if  I  do  this  thing,  I  shall  be  tried, 
convicted  and  executed,  like  Bowler  and  Bellingham  and 
other  insane  men,  therefore  I  shall  refrain  from  it."  The 
absurdity  of  an  insane  person's  recognizing  his  own  insanity, 
forming  rules  for  his  conduct,  and  acting  upon  them,  would 
seem  too  gross  to  be  deliberately  uttered  by  learned  dignita- 
ries of  the  law,  had  we  not  abundant  proof  to  the  contrary. 
In  point  of  fact,  it  may  be  safely  said  that  not  an  instance 
can  be  produced,  of  an  insane  person  being  deterred  from  the 
commission  of  a  criminal  act  by  the  punishment  of  some 
other  insane  person  for  a  similar  act,  or  encouraged  to  com- 
mit it  by  an  example  of  an  opposite  kind. 

§  40.  The  proper  remedy  for  the  evil  complained  of  by  Lord 
Brougham,  is  to  be  sought  for  in  suitable  measures  of  pre- 
vention, and  society  is  guilty  of  a  great  wrong  when  it  pun- 
ishes the  individual  for  the  consequences  of  its  own  neglect. 
The  management  of  the  insane  in  hospitals  where  they  are 
excited  to  behave  with  propriety  by  the  promise  of  reward, 
and  deterred  from  wrong  doing  by  the  fear  of  being  deprived 
of  some  privilege  or  indulgence,  is  confidently  appealed  to  in 
support  of  this  idea.  It  is  unquestionably  the  practice  in 
such  institutions  to  present  to  the  insane  motives  for  main- 
taining their  self-control,  but  it  is  not  the  fact  that  when  such 
motives  fail  to  produce  the  end  in  view,  they  are  punished. 
They  are  deprived  of  a  privilege  or  indulgence,  not  as  a  pun- 
ishment, but  because  they  have  shown  themselves  incapable 
of  enjoying  it.  The  anecdote  is  often  related  for  the  same 
purpose,  respecting  the  conversation  that  occurred  among  the 
inmates  of  a  lunatic  asylum  on  the  case  of  Martin  who  was 
then  waiting  his  trial  for  setting  fire  to  the  York  Minster. 


PRELIMINARY    VIEWS-  55 

"  He  will  not  be  hanged,"  said  one  of  them,  "  They  cannot 
hang  him,  because  he  is  mad — he  is  one  of  ourselves."  It 
is  not  very  obvious  how  this  anecdote  which,  by  the  way, 
has  the  appearance  of  a  little  embellishment,  affords  any  sup- 
port to  the  doctrine  that  some  insane  men  should  be  pun- 
ished, while  others  may  be  properly  acquitted.  If  it  indicates 
any  thing  on  this  point,  it  is  that  every  insane  man  who  com- 
mits a  criminal  act,  even  though  he  may  escape  from  an  asy- 
lum for  the  purpose,  is  a  proper  object  of  punishment. 

§  41.  Criminal  trials,  in  which  insanity  was  pleaded  in  de- 
fence, have  been  generally  so  little  known  beyond  the  place 
of  their  occurrence,  that  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  on  what 
particular  principles  of  the  common  law  the  decisions  of 
American  courts  have  been  founded,  though  from  all  that 
can  be  gathered,  it  appears  that  their  practice,  like  that  of  the 
British,  has  been  diverse  and  fluctuating.  In  the  trial  of 
Lawrence,  at  Washington,  in  1835,  for  shooting  at  president 
Jackson,  the  jury  were  advised  by  the  court  to  regulate  their 
verdict  by  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  case  of  Hadfield, 
which  had  been  stated  to  them  by  the  district-attorney.^  In 
the  case  of  Theodore  "Wilson,  tried  in  York  county,  Maine, 
in  1836,  for  the  murder  of  his  wife  in  a  paroxysm  of  insanity, 
the  court  charged  the  jury  that  if  they  were  satisfied  the  pris- 
oner was  not  of  sound  memory  and  discretion  at  the  time  of 
committing  the  act,  they  were  bound  to  return  a  verdict  of 
acquittal.  This  is  all  that  could  be  wished ;  and  considering 
that  two  highly  respectable  physicians  had  given  their  opin- 
ion in  evidence  that  the  prisoner  had  some  consciousness  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  that  the  attorney-general,  though  he 
admitted  the  existence  of  insanity  in  some  degree,  denied 
that  it  was  of  sufficient  extent  to  exempt  him  from  punish- 
ment, supporting  his  assertion  on  the  authority  of  the  lead- 
ing English  cases  relating  to  insanity,  this  decision  indicates 
an  advance  in  the  criminal  jurisprudence  of  insanity  that  does 
credit  to  the  humanity  and  intelligence  of  that  court.     In  the 


^  Niles's  Register,  xlviii.  119. 


56  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

trial  of  Cory,  for  murdering  Mrs.  Nash,  in  New  Hampshire, 
1829,  the  court,  Chief  Justice  Richardson,  stated  in  his  charge 
to  the  jury  that  the  only  question  for  them  to  settle  was, 
"  whether  he  was  of  sane  mind  when  the  deed  was  done  ?  " 
The  same  language  was  used  by  the  same  court  on  the  trial 
of  Prescott,  for  the  murder  of  Mrs.  Cochran,  in  1834.  In  State 
of  Connecticut  v.  Abbot  (1841),  the  jury  were  instructed  to 
acquit  the  prisoner  if  they  found  "  that  he  was  insane  —  had 
not  sufficient  understanding  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong, 
and  did  not  know  that  the  murder  of  his  wife  was  an  offence 
against  the  laws  of  God  and  nature."  In  CommomveaUh  of 
Massachusetts  v.  Rogers  (1843),  the  court,  Chief  Justice  Shaw, 
thus  stated  the  rule  of  law.  "  A  man  is  not  to  be  excused  from 
responsibility,  if  he  has  capacity  and  reason  sufficient  to  enable 
him  to  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong,  as  to  the  partic- 
ular act  he  is  then  doing,  and  a  knowledge  and  consciousness 
that  the  act  he  is  doing  is  wrong  and  criminal,  and  will  sub- 
ject him  to  punishment.  In  order  to  be  responsible,  he  must 
have  sufficient  power  of  memory  to  recollect  the  relation  in 
which  he  stands  to  others,  and  in  which  others  stand  to  him ; 
that  the  act  he  is  doing  is  contrary  to  the  plain  dictates  of 
justice  and  right,  injurious  to  others,  and  a  violation  of  the 
dictates  of  duty."  "  The  question  is  whether  the  disease  ex- 
isted to  so  high  a  degree,  that  for  the  time  being,  it  over- 
whelmed the  reason,  conscience,  and  judgment,  and  whether 
the  prisoner  in  committing  the  homicide  acted  from  an  irre- 
sistible and  uncontrollable  impulse."  ^  In  People  v.  Kleim, 
New  York  (1846),  the  court.  Judge  Edmonds,  said  that,  to 
establish  a  defence  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  it  must  be 
clearly  proved  that  the  party  accused  was  laboring  under 
such  a  defect  of  reason  from  disease  of  the  mind  as  not  to 
know  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  act  he  was  doing,  or  if  he 
did  know  it,  that  he  did  not  know  he  was  doing  what  was. 
wrong.  Also,  if  he  have  not  intelligence  and  capacity  enough 
to  have  a  criminal  intent  and  purpose,  and  if  his  moral  or 


^  Trial  of  Abner  Rogers,  etc.    By  Bigelow  &  Bemis,  275. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  57 

intellectual  powers  are  either  so  deficient  that  he  has  not 
sufficient  will,  conscience,  or  controlling  mental  power,  or  if, 
through  the  overwhelming  violence  of  mental  disease,  his 
intellectual  power,  is  for  the  time  obliterated,  he  is  not  a 
responsible  moral  agent.^  In  State  v.  Spencer,  New  Jer- 
sey (1846),  the  court,  Chief  Justice  Hornblower,  declared 
that  "if  the  prisoner,  at  the  time  of  committing  the  act, 
was  conscious  that  he  ought  not  to  do  it,  the  law  holds  him 
responsible,  and  he  cannot  be  exculpated  on  the  ground  of 
insanity,  although  on  some  subjects  he  may  have  been  insane 
at  the  time."' 2  In  People  v.  Freeman,  New  York  (1847),  it 
was  held  that  the  prisoner  was  responsible  if  capable  of  per- 
ceiving that  the  act  was  contrary  to  law.^  In  State  v.  Bender^ 
Pennsylvania  (1850),  the  court  said  that  the  prisoner,  to  be 
acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  should  have  been  so 
deranged  that  he  could  not  appreciate  the  nature  or  conse- 
quences of  the  act  he  was  committing ;  his  mind  must  have 
been  disturbed  by  disease,  or  other  natural  cause,  to  an 
extent  to  deprive  him  of  the  power  of  reasoning  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  act  he  was  about  to  commit;  and  had  not  mind 
enough  to  reflect,  think  and  know  the  difference  between 
right  and  wrong.  In  State  v.  Knepley,  Pennsylvania  (1850), 
the  court  said,  that  before  any  man  can  be  exempted  or 
relieved  from  responsibility  for  crime,  he  must  have  such 
alienation  of  mind  as  to  entirely  destroy  his  perception  of 
right  and  wrong  in  regard  to  the  particular  act,  or  be  labor- 
ing under  such  delusion  or  hallucination  as  controls  his  will 
and  renders  the  commission  of  his  offence,  in  his  opinion,  a 
matter  of  duty  or  necessity.  In  State  v.  Windsor,  Delaware 
(1851),  the  court  instructed  the  jury  that  the  question  before 
them  was,  whether  the  prisoner  was  under  the  influence  of  a 
diseased  mind,  and  was  really  unconscious  at  the  time  he 
was  committing  the  act  that  it  was  a  crime.  In  State  v. 
Clark,  Connecticut  (1855),  it  was  held  that  the  prisoner  was 


1  American  Journal  of  Insanity,  il.  264.  ^  1  Zabriskie,  196. 

3  4  Denio,  29. 


58  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

not  accountable,  if  he  had  not  capacity  and  reason  enough 
to  enable  him  to  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong  in  this 
instance,  to  understand  the  nature,  character,  and  conse- 
quences of  the  act,  and  to  apply  his  knowledge  to  this  case, 
not  being  overcome  by  an  irresistible  impulse  arising  from 
disease.  In  State  v.  Smith,  Pennsylvania  (1858),  the  court  held 
that  the  prisoner  was  irresponsible,  if  he  were  governed  by  an 
uncontrollable  impulse,  his  will  were  no  longer  in  subjection 
to  his  reason,  owing  to  the  excited  and  continued  impetu- 
osity of  his  thoughts,  and  the  confusion  of  a  mind  impelled 
by  disease  and  goaded  by  a  sense  of  grievous  wrongs.  In 
People  V.  Thurston,  New  York  (1851),  Peoj)le  v.  Fyler,  'New 
York  (1855),  State  v.  Sloo,  Illinois  (1857),  United  States  v. 
Holmes,  Maine  (1858),  the  law  as  expounded  by  Chief  Jus- 
tice Shaw,  in  Commonwealth  v.  Rogers,  was  adopted.  In 
State  v.  Mosler,  Pennsylvania  (1846),  the  court,  Chief  Justice 
Gibson,  said  that  insanity,  in  order  to  exempt  a  person  from 
punishment  for  criminal  acts,  must  be  so  great  in  its  extent  or 
degree,  as  to  blind  him  to  the  nature  and  consequences  of  his 
moral  duty,  and  entirely  destroy  his  perception  of  right  and 
wrong.i  In  United  States  v.  McGlue,  Massachusetts  (1851), 
the  court,  Mr.  Justice  Curtis,  instructed  the  jury  that  the 
question  for  them  to  settle  was,  whether  the  prisoner  un- 
derstood the  nature  of  the  act,  and  knew  he  was  doing  wrong 
and  would  deserve  punishment.^ 

§  42.  The  loose,  vague,  and  contradictory  tests  of  that  kind 
of  insanity  which  alone  can  be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  excuse 
for  criminal  acts,  are  strongly  illustrated  in  this  summary  of 
American  decisions.  The  cause  of  this  curious  fact  will  be 
sufficiently  apparent  on  a  little  reflection.     If  metaphysicians 


»  4  Barr,  26G. 

*  1  Curtis,  9.  Where  no  authority  is  given  for  the  cases  here  mentioned, 
our  information  has  been  derived  from  newspapers  and  pamphlets  contain- 
ing reports  of  the  trials.  Decisions  like  these,  or  any  others  at  »n'.vi  jr:»r|ws, 
can  hardly  be  considered  as  authority  strictly  speaking,  but  they  sufficiently 
answer  the  present  purpose,  which  is  to  show  what  has  been  the  practice  in 
American  courts. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  ,(59 

who  have  made  the  rational  mind  their  special  study,  widely 
differ  in  their  accounts  of  its  operations,  could  it  be  expected 
that  men  who  have  given  little  or  no  attention  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  insanity,  should  be  more  successful  in  ascertain- 
ing the  character  and  connection  of  the  thoughts  and  emo- 
tions which  occupy  the  irrational  mind  ?  It  is  not  strange 
that  every  step  in  their  analysis  of  motives  and  impulses 
should  be  marked  by  hesitation  and  distrust,  and  that  tests 
of  responsibility  once  set  up  with  the  strongest  confidence, 
should  be  either  utterly  abandoned,  one  after  another,  or 
limited  by  some  indefinite  qualification.  To  this  course  our 
courts  have  been  driven,  more  easily,  perhaps,  than  the  Eng- 
lish, because  their  sense  of  justice  has  been  less  controlled 
by  authority  and  prescription^  They  see  the  miserable  victim 
of  disease  before  them ;  they  hear  the  story  of  his  freaks  and 
fancies  from  the  lips  of  friends  and  neighbors,  and  the  testi- 
mony in  his  favor  of  distinguished  experts,  with  whom  per- 
haps they  may  be  personally  acquainted.  Thus  the  convic- 
tion of  his  insanity  becomes  irresistible,  and  they  feel  con- 
strained to  construe  the  law  in  such  a  manner  as  to  afford 
him  its  protection  ;  and  yet  such  a  construction  might  not 
have  been  thought  of,  had  the  general  features  only  of  the 
case  been  presented  to  them  in  their  chambers.  In  this  coun- 
try as  in  England,  the  insufficiency  of  the  old  tests  of  respon- 
sibility has  been  generally  recognized,  and  here  all  harmony 
of  opinion  ends.  What  the  true  test  really  is,  remains  as  far 
from  being  settled  as  ever.  The  actual  question  in  such 
cases  is,  how  far  the  various  elements  of  responsibility  have 
been  affected  by  the  presence  of  disease.  To  answer  it  cor- 
rectly, there  is  implied,  not  only  some  knowledge  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  mind  in  its  normal  condition,  but  also  a 
thorough  and  accurate  knowledge  of  its  manifestations  while 
under  the  influence  of  disease.  The  former  might  be  ex- 
pected, in  some  degree,  at  least,  in  most  men  of  a  liberal  cul- 
ture, but  the  latter  must  necessarily  be  confined  to  persons 
who  have  made  insanity  their  special  study.  It  is,  in  fact,  as 
strictly  a  professional  matter  as  the  effect  of  malaria  on  the 
nervous  system ;  and  equally  unfit  to  be  presented  for  inves- 


60  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

tigatioii  to  a  bench  of  judges.  Here  lies  the  fundamental 
error  of  the  courts,  in  supposing  that  the  question  of  respon- 
sibility may  be  settled  without  the  aid  of  scientific  research 
and  obi^ervation,  —  in  supposing  that  men  who,  never  in  their 
lives,  perhaps,  observed  very  closely  a  single  case  of  insanity ; 
who  know  nothing  of  its  various  forms,  nor  of  the  laws  which 
govern  their  origin  and  progress,  are  qualified  to  lay  down 
general  principles  touching  the  measure  of  responsibility 
which  is  left  after  reason  has  been  driven  from  her  throne,  or 
reduced  to  share  a  divided  empire  with  the  caprices  and  im- 
pulses of  disease.^  The  results  of  this  error  are  painfully 
exhibited  in  the  summary  of  decisions  given  in  the  preceding 
sections.  The  loose  and  indefinite  phraseology  w-here  terms 
should  be  precise  and  w^ell-defined  ;  the  frequent  recurrence 
to  the  same  point,  as  if  fearful  of  saying  too  much  or  too 
little ;  the  conflicting  tests  and  the  qualifications  attached  to 
them,  —  all  this  inspires  no  confidence,  and,  consequently, 
leads  to  no  uniformity  of  opinion.  It  is  a  truth  which  no 
assumption  of  superior  wisdom,  no  blind. conservatism  can 
destroy,  that,  with  hardly  a  single  exception,  these  "rules  of 
law  "  on  the  subject  of  insanity,  are  in  conflict  with  the  well- 
settled  facts  of  mental  disease.  They  would  never  have 
been  made,  we  are  quite  sure,  by  persons  practically  ac- 
quainted with  the  operations  of  the  insane  mind.     To  such 


^  As  if  to  heighten  the  absurdity  of  the  matter,  some  of  these  judicial 
dignitaries  who  arrive  at  their  conchisions  on  the  subject  of  insanity  in  the 
retirement  of  their  chambers,  exhibit  a  lofty  distrust  of  the  views  of  men 
who  liave  spent  the  best  portion  of  their  lives  in  the  company  of  the  insane, 
and  stigmatize  them  as  "  crude  and  visionary,"  if  not  unsafe  and  mischiev- 
ous. In  the  trial  of  James  Gibson  before  the  high  court  of  justiciary,  Edin- 
burgh (1845),  reported  in  Cormac's  Monthly  Journal  of  Medical  Science, 
February,  1845,  the  Lord  Justice  Clerk  (Hope),  told  the  jury  "they  were 
not  to  consider  insanity  according  to  the  definitions  of  medical  men  —  espec- 
ially such  fantastic  and  shadowy  definitions  as  are  to  be  found  in  Ray, 
whose  work  was'  quoted  by  the  counsel  for  the  panel,  and  in  many  other 
medical  works  on  the  subject."  "  Any  thing  more  Aarying,  or  inconsistent, 
or  unsatisfactory,  than  the  definitions  of  insanity  given  by  Ray  and  many 
other  medical  writers,  cannot  be  conceived." 


PRELIMINAIIY    VIEWS.  61 

it  is  well  known,  that  in  every  hospital  for  the  insane  are 
patients  capable  of  distinguishing  between  right  and  wrong, 
knowing  well  enough  how  to  appreciate  the  nature  and  legal 
consequences  of  their  acts,  acknowledging  the  sanctions  of 
religion,  and  never  acting  from  irresistible  impulses,  but  de- 
liberately and  shrewdly.  Is  all  this  to  be  utterly  ignored  in 
courts  of  justice? 

§  43.  The  frequency  with  which  insanity  is  pleaded  in 
defence  of  crime,  the  magnitude  of  its  consequences  to  the 
parties  concerned,  and  the  perplexity  in  which  the  discussions 
it  occasions  involve  the  minds  of  judges  and  jurors,  are  am- 
ple reasons  why  the  law  relative  to  insanity  should  be  simple 
and  easily  understood  —  a  result  that  can  only  be  obtained 
by  direct  legislative  enactments.  It  is  time  for  the  legislature 
to  determine  what,  amid  the  mass  of  conflicting  opinions  on 
this  subject,  shall  be  the  law  of  the  land ;  and  thus  no  longer 
permit  the  lives  and  liberties  of  people  to  be  suspended  on 
the  dicta  of  men,  whose  knowledge  of  insanity  was  exceed- 
ingly imperfect,  and  which  have  not  even  the  merit  of  uni- 
formity and  consistency.  It  may  be  well,  therefore,  to  see 
what  has  been  the  legislation  of  various  enlightened  nations, 
in  reference  to  this  subject,  inasmuch  as  it  may  furnish  valua- 
ble hints  for  our  own.  In  some,  the  legislator  has  been  con- 
tented with  indicating,  by  some  popular,  general  phrase,  that 
condition  of  mind  which  the  judge  may  consider  as  freeing 
from  responsibility.  The  Bavarian  code  (1813),  follows  this 
course,  as  well  as  the  code  of  Basle,  promulgated  in  1835. 
In  the  latter,  we  find  the  following  words :  "  Minors,  and 
those  laboring  under  general  mania,  or  hallucination,  cannot 
be  punished  as  criminals,  nor,  generally  speaking,  can  any 
others  be  punished,  who  have  committed  a  crime  while  de- 
prived of  the  use  of  their  minds."  Art.  2.  Very  nearly  the 
same  language  is  used  in  describing  such  as  are  exempted 
from  punishment  by  reason  of  mental  disorders,  in  the  code 
of  Turin  (1835),  Art.  63,  and  in  the  proposed  Hanoverian 
code.  Art.  83.  In  other  codes,  general  terms  alone  are  used, 
in  describing  the  mental  condition  of  such  as  are  irrespon- 
sible.     Thus,    in    the    Saxon  code,  we    find   these    words: 

6 


62  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

« 

"  Responsibility  is  annulled  in  persons  who  are  deprived  of 
the  use  of  reason  by  mental  disease."  Art.  65.  It  is  a  suffi- 
cient objection  to  such  enactments  that,  in  any  particular 
trial,  no  two  persons  could  be  found  to  agree  respecting  the 
practical  application  of  such  terms  as,  deprived  of  the  use  of 
reason,  bereft  of  loider standing;  &c. ;  and  how  many  judges 
and  juries  would  see,  in  the  unfortunate  monomaniac  before 
them,  —  who,  though  stained  with  the  blood  of  a  fellow  man 
whom  some  wild  delusion  had  prompted  him  to  kill,  is  still 
correct  and  coherent  in  his  discourse,  staid  and  dignified  in 
his  demeanor,  ready  and  shrewd  in  his  replies,  —  a  being 
deprived  of  the  use  of  his  reason,  or  bereft  of  his  understand- 
ing? We  have  seen  too  often  the  deplorable  failure  of  such 
general  terms  to  protect  the  miserable  subjects  of  disease, 
under  the  operation  of  the  English  common  law,  to  recom- 
mend their  use  to  the  legislator.  In  some  codes  an  attempt 
is  made  to  avoid  this  objection  to  general  terms,  by  mention- 
ing various  mental  diseases  as  illustrations  of  the  meaning 
they  are  to  convey.^  Thus,  the  proposed  Wurtemburg  code 
contains  the  following  provision :  "  An  illegal  act  is  exempt 
from  punishment,  if  committed  in  a  state  of  mind  in  which 
the  use  of  reason  is  taken  away  ;  to  this  state  belong,  chiefly, 
general  mania,  general  and  partial  hallucination,  entire  imbe- 
cility, and  complete  confusion  of  the  senses,  or  understand- 
ing." Art.  91.  In  the  code  of  the  grand  duchy  of  Hesse,  pro- 
posed in  1836,  we  find  the  following  provision:  "By  reason  of 
their  impaired  responsibility,  punishment  cannot  be  inflicted 
on  those  who  commit  penal  acts  in  a  state  of  sleep,  of  som- 
nambulism, of  general  mania,  of  hallucination,  of  imbecility, 
or  of  any  other  mental  disorder,  which  either  takes  away  all 
consciousness  respecting  the  act  generally  and  its  relation  to 
penal  law,  or  in  conjunction  with  some  peculiar  bodily  condi- 
tion, irresistibly  impels  him,  while  completely  unconscious,  to 
violent  acts."  Art.  29.  In  the  code  of  the  grand  duchy  of  Ba- 
den, it  is  enacted  as  follows:    "  Responsibility  is  annulled 


^  J.  C.  Mittermaier :  De  principio  imputationis  alienationum  mentis,  p.  24. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  63 

in  that  condition,  in  which,  either  a  consciousness  of  the  crim- 
inality of  the  offence,  or  the  free  will  of  the  offender  is  taken 
away."  Art.  65.  "  To  the  condition  which  annuls  responsi- 
bility on  the  strength  of  the  65th  Art.  belong  chiefly,  imbe- 
cility, hallucination,  general  mania,  distraction,  and  complete 
confusion  of  the  senses,  or  understanding."  Art.  69.  Some- 
what similar  is  the  phraseology  used  by  the  code  of  Lucerne, 
in  Switzerland.  This  method  is  liable  to  precisely  the  same 
objection  as  the  former,  for  the  difficulty  will  be  as  great  in 
the  one  as  in  the  other,  of  settling  the  exact  meaning  of  the 
particular  terms.  Many  a  case  will  occur,  that  will  not  be 
unanimously  referred  to  some  one  of  the  above-mentioned 
affections.  To  avoid  the  difficulties  incumbent  on  the  use  of 
suc.h  terms,  and  to  bring  the  wretched  subjects  of  mental 
disease  under  the  protection  of  the  law,  without  discrimina- 
tion, the  legislator  has,  in  some  instances,  made  the  single 
fact  of  the  presence  of  disease,  sufficient  to  annul  criminal 
responsibility.  In  Livingston's  code,  it  is  provided  that — "  No 
act  done  by  a  person  in  a  state  of  insanity  can  be  punished 
as  an  offence."  The  revised  statutes  of  the  State  of  New 
York  contain  the  same  words.^  The  revised  statutes  of  Ar- 
kansas provide  that  a  lunatic,  or  insane  person,  without  lucid 
intervals,  shall  not  be  found  guilty  of  any  crime  or  misde- 
meanor with  which  he  may  be  charged.^  The  French  penal 
code  is  equally  simple.  "  There  can  be  no  crime  nor  offence, 
if  the  accused  were  in  a  state  of  madness  at  the  time  of  the 
act. "  2  If  we  insert  after  the  word  insanity,  the  following 
words,  or  any  other  condition  of  mind  in  ivhich  the  person  is 
involuntarily  deprived  of  the  consciousness  of  the  true  nat^ire 
of  his  acts,  in  order  to  protect  him  from  the  consequences  of 
acts  committed  in  a  state  of  sleep  or  somnambulism,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  any  other  provision  would  better  pro- 
mote the  purposes  of  justice,  than  that  of  Livingston's  code. 
Under  this  law,  when  strictly  applied,  if  the  existence  of  in- 


'  Vol.  11.  p.  697.  2  Revised  Statutes  of  Arkansas,  236. 

«  Art.  64. 


64  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

sanity  is  once  established,  the  responsibility  of  the  party  is 
taken  away  ;  and  all  nice  discussions  concerning  the  effect 
of  this  or  that  kind  or  degree  of  mental  derangement,  and  the 
exact  measure  of  reason  that  has  been  left  or  taken  away,  are 
thus  effectually  precluded.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  an  in- 
sane person  may  be  actually  guilty  of  a  criminal  act,  his  in- 
sanity being  very  partial,  and  the  act  not  within  the  range  of 
its  operation,  while  by  the  letter  of  the  law,  he  must  be  acquit- 
ted. The  only  way  of  avoiding  this  evil,  would  be  to  add 
something  like,  the  following:  —  unless,  it  can  be  proved 
that  the  act  ivas  not  the  offspring  of  the  insanity.  True,  the 
fact  of  insanity  would  be  left,  as  it  now  is,  with  the  jury  to 
decide ;  but  as  they  would  no  longer  be  puzzled  with  meta- 
physical distinctions  between  total  and  partial  insanity,  and 
engaged  in  nice  estimates  of  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil, 
of  right  and  wrong,  and  of  the  power  of  design  possessed  by 
the  accused,  their  inquiries  would  be  narrowed  down  to  the 
single  fact  of  mental  impairment  on  a  certain  point  —  a  duty 
much  less  remote  from  the  train  of  their  ordinary  habits  and 
pursuits.  Thus  a  great  object  would  be  gained,  for  the  more 
that  is  provided  by  statute  and  the  less  that  is  left  to  judi- 
cial discretion,  the  greater  is  the  benefit  afforded  by  law. 

§  44.  As  the  conclusions  of  the  jury,  relative  to  the  exist- 
ence of  insanity,  must  necessarily  be  founded  on  the  testi- 
mony offered  by  the  parties,  it  is  a  subject  of  the  utmost 
importance,  by  wiiom  and  in  what  manner,  this  testimony 
shall  be  given.  If  the  decision  of  this  point  were  purely  a 
matter  of  facts,  the  only  duty  of  the  jury  would  be  to  see 
that  they  were  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  and  proceeded  from 
authentic  sources ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  matter  of 
inference  to  be  drawn  from  certain  data,  and  this  is  a  duty 
for  which  our  juries,  as  at  present  constituted,  are  manifestly 
unfit.  That  a  body  of  men,  taken  promiscuously  from  the 
common  walks  of  life,  should  be  required  to  decide,  whether 
or  not  certain  opinions  and  facts  in  evidence  prove  derange- 
ment of  mind,  or,  in  other  words,  to  decide  a  professional 
question  of  a  most  delicate  nature  and  involving  some  of  the 
highest  interests  of  man,  is  an  idea  so  preposterous  that  one 


PRELIMINARY  VIEWS.  65 

finds  it  difficult,  at  first  sight,  to  believe  that  it  ever  was  seri- 
ously entertained.  Such,  however,  is  made  their  business, 
and,  in  the  performance  of  it,  there  is  but  one  alternative 
for  them  to  follow ;  —  either  to  receive  with  the  utmost  defer- 
ence the  opinions  of  those  who  have  a  professional  acquaint- 
ance witii  the  subject,  or  to  slight  them  altogether,  and  rely 
solely  on  their  own  judgment  of  the  facts.  The  latter  course 
has  sometimes  been  adopted,  though  no  one,  probably,  per- 
sonally concerned  in  the  issue  of  the  case,  would  congratu- 
late himself  on  their  choice,  unless  specially  anxious  to  be- 
come a  victim  of  ignorance  and  obstinacy.  But,  in  the  larger 
proportion  of  cases,  the  medical  testimony,  which  is  given  in 
the  shape  of  opinions,  though  rather  an  anomaly  in  evidence 
that  courts  have  been  sorely  puzzled  at  times  whether  to  ad- 
mit or  reject,  is  mostly  relied  on,  and  determines  the  verdict 
of  the  jury.  It  is,  perhaps,  of  little  consequence,  who  testifies 
to  a  simple  fact,  that  it  requires  only  eyes  to  see,  or  ears  to 
hear  ;  but  it  is  all  very  different  with  the  delivery  of  opinions 
that  are  to  shape  the  final  decision.  As  this  requires  an  ex- 
ercise of  judgment  as  well  as  observation,  there  ought  to  be 
some  kind  of  qualification  on  the  part  of  those  who  render 
such  opinions,  not  required  of  one  who  testifies  to  mere  facts. 
The  understanding  certainly  is,  that  their  habits,  pursuits, 
and  talents,  have  rendered  them  peculiarly  competent  for 
this  high  duty,  for,  in  spite  of  the  power  of  cross-examina- 
tion, these  constitute  the  only  pledge  that  can  be  had  of  its 
correct  and  faithful  performance.  But  as  the  law  makes  no 
exclusion,  and  the  witnesses'  stand  is  open  to  any  one  whom 
the  parties  may  choose  to  call,  it  frequently  happens,  that  the 
witness  has  nothing  but  his  professional  character  to  rely  on, 
to  give  his  opinions  the  authority  they  ought  to  possess. 
And  even  when  he  may  have  been  preceded  by  the  shadow 
of  a  great  reputation,  the  jury  may  not  know,  nor  be  able 
to  discover,  how  much  of  that  reputation  is  factitious ; 
and,  in  consequence,  may  be  induced  to  confide  in  opinions 
which,  from  a  different  quarter,  they  would  have  listened  to 
with  feelings  of  doubt  and  distrust.  It  is  true,  the  law  re- 
quires that  such  opinions  should  be  founded  on  facts,  but 

6* 


66  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

who  is  to  decide  whether  the  fact  is  a  sufficient  foundation 
for  the  opinion,  or,  indeed,  has  any  relation  to  it  at  all  ? 

§  45.  It  is  not  enough,  that  the  standing  of  the  medical 
witness  is  deservedly  high  in  his  profession,  unless  it  is 
founded  on  extraordinary  knowledge  and  skill  relative  to  the 
particular  disease,  insanity.  Lunatic  asylums  have  so  mul- 
tiplied in  our  country,  that  patients  of  this  class  are  almost 
entirely  taken  away  from  the  management  of  the  private 
physician,  and  consigned  to  the  more  skilful  conductors  of 
these  institutions  ;  so  that  many  a  medical  man  may  spend 
a  life  of  full  practice,  without  having  been  intrusted  with  the 
care  of  a  dozen  insane  persons.  To  such,  therefore,  a  prac- 
tical knowledge  of  the  disease  is  out  of  the  question,  and 
thus  the  principal  inducement  is  wanting,  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  the  labors  of  those,  who  have  enjoyed  better 
opportunities.  If  a  particular  class  of  men  only  are  thought 
capable  of  managing  the  treatment  of  the  insane,  it  would 
seem  to  follow,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  such  only  are 
capable  of  giving  opinions  in  judicial  proceedings  relative  to 
insanity.  True,  in  important  cases,  the  testimony  of  one  or 
more  of  this  class  is  generally  given;  but  it  may  be  contra- 
dicted by  that  of  others  utterly  destitute  of  any  knowledge 
of  the  subject  on  which  They  tender  their  opinions  with  arro- 
gant confidence,  and  the  jury  is  seldom  a  proper  tribunal  for 
distinguishing  the  true  from  the  false,  and  fixing  on  each  its 
rightful  value.  An  enlightened  and  conscientious  jury,  when 
required  to  decide  in  a  case  of  doubtful  insanity,  which  is  to 
determine  the  weal  or  woe  of  a  fellow  being,  fully  alive  to 
the  delicacy  and  responsibility  of  their  situation,  and  of  their 
own  incompetence  unaided  by  the  counsels  of  others,  will  be 
satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  the  opinions  of  those  who 
have  possessed  unusual  opportunities  for  studying  the  char- 
acter and  conduct  of  the  insane,  and  have  the  qualities  of 
mind  necessary  to  enable  them  to  profit  by  their  observa- 
tions. If  they  are  obliged  to  decide  on  professional  subjects, 
it  wouUl  seem  but  just,  and  the  dictate  of  common  sense,  that 
they  should  have  the  benefit  of  the  best  jDrofessional  advice. 
This,  however,  they  do  not  always  have  ;  and,  consequently, 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS. 


67 


the  ends  of  justice  are  too  often  defeated  by  the  high-sound- 
ing assumptions  of  ignorance  and  vanity. 

§  46.  It  may,  at  first  sight,  be  thought  impossible  to  rem- 
edy this  defect,  without  what  would  seem  to  be  an  ingraft- 
ment  upon  our  judicial  system  of  practices  not  in  perfect 
harmony  with  it ;  but  the  difficulty,  after  all,  may  not  be 
found  utterly  intractable,  if  names  are  not  allowed  to  usurp 
in  our  minds  the  place  of  things.  Instead  of  the  unqualified 
and  irresponsible  witnesses  now  too  often  brought  forward 
to  enlighten  the  minds  of  jurymen  on  medical  subjects,  it 
would  be  far  better,  if  we  had  a  class  of  men  more  or  less 
like  that  of  the  experts^  of  the  French,  peculiarly  fitted  for 
the  duty  by  a  course  of  studies  expressly  directed  to  this  end. 
They  might  be  appointed  by  the  government,  in  numbers 
adapted  to  the  wants  and  circumstances  of  the  population, 
and -should  be  always  ready,  at  the  call  of  courts,  to  examine 
the  health  of  criminals,  draw  up  reports  touching  the  same, 


*  The  term  experts  is  used  in  the  French  law  to  designate  certain  persons, 
appointed  in  thecourseof  a  judicial  proceeding,  either  by  the  court  or  by  the 
agreement  of  the  parties,  to  make  inquiry  under  oath,  in  reference  to  certain 
facts,  and  to  report  thereon  to  the  court.  They  are  not  examined  as  wit- 
nesses ;  nor  have  they  the  power  of  deciding  the  cause,  like  arbitrator^  ;  their 
functions  are  more  analogous  to  those  of  a  master  in  chancery,  according  to 
our  laws.  The  following  extract  fiom  Pothier's  Treatise  on  Civil  Procedure 
(Part  I.  chap.  III.  art.  III.  §  T.),  will  give  an  idea  of  the  functions  of  these 
officers. 

"  The  decision  of  a  cause  frequently  depends  on  some  fact  contested 
between  the  parties,  which  can  only  be  established  by  a  visit  to  the  thing 
which  makes  the  object  of  the  contestation  ;  for  example,  the  buyer  of  a  horse 
brings  a  redhihitorij  action  against  the  seller,  to  compel  the  latter  to  take  back 
the  horse,  on  account  of  some  pretended  defect,  which  the  former  alleges 
entitles  him  to  a  return  ;  if  the  seller  denies  the  existence  of  the  defect;  this 
fact,  upon  which  the  decision  of  the  cause  depends,  can  only  be  ascertained 
by  an  examination  of  the  horse  by  experts  ;  and  the  judge,  therefore,  before 
rendering  a  definitive  judgment,  must  order  the  animal  to  be  examined  by 
experts,  who  shall  report  whether  he  labors  under  the  said  defect  or  not.  In 
like  manner,  if  I  make  a  bargain  with  a  workman  to  do  certain  work  upon 
a  house,  and  when  the  latter  demands  the  agreed  price  of  me,  I  object  that 
the  work  is  badly  done,  and  therefore  not  receivable,  there  must  be  an  order 
for  an  examination  by  exp^erts." 


68  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

and  deliver  opinions.  When  the  courts  see  the  minds  of 
jurors  perplexed  and  confounded  by  the  contradictory  opin- 
ions of  medical  witnesses,  and  with  no  means  of  satisfying 
themselves  as  to  what  is  really  true,  it  should  be  their  duty 
to  submit  the  accused  to  the  exarjiination  of  experts,  who 
should  report  at  a  subsequent  period.  Something  like  this 
is  often  done  in  France  and  Germany,  and  ought  to  be 
provided  for  in  the  criminal  procedure  of  every  country.^ 
Thus,  in  the  case  of  Henriette  Cornier,  in  Paris,  for  murder- 
ing a  neighbor's  child,  November  4,  1825,  the  court,  at  the 
request  of  the  prisoner's  counsel,  made  shortly  before  the 
trial,  which  was  ordered  to  take  place  February  27,  1826, 
appointed  a  committee  of  three  distinguished  physicians  to 
report,  after  due  examination,  whether  or  not  she  was  a  fit 
subject  for  trial.  Their  reports  not  being  satisfactory  to  the 
avocat-g6neral  (attorney-general),  the  trial,  at  his  request,  was 
postponed  to  another  session,  and  the  prisoner  was  again 
subjected  to  the  examination  of  the  committee,  who  reported 
three  months  afterwards.^  What  a  contrast  does  this  calm 
and  deliberate  inquiry  present,  to  the  indecent  haste  with 
which  the  legal  proceedings  were  precipitated  against  Bel- 
lingham,  who  committed  his  offence,  was  indicted,  tried, 
hanged,  and  dissected,  all  within  the  space  of  eight  days.  In 
this  case,  there  was  a  strong  disinclination  manifested  by  the 


^  Fodere  (De  medicine  legale,  I.,  Introd.  p.  xlii.),  relates  witli  the  most 
naive  astonishment,  that,  in  a  question  of  survivorship,  arising  out  of  the 
accouchement  of  Mrs.  Fischer  in  England,  the  opinion  of  the  celebrated 
Denman  was  rejected  by  a  jury,  that  yielded  implicit  belief  in  the  testimony 
of  one  Dallas,  who  was  not  a  physician,  and  of  two  ignorant  women,  who 
spoke  only  from  memory,  after  the  expiration  of  fourteen  years.  Many 
readers  may  recollect  that,  in  the  case  of  Donellan,  tried  in  1781  (see 
Beck's  Medical  Jurisprudence,  tenth  edition,  ii.  792),  for  the  murder  of  Sir 
Thcodosius  Boughton,  by  poisoning,  the  opinions  of  three  or  four  physicians, 
as  unknown  to  fame  as  the  science  they  professed  to  understand  seems  to 
have  been  unknown  to  them,  far  outweighed  with  the  court  that  of  John 
Hunter,  though  illustrated  by  his  various  learning  and  supported  by  his  repu- 
tation for  unrivalled  talents  and  original  research. 

^  Georget,  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folic,  71. 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  69 

court  to  listen  to  the  plea  of  insanity ;  as  if  it  were  a  fiction 
set  up  by  counsel,  in  the  absence  of  any  other  ground  of 
defence  ;  and  the  earnest  request  of  his  counsel  for  a  little 
delay,  that  he  might  obtain  witnesses  from  the  part  of  the 
country  where  the  accused  had  lived  and  was  well  known, 
who  would  substantiate  the  fact  of  his  insanity,  of  which 
there  was  already  more  than  suspicion,  was  disregarded. 
Few,  it  is  believed,  at  this  period,  unbiased  by  the  political 
prejudices  of  the  times,  and  examining  the  event  as  a  point 
of  history,  will  read  the  report  of  BeUingham's  trial  without 
being  forced  to  the  conclusion,  that  he  was  really  mad,  or,  at 
the  very  least,  that  the  little  evidence  w^hich  did  appear  rela- 
tive to  his  state  of  mind,  was  strong  enough  to  have  entitled 
him  to  a  deliberate  and  thorough  investigation  of  his  case. 
Mr.  Simpson,!  after  mentioning  the  case  of  Howison,  who 
was  tried  and  executed  for  the  murder  of  the  widow  Geddes, 
in  which  the  evidence  of  his  insanity  was  so  strong,  that  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  conceive  what  additional  evidence  could 
make  it  stronger,  states,  that  "application  was  made  without 
success  to  the  secretary  of  state,  by  Hovvison's  law-agent,  for 
time  to  obtain  further  evidence  of  his  insanity.  To  this  that 
gentleman  was  emboldened,  by  receiving  the  concurring 
opinions  of  some  of  the  first  medical  men  in  Edinburgh,  who 
had  not  been  cited,  that  even  the  evidence  adduced  on  the 
trial  was  sufficient;  but  that,  when  several  post-judicial  facts 
were  added,  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  unhappy  man 
was  not  a  fit  subject  for  punishment." 

§  47.  Cases  like  these  ought  to  convince  us,  that  the  feelings 
of  horror  and  vengeance  excited  by  the  bloody  deeds  of  the 
insane,  completely  unfit  the  popular  mind  for  a  careful  and 
impartial  investigation  of  the  plea  of  insanity,  and  that  the 
mental  condition  of  the  accused  should  be  examined  by  men 
who  have  become  fitted  for  such  duties  by  a  peculiar  course 
of  study  and  experience.  Is  it  necessary  to  go  into  a  labored 
argument  lO  prove  that  this  method  of  determining  the  grave 


^  Homicidal  Insanity,  222. 


70  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

and  delicate  question  of  insanity  must  be  infinitely  more 
satisfactory,  than  that  of  summoning  medical  witnesses  to 
the  trial  —  most  of  whom  have  but  very  imperfect  notions  of 
the  disease,  and  probably  have  not  had  the  least  communi- 
cation with  the  accused,  —  and  forcing  out  their  evidence, 
amid  the  embarrassment  produced  by  the  queries  of  ingenious 
counsel,  bent  on  puzzling  and  distracting  their  minds?  If  a 
physician,  after  listening  to  divers  vague  and  rambling  details 
concerniiTg  a  person's  ill-health,  and  looking  at  him  across  the 
apartment,  without  being  permitted  to  address  to  him  a  sin- 
gle word,  or  lay  a  finger  on  his  person,  should  then  be  re- 
quired, to  say  on  his  oath,  whether  or  not  the  individual  in 
question  were  laboring  under  inflammation  of  the  lungs, 
bowels,  or  kidneys,  he  would  scarcely  restrain  a  smile  at  the 
stupidity  which  should  expect  a  satisfactory  answer.  And 
yet,  absurd  and  foolish  as  such  a  course  would  be  considered 
in  the  abstract,  it  is  the  only  one  recognized  by  our  laws, 
\vhen  the  disease,  whose  existence  is  to  be  established,  hap- 
pens to  be  insanity.  Besides,  where  mental  derangement  is 
suspected,  there  are  many  physical  symptoms  and  numerous 
other  circumstances  that  cannot  be  investigated  in  an  hour  or 
a  day,  but  require  a  course  of  diligent  observation  that  may 
occupy  weeks  or  months,  before  the  suspicion  can  be  con- 
firmed or  disproved.  From  these  considerations,  the  general 
conclusion  is,  that  in  criminal  cases  where  insanity  is  pleaded 
in  defence,  the  ends  of  justice  would  be  best  promoted  by  the 
appointment  of  a  special  commission,  consisting  of  men  who 
possess  a  well-earned  reputation  in  the  knowledge  and  man- 
agement of  mental  derangement,  who  should  proceed  to  the 
examination  of  the  accused  with  the  coolness  and  impar- 
tiality proper  to  scientific  inquiries.^ 


*  It  may  be  proper,  perhaps,  to  inform  the  reader  that  the  exclusive  com- 
petence of  medical  men  to  give  opinions,  as  experts,  in  cases  of  doubtful  con- 
dition of  mind,  has,  at  dillerent  times,  been  warmly  disputed.  The  celebra- 
ted Kant,  by  whom  the  dispute  was  begun,  contended  that  such  cases  ought 
more  properly  to  be  submitted  to  the  Philosophical  Faculty.  {Antliropologie, 
§  41.)     Ilis  arguments  were  satisfactorily  answered  by  Metzger  (Gerichtl 


PRELIMINARY   VIEWS.  71 

§  48.  To  facilitate  the  inquiries  of  such  a  commission, 
there  is  needed  some  suitable  provision  for  the  examination 
of  the  accused.  Indeed,  with  every  disposition  to  arrive  at 
the  truth,  it  is  generally  impossible  under  the  present  arrange- 
ments. In  jails,  where  prisoners  accused  of  crime  are  con- 
fined, proper  opportunities  are  not  afforded  for  investigating 
their  mental  condition.  In  the  few  formal  interviews  to 
which  the  observation  of  the  prisoner  is  confined,  it  may 
often  happen  that  the  real  condition  of  the  mind  \^Jill  not  be 
discovered.  If  really  insane,  he  will  be  likely  to  control  his 
movements,  and  to  discourse  and  appear  very  differently 
from  w^hat  he  would  when  left  to  himself  and  unconscious  of 
being  observed.  Many  insane,  as  we  have  already  shown, 
manifest  their  aberration  only  under  certain  circumstances 
and  on  particular  occasions,  and  appear  quite  correct  at  all 
other  times.  Many,  too,  whose  insanity  is  recognized  by 
everybody  who  knows  them,  never  evince  it  in  their  dis- 
course, but  solely  in  their  ways  and  habits.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  prisoner  is  feigning  insanity,  he  will  summon  all 


medic.  Abhand.  s.  74),  Hoffbauer  (7)/e  Psycologie  in  ihren  Anwendunrjen 
duf  die  Rechtspflege^  §  1,  not.  3),  and  others,  *and  the  controversy  was  set  at 
rest  until  the  trial  of  Henriette  Cornier,  at  Paris,  which  led  to  its  revival  with 
renewed  vigor.  Coste,  a  French  physician  (Journ.  univer.  des  Scien.  vied.  t. 
43,^.  53),  and  Regnault,  a  Parisian  advocate,  who  wrote  a  book  on  the  sub- 
ject (Dw  degree  de  competence  des  medicins  dans  les  questions  relatives  aux 
alie'nalion  mentale,  1828),  have  hotly  contended  that  any  tolerably  sensible, 
well-informed  man  is  as  competent  as  a  Pinel  or  an  Esqulrol,  to  form  opin- 
ions for  judicial  purposes,  relative  to  cases  of  doubtful  condition  of  mind. 
The  arguments  —  or,  more  properly  speaking,  the  assumptions  and  declama- 
tion—  of  these  wi'iters,  have  been  severely  handled  by  their  opponents 
(^Georget,  Nouvelle  Discussion  medico  legale  sur  la  folic,  p.  20;  North  Ameri- 
can Medical  and  Surgical  Journal,  April,  1828,  p.  457  ;  Friedreich,  Hand- 
buch  der  gericht.  Psycologie ;  Leuret,  Annals,  d" Hygiene,  i.  281  ;  Royer-Col- 
lard  Journ.  hebd.  ii.  181),  and  the  controversy  may  be  considered  as  once 
more  at  rest,  precisely  where  it  was  found.  We  have  not  thought  it  worth 
while  to  discuss  this  question,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  objections  against 
receiving  the  opinions  of  physicians,  as  experts,  are  altogether  founded  in 
gross  ignorance,  misconception,  and  prejudice,  without  even  a  plausible  show 
of  support. 


72  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

his  powers  to  produce  the  requisite  impression  at  these  inter- 
views, which  being  short  and  few,  the  difficulty  of  his  task  is 
much  Icsj^ened.  To  ascertain  satisfactorily  the  mental  condi- 
tion of  a  prisoner  suspected  of  being  insane,  he  should  be 
placed  where  the  expert  may  be  able  to  see  him  often,  and  at 
times  when  he  is  not  aware  of  being  observed.  His  words, 
and  acts,  and  movements,  his  manners  and  habits  should  be 
systematically  watched,  and  a  single  day  of  such  observation 
would  often  throw  more  light  on  the  case  than  many  formal 
interviews.  We  see  no  difficulty  in  so  changing  our  modes 
of  criminal  procedure,  that  when  the  court  shall  be  satisfied 
that  there  are  reasonable  doubts  of  the  prisoner's  sanity,  it 
may  be  authorized  to  postpone  the  trial,  and  place  him,  in 
the  mean  time,  in  the  charge  of  an  expert  —  for  which  our 
hospitals  for  the  insane  furnish  a  convenient  and  suitable 
opportunity  —  whose  report  shall  be  received  in  evidence  at 
the  trial.  This  is  substantially  the  course  adopted  in  France, 
and  nothing  short  of  its  adoption  with  us,  will  render  the 
plea  of  insanity  powerless  for  evil,  and  remove  the  suspicions 
of  the  community  on  this  point. 

§  49.  If  the  above  hasty  review  of  the  judicial  opinions 
and  practices  that  have  hitherto  prevailed  relative  to  insanity, 
have  left  the  impression,  that  this  disease  is  as  yet  but  imper- 
fectly understood,  as  well  in  the  medical  profession  as  out  of 
it,  an  explanation  of  this  fact  may  perhaps  be  demanded; 
but  as  it  would  be  hardly  relevant  to  the  present  purpose  to 
enter  largely  into  a  discussion  of  this  point,  nothing  more 
will  be  attempted  than  merely  to  indicate  what  seems  to 
have  had  the  principal  share  in  producing  it.  To  explain, 
the  little  progress,  comparatively  speaking,  that  has  been 
made  by  medical  men  in  the  knowledge  of  insanity,  it  is  too 
much  the  fashion  to  allege,  that  they  have  neglected  the 
study  of  mental  philosophy,  or  that  of  mind  in  the  healthy 
state,  which  is  indispensable  to  correct  notions  on  the  disor- 
dered condition  of  mind.  So  far,  however,  is  the  fact  here 
indicated  from  being  true,  generally,  that  one  cannot  hesi- 
tate to  say,  that  the  result  in  question  has  been  owing  to  the 
undue  account  that  physicians  have  made  of  the  popular  phi- 


PEELIMINAEY   VIEWS.  73 

losophy  of  mind,  in  explaining  the  phenomena  of  insanity, 
and  that  they  have  failed  in  consequence  of  studying  meta- 
physics too  much  instead  of  too  little.  While  it  is  admitted 
that  the  knowledge  of  healthy  structure  and  functions  is 
necessary  to  a  thorough  understanding  of  diseased  structure 
and  functions,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe,  that  the  con- 
verse of  the  proposition  is  equally  true ;  neither  can  be  suc- 
cessfully studied  independently  of  the  other.  In  the  prose- 
cution of  psychological  science,  this  latter  truth  has  been 
almost  entirely  disregarded,  and  therefore  it  is,  that  we  see 
the  metaphysician  looking  for  his  facts  and  his  theories  in 
the  healthy  manifestations  of  the  mind,  and  directed  in  his 
course  solely  by  his  own  self-consciousness,  w^hile  the  stu- 
dent of  insanity,  after  collecting  his  facts  with  commendable 
diligence  and  discrimination,  amid  the  disorder  and  irregu- 
larity of  disease,  resorts  to  the  theories  of  the  former,  for  the 
purpose  of  generalizing  his  results,  instead  of  building  upon 
them  a  philosophy  of  his  own.  Metaphysics,  in  its  present 
condition,  is  utterly  incompetent  to  furnish  a  satisfactory  ex- 
planation of  the  phenomena  of  insanity,  and  a  more  deplora- 
ble waste  of  ingenuity  can  hardly  be  imagined,  th^n  is  wit- 
nessed in  the  modern  attempts  to  reconcile  the  facts  of  the 
one  with  the  speculations  of  the  other.  In  proof  of  the  truth 
of  these  assertions,  it  is  enough  barely  to  mention,  that  the 
existence  of  monomania,  as  a  distinct  form  of  mental  de- 
rangement, was  denied,  and  declared  to  be  a  fiction  of  medi- 
cal men,  long  after  it  had  taken  its  place  among  the  estab- 
lished truths  of  science ;  because,  probably,  it  was  a  condition 
of  mind  not  described  by  metaphysical  writers.  All  this, 
however,  is  in  accordance  with  a  well-known  law  of  the 
human  mind,  which  resists  important  innovations  upon  the 
common  modes  of  thinking  till  long  after  they  shall  have 
been  required  by  the  general  progress  of  knowledge.  The 
dominant  philosophy  has  prevailed  so  long  and  so  exten- 
sively, and  has  become  so  firmly  rooted  in  men's  minds  that 
they  who  refuse  to  take  it  on  trust  and  who  seriously  inquire 
into  its  foundations,  and  after  finding  them  too  narrow  and 
imperfect,  are  bold  enough  to  endeavor  to  remedy  its  defects 

7 


74  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

by  laying  foundations  of  their  own,  are  stigmatized  as  vis- 
ionaries, and  overwhelmed  with  ridicule  and  censure.  The 
only  metaphysical  system  of  modern  times  which  professes 
to  be  founded  on  the  observation  of  nature,  and  which  really 
does  explain  the  phenomena  of  insanity  with  a  clearness  and 
versimilitude  that  strongly  corroborate  its  proofs,  was  so  far 
from  being  joyfully  welcomed,  that  it  is  still  confined  to  a 
sect,  and  is  regarded,  by  the  world  at  large,  as  one  of  those 
strange  vagaries  in  which  the  human  mind  has  sometimes 
loved  to  indulge.  So  true  it  is,  that,  in  theory,  all  mankind 
are  agreed  in  encouraging  and  applauding  the  humblest 
attempt  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  our  ideas,  while,  in  practice, 
it  often  seems  as  if  they  were  no  less  agreed  to  crush  them 
by  means  of  every  weapon  that  wit,  argument,  and  calumny 
can  furnish.  In  the  course  of  this  work,  the  reader  will  have 
frequent  occasions  to  see  how  the  popular  misconceptions,  — 
which  are  too  much  adopted  by  professional  men  —  of  the 
nature  of  various  forms  of  mental  derangement,  have  been 
produced  and  fostered  by  the  current  metaphysical  doctrines, 
and  thus  may  have  some  means  of  judging  for  himself,  how 
far  the  imperfect  notions  of  insanity,  that  are  yet  prevalent, 
may  be  attributed  to  the  cause  above  assigned. 


CHAPTER    I. 


MENTAL  DISEASES   IN   GENERAL. 


§  50.  CoERECT  ideas  of  the  pathology  of  insanity  are  not 
unessential  to  the  progress  of  enlightened  views  respecting 
its  legal  relations.  If  it  be  considered  as  withdrawn  from  the 
influence  of  the  common  laws  of  nature  in  the  production  of 
disease,  and  attributed  to  the  direct  visitation  of  God  ;  if  the 
existence  of  physical  changes  be  overlooked  or  denied,  and 
be  referred  exclusively  to  some  mysterious  affection  of  the 
immaterial  spirit  for  its  cause;  then  is  it  in  vain  to  hope,  that 
such  a  condition  can  ever  be  the  object  of  discriminating, 
salutary  legislation.  In  the  prevalence  of  such  views  in  past 
times,  however,  we  may  look  for  the  cause  of  much  of  the 
error  and  absurdity  that  pervade  the  law  of  insanity,  and 
that  are  equally  at  variance  with  the  principles  of  science 
and  the  dictates  of  humanity.  It  is  an  undoubted  truth,  that 
the  manifestations  of  the  intellect,  and  those  of  the  senti- 
ments, propensities,  and  passions,  or  generally,  of  the  intel- 
lectual and  affective  powers,  are  connected  with  and  depend- 
ent upon  the  brain.  It  follows,  then,  that  abnormal  condi- 
tions of  these  powers  are  equally  connected  with  abnormal 
conditions  of  the  brain ;  but  this  is  not  merely  a  matter  of 
inference.  The  dissections  of  many  eminent  observers, 
among  whom  it  is  enough  to  mention  the  names  of  Gre- 
ding.  Gall,  and  Spurzheim,  Calmeil,  Foville,  Falret,  Bayle, 
Esquirol,  and  Georget,  have  placed  it  beyond  a  doubt ;  and 
no  pathological  fact  is  better  established  —  though  its  cor- 
rectness was  for  a  long  while  doubted  —  than  that  deviations 
from  the  healthy  structure  are  generally  presented  in  the 
brains  of  insane  subjects.     In  the  few  cases  where  such  ap- 


76  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

pearances  have  not  been  observed,  it  is  justly  concluded  that 
death  took  place  before  the  deviation  was  sufficiently  great 
to  be  perceptible,  —  a  phenomenon  not  rare  in  affections  of 
other  organs. 

§  51.  These  pathological  changes  are  not  sufficiently  defi- 
nite to  admit  of  classification,  or  of  practical  application  in 
the  treatment  of  the  various  kinds  of  insanity;  but  we  learn 
from  them,  that  changes  of  structure  may  proceed  in  the 
brain,  as  in  other  organs,  to  an  incurable  degree,  without  giv- 
ing rise  to  much,  if  any,  very  perceptible  disturbance  of  its 
functions,  until  some  striking  and  unexpected  act  leads  the 
enlightened  physician  to  suspect  its  existence,  and  draws 
down  upon  the  unfortunate  subject  the  restraints  and  penal- 
ties of  the  law. 

§  52.  A  natural  classification  of  the  various  forms  of  in- 
sanity, though  of  secondary  importance  in  regard  to  its  medi- 
cal treatment,  will  be  of  eminent  service  to  the  legal  inquirer, 
by  enlarging  his  notions  of  its  phenomena,  and  enabling  him 
to  discriminate,  where  discrimination  is  necessary  to  the 
attainment  of  important  ends.  The  deplorable  consequences 
of  knowing  but  one  kind  of  insanity,  and  of  erecting  that 
into  a  standard,  whereby  every  other  is  to  be  compared  and 
tested,  are  too  common  in  the  records  of  criminal  jurispru- 
dence ;  and  it  is  time  that  it  were  well  understood,  that  the 
philosophy  of  such  a  method  is  no  better  than  would  be  that 
of  the  physician  who  should  recognize  no  diseases  of  the 
stomach,  for  instance,  but  such  as  proceeds  from  inflamma- 
,  tion,  and  reject  all  others  as  anomalous  and  unworthy  of 
attention.  The  various  diseases  included  in  the  general  term 
insanity,  or  mental  derangement,  may  be  conveniently  ar- 
ranged under  two  divisions,  founded  on  two  very  different 
conditions  of  the  brain ;  the  first  being  a  want  of  its  ordi- 
nary development,  and  the  second,  some  lesion  of  its  struc- 
ture subsequent  to  its  development.  In  the  former  of  these 
divisions,  we  have  idiocy  and  imbecility,  differing  from  each 
other  only  in  degree.  The  various  affections  embraced  in 
the  latter  general  division  may  be  arranged  under  two  subdi- 
visions, MANIA  and  DEMENTIA,  distinguished  by  the  contrast 


MENTAL  DISEASES   IN   GENERAL. 


77 


they  present  in  the  energy  and  tone  of  the  mental  manifesta- 
tions. Mania  is  characterized  by  unnatural  exaltation  or 
depression  of  the  faculties,  and  may  be  chiefly  confined  to 
the  intellectual  or  to  the  affective  powers,  or  it  may  involve 
them  both;  and  these  powers  may  be  generally  or  partially 
deranged.  Dementia  depends  on  a  more  or  less  complete 
enfeeblement  of  the  faculties,  and  may  be  consecutive  to 
injury  of  the  brain,  to  mania,  or  to  some  other  disease ;  or  it 
may  be  connected  with  the  decay  of  old  age.  These  divis- 
ions will  be  more  conveniently  exhibited  in  the  following 
tabular  view. 


Defective 
develop- 
ment of 
the  facul- 
ties. 


Idiocy. 


Imbecility 


Insanity. -( 


Lesion  of ' 
the  facul- 
ties sub- 
sequent 
to  their 
develop- 
ment. 


Mania. 


Dementia. 


L 


w 


Resulting  from  congenital  defect. 
2.  Resulting  from  an  obstacle  to  the 
development  of  the  faculties, 
supervening  in  infancy. 


n- 


Resulting  from  congenital  defect. 

Resulting  from  an  obstacle  to  the 
development  of  the  faculties, 
supervening  in  infancy. 


Intellectual. 


Affective. 


^  1.  General. 
I  2.  Partial. 

^  1.  General. 
(  2.  Partial. 


I 

(  1.  Consecutive  to  mania,  or  injuries 

-|  of  the  brain. 

(  2.  Senile,  peculiar  to  old  age. 


§  53.  It  is  not  pretended  that  any  classification  can  be  rig- 
orously correct ;  for  such  divisions  have  not  been  made  by 
nature,  and  cannot  be  observed  in  practice.  Diseases  are 
naturally  associated  into  some  general  groups  only ;  and  if 
these  be  ascertained  and  brought  into  view,  the  great  end  of 
classification  is  accomplished.  We  shall  often  find  them 
running  into  one  another,  and  be  puzzled  to  assign  to  a 
particular  disease  its  proper  place ;  but  since  such  is  the 
order  of  nature,  we  must  make  the  most  of  the  good  it  pre- 
sents, and  remedy  its  evils  in  the  best  manner  we  can.  j  The 
above  arrangement,  with  the  exception  of  some  slight  modi- 
fications, is  that  adopted  by  Esquirol,  and  has  this  advantage 


78  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

over  some  others,  that  it  preserves  the  divisions  made  by 
natm-e,  and  will  thus  be  serviceable  to  our  present  purpose. 
Several  other  conditions  of  mind  in  which  moral  freedom  is 
impaired,  will  also  be  considered,  though  they  cannot  be 
strictly  called  insanity. 


CHAPTER   II. 


IDIOCY. 


§  54.  Idiocy  is  that  condition  of  mind,  in  which  the  re- 
flective, and  all  or  a  part  of  the  affective  powers,  are  either 
entirely  wanting,  or  are  manifested  to  the  slightest  possible 
extent.  As  the  organic  defects  on  which  idiocy  depends, 
are  various  in  kind  and  degree,  and  also  as  it  regards  the 
parts  of  the  brain  affected,  we  should  be  led  to  expect,  what 
observation  shows  is  actually  the  case,  considerable  variety 
in  the  manifestations  of  this  condition.  The  individual  may 
hardly  rise  to  the  level  of  some  of  the  brutes,  his  movements 
being  confined  to  the  necessities  of  the  automatic  life  ;  or  he 
may  be  capable  of  performing  some  useful  services,  of  ex- 
ercising some  talent,  or  of  displaying  some  of  the  higher 
moral  sentiments.  In  short,  there  is  even  more  diversity  in 
the  characters  of  the  idiotic  and  imbecile,  than  in  those  of 
the  sound,  and  this  truth  must  not  be  forgotten,  if  we 
would  avoid  the  flagrant  error  of  regulating  judicial  de- 
cisions by  rules,  which,  though  perfectly  correct  in  regard 
to  one  case  or  set  of  cases,  may  be  wholly  incorrect  in  regard 
to  others. 

§  55.  No  particular  physical  trait  can  be  considered  as 
inseparable  from  idiocy,  although  after  the  period  of  infancy, 
the  physical  organization  never  fails  to  give  notice  of  its 
presence.  In  a  small  number  of  cases,  the  head  presents  no 
deviation  from  the  normal  form  and  size,  but  with  this  excep- 
tion, the  head  is  either  too  large  or  too  small ;  the  tables  of 
the  skull  being  thin  and  distended  with  water,  or  thick,  indu- 
rated, and  uneven.     In  the  former  class,  the  forehead,  though 


80  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

prominent,  is  always  depressed,  and  the  posterior  part  of  the 
head  is  apparently  of  the  regular  size,  while  the  middle  region 
is  more  or  less  distended,  either  laterally  or  upwards.  In  the 
latter  class,  the  depression  is  equally  destitute  of  uniformity. 
Sometimes  it  affects  principally  the  superior  and  anterior 
parts  of  the  head,  producing  a  narrow  and  retreating  fore- 
head ;  in  other  instances,  it  affects  the  posterior  or  occipital 
parts,  the  occipital  curve  being  reduced  to  an  almost  straight 
line ;  in  others,  the  lower  parts  of  the  skull  are  tolerably 
regular,  while  the  upper  appear  to  be  diminished  and  flat- 
tened ;  in  others,  finally,  the  two  sides  of  the  skull  are  exceed- 
ingly unequal.  In  all  these  cases,  the  head  is  found,  by 
measurement,  below  the  ordinary  size.  The  circumference, 
measured  immediately  over  the  orbitar  arch  and  the  most 
prominent  part  of  the  occiput,  is  fixed  by  Gall  at  between 
eleven  and  one  third  and  fourteen  and  a  half  inches,  the  brain, 
consequently,  equalling  that  of  a  new-born  infant,  that  is, 
about  one  fourth,  one  fifth,  or  one  sixth  of  the  cerebral  mass 
of  an  adult.  The  senses  of  idiots  are  more  or  less  imperfect, 
if  not  entirely  wanting.  Some  are  blind,  and  in  nearly  all 
who  see,  the  eye  is  either  in  constant  motion,  unable  to  fix 
its  regards  on  any  particular  object,  or  unnaturally  fixed  and 
not  easily  changing  its  look  from  one  point  to  another.  Many 
are  entirely  deaf,  and  many  more  are  incapable  of  listening. 
Many  are  mute,  and  many  utter  only  wild,  inarticulate  cries. 
Some  speak  slowly  and  with  difficulty,  others  tolerably  well. 
The  sense  of  touch  frequently  exhibits,  an  excess  or  defect  of 
sensibility.  Many  are  incapable  of  perceiving  odors,  and 
have  so  little  taste  as  to  show  no  discrimination  in  their 
choice  of  food,  swallowing  whatever  comes  to  hand.  Their 
movements  are  constrained  and  awkward ;  they  walk  badly, 
easily  falling  down ;  and  are  constantly  dropping  whatever  is 
placed  in  their  hands.  Sometimes  the  limbs  are  crooked  and 
feeble,  and  limited  in  their  motions.  Idiots  are  often  affected 
with  rickets,  epilepsy,  scrofula,  or  paralysis,  their  whole  phy- 
sical economy  indicating  a  depraved  and  defective  consti- 
tution. 

§  56.    In  reasoning  power,  many  idiots  are  below  the  brute. 


IDIOCY.  81 

Unable  to  compare  two  ideas  together,  nothing  leads  them  to 
act  but  the  faint  impressions  of  the  moment,  and  these  are 
often  insufficient  to  induce  them  to  gratify  even  their  instinc- 
tive wants.  It  frequently  happens,  however,  that  some  one 
or  more  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  always  excepting  the 
reflective,  are  manifested  in  more  or  less  perfection.  Among 
the  moral  sentiments,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find  self-esteem, 
love  of  approbation,  religious  veneration,  and  benevolence, 
bearing  a  prominent  part,  if  not  constituting  the  entire  char- 
acter, and  thus  producing  a  slight  approximation  to  human- 
ity. Rush  1  speaks  of  one  who  was  remarkable  for  kindness 
and  affection,  and  spent  his  life  in  acts  of  benevolence, 
though  he  showed  no  one  mark  of  reason.  Dr.  Combe  ^  saw 
two  who,  though  differing  much  in  other  respects,  agreed  in 
evincing  a  strong  predilection  for  religious  worship,  and  for 
listening  to  sermons  and  prayers.  Some  can  recollect  names, 
numbers,  or  historical  facts ;  some  are  capable  of  repeating 
what  they  have  frequently  heard ;  others  are  able  to  sing  a 
few  airs,  and  even  to  play  on  musical  instruments.  Gall  ^ 
saw  one  at  Hamburg,  sixteen  years  old,  who  learned  names, 
dates,  numbers,  history,  and  repeated  them  all  mechanically, 
but  was  destitute  of  all  power  of  combining  and  comparing 
his  ideas,  and  was  incapable  of  being  engaged  in  any  em- 
ployment. Various  propensities,  such  as  amativeness,  cun- 
ning, and  destructiveness,  they  often  manifest  in  an  inordi- 
nate degree  of  vigor  and  activity. 

§  57.  It  has  been  reserved  for  our  own  times  to  prove,  on 
a  large  scale,  that  these  defective  beings  are  not  beyond  the 
reach  of  education.  Under  the  united  efforts  of  science  and 
philanthropy,  the  lowest  have  been  raised  some  steps  in  the 
scale  of  being,  and  those  less  unhappily  endow^ed  have 
showed  an  improvement  in  their  personal  habits,  in  the 
number  of  their  ideas,  and  their  capacity  for  useful  employ- 


^  Medical' Inquiries. 

*  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  243. 

^  Sur  les  Fonctions,  i.  193. 


82  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ment,  that  would  once  have  appeared  quite  incredible.  It  is 
not  supposed  that  education  can  ever  efface  the  distinction 
between  them  and  ordinary  men,  but  small  as  its  results  may 
be  comparatively,  they  are  enough  to  be  of  some  medico- 
legal importance. 

§  58.  In  that  form  of  idiocy  called  cretinism,  which  is 
endemic  in  the  Alps,  and  some  other  mountainous  countries, 
opportunities  of  observing  its  phenomena  are  offered  on  a 
grand  scale.  The  difference  in  the  degrees  of  this  affection 
has  led  to  its  division  into  three  classes,  namely,  cretinism, 
semi-cretinism,  and  cretinism  of  the  third  degree.  In  the 
first,  life  seems  to  be  almost  entirely  automatic ;  most  of  its 
subjects  are  unable  to  speak,  their  senses  are  dull,  if  not  alto- 
gether wanting,  and  nothing  but  the  most  urgent  calls  of 
nature  excite  their  attention.  To  good  or  to  bad  treatment 
they  are  equally  insensible.  The  semi-cretins  show  some 
glimmering  of  a  higher  nature ;  they  note  what  passes 
around ;  they  remember  simple  events ;  and  make  use  of 
language  to  express  their  wants.  They  are  capable  of  little 
else,  however,  for  they  have  no  idea  of  numbers,  and,  though 
taught  to  repeat  certain  passages,  they  learn  nothing  of  their 
meaning.  The  actions  of  those  of  the  third  kind  indicate  a 
still  higher  degree  of  intellect ;  they  have  a  stronger  memory 
of  events,  and  they  learn  to  read  and  write,  though  with 
scarcely  any  conception  of  the  purposes  of  either.  Particu- 
lar talents  are  often  displayed  by  them  in  a  very  respectable 
degree.  Music,  drawing,  painting  machinery,  etc.,  have  each 
had  its  followers  in  a  humble  way,  among  these  cretins.  In 
the  construction  of  some  parts  of  a  watch,  they  are  often 
employed  in  Geneva,  and  their  work  is  characterized  by  neat- 
ness. Others  have  executed  drawings  of  some  merit,  and 
some  have  even  studied  several  languages,  in  which  their 
acquisitions  were  by  no  means  insignificant;  while  others 
have  even  attempted  poetry,  though  succeeding  in  nothing 
but  the  rhyme.  Though,  in  all  degrees  of  idiocy,  the  intel- 
lectual powers  are  so  deficient  as  hardly  to  be  recognized, 
and  therefore  these   distinctions   can   be   of  little  practical 


IDIOCY.  83 

importance,  yet  they  may  serve  to  teach  us  how  independent 
of  one  another  are  the  various  moral  and  intellectual  facul- 
ties, and  lead  us  to  be  cautious  how  we  infer  the  soundness 
or  capacity  of  the  whole  mind,  from  the  perfection  mani- 
fested by  one  or  two  of  its  faculties. 


CHAPTER    III 


IMBECILITY. 


§  59.  By  imbecility  is  meant  an  abnormal  deficiency 
either  in  those  faculties  that  acquaint  us  with  the  qualities 
and  ordinary  relations  of  things,  or  in  those  which  furnish  us 
with  the  moral  motives  that  regulate  our  relations  and  con- 
duct towards  our  fellow  rrien ;  and  frequently  attended  with 
excessive  activity  of  one  or  more  of  the  animal  propensities. 
In  imbecility  the  development  of  the  moral  and  intellectual 
powers  is  arrested  at  an  early  period  of  existence.  It  differs 
from  idiocy  in  the  circumstance,  that  while  in  the  latter  there 
is  an  almost  utter  destitution  of  every  thing  like  reason,  the 
subjects  of  the  former  possess  some  intellectual  capacity, 
though  far  less  than  is  possessed  by  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind. Imbeciles  can  never  attain  that  degree  of  knowledge 
which  is  common  among  people  of  their  own  rank  and  op- 
portunities, though  it  is  very  certain  that  they  are  not  entirely 
unsusceptible  of  the  influences  of  education.  They  are  capa- 
ble of  forming  a  few  simple  ideas  and  of  expressing  them  in 
language ;  they  have  some  memory  and  a  sense  of  the  con- 
veniences and  proprieties  of  life.  Many  of  them  learn  to 
read,  write,  and  count,  and  make  some  progress  in  music, 
though,  for  the  most  part,  they  are  untaught  and  employed  in 
the  coarsest  and  rudest  labors.  Their  moral  and  intellectual 
character  presents  the  same  infinite  variety  that  is  witnessed 
in  the  normal  state  of  the  mind.  While  some  are  changing 
their  plans  and  resolutions  with  the  fickleness  of  the  winds, 
others  have  some  favorite  project  which  they  are  bent  on 
accomplishing.  While  nothing  can  arrest  the  attention  of 
some    for    a    moment,   others    pertinaciously    retain    some 


IMBECILITY.  85 

crotchet  that  occupies  nearly  all  their  thoughts.  Some 
engage  in  certain  occupations,  and  manage  to  take  care  of 
themselves  and  their  property,  though  frequently  obliged  to 
resort  to  others  for  advice  and  assistance.  They  talk  but 
little,  and  will  answer  questions  correctly,  provided  they  are 
not  without  the  circle  of  their  customary  thoughts  and  habits, 
and  are  not  required  to  follow  a  conversation.  They  are 
particularly  deficient  in  forethought  and  in  strong  and  dura- 
ble affections,  and  they  generally  labor  under  a  certain  unea- 
siness and  restlessness  of  disposition  that  unfit  them  for 
steady  employment.  They  are  thus  easily  induced  by  bad 
men  to  assist  in  the  execution  of  their  criminal  enterprises. 
It  is  also  worthy  of  notice  that  the  same  physical  imperfec- 
tions and  a  tendency  to  the  same  diseases  which  accompany 
idiocy,  are  generally  observed,  though  in  a  less  degree,  in 
imbecility. 

§  60.  Much  as  the  moral  and  intellectual  powers  vary  in 
the  different  cases,  but  little  has  been  done  towards  distin- 
guishing the  various  degrees  of  imbecility,  by  a  system  of 
classification,  though  it  must  be  obvious  atfirst  sight,  that 
something  of  this  kind  is  absolutely  necessary  before  its  legal 
relations  can  be  determined  with  much  correctness  or  coh- 
sistency.  Hoffbauer^  alone  has  made  an  attempt  to  supply 
this  want,  and  though  perhaps  not  perfectly  satisfactory,  as 
might  have  been  expected  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  yet 
it  evinces  such  a  correct  appreciation  of  mental  diversities, 
and  so  much  ability  in  the  analysis  of  deficient  understand- 
ings, that  it  would  be  doing  injustice  to  the  subject,  to  neglect 
giving  some  account  of  his  views  in  this  place. 

§  61.  Mental  deficiency  is  manifested  under  two  different 
forms  which  Hoffbauer  designates  by  the  terms  imbecility 
{Blddsinn),  and  stupidity  {Dumheit).  The  former  consists 
in  a  defect  of  the  intensity,  the  latter  in  a  defect  of  the  ex- 
tensity,  necessary  to  a  sound  and  healthy  mind.    By  intensity 


^  Die   Psychologie  in   ihren   Hauptanwendungen  auf  die  Rechtspflege, 
I  26-46. 

8 


86  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

is  meant  the  power  of  the  mind  to  examine  the  data  pre- 
sented to  it  by  the  sent^es,  and  therefrom  to  deduce  correct 
judgments ;  by  its  extensity,  the  mind  perceives  and  em- 
braces these  data,  and  suff'ers  none  to  escape,  —  one,  it  may 
be  added,  is  the  reflective;  the  other,  the  perceptive  power. 

§  62,  "  In  reference  to  the  faculty  of  judgment,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, that  the  stupid  person  is  more  liable  than  the  imbecile 
to  form  erroneous  decisions ;  the  latter  experiences  great 
difficulty  in  bringing  himself  to  any  conclusion.  Secondly, 
the  stupid  person  sometimes  judges  very  correctly  on  subjects 
to  which  his  attention  has  been  strongly  applied ;  occasion- 
ally he  surpasses,  in  this  respect,  those  of  superior  intelligence. 
When  he  judges  wrongly,  it  is  through  neglect  of  some  of 
the  considerations  which  ought  to  have  formed  the  ground- 
work of  his  judgment,  and  he  w^ill  say,  in  order  to  excuse 
himself,  that  '  he  never  should  have  dreamed  of  this  or  that 
circumstance.'  To  the  imbecile,  on  the  contrary,  the  most 
simple  act  of  judgment  is  difficult.  A  lady,  for  instance,  who 
said  she  was  twenty-five  years  of  age,  and  had  been  married 
six  years,  could  not,  after  many  efforts,  tell  how  old  she  was 
at  the  period  of  her  wedding ;  at  one  time  calling  it  twenty, 
at  another,  twenty-two.  Thirdly,  the  stupid  man  may  often 
be  induced  to  correct  his  mistake;  some  simple  reason,  or 
particular  circumstance  being  suggested  to  him  which  leads 
to  its  detection.  The  imbecile  man  can  scarcely  rectify  his 
errors,  being  unable  sufficiently  to  concentrate  his  attention 
on  any  particular  subject.  Fourthly,  the  stupid  man,  in 
recovering  from  his  error,  frequently  falls  into  the  opposite 
extreme,  passing  from  the  blindest  confidence  to  the  most 
jealous  distrust,  because  he  views  every  subject  on  one  side 
only,  and  is  embarrassed  by  every  complex  idea. 

§  63.  "In  relation  also  to  memory, there  is  a  decided  differ- 
ence between  the  stupid  and  the  imbecile.  The  latter  appear 
to  be  almost  entirely  deficient  in  this  faculty,  while  the  for- 
mer recollect  after  a  long  interval  of  time,  and  with  tolerable 
accuracy,  some  insulated  circumstances. 

§  64.  "  Weakness  of  intellect  is  displayed  in  both  these 
classes,  when  their  defect  is  excessive,  by  a  propensity  to  talk 


IMBECILITY.  87 

to  themselves.  This  is  mostly  observable  when  the  individ- 
ual is  alone,  or  supposes  himself  alone.  In  reality,  we  em- 
ploy words,  not  merely  for  purposes  of  intercourse,  but  as 
an  instrument  of  thought;  and  when  the  mind  is  morbidly 
enfeebled,  the  silent  and  unperceived,  or  mental  employment 
of  words  is  insufficient;  they  must  be  repeated  more  or  less 
audibly.  This  practice  is  not  uncommon  with  imbecile  and 
stupid  people,  but  when  in  company,  they  generally  perceive 
its  incongruity  and  abstain  from  it.  If,  however,  such  indi- 
viduals talk  to  themselves,  knowing  that  they  are  in  the  pres- 
ence of  company,  it  is  a  proof  of  greater  deficiency. 

§  65.  "  Another  distinction  between  the  imbecile  and  the 
stupid  person  is,  that  the  latter  imagines  himself  equal,  if  not 
superior,  to  other  men  in  intelligence ;  whereas  the  former  is 
sensible  of  his  defect,  and  even  exaggerates  it.  Hence  results 
another  difference  between  the  stupid  and  the  imbecile  per- 
son. The  former  acts  precipitately  and  without  reflection  ; 
the  latter  never  can  make  up  his  mind,  even  on  the  simplest 
affair,  from  the  fear  that  there  may  be  consequences  which 
he  is  incapable  of  foreseeing.  The  imbecile  is  frequently 
timid,  and  even  misanthropic  ;  not  only  because  he  is  con- 
scious of  his  deficiency,  but  because  he  has  a  disagreeable 
experience  of  the  superiority  of  others.  When  this  is  the 
cause  of  his  jealous  distrust,  we  observe,  first,  that  he  reposes 
^unlimited  confidence  in  those  whose  benevolence  he  has  ex- 
perienced ;  secondly,  that  when  his  condition  in  society  places 
him  beyond  the  reach  of  injury,  he  has  none  of  this  mis- 
anthropy of  which  we  speak,  and  is  at  peace  with  all  the 
world.  The  pusillanimity  and  misanthropy  of  the  imbecile 
lead  them  to  a  species  of  devotion,  if  such  it  may  be  called  ; 
for  it  is  natural  that,  on  seeing  themselves  repulsed,  or  ill- 
treated  by  men,  they  should  apply  to  the  deity  for  support. 
The  stupid,  more  confident  in  themselves,  fancy  that  they 
acquire  merit  by  their  devotions,  or  confer  an  honor  on  the 
divinity." 

§  66.  Hoffbauer,  while  he  acknowledges  the  various  and 
almost  imperceptible  shades  of  difference  between  one  case 
of  imbecility  and  another,  has  reduced  its  numberless  grada- 


bo  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

tions  to  five  degrees,  and  those  of  stupidity  to  three.  To 
these,  as  described  and  explained  by  him,  he  looks  for  the 
means  of  a  consistent  and  rational  application  of  the  legal 
principles  that  should  regulate  their  civil  and  criminal  rela- 
tions. 

§  67.  "  The  first  degree  of  imbecility  manifests  itself  in  the 
inability  to  form  a  judgment  respecting  any  new  object,  even 
when  the  necessary  data  are  furnished,  and  the  question  is 
one  which,  in  itself,  presents  no  difficulties.  In  this  degree 
of  the  affection,  the  individual  can  very  well  judge  respecting 
objects  to  which  he  is  daily  accustomed,  and  in  familiarity 
with  which  he  may  be  said  to  have  grown  up.  In  the  pur- 
suit of  his  daily  concerns,  he  often  shows  a  minute  exactness 
that  appears  to  him  a  matter  of  absolute  necessity.  His 
memory  is  very  limited  ;  not  that  he  loses  absolutely  the 
remembrance  of  things,  but  because  he  cannot  apply  his 
recollections  according  to  his  wishes.  He  scrupulously 
observes  whatever  he  thinks  becoming  in  his  situation, 
because  he  fears  to  offend  by  neglecting  it.  When  he  gives 
himself  up  to  avarice,  there  is  observed  in  him  rather  an  ap- 
prehension of  losing  than  a  desire  of  accumulating.  The 
propensity  to  talk  to  himself,  and  the  species  of  devotion  to 
which  we  have  alluded,  is  seldom  to  be  met  with  in  this 
instance;  the  former,  because  the  routine  of  daily  occupa- 
tions, above  which  the  individual  seldom  raises  himself,  makes 
but  small  demands  on  his  intelligence ;  the  latter,  because 
his  infirmity  is  not  so  remarkable  in  ordinary  society  as  to 
render  it  a  subject  of  general  observation,  and  entail  upon 
him  frequent  annoyance,  and  thus  make  him  feel  the  neces- 
sity of  seeking  support  elsewhere.  He  is  very  subject  to 
gusts  of  passion,  which,  nevertheless,  are  as  easily  appeased 
as  they  are  excited." 

The  description  of  the  second  degree  of  imbecility  applies 
to  the  subjects  of  dementia,  which  will  be  considered  in 
another  place  ;  and  it  may  therefore  be  omitted  here. 

§  68.  "  A  person  affected  with  imbecility  in  the  third 
degree,  is  unfitted  for  all  matters  that  require  more  than  a 
mechanical  mode  of  action  ;   but  he  preserves  sufficient  in- 


IMBECILITY.  89 

telliofence  to  be  aware  of  his  weakness  and  of  the  intellectual 
superiority  of  others.  We  may  likewise  remark  in  him  that 
propensity  to  devotion  and  misanthropy  of  which  we  have 
spoken  above.  His  mind  is  not  completely  inactive,  although 
it  cannot  raise  itself  to  any  elevated  views ;  hence  he  has  the 
propensity  to  talk  to  himself.  He  has  not  the  power  of  seiz- 
ing an  idea  so  clearly  as  to  impress  it  on  his  mind  ;  hence  a 
very  marked  defect  of  memory  and  a  great  propensity  to  pass 
rapidly  from  one  topic  to  another.  He  is  very  irritable  and 
suspicious,  fancies  a  design  to  insult  him  v/here  it  is  impos- 
sible, because  his  state  yet  permits  him  to  feel  and  resent  in- 
juries—  of  which  susceptibility  those  about  him  often  take 
advantage  in  order  to  annoy  him. 

§  69.  "  The  fourth  degree  of  imbecility  is  marked  by  a 
clouded  state  of  the  understanding  and  memory,  with  a 
great  insensibility,  which  nevertheless  leaves  the  patient  a 
confused  idea  of  his  weakness.  He  eagerly  seeks  excitement 
by  various  stimuli." 

§  70.  The  fifth  degree  of  imbecility,  as  described  by  HofF- 
bauer,  corresponds  to  the  last  stage  of  dementia,  or  the  fatu- 
ity which  results  from  some  cerebral  diseases,  and  therefore 
does  not  belong  to  this  condition  of  mind  according  to  the 
arrangement  above  adopted. 

§  71,  Stupidity,  generally  speaking,  is  a  defect  less  severe 
than  imbecility,  according  to  fhe  definition  given  of  each. 
The  slightest  degree  of  imbecility,  however,  indicates  an 
imperfection  of  the  intellectual  powers,  less  severe  than  the 
greatest  degree  of  stupidity. 

§  72.  "  In  ihe  first  degree  of  stupidity,  the  individual  is  only 
incapable  of  judging  and  deciding,  when  it  is  necessary  to 
weigh  opposing  motives.  Then  he  feels  his  incapacity,  and 
resorts  to  the  intelligence  of  others,  unless  too  proud,  which 
often  happens.  If  he  acts  absurdly,  it  is  often  because  he 
applies  to  his  actions  a  rule  good  in  itself,  but  the  application 
of  which  requires  other  considerations. 

§  73.  "  The  subject  of  the  second  degree  of  stupidity 
judges  accurately  and  sometimes  even  promptly,  respecting 
things  by  which  he   is   habitually  surrounded ;  but  he  com- 

8* 


90  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

mits  serious  errors  whenever  it  is  necessary  to  exert  a  certain 
vigor  of  judgment.  He  is  embarrassed  in  any  train  of  rea- 
soning, howes'er  simple  it  may  be.  His  memory  is,  perhaps, 
faithful,  but  it  is  slow ;  he  cannot,  without  great  difficulty, 
express  a  complex  idea,  if  it  is  the  result  of  his  own  reflec- 
tions, and  has  not  been  received  from  another.  When  his 
faculties  have  been  somewhat  developed  by  education,  he  is 
an  obstinate  partisan  of  any  thing  which  is,  as  we  say,  good 
in  theory,  but  useless  in  practice;  because  he  cannot  observe 
the  circumstances  that  distinguish  particular  cases,  and  ap- 
preciate them  according  to  their  just  value.  These  two  con- 
ditions are  indispensable,  however,  to  the  proper  application 
of  general  rules. 

§  74.  "  In  the  highest  degi-ee  of  stupidity  the  individual 
cannot  go  beyond  one  single  idea;  and  he  must  completely 
lose  that  one  before  he  can  pass  to  another.  Hence  he  is  less 
capable  of  judging  than  the  imbecile,  because  the  comparison 
of  several  ideas  is  necessary  to  form  a  judgment.  Individuals 
who  are  affected  with  stupidity  in  the  third  degree,  often 
express  themselves  in  half-uttered  words,  return  incessantly 
to  the  same  subject,  make  known  their  ideas  by  sentences, 
short,  incoherent,  and  unfinished,  like  children  who  can  retain 
words  but  do  not  know  how  to  connect  them  together;  they 
often  express  the  subject  and  the  attribute  without  connect- 
ing the  one  to  the  other  by  the  affirmative  or  negative.  If 
they  wish  to  say  'the  rose  is  beautiful,'  they  will  say,  'rose 
beautiful,'  or  only  '  rose,'  or  '  beautiful,'  according  as  the  sub- 
ject or  attribute  strikes  them  most.  Often  they  reverse  the 
natural  order  of  words,  and  say,  for  example, '  rose  beautiful 
is ; '  and  when  they  perceive  an  omission  which  they  wish  to 
repair,  they  become  still  more  perplexed." 

§  75.  It  does  not  need  the  high  authority  of  Esquirol  to 
convince  us,  that  these  distinctions  are  drawn  with  a  minute- 
ness and  show  of  accuracy  that  savor  more  of  the  labors  of 
the  closet  than  of  the  rigid  and  faithful  observation  of  nature. 
This  objection,  however,  which  might  not  have  been  unsus- 
pected by  the  author  himself,  does  not  entirely  destroy  the 
utility  of  his  attempt,  so  long  as  it  is  admitted  to  be  an 


IMBECILITY.  91 

approximation  to  the  truth ;  for,  with  all  its  defects,  it  estab- 
lishes the  important  fact  that  mental  deficiency  is  distin- 
guished by  various  grades  of  intensity,  instead  of  being  inva- 
riably the  same  condition,  and  therefore  that  it  cannot  prop- 
erly be  always  subjected  to  the  same  legal  regulations.  It  ia 
a  material  defect  in  the  above  descriptions,  that  the  state  of 
the  moral  faculties  is  seldom  adverted  to,  though  their  devia- 
tions from  the  normal  condition  are  no  less  striking  than 
those  which  the  intellectual  powers  exhibit.  Whatever  may 
be  their  character,  it  is  obvious  that  their  ordinary  relations 
to  the  intellect  must  be  affected,  and  thus  the  idea  is  forced 
upon  us,  that,  as  accountable  beings,  the  subjects  of  mental 
deficiency  must  be  viewed  in  a  very  different  light  from  that 
in  which  we  are  accustomed  to  regard  those  of  sound  and 
well-developed  minds.  The  observations  of  Georget  on  the 
moral  faculties  of  imbeciles,  partially  supply  this  defect  in 
Hoffbauer's  descriptions,  and  therefore  are  worthy  of  notice 
in  this  connection. 

§  76.  "  In  hospitals  for  the  insane,"  says  he,  "  there  is 
always  a  certain  number  of  imbeciles  who  do  the  coarser 
work  of  the  house,  or  serve  as  domestics  and  assistants  to 
the  regular  officers.  They  become  sufficiently  intelligent,  at 
last,  to  perform  their  duties  well,  to  sweep  the  courts,  carry 
burdens,  move  machines,  execute  simple  commissions,  know 
the  use  of  money,  and  procure  various  enjoyments.  But 
they  have  no  idea,  or  a  very  imperfect  one,  of  society,  laws, 
morality,  courts,  and  trials  ;  and  though  they  may  have  the 
idea  of  property,  they  have  no  conception  of  the  conse- 
quences of  theft.  They  may  have  been  taught  to  refrain 
from  injuring  others,  but  they  are  ignorant  of  what  would  be 
done  to  them  if  guilty  of  incendiarism  or  murder.  Indeed, 
it  is  well  known  how  common  theft  is  among  imbeciles  and 
idiots,  and  for  a  very  obvious  reason.  Some  of  them  have 
no  conception  of  property,  nor  of  the  distinctions  of  meum 
and  tumn;  their  conduct  is  actuated  solely  by  the  fear  of 
punishment,  when  capable  of  experiencing  this  sentiment, 
and  by  their  own  desires.  Others  have  some  notions  of 
property,  but  neither  a  sense  of  morality,  nor  a  fear  of  pun- 


92  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ishment  furnishes  motives  sufficiently  powerful  to  prevent 
thenri  from  stealing.  The  sentiment  of  cunning,  too,  may  be 
very  much  developed,  while  the  other  faculties  are  more  or 
less  deficient.  Among  the  lower  orders  of  society  are  many 
imbeciles  a  little  more  intelligent  than  these,  and  not  consid- 
ered as  utterly  devoid  of  understanding,  who,  nevertheless, 
have  but  vague  and  imperfect  notions  of  social  duties  and  of 
justice.  They  engage  in  occupations  that  require  no  great 
extent  of  intellect,  and  even  in  the  simplest  of  the  mechanic 
arts.  If  they  do  not  pass  among  their  acquaintances  for 
imbeciles,  theji  are  at  least  regarded  as  singular  beings  with 
feeble  understandings,  and  are  teazed  and  tormented  in  innu- 
merable ways.  Many  of  them,  for  want  of  some  powerfully 
restraining  motive,  indulge  in  drinking,  and  become  lazy, 
drunken,  and  dissipated,  and  finally  fall  into  the  hands  of 
justice  in  greater  numbers  than  is  generally  suspected.  They 
steal  adroitly,  and  hence  are  considered  as  very  intelligent ; 
they  recommence  their  offences  the  moment  they  are  released 
from  confinement,  and  thus  are  believed  to  be  obstinately 
perverse ;  they  are  violent  and  passionate,  and  the  slightest 
motive  is  sufficient  to  plunge  them  into  deeds  of  incen- 
diarism and  murder.  Those  who  have  strong  sexual  pro- 
pensities, soon  become  guilty  of  outrages  on  female  chastity. 
I  have  had  occasion  to  see  many  examples  of  .this  class  in 
prisons,  who  had  been  judicially  decided  to  be  rational,  but 
whose  demi-imbecility  was  manifest  enough  to  me."  ^ 

If  this  is  a  correct  representation  of  the  moral  character  of 
the  lesser  grades  of  imbecility  —  and  the  accuracy  and  good 
faith  of  Georget  are  not  to  be  doubted  —  it  may  be  easily 
imagined,  without  the  help  of  further  description,  what  it 
must  be  in  the  higher  degrees. 

§  77.  By  imbecility  is  ordinarily  understood  a  deficiency 
of  intellect;  but  it  has  been  seen  above  (§  59)  that  its  signi- 
fication is   here  extended,  in  order  to  include  that  class  of 


^  Discussion  medico-legale  siir  la  Folie,  140;  and  Des  maladies  mentales, 
considerees  dans  leurs  rapports  avec  la  legislation  civile  et  criminelle,  8. 


IMBECILITY.  93 

subjects  in  whom  the  mental  defect  consists  in  a  great  defi- 
ciency, if  not  utter  destitution  of  the  iiigher  7noral  faculties, 
the  intellectual,  perhaps,  not  being  sensibly  affected.  The 
following  case  will  illustrate  this  form  of  the  disorder. 

§  78.  E.  S.,  aged  thirty-four,  who  had  been  ten  years  an 
inmate  of  the  Richmond  Lunatic  Asylum  in  Dublin,  was 
brought  before  Mr.  George  Combe,  during  a  visit  to  that  insti- 
tution, on  the  20th  of  April,  1829,  to  be  subjected,  with  several 
others,  to  a  phrenological  examination.  A  few  months  after. 
Dr.  Crawford,  the  physician  of  the  asylum,  addressed  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Combe  respecting  this  patient,  from  which  the  follow- 
ing description  is  taken.  "  You  observe  in  your  notes,  '  I 
am  surprised  he  was  not  executed  before  he  became  insane.' 
This  would  lead  to  the  supposition  that  he  had  been  afllicted 
with  some  form  of  insanity,  in  addition  to  a  naturally  de- 
praved character.  Such,  however,  is  by  no  means  the  case  ; 
he  never  was  different  from  what  he  now  is  ;  he  has  never 
evinced  the  slightest  mental  incoherence  on  any  one  point, 
nor  any  kind  of  hallucination.  It  is  one  of  those  cases 
where  there  is  great  difficulty  in  drawing  the  line  between 
extreme  moral  depravity  and  insanity,  and  in  deciding  at 
what  point  an  individual  should  cease  to  be  considered  as  a 
responsible  moral  agent,  and  amenable  to  the  laws.  The 
governors  and  medical  gentlemen  of  the  asylum  have  often 
had  doubts  whether  they  were  justified  in  keeping  E.  S.  as  a 
lunatic,  thinking  him  a  more  fit  subject  for  a  Bridewell.  He 
appears,  however,  so  totally  callous  with  regard  to  every 
moral  principle  and  feeling — so  thoroughly  unconscious  of 
ever  having  done  any  thing  wrong  —  so  completely  destitute 
of  all  sense  of  shame  or  remorse  when  reproved  for  his  vices 
or  crimes  —  and  has  proved  himself  utterly  incorrigible 
throughout  life,  that  it  is  almost  certain  that  any  jury  before 
whom  he  might  be  brought  would  satisfy  their  doubts  by 
returning  him  insane,  which,  in  such  a  case,  is  the  most 
humane  line  to  pursue.  He  was  dismissed  several  times 
from  the  asylum,  and  sent  there  the  last  time  for  attempting 
to  poison  his  father;  and  it  seems  fit  he  should  \fe.  kept  there 
for  life  as  a  moral  lunatic  ;  but  there  has  never  been  the  least 


94r  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

symptom  of  diseased  action  of  the  brain,  which  is  the  general 
concomitant  of  what  is  usually  understood  as  insanity"  ^ 

§  79.  Nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  this  individ- 
ual was  denied  by  nature  the  possession  of  those  moral  facul- 
ties, the  due  development  and  exercise  of  which  constitute 
an  essential  element  of  responsibility.  By  the  aid  of  kind 
and  intelligent  friends,  he  was  secluded  from  scenes  in  which 
he  was  unfitted  to  mingle ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  he  had 
been  suffered  to  go  at  large,  with  his  animal  propensities 
uncontrolled  by  the  higher  powers  of  our  moral  nature,  and 
constantly  meeting  with  opportunities  for  indulgence,  what 
else  could  have  been  expected  but  some  deed  of  violence  that 
would  have  brought  upon  him  the  tender  mercies  of  the  law? 
Dr.  Crawford  is  altogether  too  sanguine  in  believing  that  a 
jury  would  have  pronounced  E.  S.  insane  ;  for  the  melan- 
choly termination  of  the  cases  above  given,  teaches  how  little 
we  can  here  rely  on  the  intelligence  of  courts  and  juries. 
Had  he  committed  a  capital  crime,  he  would  probably  have 
been  condemned  and  executed,  while  the  intelligent  and  the 
educated,  the  philosopher  and  the  man  of  the  world  would, 
for  the  most  part,  have  joined  the  unthinking  populace,  in 
thanking  God,  that  a  monster  of  wickedness  had  fallen  be- 
neath the  arm  of  the  law. 

§  80.  A  striking  illustration  of  this  form  of  mental  de- 
ficiency occurs  in  a  recent  publication.  "  This  person,  aged 
twenty-one,  was  the  son  of  a  very  respectable  farmer,  well 
grown,  and  in  good  general  health.  When  I  saw  him  he 
exhibited  in  his  general  appearance  nothing  noticeable,  except 
a  coarse  and  sullen  expression  of  countenance.  I  learnt, 
from  his  relations  and  a  family  friend,  whose  testimony  bore 
strong  internal  evidence  of  truth,  that  he  had  been  a  singular 
child,  with  obstinate  fancies  —  such  for  instance,  as  refusing 
to  be  dressed  in  the  morning  without  some  absurd  condition 
being  granted.  By  five  years  old  he  was  a  confirmed  liar,  as 
well  as  a  believer  in  his  own  marvellous  assertions.     Byfour- 

5 _^ 

'  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  vi.  147. 


IMBECILITY.  95 

teen  he  had  run  away  from  school,  and  was  domesticated  at 
home,  under  careful,  but  ineffectual,  surveillance.  He  would, 
I  was  told,  at  that  time  obtain,  if  he  could,  any  article  that 
struck  his  fancy,  upon  credit;  then  promptly  throw  it  away 
or  give  it  without  judgment.  As  an  instance  of  defective 
intelligence,  the  following  detail  was  quaintly  given  me: 
'  He  paid  a  visit  to  his  grandfather,  and  during  it,  behaved 
remarkably  well.  But,  then  starting  home  on  his  pony,  he 
went  several  miles  in  an  opposite  direction,  and  visited  his 
old  schoolmaster,  to  whom  he  told  a  false,  but  plausible  tale, 
without  any  apparent  purpose;  thence,  to  another  town, 
equally  without  an  object;  there  he  did  nothing  but  sit  in  an 
inn  ;  then  turning  towards  home,  he  was  found  in  a  lane  cry- 
ing, and  brought  back  to  his  father's  house,  where  he  appears 
to  have  always  been  treated  with  great  kindness  and  no  want  of 
discretion.'  Of  all  the  above  freaks,  he  gives  no  explanation. 
His  conduct  darkened  as  he  grew  older ;  after  turning  into 
money  other  people's  property  as  well  as  his  own,  he  proceeded 
to  forge  checks  of  his  father,  absconding  with  the  cash.  These 
matters  having  been  arranged,  he  was  sent  on  a  voyage  to 
Calcutta;  and  after  having  behaved  well  at  first,  dropped 
into  a  series  of  scrapes  similar  to  the  former.  Subsequently, 
he  enlisted  as  a  common  soldier ;  then  became  a  cabman, 
always  rejoicing  in  the  lowest  company,  but  without  indulg- 
ing to  excess  in  drink  ;  habitually  defrauding  when  he  could, 
his  near  relatives,  and  in  his  other  conduct  towards  them 
equally  remote  from  affectionateness  when  kindly  treated, 
and  from  malignity  when  thwarted.  No  advice  had,  at  any 
time,  the  slightest  effect  on  him.  The  leading  moral  ele- 
ments in  this  young  man  were  a  love  of  acquisition,  and  a 
love  of  change.  His  intellect  was  limited ;  and  though  his 
powers  of  acquiring  knowledge  were  not  obviously  below 
par,  it  could  by  no  means  modify,  direct,  or  restrain  the  above 
tendencies."  ^ 


^  Mayo.  Medical  Testimony  and  Evidence  in  Cases  of  Lunacy,  p.  102. 
By  this  writer,  who  gives  no  countenance  to  the  doctrine  of  moral  insanity, 
the  above  case  is  referred  to  a  form  of  mental  disorder,  which  he  calls  un- 
soundness of  mind.     What  is  gained  by  substituting  this  designation  for  that 


96  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  81.  The  following  case,  which  occurred  under  my  own 
observation,  belongs  to  the  same  type  as  the  last.  This  lad, 
though  belonging  to  a  family  in  the  easier  walks  of  life,  and 
surrounded  by  good  moral  influences,  was  undutiful  and  dis- 
obedient from  early  boyhood,  and  soon  entered  upon  a 
shameless  career  of  vice  and  low  pleasure.  He  stuck  at  no 
means  of  raising  money,  one  of  which  was  to  make  out  bills 
against  his  father's  customers  in  distant  places  and  represent 
himself  as  authorized  to  collect  them.  By  the  age  of  fifteen 
he  had  made  the  acquaintance  of  every  haunt  of  infamy,  and 
of  every  blackguard  and  blackleg  in  his  native  city  as  well  as 
in  some  others.  At  last,  when  seventeen  years  old,  becoming 
very  troublesome,  his  father  placed  him  in  a  hospital  for  the 
insane.  Here  he  soon  began  to  manifest  a  heartless,  mis- 
chievous disposition,  enjoying  nothing  so  much  as  to  teaze 
and  worry  his  associates.  No  opportunity  of  this  kind  was 
neglected.  A  favorite  occupation  was  to  recount  his  peculiar 
experience  without  the  slightest  manifestation  of  shame  or 
compunction.  According  to  his  own  account  he  was  famil- 
iar with  every  form  of  vice,  but  though  bad  enough,  no 
doubt,  he  was  too  inveterate  a  liar  to  narrate  even  his  own 
disgraces  without  a  touch  of  fiction.  Intellectually,  he  was 
rather  deficient,  and  though  at  tlie  best  schools,  scarcely 
acquired  the  rudiments  of  learning,  owing  as  much  probably 
to  idleness  as  inability.  In  his  adventures  there  was  often  a 
lack  of  method  and  purpose,  such  as  we  frequently  witness 
with  the  insane.  Once,  while  at  school,  he  ran  away  of  a  cold 
night,  half  clad,  though  he  had  clothes,  and  time  enough  to 
put  them  on.  Once,  he  went  off  with  the  horse  and  carriage 
of  his  landlord,  without  leave,  and  before  getting  anywhere 
abandoned  them  by  the  roadside.  He  manifested  consider- 
able adroitness  in  escaping  from  the  hospital,  which  he  did, 
several  times.  On  his  f.rst  return,  having  been  absent  three 
or  four  weeks,  it  was  evident  that  he  had  been  taking  lessons 
in  lock-picking,  for  no  kind  of  lock  was  proof  against  his  arts. 


of  moral  insanity,  is  not  very  obvious.     The  thing  itself,  certainly,  is  not 
affected  by  the  change  of  name. 


IMBECILITY.  97 

It  is  a  significant  fact,  in  connection  with  this  lad's  psycho- 
logical condition,  that  one  of  his  sisters  is  idiotic,  and  one  or 
two  more  have  evinced  some  curious  moral  obliquities. 

§  82.  In  a  class  of  cases  by  no  means  unfrequent,  this 
moral  imbecility  is  particularly  manifested  in  a  morbid  ac- 
tivity of  the  destructive  propensity.  An  interesting  case  of 
this  kind  is  related  at  length  by  Parent  Duchatelet.^  The 
subject  of  it  was  a  little  girl  fourteen  years  old,  who  lived 
with  her  grandmother,  a^very  respectable  and  religious  woman, 
till  the  age  of  seven,  when  she  returned  to  the  charge  of  her 
parents.  At  this  time,  she  is  described  as  never  playing,  nor 
crying,  nor  laughing.  She  had  been  taught  to  read,  sew,  and 
knit,  though  quite  averse  to  all  instruction.  Her  mother 
being  sick,  she  expressed  regret  that  she  was  not  dead,  be- 
cause in  that  case  she  would  inherit  her  mother's  clothes 
which  she  would  alter  so  as  to  wear  them  herself  She  de- 
clared that  she  would  have  killed  her  while  sick  if  she  could 
have  evaded  the  observation  of  the  attendants,  and  told  her 
mother,  who  asked  how  she  would  have  accomplished  her 
purpose,  that  she  would  have  plunged  a  poignard  into  her 
bosom.  She  said  she  was  aware  her  father  would  put  her 
in  prison,  but  that  would  not  deter  her.  A  few  months  after- 
wards, on  the  occasion  of  the  murder  of  a  child,  she  told  her 
mother  that  if  she  had  killed  her  with  a  knife  she  would 
have  got  blood  on  her  clothes,  which  would  have  led  to 
discovery,  and  therefore  she  would  have  taken  care  to  undress, 
before  committing  the  act.  Subsequently  she  said,  she  would 
use  poison,  in  order  to  kill  her  mother.  She  frequently  de- 
clared that  she  never  loved  her  father,  nor  mother,  nor  grand- 
mother. It  appears  that  from  the  age  of  four  years  she  was 
addicted  to  the  practice  of  self-abuse,  and  no  precautions  nor 
persuasions  could  deter  her  from  this  dreadful  habit.  Such 
was  the  moral  state  of  this  child,  now  eight  years  old,  when 
she  was  examined  by  a  commissary  of  the  police,  and  sent 
to  a  convent.     At  the  age  of  fourteen,  she  appears  to  have 


^  Annales  d  Hygiene,  vii.  1 73. 
9 


98  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

abandoned  her   murderous  designs,  but   continued  dejected 
and  silent. 

§  83.    This  form  of  insanity  which  is  above  denominated 
moral  imbecility,  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  that  in  which 
the  intellect  is  affected,  is  not  very  rare  in  receptacles  for  the 
insane,  and  is  more  common  in  society  than  is  generally  sup- 
pected.     It  is  seldom  regarded  in  its  true  light,  and  when  its 
subjects  have  occupied  a  high  place  in  society,  and  thus  been 
enabled  to  indulge  more  freely  their   mischievous  propensi- 
ties, they  have  often  been  consigned  by  the  historian  to  the 
eternal  execrations  of  mankind.     Count   Charolais,  brother 
of  the  duke  de  Bourbon  Conde,  whose  sanguinary  character 
has  been  commemorated  by  Lacretelle,  was  undoubtedly  a 
case  of  this   kind.     He  manifested  an  instinct  of  cruelty  in 
the  very  sports  of  his  childhood.     He  took  a  pleasure  in  tor- 
turing animals,  and   committing  the  most  ferocious  acts  of 
violence  against  his  domestics.     He  would  stand  at  his  win- 
dow and   shoot  the   artizans  at  work  upon  the  neighboring 
buildings,  merely  for  the  pleasure  of   seeing   them    tumble 
from  the  roofs  and  ladders.     It  is  said  that  he  loved  to  stain 
even  his  debaucheries  with  blood,  and  committed  many  mur- 
ders from  no  motive  of  interest  or  anger.^     Dr.  Rush  says 
that  in  the  course  of  his  life  he  had  been  consulted  in  three 
cases  of  moral  imbecility  ;  and  nothing  can  better  express  the 
true  characters  of  their  physiology,  than  his  remark  respecting 
them.     "In  all  these  cases,"  he  observes,  "there  is  probably 
an  original  defective  organization  in  those  parts  of  the  body 
which  are  occupied  by  the  moral  faculties  of  the  mind,"^  — 
an  explanation  that  will  receive  but  little  countenance  in  an 
age  that  derives  its  ideas  of  the  mental  phenomena  from  the 
exclusive  observation  of  mind  in  a  state  of  acknowledged 
health  and  vigor.     To  understand  these  cases  properly,  re- 
quires a  knowledge  of  our  moral  and  intellectual  constitu- 
tion, to  be  obtained  only  by  a  practical  acquaintance  with 
the  innumerable  phases  of  the  mind,  as  presented  in  its  vari- 


Ilistoire  de  France,  ii.  59.  ^  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  357. 


IMBECILITY.  99 

ous  degrees  of  strength  and  weakness,  of  health  and  disease, 
anriid  all  its  transitions  from  a  state  of  brutish  idiocy  to  that 
of  the  most  commanding  intellect. 

§  84.  The  prevalent  error  of  looking  at  mind  in  the  ab- 
stract, as  a  unique  principle  endowed  with  a  certain  apprecia- 
ble measure  of  strength  and  activity,  has  been  the  cause  of 
much  dispute  and  discrepancy  of  opinion,  in  cases  where  the' 
acts  of  persons  affected  with  HofFbauer's  first  degree  of  im- 
becility, have  been  made  the  object  of  judicial  investigation. 
One  witness  has  observed  a  range  and  tenacity  of  memory 
which  he  could  not  square  with  his  notions  of  mental  weak- 
ness ;  another,  perhaps,  has  seen  the  party  whose  acts  are  in 
question  conducting  himself  with  the  utmost  propriety,  and 
observing  the  social  usages  proper  to  his  station,  and  this  he 
has  deemed  incompatible  with  imbecility  of  mind ;  while 
another  has  heard  him  replying  to  questions  on  common 
place  subjects,  readily  and  appropriately,  and  he  also  draws 
similar  conclusions.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  seen  engaging 
in  occupations  and  amusements,  and  associating  with  com- 
pany, seemingly  below  the  dignity  of  his  age  or  station,  by 
one  who  desires  no  further  proof  of  an  imbecile  mind ;  or 
he  may  be  so  extravagantly  vain  of  some  personal  accom- 
plishments, as  to  impress  another  with  the  idea,  that  his 
understanding  has  scarcely  the  strength  of  a  child.  And 
it  is  worthy  of  notice,  that  oftentimes  the  very  fact  which 
furnishes  undoubted  proof  of  imbecility  to  one  observer,  con- 
veys an  unshaken  conviction  of  mental  soundness  to  another. 
Few,  indeed,  are  capable  of  sounding  the  depths  of  another's 
intelligence,  because  few  are  aware  of  the  necessity,  or  have 
the  ability  if  they  were,  of  scrutinizing,  not  one  act  or  trait 
of  character  alone,  but  every  intellectual  manifestation  as  it 
appears  in  the  conduct,  conversation,  and  manners,  as  the 
only  means  of  obtaining  an  insight  into  his  real,  mental 
capacity.  Scarcely  a  case  comes  up  in  which  the  under- 
standing of  an  imbecile  is  judicially  investigated,  that  does 
not  furnish  striking  illustrations  of  this  fact,  as  might  be 
shown  by  numerous  instances  in  point.  The  following,  how- 
ever, the  first  of  which  was  adjudicated  in  1832,  may  serve  as 
examples. 


100  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

§  85.  "  Miss  Bagster  was  a  young  lady  of  fortune,  and 
perpetrated  a  runaway-match  with  Mr.  Newton.  An  appli- 
cation was  made  by  her  family  to  dissolve  the  marriage,  on 
the  ground  that  she  was  of  unsound  mind.  The  facts  urged 
against  her  before  the  commissioners  were,  that  she  had  been 
a  violent,  self-willed,  and  passionate  child ;  that  this  con- 
•tinued  till  she  grew  up ;  that  she  was  totally  ignorant  of 
arithmetic,  and  therefore  incapable  of  taking  care  of  her 
property ;  that  she  had  evinced  a  great  fondness  for  matri- 
mony, having  engaged  herself  to  several  persons ;  and  that, 
in  many  respects,  she  evinced  little  of  the  delicacy  becoming 
her  sex.  Dr.  Sutherland  had  visited  her  four  times,  and  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  she  was  incapable  of  taking  care  of 
herself  or  of  her  property.  She  had  memory,  but  neither 
judgment  nor  reasoning  power.  Dr.  Gordon  did  not  consider 
her  capacity  to  exceed  that  of  a  child  of  seven  years  of  age. 
Several  non-medical  witnesses,  who  had  known  her  from 
infancy,  spoke  of  her  extremely  passionate  and  occasionally 
indelicate  conduct.  On  her  examination,  however,  before  the 
commissioners,  her  answers  were  pertinent  and  in  a  proper 
manner.  No  indelicate  remark  escaped  from  her.  Drs.  Mor- 
rison and  Haslam  had  both  visited  her,  and  were  not  disposed 
to  consider  her  imbecile  or  idiotic.  She  confessed  and  la- 
mented her  ignorance  of  arithmetic,  but  said  that  her  grand- 
father sent  excuses  when  she  was  at  school,  and  begged  that 
she  might  not  be  pressed.  Her  conversation  generally  im- 
pressed these  gentlemen  in  a  favorable  manner  as  to  her 
sanity.  The  jury  brought  in  a  verdict,  that  Miss  Bagster 
had  been  of  unsound  mind  since  November  1,  1830,  and  the 
marriage  was  consequently  dissolved."  ^ 

§  86.  There  would  seem  to  have  been  no  doubt  as  to  the 
existence  of  some  degree  of  mental  deficiency  in  this  young 
lady ;  the  question  was,  whether  it  was  constitutional,  or 
merely  the  result  of  a  neglected  education  and  misplaced 
indulgences,  and  consequently  capable  of  being  remedied. 


^  Beck,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  i.  752. 


IMBECILITY.  101 

In  proof  of  its  constitutional  nature,  we  have  the  opinion  of 
a  respectable  physician  that  she  was  incapable  of  taking 
care  of  herself  or  of  her  property;  and  of  another,  that  her 
capacity  did  not  exceed  that  of  a  child  seven  years  old, 
which  opinion  is  corroborated  by  the  facts  in  evidence,  that 
she  was  extremely  passionate,  and  often  indelicate  in  her 
conduct;  that  her  mind  ran  greatly  upon  matrimony;  and 
that  she  had  not  made  the  most  ordinary  attainments  in 
knowledge.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appears  that  her  educa- 
tion was  unquestionably  neglected ;  that,  before  the  commis- 
sioners, her  answers  were  pertinent  and  in  a  proper  manner; 
and  that  two  eminent  physicians  were  not  disposed  to  con- 
sider her  idiotic  or  imbecile.  It  is  obvious,  that  in  cases  like 
this,  the  opinions  of  the  medical  witnesses  will  depend  very 
much,  if  not  altogether,  on  the  extent  of  their  previous 
acquaintance  with  the  manifestations  of  the  mind,  both  in 
its  normal  and  abnormal  conditions.  Hence  it  is  that  a  trait 
by  no  means  incompatible  with  imbecility  was  considered,  in 
this  case,  as  indicative  of  a  proper  soundness  of  mind.  Per- 
sons laboring  under  far  more  imbecility  than  Miss  Bagster, 
are  capable,  on  occasions,  of  controlling  themselves  and  con- 
cealing their  more  prominent  faults  to  such  a  degree  that  a 
stranger  finds  it  difficult  to  believe,  that  in  point  of  under- 
standing, they  are  much  below  the  level  of  ordinary  people. 
It  should  be  recollected  that  imbecility  is  manifested  in  the 
conduct  and  manners,  as  well  as  the  thoughts  and  language ; 
and  when  it  is  considered  that  persons  like  Miss  Bagster  are 
confessedly  of  narrow  understandings,  and  often  of  defective 
education,  it  could  not  be  expected  that  strong  indications  of 
imbecility  would  be  observed  in  their  conversation  alone. 
Her  answers,  it  seems,  were  pertinent,  and  properly  delivered, 
as  they  might  well  have  been,  if  they  related  to  things  in 
which  she  was  particularly  interested,  and  were  not  beyond 
her  powers  of  comprehension,  and  she  still  have  been  imbe- 
cile or  stupid.  In  the  description  of  the  first  degree  of  imbe- 
cility, already  quoted  (§  67),  HofFbauer  expressly  says  that 
"the  individual  can  very  well  judge  respecting  objects  to 
which  he  is  daily  accustomed,  and  in  familiarity  with  which 

9* 


103  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDEXCE   OF  INSANITY. 

he  may  be  said  to  have  grown  up."  It  may  be  also  added, 
that  their  answers  are  sometimes  not  only  pertinent,  but 
characterized  by  considerable  pith  and  shrewdness.  Miss 
Bagster's  education  was,  no  doubt,  grossly  neglected,  but  this 
circumstance  could  not  have  produced  so  much  mental  defi- 
ciency as  to  have  impressed  a  careful  and  intelligent  observer 
with  the  conviction  that  her  capacity  did  not  exceed  that  of  a 
child  seven  years  old.  Neglected  or  vicious  education  is  a 
cause  of  ignorance,  but  can  never  degrade  the  mind  into  a 
state  of  imbecility  or  stupidity,  which  are  always  either  con- 
genital or  the  effect  of  disease.  Dr.  Morrison  indeed  stated 
under  oath,  that  he  would  undertake  to  teach  her,  in  six 
months,  arithmetic  and  the  use  of  money,  but  his  success 
would  have  been  far  from  disproving  the  existence  of  imbe- 
cility. It  is  not  doubted  that  in  this  condition  of  mind,  there 
is  some  susceptibility  of  education,  and  the  cases  are  not  un- 
frequent  where,  in  regard  to  one  or  two  particular  powers,  the 
individual  is  quite  on  a  level  with  his  more  happily-endowed 
fellow  men.i 


^  I  regret  tliat  the  drift  of  these  remarks  on  Miss  Bagster's  case  has  been 
entirely  misunderstood.  In  a  notice  of  this  work  in  the  British  and  Foreign 
Medical  Review  (July,  1840),  they  are  pronounced  to  be  in  contradiction 
■with  the  views  subsequently  expressed  in  the  chapter  on  Interdiction,  and 
charged  with  favoring  legal  oppression.  This  case  was  quoted  for  the  pur- 
pose of  illustrating  that  discrepancy  of  opinion  and  irrelevancy  of  facts  so 
often  witnessed  in  medico-legal  investigations  of  cases  of  mental  imbecility 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  preceding  paragraph.  In  the  commejits  which 
follow,  my  object  was  merely  to  examine  the  value  of  certain  evidence,  and 
show  how  far  it  proved  or  disproved  mental  imbecility  generally.  I  contend 
that  certain  facts  alleged  in  disproof  of  imbecility,  are  not  incompatible  with 
that  condition,  and  it  may  be  inferred,  no  doubt,  from  my  remarks,  that  I 
considered  Miss  B.  as  laboring  under  some  degree  of  imbecility,  a  point 
which  the  reviewer  himself  admits.  Whether  the  imbecility  were  of  such  a 
kind  as  to  incapacitate  her  from  being  a  party  to  the  marriage  contract,  is  a 
question  very  different  from  that  of  imbecility  in  the  abstract,  and  one  which 
I  did  not  pretend  to  discuss.  For  any  thing  I  have  said  to  the  contrary,  it 
may  have  been  the  height  of  Injustice  to  annul  this  marriage.  "What  foun- 
dation, then,  has  the  reviewer  for  his  assertion,  that  the  author  "comes  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  verdict  was  correct,  and  that  this  lady  was  really 


IMBECILITY.  103 

§  87,  In  the  case  of  Portsmouth  v.  Portsmoiilli,  which  was 
a  suit  of  nullity  of  marriage,  on  the  ground  of  the  mental 
unsoundness  (which  was,  in  fact,  imbecility  in  the  first 
degree)  of  the  husband,  the  Earl  of  Portsmouth,  numerous 
facts  were  deposed  to  by  witnesses,  in  proof  that  he  pos- 
sessed a  capacity  and  understanding  fully  equal  to  the  ordi- 
nary transactions  of  life.  It  appeared  that  when  at  school 
he  evinced  a  very  good  memory,  and  made  respectable  pro- 
ficiency in  arithmetic  and  the  languages;  and  that,  after 
coming  of  age,  he  settled  accounts  with  his  agents;  at- 
tended public  meetings  and  committees  ;  prosecuted  an 
offender,  and  was  examined  as  a  witness ;  and  that  his 
friends  had  failed  in  making  him  the  object  of  a  commission 
of  lunacy.  In  regard  to  these  circumstances,  the  court.  Sir 
John  Nicholl,  observed  in  substance,  that  the  capacity  for 
instruction  and  improvement  is  possessed  even  by  the  brute 
creation,  and  therefore  did  not  of  itself  disprove  the  fact  of 
imbecility;  that  when  he  appeared  as  a  witness  in  a  court  of 
justice,  it  was  only  a  simple  fact  he  had  to  state,  requiring 
little,  if  any  thing,  more  than  memory,  and  that  his  cross- 
examination  could  require  nothing  more  than  the  recollection 
of  facts  —  not  any  considerable  exercise  of  the  understanding 
and  of  the  reasoning  powers ;  that  his  behavior  in  company, 
and  his  few  observations  on  the  state  of  the  weather,  horses, 
and  farming,  were  not  incompatible  with  great  imbecility  of 
mind,  because,  under  the  restraints  produced  by  formal  com- 
pany and  by  the  sense  of  being  observed,  the  more  promi- 
nent features  of  imbecility  would  be  shaded,  and  the  indi- 


imbecile  to  a  degree  requiring  legal  interference  ?  "  A  closer  examination 
of  my  remarks  on  this  case  would  have  satis6ed  the  reviewer,  I  think,  that 
they  are  nowise  contradictory  to  the  general  principle  prominently  set  forth 
in  various  parts  of  this  work,  —  that  the  legal  consequences  of  the  various 
forms  of  insanity,  are  to  be  determined  by  no  general  arbitrary  rule,  but 
always  in  reference  to  the  particular  act  in  question.  I  have  since  carefully 
read  the  report  of  this  case  in  the  Medical  Gazette,  vol.  x.,  and  have  no 
hesitation  in  concluding  that  the  verdict  was  correct,  and  that  this  lady  was 
really  imbecile  to  a  degree  requiring  legal  interference. 


104  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDEXCE    OP   INSANITY. 

vidual  might  pass  as  possessing  a  considerable  degree  of  un- 
derstanding. On  the  contrary,  it  was  satisfactorily  proved 
that  he  had  always  been  treated  by  his  family  as  one  of  fee- 
ble capacity,  and  by  a  family  arrangement,  he  was  married, 
when  thirty-two  years  of  age,  to  a  lady  of  forty-seven,  evi- 
dently for  the  purpose  of  saving  him  from  improper  con- 
nections, and  obtaining  for  him  suitable  care  and  protection. 
It  appeared  that  his  servants  were  his  play-fellows,  and  that 
he  played  all  sorts  of  tricks  with  them ;  that  he  was  fond  of 
driving  a  team,  and  that  his  wife  so  far  indulged-  him,  as  to 
have  a  team  of  horses  kept  for  his  amusement  as  a  toy  and 
a  plaything,  with  which  he  carted  dung,  timber,  and  hay; 
that  he  had  a  propensity  for  bell-ringing,  was  fond  of  slaugh- 
tering cattle,  and  indulged  in  wanton  cruelty  towards  man 
and  beast,  never  expressing  regret,  but  merely  observing, 
"  serves  him  right,"  on  his  own  acts  of  cruelty.  It  also  ap- 
peared that  a  medical  man  was  taken  into  the  family  to 
assist  in  superintending  the  earl,  and  that  he  obtained  com- 
plete ascendency  over  him,  the  mention  of  his  name  being 
sufficient  to  intimidate  him  and  exact  his  obedience.  This 
gentleman  at  last  thought  it  prudent  to  deliver  up  his  charge 
to  the  earl's  trustees  in  London,  one  of  whom,  within  one 
week  after,  married  him  to  his  own  daughter.  This  mar- 
riage was  declared  by  the  court  null  and  void.^  In  the  above 
statement  a  few  facts  only  have  been  selected  from  a  mass  of 
evidence  given  by  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  witnesses ; 
but  this  is  sufficient  to  illustrate  the  general  principle  that 
proof  of  imbecility  is  not  to  be  found  in  a  few  isolated  facts, 
but  in  an  investigation  of  the  whole  character  and  conduct 
of  the  party. 

§  88.    A  similar  diversity  of  views  on  the  value  of  evidence 
respecting  mental  imbecility,  w^as  strikingly  displayed  in  the 


^  1  Haggard,  35D.  The  reader  ■who  wishes  to  extend  his  inquiries  further, 
Tvill  find  in  tlie  judgment  of  Sir  John  Nicholl,  in  Ingram  v.  Wyatt,  1  Hag- 
gard, 384,  some  excellent  observations  on  the  characters  of  imbecility,  be- 
sides a  masterly  analysis  of  evidence  relative  to  this  condition,  ranging 
through  a  life  of  seveuty-four  years. 


IMBECILITY.  105 

Lispenard  case  which  was  finally  decided  in  the  New  York 
Court  of  Errors  in  1841.  It  arose  out  of  the  refusal  of  the 
Surrogate  of  New  York  to  approve  the  will  of  Alice  Lispen- 
ard, on  the  ground  of  mental  incompetence.  This  woman 
was  born  in  1781 ;  her  father  died  in  1806,  leaving  her  an 
annuity  of  ^500  ;  her  brother  died  in  1808,  leaving  her,  as  one 
of  his  heirs  at  law,  considerable  property ;  and  in  1834  she 
made  her  will,  whereby  she  gave  all  her  estate  to  A.  L. 
Stewart,  her  sister's  husband,  and  appointed  him  sole  execu- 
tor. In  1836  she  died.  The  probate  of  the  will  having  been 
refused  by  the  Surrogate,  an  appeal  was  made,  first  to  the 
circuit  judge,  and  from  him  to  the  chancellor,  both  of  whom 
sustained  his  decision.  The  case  was  then  carried  into  the 
Court  of  Errors,  by  which  these  decisions  were  overruled,  and 
probate  of  the  will  decreed. 

§  89.  It  appeared  in  evidence  that  the  devisor  was  always 
regarded  by  her  family  as  mentally  deficient,  and  that  her 
father  left  her  only  an  annuity  of  |500,  because,  as  he  states 
in  his  will,  "  it  hath  pleased  Almighty  God  that  my  daughter 
Alice  should  have  such  imbecility  of  mind  as  to  render  her 
incapable  of  managing  or  taking  care  of  property."  By 
several  persons  who  lived  or  were  intimate  in  the  family,  it 
was  testified  that  she  was  washed,  nursed,  and  put  to  bed 
the  same  as  a  child,  until  she  was  twenty-two  years  old ;  that 
she  had  a  vacant  expression  of  countenance,  and  a  silly  laugh 
when  spoken  to ;  that  she  dribbled  at  the  mouth  ;  had  an 
awkward  and  unnatural  carriage  of  the  body  and  a  violent 
temper ;  that  she  was  not  permitted  to  see  company  like  the 
other  children,  but  was  kept  out  of  sight ;  that  no  one  thought 
of  entering  into  conversation  with  her  ;  and  that  all  attempts 
to  teach  her  beyond  spelling  short  words  of  two  syllables, 
were  abandoned  as  impracticable.  While  at  board,  which 
was  from  1817  to  1827,  she  was  washed,  dressed,  and  put  to 
bed  like  a  child;  cried  when  the  children  of  the  family  refused 
to  share  their  cake  and  candy  with  her ;  ate  her  food  vora- 
ciously ;  would  strike  those  around  her  when  in  a  rage,  which 
was  not  seldom ;  and  could  not  be  taught  the  Lord's  prayer. 
Although  placed  in  the  charge  of  a  teacher   at   home,  she 


106  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF  INSANITY. 

w&s  found  incapable  of  being  taught  to  read,  and  forty  years 
afterwards,  when  the  attempt  was  renewed  by  her  sister,  it  met 
with  no  better  success.  One  witness  stated,  that  when  six- 
teen or  eighteen  years  of  age,  she  preferred  a  sixpence  to  a 
dollar.  Another  could  not  teach  her  to  distinguish  a  two 
shilling  piece  from  a  half  dollar.  Once  she  was  found  chok- 
ing a  child  six  years  old,  until  he  was  black  in  the  face.  In 
the  selection  of  boarding-places  she  was  never  consulted,  and 
it  appeared  that  the  families  with  whom  she  was  placed,  were 
in  humble  and  narrow  circumstances,  without  those  conven- 
iences and  accommodations  which  she  had  a  right  to  expect. 
Even  when  under  the  kind  and  judicious  management  of  her 
sister,  she  submitted  to  be  imprisoned  in  her  room  whenever 
it  was  ordered,  and  was  frequently  subjected  to  confinement 
as  a  punishment  for  misbehavior. 

§  90.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  stated  that  much  of  her 
deficiency  might  be  attributed  to  the  excessive  indulgence  of 
her  parents,  and  especially  to  habits  of  intemperate  drinking 
they  had  allowed  her  to  contract.  It  appeared  that  she  car- 
ried simple  messages  from  one  part  of  the  establishment  to 
another,  and  that  she  performed  the  duty  of  delivering  out 
clothes  for  the  wash,  and  soap,  candles,  starch,  &c.,  to  the 
servants.  By  her  sister  she  was  taught  to  perform  some  little 
offices  about  her  own  person  and  clothes,  and  to  distinguish 
small  pieces  of  money.  Another  witness  had  seen  her  Avash- 
ing  cups  and  saucers.  Another  stated  that  when  she  wanted 
any  thing  she  asked  for  it,  and  if  medicine  was  given  to  her 
she  would  take  it.  On  a  very  cold  day  when  somebody  was 
to  be  baptized,  she  said  she  would  not  be  a  baptist,  to  be  bap- 
tized on  such  a  day,  and  asked  if  they  dip  them  as  they  dip 
candles.  She  also  told  the  witness  that  when  her  sister  died, 
they  put  her  into  a  coffin  with  a  silver  plate  having  her  name 
and  age  upon  it,  and  that  when  she  (Alice)  died,  she  would 
like  to  be  put  into  such  a  coffin  and  laid  in  the  same  room. 
It  was  stated  that  while  living  in  her  brother's  family,  which 
was  during  the  last  fifteen  years  of  her  life,  she  had  charge  of 
the  clothes  that  were  sent  to  the  wash,  would  give  the  neces- 
sary directions,  and   correct   mistakes   when   they  were   re- 


IMBECILITY.  107 

turned  ;  that  she  took  charge  of  her  own  clothe?,  was  very- 
careful  of  them,  and  would  send  them  to  the  sempstress  if 
they  needed  repairing.     In  the  absence  of  other  members  of 
the  family,  she  would  give  directions  to  masons  and  carpen- 
ters  employed  in  making  repairs  and  alterations  about  the 
house,  who  obeyed  her,  and  invariably  found  that  her  direc- 
tions were   approved.     She  sent  messages  by  the  servants, 
kept  an  eye  upon  them,  and  reported  their  misconduct.     She 
recognized  persons  whom  she  had  known  in  her  youth,  but 
had  not  seen  for  many  years,  called  them  by  name,  made  in- 
quiries respecting  particular  members  of  their  families,  and 
recurred  to  the  scenes  and  amusements  of  her  youth.     She 
would  inquire  of  visitors  as  to  the  health  of  particular  mem- 
bers of  their  families  with  whom  she  was  acquainted.  Several 
other  facts  of  similar  importance  were  also  related  by  the 
same  witness.     Another  stated  that  when  the  children  played 
school,  Alice  would  act  the  mistress,  and  punish  the  others 
if  they  did   not  know  their  lesson.     A  clergyman  who  was 
somewhat  acquainted  with  her,  thought  well  of  her  under- 
standing, on  the  score  of  her  religious  attainments.     "  Her 
confession  of  guilt,"  he  says,  "  might  have  implied  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  depravity  of  nature,  the  necessity  of  forgiveness, 
and  the  ability  of  God  to  forgive  in  any  circumstances,  and 
might  (when  instruction  had  been  received,  as  was  the  fact 
in  her  case)  imply  a  knowledge  of  the  atonement  of  Jesus 
Christ.     Prayer  is  a  means  by  which  we  receive  the  influence 
of  the  Holy  Spirit;  and  as  she  said  she  constantly  prayed,  it 
may  naturally  be  inferred   that    it  was  for  that  influence." 
This   opinion    is  hardly  corroborated    by  the    statement   of 
another  witness  who  said  that  when  she  read  the  Bible  to 
her,  "she  would  ask  the  meaning  of  Christ,  and  ask  who 
Christ  was.     She  would  then  turn  round  and  laugh,  and  say, 
'  Oh,  you  devil;'  and  would  then  go  down  stairs  laughing,  and 
perhaps    she  would  laugh  till  she  got  down   to  her  room." 
A  physician  who  was  also  one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses 
of  the  will,  and  had  often  conversed  with  the  testator,  thought 
her  natural  powers  were  sufficiently  good  for  any  transaction 
requiring  memory  or  judgment ;  and  that  if  her  education 


108  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

had  been  carefully  attended  to,  she  would  have  become  a 
highly  useful  member  of  society.  On  cross-examination,  he 
stated  that  he  did  not  regard  her  of  ordinary  understanding; 
he  believed  her  to  be  a  weak  woman,  but  whether  capable  of 
buying  or  selling,  could  not  answer,  not  knowing  that  the 
duty  was  ever  put  upon  her.  Another  physician,  who  enter- 
tained a  similar  opinion  of  her  capacity,  in  answer  to  the 
question  whether  she  could  read,  replied  that*  he  did  not 
know  and  did  not  inquire;  he  would  have  thought  it  an  insult 
to  ask  her. 

§  91.  It  did  not  appear  that  she  had  any  idea  of  the  nature 
and  extent  of  her  property,  or  even  called  her  brother-in-law, 
who  had  charge  of  it,  to  an  account.  Neither  did  it  appear 
that  she  gave  any  instructions  for  the  will,  which  was  pre- 
pared by  the  executor  himself.  At  the  time  of  the  execution, 
however,  and  previously  at  different  times,  she  declared  her 
intention  to  give  all  her  property  to  the  executor,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  other  members  of  the  family. 

§  92.  That  there  was  great  mental  deficiency  in  this 
woman  was  not  questioned,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  perceive 
from  the  published  statement  of  the  evidence,  how  any  one 
can  believe  that  the  will  in  question  was  her  will,  and  not 
wholly  and  exclusively  the  will  of  the  executor.  If  by  means 
of  any  considerations,  legal,  medical,  or  psychological,  the 
validity  of  such  an  act  could  be  established,  the  decision  of 
the  court  of  appeals  might  be  justified.  It  is  worthy  of 
especial  notice  that  the  ground,  of  this  decision  was  a  tech- 
nical construction  of  the  phrase  imsoiindness  of  mind,  if  the 
views  of  the  court  were  fairly  represented  by  the  two  senators 
who  expressed  their  opinions.  The  law  of  the  State  permits 
every  male  person  eighteen  years  old,  and  every  female  (not 
married)  sixteen  years  pld,  of  sound  mind  and  memory,  to  give 
and  bequeathe  his  or  her  personal  estate  by  will  or  testament. 
Now,  the  mental  deficiency  of  the  testator,  not  being  em- 
braced in  either  of  the  kinds  of  unsoundness  as  defined  by 
Coke  (§  3),  it  follows  that  she  was  not  incapacitated  by 
law  from  making  her  testament.  Her  mind  was  weak,  but 
not  unsound,  and  courts  cannot  measure  the  extent  of  peo- 


IMBECILITY.  109 

pie's  understanding  or  capacities,  however  feeble  they  may 
be  without  being  positively  unsound.^  Such  a  distinction, 
however  tolerable  in  the  plea  of  an  advocate  laboring  under 
the  difficulties  of  a  weak  cause,  could  hardly  have  been  ex- 
pected in  a  judicial  decision. 


^  26  Wendell,  256.     Stewart  executor  v.  Lispenard, 

10 


/ 


CHAPTER  IV. 

LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MENTAL   DEFICIENCY. 


§  93.  The  general  principles  that  determine  the  legal 
relations  of  idiocy  are  so  obvious,  and  the  fact  of  its  exist- 
ence so  easily  established,  that  little  occasion  has  been 
afforded  for  doubt  or  diversity  of  opinion.  The  maxims  of 
the  law  have  sprung  from  the  suggestions  of  common  sense, 
and  its  provisions  have  equal  reference  to  the  best  interests 
of  its  wretched  subjects  and  of  those  who  are  about  them. 
It  may  be  mentioned  as  a  curious  fact,  however,  that  while 
the  idiot  is  denied  the  enjoyment  of  most  of  the  civil  rights, 
he  is  quietly  left  by  the  constitutions  of  the  several  States  of 
the  union,  in  possession  of  one  of  those  political  rights,  that 
of  suffrage,  the  very  essence  of  which  is  the  deliberate  and 
unbiased  exercise  of  a  rational  will.  How  this  anomaly  has 
arisen,  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive.  A  natural  jealousy  of  any 
attempt  to  encroach  upon  the  popular  right,  might  suggest 
evils  to  this  institution  in  allowing  the  mental  qualifications 
of  voters  to  be  too  closely  scrutinized;  but  such  fears  could 
hardly  have  been  expected  in  view  of  the  unlimited  control 
maintained  by  the  law  over  the  property  and  personal  liberty 
of  idiots. 

§  94.  The  little  indulgence  shown  to  imbecility  in  crimi- 
nal courts,  sufficiently  indicates  that  either  the  psychological 
nature  of  this  condition  of  mind  is  very  imperfectly  under- 
stood, or  the  true  ground  on  which  the  idea  of  responsibility 
reposes  is  not  clearly  perceived.  Whichever  it  may  be,  it 
may  no  doubt  be  attributed  to  the  prevalent  habit  of  study- 
ing the  moral  and  intellectual  phenomena  in  sound  and 
healthy  minds  only,  without  a  suspicion,  apparently,  of  the 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF  IMBECILITY.  Ill 

great  modifications  they  present,  when  the  development  of 
the  cerebral  organism  is  interrupted  by  disease.  It  will  be 
necessary,  therefore,  before  coming  to  any  positive  conclu- 
sions relative  to  the  legal  accountability  of  imbeciles,  to 
bring  into  view  some  considerations  on  this  point,  which 
have  been  too  much,  if  not  altogether,  overlooked. 

§  95.  Our  moral  and  intellectual  constitution  is  con- 
structed in  harmony  with  the  external  world,  on  which  it  acts 
and  by  which  it  is  acted  upon  ;  the  result  of  this  mutual 
action  being  the  happiness  and  spiritual  advancement  of  an 
immortal  being.  Thus  endowed  with  the  powers  of  perform- 
ing the  part  allotted  us,  and  placed  in  a  situation  suitable  for 
exercising  and  developing,  them,  we  become  accountable  for 
the  manner  in  which  they  are  used,  —  to  our  Maker,  under 
all  circumstances ;  to  our  fellow  men,  when  the  institutions 
of  society  are  injured.  All  legal  responsibility,  therefore,  is 
founded  on  this  principle  of  adaptation,  and  ceases  whenever 
either  of  its  elem,ents  is  taken  away.  The  intellect  must  not 
only  be  sufficiently  developed  to  acquaint  the  individual 
with  the  existence  of  external  objects  and  with  some  of  their 
relations  to  him,  but  the  moral  powers  must  be  sound  enough 
and  strong  enough  to  furnish  each  its  specific  incentives,  to 
pursue  that  course  of  conduct  which  the  intellect  has  already 
approved.  It  is  nothing  that  the  mind  is  competent  to  dis- 
cern some  of  the  most  ordinary  relations  of  things,  and  is 
sensible  of  the  impropriety  of  certain  actions  ;  for  so  long  as 
the  individual  is  incapable,  by  defect  of  constitution,  of 
feeling  the  influence  of  those  hopes  and  fears  and  of  all 
those  sentiments  and  aff'ections  that  man  naturally  possesses, 
an  essential  element  of  legal  responsibility  is  wanting,  and 
he  is  not  fully  accountable  for  his  actions. 

§  96.  In  the  normal  mind  the  idea  of  crime  is  associated 
with  those  of  injury  and  wrong ;  can  we  then  impute  crime 
when  there  is  neither  intention  nor  consciousness  of  wrong  ? 
For  want  of  the  higher  and  nobler  faculties,  the  actions  of 
the  imbecile  are  contemplated  by  him  solely  in  relation  to 
himself;  not  a  thought  enters  his  mind  respecting  their  con- 
sequences to  others.     For  the  same  reason  that  he  puts  to 


112  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

death  a  brute,  that  of  mere  personal  gratification,  he  mur- 
ders a  fellow  being,  and  is  constitutionally  unable  to  appre- 
ciate any  difference  in  the  moral  character  of  the  two  actions. 
In  the  latter  case,  as  in  the  former,  he  has  a  selfish  object  in 
view,  and  is  restrained  from  pursuing  his  purpose  by  none  of 
the  considerations  that  actuate  the  sound  and  well-developed 
mind.  The  natural  right  of  every  one  to  the  undisturbed 
possession  of  his  own  life,  and  the  sentiment  of  wrong 
awakened  by  the  infliction  of  injury,  are  things  as  far  beyond 
the  sphere  of  his  contemplations,  as  the  most  difficult  prob- 
lem in  mathematics;  and  he  merely  feels  the  animal  impulse 
—  which  to  him  has  the  strength  of  a  natural  right — to 
appropriate  to  himself  whatever  will  conduce  to  his  momen- 
tary gratification.  The  thought  of  the  wounds  inflicted  on 
the  friends  and  connections  of  his  victim  by  his  decease, 
cannot  restrain  him,  because  the  feelings  of  benevolence 
and  sympathy  which  they  suppose,  are  utter  strangers  to 
his  own  bosom ;  and  it  would  be  preposterous  to  expect 
him  to  be  influenced  by  a  regard  to  feelings  which  he  never 
experienced  himself.  The  sense  of  future  accountability 
cannot  restrain  him,  for  the  idea  of  an  Almighty,  All-seeing 
Being,  ever  witnessing  his  actions,  is  too  confused  and  too 
limited  in  his  mind,  to  present  the  slightest  check  to  the  in- 
dulgence of  his  caprices  and  passions.  The  fear  of  punish- 
ment cannot  restrain  him,  because  his  intellect  can  discern 
no  necessary  connection  between  his  crime  and  the  penalty 
attached  to  it,  even  if  he  were  aware  of  the  existence  of  the 
penalty.  To  make  such  a  person  responsible  for  his  actions 
to  the  same  degree  as  one  enjoying  the  full  vigdr  and  sound- 
ness of  the  higher  faculties,  is  therefore  manifestly  unjust ; 
because  an  essential  element  of  responsibility  is  a  power  to 
refrain  from  evil-doing,  which  power  is  furnished  by  the 
exercise  of  those  faculties  that  are  but  imperfectly,  if  at  all, 
developed  in  the  imbecile.  The  law  looks  only  to  the  inten- 
tion, not  to  the  amount  of  injury  committed  ;  and  since  there 
can  be  no  criminal  intention  where  there  is  no  consciousness 
of  wrong,  it  cannot  properly  reach  those  wretched  objects, 
who,  to   use  the  expression  of  one  of  them,  whose  case  w^U 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  IMBECILITY.  113 

be  shortly  noticed,  "  can  see  no  difference  between  killing  an 
ox,  and  killing  a  man." 

§  97.  Many,  it  is  true,  find  it  hard  to  be  convinced  that 
one  who  labors  under  no  delusion,  and  enjoys  a  certain  de- 
gree, at  least,  of  moral  Uberty,  may  still  not  be  responsible 
for  his  criminal  acts.  They  see,  perhaps,  that  he  has  intelli- 
gence enough  to  perform  the  inferior  kinds  of  employment, 
and  feel  assured  that  observation  must  have  made  him  ac- 
quainted with  the  consequences  of  such  acts,  even  though  a 
stranger  to  that  high  moral  power  which  instinctively  teaches 
the  distinctions  of  right  and  wrong.  "  He  knew  better,''  is 
their  language,  "and  therefore  justice  requires  his  punish- 
ment." The  error  of  this  reasoning  arises  in  the  vulgar  habit 
of  estimating  the  strength  and  extent  of  the  moral  faculties 
by  the  ability  to  go  through  certain  mechanical  duties,  and 
provide  for  the  wants  and  exigencies  of  the  present  moment. 
Not  only  has  this  ability  no  connection  with  the  moral  senti- 
ments, but  it  is  not  even  an  index  of  the  measure  of  intelli- 
gence ;  any  more  than  the  skill  of  the  bee  or  beaver  in 
erecting  their  structures,  is  indicative  of  great  intellectual 
resources.  These  degraded  specimens  of  our  race  are  not 
without  the  capacity  of  being  educated  in  a  limited  degree  ; 
and  thus  like  those  inferior  animals  which  man  has  made 
conducive  to  hi^  comfort,  they  are  trained  to  perform  some 
kinds  of  service  with  tolerable  merit.  This,  however,  no 
more  proceeds  from  the  kind  of  intelligence  that  discerns 
moral  truth,  than  does  the  isolated  talent  for  music  or  con- 
struction not  unfrequently  met  with  in  the  complete  idiot. 

§  98.  For  the  purpose  of  illustrating  and  confirming  the 
above  views,  some  account  will  now  be  given  of  a  few  crim- 
inal trials,  the  subjects  of  which  seem  to  have  been  affected 
with  mental  imbecility,  stating  very  briefly  the  facts  as 
they  are  found  recorded,  and  accompanying  them  with  such 
reflections  as  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  require. 
They  are  well  worth  the  consideration  of  every  honest  and 
unprejudiced  inquirer,  for  he  will  find  in  them  a  kind  of 
information  which  he  can  obtain  from  no  other  quarter,  and 
he  will  be  able  to  see  for  himself,  how  little  of  true  philoso- 

10* 


114  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

phy  has  presided  over  this  department  of  criminal  jurispru- 
dence. 

§  99.  In  November,  1821,  John  Schmidt,  aged  17,  was 
tried  at  Metz  for  parricide.  He  had  manifested,  from  an 
early  age,  a  proneness  to  mischief  and  even  cruelty.  As 
soon  as  he  was  old  enough  to  run  in  the  streets,  he  would 
amuse  himself  by  throwing  stones  into  the  rivulet,  that  ran 
through  the  village,  in  order  to  spatter  and  hurt  the  people 
who  were  passing  by,  many  of  whom  were  injured  by  him. 
They  contented  themselves,  however,  with  charging  his  par- 
ents to  take  care  of  him,  for  he  was  even  then  considered  to 
be  mad. 

The  first  count  in  the  indictment  charged  him  with  wound- 
ing on  the  head  his  sister-in-law,  in  one  of  their  domestic 
quarrels.  The  second  charged  him  with  an  attempt  on  the 
life  of  one  of  his  cousins,  whom  he  pushed  into  the  water 
while  fishing  by  the  side  of  a  pond,  and  then  laughed  at  his 
struggles  to  extricate  himself.  When  he  finally  succeeded, 
Schmidt  approached  him  and  asked  if  he  were  wet,  and  if 
the  water  had  reached  his  skin  ;  the  boy,  to  show  that  it  had, 
opened  his  shirt,  when  Schmidt  plunged  a  knife  in  his  bosom. 
Happily,  the  wound  was  not  severe. 

On  the  night  of  the  parricide,  the  father  was  boiling  pot- 
ashes. At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  he  called  to  his  wife 
to  come  and  assist  him  in  lifting  the  kettle  from  the  fire,  but 
she  refused  and  ordered  John  to  go.  John  went  in  his  shirt, 
and  set  the  kettle  on  the  floor,  and  while  his  father  was 
bending  over  to  stir  the  potashes,  he  struck  him  a  blow  with 
a  hatchet  lying  near,  that  felled  him  senseless  to  the  ground. 
He  then  ascended  to  the  garret,  where  his  brother  and  sister 
were  sleeping,  and  severely  wounded  the  latter  with  the 
hatchet.  On  being  seized  by  his  brother  soon  after,  he  asked 
to  see  his  father,  who  had  just  expired;  and  when  gratified 
in  this  wish,  he  uttered  these  remarkable  words  :  "  Ah,  my 
dear  father,  where  are  you  now  ?  What  will  become  of  me  ? 
You  and  my  mother  are  the  cause  of  my  misfortunes.  I 
predicted  it  long  ago,  and  if  you  had  brought  me  up  better, 
this  would  not   have  happened."     When  asked  what  had 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  115 

induced  him  to  commit  such  an  atrocious  crime,  he  replied 
that  the  devil  undoubtedly  instigated  him.  He  also  declared 
that  the  itch,  which  he  had  taken  from  his  sister-in-law,  was 
repelled,  and,  in  consequence,  frequently  occasioned  a  mental 
derangement  and  fits  of  fury  which  impelled  him  to  sacrifice 
every  thing.  Several  witnesses  testified  that  he  had  always 
been  remarkable  for  profound  piety  and  religious  habits. 
He  confessed  to  his  counsel  that  whenever  he  saw  a  cutting 
instrument,  such  as  a  hatchet,  a  knife,  etc.,  he  felt  the  strongest 
desire  to  seize  it,  and  wound  the  first  person  that  came  in  his 
way.  His  counsel  unsuccessfully  pleaded  in  his  defence 
mental  derangement,  though  Schmidt  interrupted  him  by 
declaring  that  he  was  not  mad.  Shortly  before  the  fatal 
hour,  food  was  brought  to  him,  but  observing  it  to  be  meat, 
he  refused  to  eat  it,  saying  that  in  a  few  minutes  it  would  be 
Friday.  As  he  walked  barefooted  to  the  place  of  execution, 
his  confessor  asked  him  if  the  pavement  did  not  hurt  him  ? 
"I  wish,"  he  replied,  "they  had  made  me  walk  on  thorns." 
When  he  arrived  at  the  scaffold,  they  cut  off  his  hand,  but 
he  uttered  not  a  word  or  a  cry,  and  remained  firm  to  the 
last. 

§  100.  Dr.  Marechal,  of  Metz,  who  communicated  this  case, 
observes  that  he  was  struck  with  the  small ness  of  the  head, 
and  its  singular  shape,  and  that  on  carefully  examining  his 
skull,  he  found  the  forehead  very  narrow  and  retreating,  the 
sinciput  tolerably  high,  and  a  marked  prominence  over  the 
ears.  He  said  it  had  the  same  shape  as  those  of  all  the  idiots 
mentioned  by  Pinel. 

§  101.  In  Schmidt  we  have  ample  confirmation  of  the  other 
indications  of  imbecility,  in  the  physical  structure,  which 
speaks  a  language  that  cannot  deceive.  If  his  cranium  were 
shaped  like  those  of  the  idiots  described  by  Pinel,  what  better 
manifestations  of  mind  or  morals  could  have  been  expected 
from  one  thus  stamped  by  nature  with  the  impress  of  inferi- 
ority ?  This  furnishes  an  explanation  of  his  early  indulgence 
in  brutal  propensities,  to  such  a  degree,  that  he  was  deemed 
mad ;  and  gives  us  a  clew  to  the  cause  of  his  attempts 
on  life,  solely  for  the  momentary  gratification  they  afforded ; 


116  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

of  the  motiveless  and  cold-blooded  murder  of  his  father ;  and 
of  that  regard  of  religious  observances  which  had  no  better 
foundation  than  the  merest  superstition.  His  inclination  to 
kill  on  seeing  a  cutting  instrument,  shows  some  morbid 
action  in  the  brain  not  uncommon  in  imbecility,  which  is 
also  indicated  by  the  paroxysms  of  fury  in  which  he  felt  him- 
self urged  on  to  indiscriminate  slaughter.  These  vehement 
impulses,  the  slight  consciousness  of  wrong,  denoted  by  his 
exclamation  on  seeing  the  corpse  of  his  father,  was  totally 
unable  to  restrain ;  and,  by  a  process  unknown  to  himself, 
and  which  he  could  only  explain  on  the  popular  notion  of  the 
instigation  of  the  devil,  they  would  burst  forth  with  fatal  vio- 
lence. His  extraordinary  proneness  to  mischief  and  cruelty, 
and  the  early  age  at  which  it  began  to  appear,  point  dis- 
tinctly to  an  original  defect  of  constitution,  which,  though 
not  attended  by  what  is  probably  called  mania,  deprived  him 
of  all  controlling  influence  over  the  purely  animal  propensi- 
ties. Ferocity  of  disposition  in  imbeciles  no  more  irn  plies 
responsibility  for  criminal  acts,  than  it  does  in  the  brutes; 
and  affords  but  an  indifferent  reason  for  ridding  the  world  of 
their  presence.  To  conclude,  then,  we  cannot  hesitate  to 
believe  with  MM.  Marechal  and  Georget,  that  Schmidt  was 
one  of  those  wretched  beings  who  are  disgraced  by  nature 
from  their  very  birth,  and  whose  vicious  propensities  are 
counterbalanced,  neither  by  a  sense  of  justice  and  morality, 
nor  a  fear  of  punishment. 

§  102.  Pierre  Joseph  Delepine,  aged  sixteen,  was  tried  at 
Paris  for  eight  different  incendiary  acts,  committed  in  the 
Faubourg  St.  Antoine,  in  1825.  The  first  time,  a  bird,  with 
burning  tow  dipped  in  spirits  attached  to  its  tail,  was  let 
loose  in  a  garden  adjoining  that  of  the  accused.  At  another 
time,  August  17th,  a  fire  broke  out  in  the  adjoining  garden, 
two  heaps  of  straw  being  burnt  and  a  part  of  the  wall  de- 
stroyed. Three  days  afterwards,  a  grange  belonging  to  Dele- 
pine's  garden  was  burned,  and  three  days  after  this,  a  cousin 
of  his  was  awakened  by  a  dense  smoke,  and  soon  discovered 
that  a  chest  containing  his  effects  was  on  fire.  The  next 
night,  a  person  passing  through  the  street,  observed  a  heap  of 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   IMBECILITY.  117 

straw  in  flames  at  the  farther  end  of  the  garden  which  laid 
on  the  street.  He  sprang  over  into  the  garden  to  render  as- 
sistance, when  Delepine  and  his  family  rose  and  finally  extin- 
guished the  fire.  While  this  was  doing,  a  bucketful  of  burn- 
ing charcoal  was  discovered  in  the  garret,  in  time,  however, 
to  be  extinguished.  In  the  morning  of  the  7th  September,  a 
piece  of  burning  canvas  was  found  in  a  wood-closet  under 
the  staircase ;  and  Delepine,  who  expressed  his  astonishment, 
helped  to  extinguish  the  flames.  Soon  after,  there  was  found 
under  the  two  mattresses  in  his  sister's  room,  a  handful  of 
burning  flax  by  which  the  bed-furniture  had  been  already  set 
on  fire,  and  some  was  also  discovered  in  his  own  chamber, 
placed  under  his  pillow,  and  an  hour  or  two  afterwards,  a 
heap  of  straw  in  a  neighboring  garden  was  observed  to  be  on 
fire.  He  was  also  charged  with  having  committed  several 
thefts. 

§  103.  On  the  trial,  his  father  stated  that  the  prisoner's 
intellectual  faculties  were  not  what  might  have  been  ex- 
pected from  one  of  his  age ;  and,  in  support  of  his  assertion, 
he  adduced  the  nature  of  the  criminal  acts  themselves,  and 
the  absence  of  sufficient  motives  to  excite  him  to  so  many 
attempts,  both  against  his  own  family,  and  people  who  were 
indifferent  to  him.  He  also  produced  a  certificate  signed 
by  nine  of  his  neighbors,  which  purported  that  Delepine's 
thoughts  and  feelings  were  frequently  in  a  disordered  con- 
dition ;  that  he  would  often  wander  in  his  conduct  and 
conversation  ;  that  he  would  sometimes  strip  himself  naked 
and  run  like  a  madman  through  his  father's  garden ;  that 
they  heard  his  parents  say  that  in  the  January  previous,  he 
attempted  to  hang  himself,  and  some  time  after,  to  jump  into 
a  well.  It  appears  from  the  evidence  that  he  led  an  irregular 
life,  was  jealous  of  his  brothers  and  sisters,  and  caused  his 
father  much  uneasiness.  At  various  times  he  had  stolen 
from  his  parents,  and  it  was  for  having  stolen  a  horse  that 
he  met  in  the  street,  without  its  owner,  that  he  was  first 
arrested  by  the  police. 

§  104.    On  his  trial,  Delepine  replied  to  the  questions  put 
to  him,  with  calmness ;  his  countenance  was  devoid  of  ex- 


118  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

pression  and  presented  a  picture  of  stupidity.  He  denied 
the  facts  charged  in  the  indictment,  and  could  not  conceive 
how  they  happened.  The  newspapers  described  him  as  hav- 
ing a  low  forehead;  and  all  the  witnesses  who  had  an  oppor- 
tunity of  knowing,  agreed  in  believing  that  there  was  some 
singular  defect  in  his  mental  organization.  His  mother  tes- 
tified that  for  some  time  previous  his  parents  had  had  occa- 
sion to  reprove  him  for  his  conduct,  and  that  they  had 
intended  to  seclude  him.  She  said  he  was  odd,  addicted  to 
the  strangest  tricks,  and,  in  short,  showed  that  "there  was 
something  wrong  about  his  head,"  though  he  was  not  mad 
nor  idiotic.  This  testimony  of  the  mother  was  confirmed  by 
that  of  eight  or  nine  other  witnesses,  who  agreed  in  repre- 
senting him  as  having  been  ahvays  very  odd  and  strange  in 
his  conduct,  and  addicted  to  mischief,  though  not  mad,  nor, 
properly  speaking,  idiotic.  He  was,  notwithstanding,  con- 
victed, and  condemned  to  death  ;  but  he  heard  the  sentence 
as  unmoved  as  he  had  continued  to  be  during  the  trial, 

§  105.  In  a  memoir  addressed  to  the  king  by  his  counsel, 
M.  Cleveau,  he  is  described  as  being  "  weak  in  body,  his  face 
pale,  his  eye  dull,  and  his  mind  infirm ;  as  manifesting  no 
disposition  for  employment,  wrapped  in  silence,  and  subject 
to  convulsive  agitations.  He  was  in  the  habit  of  shunning 
his  companions,  and  when  he  did  incline  to  join  them,  he 
proposed  only  the  most  frightful  sports.  Once,  in  the  middle 
of  the  night,  he  placed  baskets  on  his  head,  wrapped  himself 
in  his  bed-clothes,  and  ran  through  the  garden,  uttering  the 
most  fearful  bowlings.  On  one  occasion  he  kindled  a  fire  in 
a  stove  with  thirty  crackers,  and  though  covered  with  the 
ruins,  he  was  not  astonished  at  the  result.  After  the  trial, 
while  in  prison  and  in  irons,  and  under  the  eyes  of  his 
keepers,  he  contrived  to  place  burning  coals  in"  his  bed,  and 
then  laid  down  upon  it  while  actually  on  fire.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  he  is  enslaved  by  a  passion  for  conflagrations, 
incessantly  haunted  by  images  of  flames,  cinders,  and  ruins, 
and  would  not  mind  perishing  himself,  provided  he  could 
enjoy  the  sight  of  them,  in  the  act.  He  belongs  to  that 
class  of  wretched  beings  who  are  doomed  from  the  cradle ; 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  119 

who  live  without  motives,  and  are  cut  off  without  under- 
standing why."  In  consequence  of  this  memorial,  his  pun- 
ishment was  commuted  to  that  of  imprisonment  for  life. 

§  106.    While  in  prison  he  amused  himself  with  scribbling 
his  name  in  every  variety  of  form  on  the  copy  of  the  indict- 
ment that  was  left  with  him ;  by  writing  on  it  unmeaning 
or  disconnected  words,  or  words  formed  by  letters  put  together 
at  random  ;  by  drawing  on  it  grotesque  figures,  and  changing 
the  letters    in  such  a  manner  that  some  parts   of  it  could 
scarcely   be   read.       Thus,    the  words,   "  Acte   d'accusation 
contre   Joseph   Delepine,"  were    changed   in   the    following 
manner :     Dacte    deaccusationiss   contre    Josephu    Delapine  ; 
and  the  first  page  is  filled"  with  ink-spots,  and  detached  and 
insignificant  words,  such  as,  Marieux,  meche,  a  mosire  non, 
dacculer,  mosieur  je  dit,  bonjour  a  monsieur  leru,  etc.     "  Can 
it  be  conceived,"  says  Georget,  "  that  a  person  who  is  con- 
scious of  the  enormity  of  his  crime,  and  who  cannot  be  with- 
out some  anxiety  respecting  the  result  of  his  trial,  should  be 
absorbed  in  such  puerilities  ?  that  he  should  read  such  grave 
charges,  not   only  without  a  single  emotion   of  horror,  but 
even  with  the  most  perfect  indifference,  and  use  the  paper 
containing  them  for  his  amusement?     Such  conduct  not  only 
displays  insensibility,  which  is  not  rare  in  hardened  criminals, 
but  betokens  the  mind  of  a  child  ;  and  in  a  lad  of  sixteen, 
indicates  stupidity,  silliness,  and  imbecility."     The  physical 
characters  attributed  to  Delepine,  and  his  manners,  as  de- 
scribed by  those  who  were  in  the  habit  of  frequently  seeing 
him,   clearly   indicate    a    natural    deficiency   of    his   moral 
powers ;  but  though  his  crimes  were  the  acts  of  a  chiH  five 
or  six  years  old,  his  imbecility  alone  may  not  be  sufficient  to 
account  for   the  particular   form   his   offences  assumed.     It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  imbecility,  as  in  other  abnormal 
conditions,  there  is  not  only  deficiency  and  irregularity,  but 
also  a  great  tendency  to  diseased  cerebral  action,  manifesting 
itself  in  excessive  uncontrollable  indulgence  of  some  one  or 
more  propensities.     In  Delepine,  it  assumed  the  form  of  that 
monomania  which  consists  in  a  morbid  impulse,  which  the 
higher  powers  cannot  restrain,  to  acts  of  incendiarism.     That 


120  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  incendiary  acts  of  Delepine  arose  from  diseased  action  in 
the  brain,  and  not  from  mere  love  of  mischief,  is  abundantly 
proved  by  the  slightest  examination  of  their  nature.  To  let 
loose  a  bird  with  burning  tow  attached  to  it,  without  know- 
ing or  caring  where  it  would  alight,  is  what,  perhaps,  might 
have  been  expected  from  a  low  and  simple,  though  sound 
mind,  deliberately  bent  on  mischief;  but  certainly,  nothing 
less  than  genuine,  unequivocal  insanity,  can  account  for  his 
setting  his  own  bed  on  fire,  and  then  calmly  lying  down  upon 
it.  If,  too,  he  had  been  actuated  by  malice  or  a  pure  love  of 
mischief,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  he  would  have  chosen 
his  own  home  for  its  objects,  and  thus  deliberately  endeavored 
to  deprive  himself  of  a  shelter,  as  well  as  those  on  whom  he 
depended.  In  short,  the  fact  of  imbecility,  combined  with 
mania,  is  so  plainly  written  on  the  history  of  this  singular 
case,  that  it  would  be  hopeless,  by  any  additional  comments, 
to  make  it  more  clear  to  those  who  cannot  read  it  for  them- 
selves.^ 

§  107.  Abraham  Prescott  was  tried  at  Concord,  New 
Hampshire,  in  September,  1834,  for  the  murder  of  Mrs.  Sally 
Cochran.^  On  the  morning  of  June  23d,  1833.  he  lefr  home 
with  the  deceased,  who  was  the  wife  of  his  employer,  for  the 
purpose  of  picking  strawberries  in  a  neighboring  pasture. 
An  hour  and  a  half  afterwards,  the  family  heard  a  whining, 
moaning  sound  in  the  barn,  which  was  found  to  proceed 
from  Prescott,  who,  on  being  asked  what  was  the  matter 
with  him,  said  that  "  he  had  struck  Sally  [Mrs.  Cochran]  with 
a  stake  and  killed  her."  He  then  went  with  them  and  showed 
them  'the  body,  which  they  found  had  been  dragged  a  little 
distance  from  the  place  where  the  murder  was  committed, 
and  concealed  among  some  bushes.  On  his  way  thither  he 
asked  the  husband  if  he  would  hang  him ;  he  showed  no  dis- 


^  The  facts  in  the  above  cases  are  taken  from  Georget's  work,  already 
referred  to,  entitled,  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folic,  130,  144. 

-  The  facts  of  this  case  are  derived  from  the  report  of  the  trial,  published 
at  Concord,  in  1834,  and  from  an  article  in  the  Boston  Statesman  of  January 
9,  1836,  entitled  "  Execution  of  Abraham  Prescott." 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  121 

position  to  escape,  though  not  arrested  till  several  hours  after- 
wards, and  slept  soundly  the  succeeding  night.  He  was 
eighteen  years  old,  had  lived  three  years  in  Mr.  Cochran's 
family,  by  which  he  had  been  always  kindly  treated,  and  his 
conduct  had  been  uniformly  correct  and  satisfactory.  No 
misunderstanding  had  occurred  between  him  and  any  other 
member  of  the  family,  and  they  reposed  unlimited  confidence 
in  his  fidelity  and  attachment,  though  on  one  occasion  it  was 
strongly  tried.  On  the  6th  of  January,  1833,  that  is,  about 
six  mouths  previously,  he  arose  in  the  night,  procured  an 
axe  from  the  shed,  went  to  the  bed  where  Mr.  and  Mrs. 
Cochran  were  sleeping,  and  struck  each  of  them  some  severe 
blows  on  the  side  of  the  head,  which  left  them  senseless. 
He  then  went  to  an  adjoining  room  where  Mr.  Cochran's 
mother  slept,  and  told  her,  he  "  believed  he  had  killed  Mr. 
and  Mrs.  Cochran."  They  recovered,  however,  and  warmly 
repelled  every  suspicion  of  the  truth  of  his  own  statement 
that  he  had  committed  the  act  in  his  sleep,  unconsciously 
though  he  had  never  been  known  to  walk  in  his  sleep  before. 
For  several  months  after  the  murder,  he  continued  to  explain 
his  conduct  in  regard  to  it,  by  saying  that  while  in  the  pasture 
he  had  the  toothache,  that  he  sat  down  on  a  stump,  and  fell 
asleep,  and  that  was  the  last  he  knew,  until  he  found  he 
had  killed  Mrs.  Cochran.  On  being  much  pressed  by  the 
coroner  and  warden  to  confess  the  whole  truth,  for  they  did 
not  believe  that  he  acted  without  a  motive,  and  assured  by 
them  that  he  would  stand  a  better  chance  of  being  pardoned 
if  he  confessed,  he  told  these  officers,  that  he  made  an  insult- 
ing proposal  to  Mrs.  Cochran,  which  she  resented,  and  threat- 
ened to  tell  her  husband  of  and  get  him  punished ;  that  he 
supposed  he  should  have  to  go  to  prison,  and  thinking  he 
would  rather  be  hanged  than  go  there,  he  took  up  a  stake 
and  killed  her.  Subsequently,  he  stated  that  he  did  not 
make  such  proposals  to  Mrs.  Cochran,  and  uniformly  denied 
that  he  had  ever  so  confessed  ;  but  declared  that  the  coroner 
and  warden  had  troubled  him  so  much  that  he  did  not  know 
what  he  told  them.  To  the  keeper  of  the  jail  and  the  clergy- 
men who  visited  him,  he  invariably  stated,  "  that  he  attempt- 

11 


122  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ed  to  kill  Mr.  Cochran  and  his  wife,  in  January,  1833,  in 
order  to  get  possession  of  their  property ;  and  that  when  he 
found  he  had  not  despatched  them,  he  feigned  that  he  had 
been  asleep  when  he  did  it.  In  June,  his  intentions  were, 
first  to  kill  Mrs.  Cochran  in  the  hollow,  and  then  call  down 
Mr.  Cochran  and  kill  him." 

§  108.  His  counsel  set  up  in  defence  the  plea  of  homicidal 
insanity,  which  they  supported  by  quoting  numerous  cases  of 
this  disorder,  and  citing  the  opinions  of  high  medical  author- 
ities and  witnesses  ;  and,  in  short,  nothing  was  omitted  by 
them  that  could  help  to  render  the  defence  satisfactory  to  the 
jury.  Chief  Justice  Richardson,  in  his  charge,  strongly  in- 
clined to  the  belief  of  his  insanity,  and  observed  that  if  the 
prisoner  "  had  been  all  the  time  sane,  his  conduct  had  cer- 
tainly been  most  extraordinary.  And  on  the  other  hand,  if 
he  had  been  otherwise  than  sane,  it  was  a  most  extraordi- 
nary case  of  insanity." 

§  109.  There  certainly  are  strong  reasons  for  believing  that 
Prescott  was  utterly  unconscious  of  what  he  was  doing  when 
he  murdered  Mrs.  Cochran,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  careful 
examination  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  presents  us 
with  still  stronger  reasons  for  thinking  that  he  did  know  well 
enough  what  he  was  doing.  It  appears  perfectly  evident 
that  he  belonged  to  that  wretched  class  of  men,  in  whom 
mental  deficiency  is  accompanied  by  more  or  less  perversion 
of  the  moral  faculties.  Upon  any  other  than  this  view  of  his 
mental  condition,  it  is  impossible  to  furnish  a  satisfactory 
explanation  of  his  conduct  and  the  circumstances  attending 
it.  His  original  statement  that  he  was  unconscious  when 
he  committed  the  murder,  is  opposed  by  his  subsequent  con- 
fessions that  he  was  actuated  by  certain  motives ;  so  that  we 
are  presented,  in  the  outset,  with  the  very  unusual  case  of  a 
criminal  defended  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  who  denies  that 
he  was  insane,  and  furnishes  rational  motives  for  his  conduct. 
There  is  good  ground  for  believing  that  his  last  confession 
was  the  true  one,  first,  because  he  could  have  had  no  reason 
then  for  inculpating  himself  falsely,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  hope  of  escaping  punishment  was  a  sufficient  reason  for 
his  fabricating  the  story  which  he  told  at  first ;  and,  secondly, 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  123 

because  it  furnished  the  same  motive  for  the  attempt  to  kill 
in  January,  and  this  establishes  a  consistent  and  satisfactory 
relation  between  these  two  acts.  To  remove  the  only  doubt 
in  his  favor,  that  of  his  sanity,  and  confess  a  fictitious  motive 
for  his  conduct,  is  of  itself,  considering  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  strongly  indicative  of  mental  imbecility.  We  are 
obliged,  therefore,  to  believe  that  he  was  actuated  by  a  motive, 
and  that  this  motive  was  a  desire  of  gain  ;  and  nothing  can 
more  strongly  show  the  imbecility  of  his  mind  than  the 
means  which  he  took  to  obtain  his  object.  It  seems  that  the 
idea  haunted  his  mind  that  the  death  of  the  Cochrans  would 
put  him  in  possession  of  their  property;  and  with  this  view 
"  he  thought,"  as  he  said,  '"■  a  thousand  times  of  killing  them, 
along  through  the  fall,  before  the  attempt  on  their  lives  in 
January."  When  asked  if  he  did  not  know  that  the  prop- 
erty would  descend  to  the  children,  he  replied,  "  that  he  knew 
it  would  so  descend,  but  he  did  not  think  of  it  at  that 
moment."  In  fact  he  w^as  not  even  the  most  distantly  rela- 
ted to  the  Cochrans,  and  had  no  reason  whatever  for  sup- 
posing that  they  had  made  testamentary  dispositions  in  his 
favor.  His  imbecility  is  also  strikingly  manifested  in  the 
feebleness  of  spirit  and  want  of  resolution  which  character- 
ized his  criminal  attempts.  He  kills,  as  he  supposes,  both 
husband  and  wife  in  their  bed  ;  but  when  he  returns  to  their 
room  and  finds  them  still  living,  instead  of  completing  his 
work  by  an  additional  blow,  as  the  cool  assassin  would  have 
done,  he  goes  and  arouses  the  rest  of  the  family  and  the 
neighbors,  and  tells  them  what  he  has  done.  Again,  instead 
of  taking  an  opportunity  when  both  his  victims  might  be 
finished  together,  with  some  shade  of  secrecy,  he  despatches 
one  in  open  day,  almost  within  call  of  help,  intending  to 
trust  to  his  chance  of  overpowering  the  other  under  similar 
circumstances.  The  latter  part  of  this  plan  —  that  of  call- 
ing Mr.  Cochran  and  killing  him — he  abandons  the  mo- 
ment he  has  murdered  the  wife  ;  and  seems  then  for  the  first 
time  to  have  thought  of  concealing  the  body  and  his  own 
share  in  the  bloody  act.  This  purpose,  too,  he  but  half 
performs,  and  finally  goes  and  discloses  the  whole  transac- 


124  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

tion  to  the  very  person  most  interested  in  knowing  it.  Such 
conduct  is  perfectly  inexplicable  on  the  supposition  of  his 
possessing  a  soundly  acting  mind;  but  it  is  a  fair  specimen 
of  that  vacillation  of  purpose,  feebleness  of  resolution,  and 
capriciousness  of  design,  which  are  among  the  most  com- 
mon features  of  imbecility.  Had  he  belonged  to  the  class 
of  ordinary  criminals,  he,  certainly,  after  obtaining  the  ob- 
ject he  had  in  view  in  committing  the  murder,  would  either 
have  fled,  or  taken  some  means  of  turning  suspicion  from 
himself,  and  provided  for  his  escape  in  this  last  resort.  But 
he  was  an  imbecile,  and  because  he  was  an  imbecile,  he 
immediately  proclaims  his  own  agency  in  the  act,  relying 
for  his  safety  on  the  very  suspicious  excuse  of  being  uncon- 
scious of  what  he  was  doing,  —  an  excuse  which,  at  best, 
would  not  have  saved  him  from  much  tedious,  perhaps  per- 
petual confinement,  and  the  ineffaceable  stigma  of  having 
murdered  a  fellow-being.  Even  the  motive  he  assigned  to 
the  coroner  and  warden,  and  on  which  the  attorney-general 
rested  the  burden  of  his  argument  against  him,  supposing 
it  were  actually  the  true  one,  would  only  strengthen  this 
view  of  his  mental  condition ;  for  none  but  an  imbecile  or 
an  idiot  would  ever  have  imagined  that  he  would  be  sent  to 
jail  for  offering  an  insulting  proposal  to  a  woman,  or  would 
have  preferred  hanging  to  temporary  imprisonment,  and  then 
added  murder  to  insult  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  his 
preference.  Nothing  that  appears  in  what  is  said  of  him 
during  his  confinement,  gives  any  higher  idea  of  his  moral 
and  intellectual  powers.  The  utmost  efforts  of  zealous  and 
judicious  clergymen  failed  to  impress  him  with  a  sense  of 
his  awful  situation,  or  inspire  him,  in  the  least  degree,  with 
those  cheering  hopes  which  even  the  most  abandoned  crim- 
inals often  entertain.  This  did  not  arise  from  a  spirit  of 
bravado,  nor  from  the  utter  recklessness  sometimes  mani- 
fested by  the  hardened  victims  of  the  law ;  but  from  stupid 
indifference,  or  sheer  inability  to  comprehend  the  simple 
truths  of  religion,  or  imagine  any  thing,  beyond  the  present, 
worse  than  the  annoyances  to  which  he  was  subjected.  In 
short,  so  obvious  was  his  imbecility,  that  the  writer,  from 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  IMBECILITY.  125 

whose  statement  the  foregoing  account  is  partly  taken,  ob- 
serves that  "  no  one  who  has  had  any  intercourse  with  Pres- 
cott  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  he  is  or  has  been  insane, 
but  they  all  consider  him  to  have  been  deficient  in  intellect 
or  common  sense."  ^  The  signs  of  imbecility  were  not  want- 
ing even  in  his  physical  constitution.  A  medical  witness, 
who  had  been  physician  of  a  private  asylum  for  the  insane 
for  fifteen  years,  speaking  of  his  appearance  at  the  bar,  said, 
"  the  motion  of  his  eye  is  idiotic,  dull,  lazy,  indifferent ;  no 
appearance  of  fear  or  anxiety  in  his  countenance.  I  noticed 
no  agitation,  nor  anxiety  in  the  prisoner  during  the  examina- 
tion of  the  first  two  government  witnesses."  It  is  also 
worthy  of  notice, .that  insanity  had  been  a  common  disease 
in  the  Prescott  family  ;  that  his  mother  was  fifty-six  years 
old  when  he  was  born,  and  his  father  but  one  year  younger; 
and  that  the  prisoner,  when  a  child,  had  a  scrofulous  or 
rickety  affection,  for  which  they  used  cold  bathing  and  some 
external  remedies.  Stronger  predisposing  causes  of  imbe- 
cility than  these,  when  combined,  do  not  exist. 

§  110.  Such  are  the  reasons  that  induce  the  belief,  that  Pres- 
cott was  a  subject  of  imbecility,  not  mania,  —  that  he  belonged 
to  that  unfortunate  class  described  by  Georget  (§  58)  who 
know  no  other  incentive  than  the  gratification  of  animal  pas- 
sion ;  and  who  are  restrained  from  evil-doing  by  no  higher 
sentiment  than  the  fear  of  punishment.  This  consequence 
he  certainly  should  have  been  made  to  suffer  in   a  limited 


1  It  is  true,  tliat  one  witness,  with  whom  the  accused  lived  a  year  and  a 
half,  previous  to  living  with  the  Cochrans,  described  him  as  "  intelligent," ' 
and  another,  who  had  been  acquainted  with  him  from  a  child,  said,  "  he  was 
as  intelligent  as  boys  in  general ;  "  but  when  we  bear  in  mind  how  ill-quali- 
fied most  persons  are  to  estimate  the  intellectual  capacity  of  others,  and  that 
with  them  intelligence  generally  means  only  manual  skill,  or  a  tolerable  apt- 
ness in  performing  the  coarser  labors  of  the  farm  and  the  work-shop,  we 
shall  place  little  reliance  on  these  representations,  more  especially,  too,  as 
they  are  not  sustained  by  other  testimony.  The  keeper  of  the  jail  and  his 
wife,  who  seem  to  have  been  particularly  interested  in  him,  and  to  have  had 
considerable  intercourse  with  him,  both  testified  that  they  considered  him 
*'  not  as  intelligent  as  boys  in  general." 

11' 


126  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

degree;  but  to  mete  it  out  to  him  in  the  same  measure  that 
is  bestowed  on  ordinary  criminals,  was  manifestly  contrary  to 
the  principles  of  natural  justice. 

§  111.  On  the  14th  of  May,  1833,  a  young  man,  John  Bar- 
clay, was  executed  at  Glasgow,  for  the  murder  of  Samuel 
Neilson,  for  whom  he  had  previously  shown  some  affection. 
He  took  from  hirn  three  one-pound  notes  and  a  watch,  to 
obtain  possession  of  which  seems  to  have  been  the  object  of 
the  murder.  So  little  sense  had  he  of  having  done  wrong, 
or  of  his  own  situation,  that  he  hovered  about  almost  with- 
out disguise,  and,  while  going  to  spend  part  of  the  money 
with  the  first  person  he  spoke  to,  he  dropped  first  one  and 
then  another  note  at  his  feet,  as  a  child  would  have  done. 
He  was  devoid  of  natural  affection,  and  evinced  no  sorrow 
for  what  had  happened.  When  questioned,  he  said  he 
could  see  no  difference  between  killing  a  man,  and  killing  an 
ox,  except  that  he  "  would  never  hear  him  fiddle  again  ; " 
and  so  little  did  he  know  of  the  nature  of  the  watch,  that  he 
regarded  it  as  an  animal,  and  when  it  stopped  from  not 
having  been  wound  up,  believed  it  had  died  of  cold  from  the 
glass  being  broken.  His  only  idea  of  God  was,  that  he  was 
a  mucklc  horse.  He  had  no  idea  of  time,  and  did  not  know 
the  number  of  days  in  a  week.  So  obvious  was  Barclay's 
mental  deficiency,  that  the  court  of  justiciary  before  which 
he  was  brought,  declined  proceeding  to  his  trial  till  it  was 
decided  by  medical  evidence,  that  he  was  a  fit  subject  for 
trial.  In  his  parish,  he  was  familiarly  known  as  "daft  Jock 
Barclay;"  and  the  clergyman,  who  knew  him  well,  "always 
regarded  him  as  imbecile,  and  had  never  been  able  to  give 
him  any  religious  instruction,  and  did  not  consider  him  a 
responsible  being."  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Barclay's 
weakness  of  mind  was  recognized  by  all  parties  from  the 
judge  downwards,  and  that  the  jury  strongly  recommended 
him  to  mercy  on  that  account,  he  was  condemned  and  exe- 
cuted.^    It  appears  that  much  stress  was  laid  on  Barclay's 


'  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  x.  33. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  127 

knowing'  right  from  wrong,  as  affbrding  indisputable  proof  of 
his  being  a  moral  agent.  The  reader  may  judge  for  himself, 
how  extensive  and  accurate  must  have  been  the  notions  on 
this  point,  of  one  who  thought  a  watch  was  a  live  creature, 
and  who  could  see  no  difference  between  killing  an  ox  and 
killing  a  man. 

In  the  above  case  the  imbecility  was  congenital,  and  re- 
sulted from  an  imperfect  development  of  the  cerebral  organ- 
ism. In  the  following,  it  was  the  effect  of  disease,  pervert- 
ing the  normal  action  of  the  brain. 

§  112.  Louis  Lecouffe,  aged  twenty-four  years,  was  tried  at 
Paris,  11th  December,  1823,  for  the  murder  of  a  woman 
whom  he  robbed  of  a  quantity  of  plate.  It  appears  that  he 
was  an  epileptic  from  infancy;  and  those  who  were  in  the 
habit  of  associating  with  him  always  regarded  him  as  an 
idiot  or  fool.  He  had  some  disease  of  the  head  when  very 
young.  At  fifteen,  he  showed  manifest  signs  of  insanity  ; 
and  affirmed  that  God,  from  time  to  time,  came  to  visit  him. 
His  mother,  whom  he  strongly  accused  and  seriously  com- 
promised by  his  disclosures,  declared,  even  while  she  stigma- 
tized him  as  a  monster  and  a  villain,  that  he  had  always 
been  in  bad  health,  and  hardly  ever  in  possession  of  his 
senses.  At  his  first  examination  he  denied  the  charge,  but 
subsequently  he  confessed,  for  the  following  reason.  He 
stated  that  on  the  preceding  night,  while  still  awake,  the 
spirit  of  his  father  appeared  to  him,  with  an  angel  at  his 
right  hand,  and  commanded  him  to  confess  his  crime ;  that 
God  immediately  after,  placed  his  hand  upon  his  heart,  and 
said  to  him,  "  I  pardon  thee,"  and  ordered  him  to  confess 
every  thing  within  three  days.  It  appears  that  his  mother, 
of  whom  he  stood  greatly  in  awe,  had  refused  her  consent  to 
a  marriage  he  was  anxious  to  contract;  that  she  refused  him 
again  on  another  occasion,  and,  according  to  his  confession, 
she  long  teased  him  to  commit  the  murder  and  robbery,  andr 
decided  his  resolution  by  promising  no  longer  to  oppose  his 
marriage.  The  plate  was  pawned  for  two  hundred  and 
thirty  francs,  of  which  his  mother  gave  him  only  forty  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  his  marriage.     He  declared  that  his 


128  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

victim  was  fond  of  him,  and  that  he  deserved  her  good  will 
by  having  rendered  her  many  little  services.  On  being  con- 
fronted with  his  mother,  he  did  not  retract  his  assertions,  but 
only  showed  some  hesitation,  saying  he  was  not  himself,  and 
experienced  a  violent  nervous  attack.  He  said,  next  day, 
that  if  placed  again  in  the  presence  of  his  mother,  he  would 
be  unable  to  answer  for  himself;  that  she  would  give  him 
the  lie,  and  he  would  not  have  firmness  enough  to  maintain 
the  truth.  Her  unbounded  influence  and  authority  over  him, 
which  were  deposed  to  by  several  witnesses,  were  such,  that 
he  did  whatever  she  ordered  him,  and  absolutely  deprived 
himself  of  every  thing  to  support  her,  giving  her  all  his  earn- 
ings, without  daring  to  retain  a  single  sous.  The  keeper  of 
the  prison  testified  that  he  talked  incoherently,  and  that  he 
seemed  idiotic  and  weak-minded.  The  chief  keeper  said, 
that  he  had  often  seen  the  accused  with  haggard  looks,  and 
eyes  filled  with  tears,  complaining  of  headache,  but  without 
manifesting  any  true  derangement  of  mind.  During  the 
trial  he  had  very  frequent  violent  attacks  of  convulsions,  and 
he  stated  that  when  he  felt  vexed,  a  kind  of  flame  or  flash 
passed  before  his  eyes.^ 

§  113.  The  facts  here  related  may  seem  to  some,  to  estab- 
lish the  imbecility,  or  mania,  or  both,  of  Lecouffe,  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt;  but  not  so  thought  the  court  or  jury,  and, 
accordingly,  he  was  condemned  and  executed  with  his 
mother.  Certainly,  nothing  short  of  great  weakness  of  mind 
can  account  for  the  entire  submission  of  a  man  twenty-four 
years  old  to  the  despotic  rule  of  his  mother,  to  whom  he 
yielded  the  last  sous  of  his  earnings,  sacrificed  his  matrimo- 
nial scheme,  on  which  he  was  strongly  bent,  and  from 
whom  he  received  only  forty  of  the  two  hundred  and  thirty 
francs,  for  which,  at  her  instigation,  he  had  murdered  his 
benefactress.  That  this  mental  weakness  amounted  to  im- 
.becility,  is  satisfactorily  proved  by  the  fear  and  convulsive 
agitations  which  he  experienced  when  brought  into  her  pres- 


*  Georget,  Examen  des  proces  crim. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUEXCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  129 

ence ;  by  the  common  opinion  of  those  who  were  in  the 
habit  of  associating  with  him  ;  and  by  the  well-known  effects 
of  this  disease  on  the  understanding  of  its  subject.  If  Le- 
couffe,  after  suffering  the  disease  his  whole  life,  had  still 
possessed  a  sound  mind,  it  would  have  been  a  fact  almost, 
if  not  altogether,  without  a  parallel;  but  that  he  did  not 
escape  its  deteriorating  effects,  is  abundantly  proved  by  the 
evidence  adduced.  Occasionally,  his  mental  affection  took 
the  form  of  proper  mania,  as  was  indicated  by  the  wildness 
and  disorder  of  his  looks,  by  talking  incoherently  to  himself, 
by  his  groanings  and  mournful  cries  in  the  night,  observed 
by  one  of  the  witnesses,  by  his  nocturnal  apparitions,  and  by 
the  testimony  of  his  own  mother,  that  he  was  almost  never 
in  possession  of  his  senses. 

§  114.  Against  all  this  array  of  evidence,  the  advocate- 
general  had  nothing  to  offer  but  the  idle  declamation  usually 
resorted  to  on  such  occasions.  The  attempts  of  the  prison- 
er's counsel  to  establish  the  existence  of  imbecility  and  ma- 
nia, he  reprobated  in  the  severest  terms,  as  dangerous  to 
society,  subversive  of  social  order,  destructive  of  morality 
and  religion,  and  affording  a  direct  encouragement  to  crime. 
It  forms  no  part  of  the  plan  of  this  work  to  show  the  utter 
groundlessness  of  these  assertions ;  and  they  are  mentioned 
here,  merely  that  the  reader  may  see  what  powerful  consider- 
ations succeeded  in  invalidating  the  evidence  in  favor  of 
Lecouffe,  and  consigning  him  to  an  ignominious  end! 

§  115.  If  the  principles  above  laid  down  (§§  75,  76,  83) 
are  not  'entirely  incorrect,  it  follows  that  the  persons  whose 
cases  have  been  related,  were  not  fit  subjects  for  criminal 
punishment  —  at  least,  not  that  of  death.  The  usual  treat- 
ment of  such  offenders,  it  is  to  be  feared,  is  prompted  more 
by  prejudice  and  excited  feelings,  than  by  enlarged  views 
of  human  nature  and  of  the  ends  of  criminal  jurisprudence. 
While  the  public  feeling  has  become  too  refined  to  tolerate 
the  infliction  of  blows  and  stripes  on  the  imbecile  and  the 
mad  in  the  institutions  where  they  are  confined,  and  is  in- 
clined to  discountenance  altogether  the  idea  of  punishment 
as  applied  to  the  insane,  it  can   still   be  gratified  by  gazing 


130  MEDICAL  JURISPKUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

on  the  dying  agonies  of  a  being  unable  to  comprehend  the 
connection  between  his  crime  and  the  penalty  attached  to  it, 
and  utterly  insensible  of  the  nature  of  his  awful  situation. 
The  voice  of  reason  and  humanity  which  speaks  successfully 
in  the  first  instance,  is,  in  the  last,  drowned  by  the  more 
imperious  tones  of  prejudice  and  passion.  When  imbeciles 
are  convicted  on  a  charge  of  great  criminal  offences,  the  only 
rational  course  to  be  pursued  with  them,  is  that  of  perpetual 
confinement,  which  at  once  secures  society  from  their  future 
aggressions,  and  is  most  conducive  to  their  mental  and  bodily 
welfare. 

§  116.  It  has  been  already  mentioned  (§  75)  as  an  essen- 
tial defect  in  Hoffbauer's  description  of  the  various  grades  of 
imbecility  and  stupidity,  that  he  has  almost  entirely  left  out 
of  view  the  state  of  the  moral  faculties,  —  an  omission  that 
is  fatal  to  the  value  of  the  principles  which  he  lays  down 
relative  to  the  legal  consequences  of  this  mental  condition  in 
connection  with  crime.  The  ground  above  taken  (§§  75,  76) 
obliges  us  to  consider  the  principle  he  has  adopted,  of  gradu- 
ating criminal  responsibility  by  the  strength  and  extent  of 
the  intellect  alone,  as  exceedingly  partial  and  unjust  in  its 
operation.  The  only  conditions  of  culpability  which  he 
recognizes  are,  first,  a  knowledge  that  the  act  is  contrary 
to  law;  and,  secondly,  that  the  act  is  precisely  the  one  pro- 
hibited by  the  law.  In  the  first  degree  of  imbecility  —  for 
in  the  third  all  legal  culpability  is  annulled — the  absence 
of  these  conditions  may  be  alleged  in  excuse ;  but  only, 
first,  when  the  violated  law  neither  forms  a  part  of  those 
general  relations  which  concern  the  offender  in  common  with 
other  members  of  society,  nor  belongs  to  his  own  particular 
condition  or  circumstances;  and,  secondly,  when  the  action 
forbidden  by  the  law  is  not  contrary  to  the  law  of  nature. 
Accordingly,  he  considers  "  that  inattention  or  absence  of 
mind,  want  of  foresight,  etc.,  are  not  to  be  received  in  excuse 
when  they  have  regard  to  objects  universally  known,  as  to 
fire,  or  to  those  which  are  familiarly  used  by  the  imbecile,  as 
the  tools,  etc.  of  his  profession."  In  all  other  instances  his 
fault  loses  the  degree  of  culpability  that  belongs  to  it,  in 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   IMBECILITY.  131 

absiracto,  according  to  the  expression  of  jurists.  This  is  also 
the  case  when  the  act  is  the  result  of  sudden  anger  or  fear, 
to  which  weak  persons  are  prone.^ 

§  117.  In  determining  the  civil  responsibilities  and  rela- 
tions of  the  imbecile,  Hoffbauer's  descriptions  are  not  so 
unsuitable  for  practical  application ;  as  these  must  chiefly 
be  determined  by  the  condition  of  the  intellect  alone.  As 
his  observations,  however,  have  reference  in  a  great  measure 
to  the  legal  regulations  of  his  own  country,  they  will  be 
noticed  no  further  than  merely  to  state  his  opinion  that  when 
imbecility  reaches,  or  approaches  the  third  degree,  the  party 
can  no  longer  be  considered  capable  of  taking  care  of  his 
property,  or  of  bequeathing  it  by  will. 

§  118.  No  cases  subjected  to  legal  inquiry  are  more  calcu- 
lated to  puzzle  the  understandings  of  courts  and  juries,  to 
mock  the  wisdom  of  the  learned,  and  baffle  the  acuteness  of 
the  shrewd,  than  those  connected  with  questions  of  imbe- 
cility. Much  of  the  difliculty  consists,  no  doubt,  in  a  want 
of  that  practical  tact  which  is  obtained  by  experience,  in 
unravelling  their  intricacies,  and  of  that  knowledge  of  the 
psychological  nature  of  this  condition  of  mind,  which  directs 
the  attention  exclusively  to  the  real  question  at  issue,  and 
abstracts  whatever  is  extraneous,  or  without  any  direct  bear- 
ing on  its  merits.  It  is  impossible  to  specify  any  particular 
rules  for  ascertaining  the  mental  capacity  of  imbecile  per- 
sons ;  for  circumstances,  always  proper  to  be  taken  into  the 
account,  are  constantly  varying  with  each  individual  case. 
The  education  of  the  party,  the  sphere  of  life  in  which  he 
has  moved,  his  capacity  of  acquirement,  his  exposure  to 
improper  influences,  and  especially  the  nature  of  the  act  in 
question,  —  are  points  which  require  a  close  and  thorough 
consideration.  In  questions  of  interdiction  which  present 
the  greatest  difficulty,  some  overt  acts  of  extravagance  or 
indiscretion  generally  appear  in  evidence  when  the  party  is 
really  incapable  of  managing  his  affairs,  which  will  remove 


Op.  cit.  sup.  §  58. 


132  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  doubts  that  a  direct  investigation  of  his  intelligence  and 
capacity  may  have  left  behind.  It  ought  to  be  considered  as 
a  general  rule,  that  when  no  acts  of  this  kind  have  been 
committed,  notwithstanding  the  management  of  his  property 
has  been  entirely  in  his  own  hands,  beyond  the  control  of 
others,  the  party  ought  not  to  be  interdicted  on  the  score  of 
imbecility.  In  all  cases  it  will  be  indispensably  necessary, 
as  Mr.  Haslam  advises,  to  investigate  his  comprehension  of 
numbers,  without  which  the  nature  of  property  cannot  be 
understood.  But  the  assertion  of  this  writer,  that  "  if  a  per- 
son were  capable  of  enumerating  progressively  to  the  num- 
ber ten,  and  knew  the  force  and  value  of  the  separate  units,  he 
would  be  fully  competent  to  the  management  of  property,"  ^ 
is  by  no  means  to  be  admitted  as  true ;  for  it  is  very  certain 
that  a  large  proportion  of  those  whose  mental  capacity  is 
unquestionably  inadequate  to  the  managiement  of  property, 
have,  nevertheless,  these  arithmetical  acquirements.  Cases, 
even,  are  occasionally  met  with  of  imbeciles  who  possess 
surprising  powers  of  calculation,  but  have  not  the  compe- 
tency of  children  to  manage  pecuniary  affairs  of  any  extent. 
No  doubt  the  converse  of  the  proposition,  in  reference  to 
people  of  doubtful  capacity,  comes  nearer  the  truth.  When 
there  exists  this  inability  of  comprehending  the  value  of 
numbers,  the  individual  ought  to  be  considered,  in  all  ques- 
tions of  property,  as  legally  non  compos  mentis,  notwith- 
standing we  might  hesitate  to  adopt  this  conclusion,  after  an 
investigation  of  his  intellectual  capacity  in  regard  to  the 
general  nature  and  relations  of  property  and  business  trans- 
actions. 

§  119.  Imbeciles  in  the  third  degree  are  evidently  inca- 
pable of  making  wills;  but  not  necessarily  so,  Hoffbauer 
thinks,^  are  imbeciles  in  the  first  degree,  even  when  subjected 
to  a  curator.  The  purpose  of  this  guardianship  is  to  protect 
them  from  the  damage  they  might  do  themselves  if  left  with 


*  jMedical  Jurisprudence,  as  It  relates  to  Insanity,  347. 
'-  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  82. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   IMBECILITY.  133 

the  administration  of  their  affairs,  and  to  prevent  thenn  from 
entering  into  engagements  which  they  would  find  it  impos- 
sible to  perform.  But  as  testamentary  dispositions  depend  on 
a  single  arrangement,  and  one  which  the  testator  may  have 
taken  some  time  to  think  upon  and  mature,  they  do  not  re- 
quire the  same  degree  of  intelligence  as  the  administration  of 
property,  and  therefore  the  validity  of  a  will  ought  not  to  be 
considered  as  necessarily  incompatible  with  the  iiiterdiction 
of  the  testator.  As  a  general  principle,  the  correctness  of 
Hoffbauer's  doctrine  maybe  admitted,  because  it  places  no 
arbitrary  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  a  natural  right,  the 
abuse  of  which  can  be  sufficiently  prevented  by  judicial 
interference ;  and  because,  if  it  be  rejected,  we  may  have 
the  curious  spectacle  of  a  person  debarred  from  having  any 
voice  in  the  final  dispordtion  of  his  property,  —  in  an  act 
which  really  comes  within  the  reach  of  his  understanding, — 
while  in  the  management  of  his  property,  a  judicious  com- 
mittee is  constantly  paying  all  the  deference  to  his  wishes 
and  suggestions  which  their  reasonableness  deserves.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  nature  and  consequences  of  a 
testament  may  be  sufficiently  understood  by  many  an  imbe- 
cile who  is  utterly  incapable  of  discerning  the  complicated 
relations  that  are  involved  in  the  management  of  property. 
For  this  reason  it  is  said  that,  "if  a  man  be  of  a  mean 
understanding,  neither  of  the  wise  sort,  nor  of  the  foolish, 
but  indifferent  as  it  were,  betwixt  a  wise  man  and  a  fool, 
yea,  though  he  rather  incline  to  the  foolish  sort,  so  that  for 
his  dull  capacity  he  might  worthily  be  called  grossum  caput, 
a  dull  pate,  or  a  dunce ;  such  a  one  is  not  prohibited  to  make 
a  testament."  ^  Nothing  can  be  more  natural  than  that  he 
should  be  attached  to  those  who  have  rendered  him  impor- 
tant services,  and  perhaps  have  well-founded  claims  on  his 
bounty  ;  and  if  anxious  to  leave  some  substantial  token  of 
his  regard,  no  legal  impediment  ought  to  prevent  him  from 
bequeathing  them  a  reasonable  portion  of  his  property.     The 


*  Swinburne  on  Wills,  part  2,  s.  4. 

12 


134  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

danger  anticipated  from  such  an  exercise  of  the  testamentary 
power,  is  probably  more  imaginary  than  real;  for  it  can 
hardly  be  conceived  that  testamentary  dispositions,  which 
turn  the  descent  of  property  altogether  from  its  natural  chan- 
nels, to  heap  it  up  in  the  lap  of  a  stranger  or  a  favorite,  would 
not  be  attended  by  appearances  of  fraud  or  circumvention 
that  would  inevitably  destroy  their  validity.  All  that  is 
required  to  establish  the  wills  of  people  of  weak  under- 
standings is  that  they  should  have  been  capable  of  compre- 
hending their  nature  and  effect,^  —  a  point  entirely  indepen- 
dent of  the  accidental  circumstance  of  interdiction.  Much 
injustice,  therefore,  might  be  committed  by  depriving  all 
interdicted  imbeciles  of  the  testamentary  power,  compared 
with  which  the  temporary  inconvenience  that  would  arise 
from  the  absence  of  any  statutory  provisions  on  the  subject, 
is  hardly  to  be  mentioned.  Of  course,  the  slightest  appear- 
ance of  interference,  or  improper  influence,  should  be  closely 
scrutinized,  and  as  much  less  evidence  required  to  substan- 
tiate its  existence,  as  the  party  is  more  likely  to  have  been 
affected  by  it.  The  propriety  of  the  practice  here  advocated 
was  recognized  on  the  14th  of  February,  1808,  by  the  Royal 
Court  of  Aix,  who  confirmed  the  will  of  the  Sieur  Beau- 
quaire,  a  person  of  weak  understanding  (though  at  the  time 
of  making  it  he  was  under  the  surveillance  of  a  curator)  ;  for 
the  reasons  that  the  dispositions  of  the  will  were  rational, 
and  that  the  mind  of  the  testator  was  capable  of  under- 
standing them,  though  too  weak  to  be  intrusted  with  the 
management   of  his   property .^      The  French  tribunals,  ac- 


^  Shelford  on  Lunacy,  275. 

*  Sirey,  Recueil  gen.  des  lois  et  des  arrets,  viii.  315.  In  coming  to  this 
decision,  the  Court  considered  the  testator  to  be  one  of  those  persons  whose 
case  is  contemplated  in  the  following  article  (499)  of  the  Civil  Code,  in 
which  the  power  of  making  a  will  is  not  mentioned  among  the  civil  acts, 
which  they  are  rendered  unable  to  perform.  "  In  rejecting  a  petition  for 
interdiction,  the  court  may,  nevertheless,  if  circumstances  require,  decree 
that  the  defendant  is  henceforth  incapable  of  appearing  in  suits,  of  making 
contracts,  of  borrowing,  receiving  payment  for  debts  or  giving  a  discharge, 
alienating,  or  pledging  his  property,  without  the  aid  of  a  council  which  shall 
be  appointed  in  the  same  judgment." 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OP  IMBECILITY.  135 

cording  to  Georget,  have  ever  shown  themselves  the  pro- 
tectors of  the  right  of  making  wills,  taking  into  consideration 
the  mental  condition  of  the  testator  and  the  dispositions  of 
the  will  itself. 

§  120.  It  would  seem  to  be  reasonable  that  the  validity 
of  the  contracts  of  imbecile  persons  not  under  guardianship, 
should  be  determined  by  the  same  principles  as  that  of  their 
wnlls.  This,  however,  is  not  the  doctrine  of  the  law,  which 
does  not  recognize  imbecility  as  a  form  of  insanity.  What- 
ever may  be  the  nature  or  magnitude  of  the  contract,  the 
question  at  law  is  one,  not  of  capacity  or  incapacity,  but  of 
soundness  or  unsoundness  of  mind;  and  on  this  question, 
the  law  "  makes  no  distinction  between  important  and  com- 
mon affairs,  large  or  small  property."  ^  Courts  of  law  have 
always  refused  to  invalidate  the  contracts  of  imbeciles  and 
others  of  weak  understanding,  and  courts  of  equity  have 
declined  to  interfere,  except  on  the  ground  of  fraud.^  There 
is  this  strong  objection  to  this  doctrine,  that  we  have  no  rule, 
and  cannot  have  in  the  nature  of  things,  by  which  the  ques- 
tion of  compos  or  non  compos  can  be  uniformly  determined ; 
for  one  court  or  jury,  for  instance,  may  range  through  the 
whole  life  and  conversation  of  the  party,  while  another 
may  think  itself  obliged  not  to  go  beyond  the  particular 
act  in  question.  A  surer  and  safer  principle  is,  that  if  the 
imbecile  person  is  capable  of  comprehending  the  nature 
of  the  particular  act,  then  has  he  all  the  capacity  which  the 
case  requires,  and  the  act  should  be  established;  and  vice 
versa.  Indeed,  whether  the  question  be  one  of  capacity  or 
soundness,  regard  must  always  be  had  to  the  nature  of  the 
subject  to  which  the  mind  is  applied,  and  the  utmost  respect 
for  technical  rules  and  definitions  cannot  prevent  us  from 
being  governed  by  this  rule,  in  the  majority  of  cases.  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  unjust  than  to  infer  imbeciltty  in  general, 


1  4  Dane's  Abridgment,  561.     This  point  is  discussed  at  some  length,  in* 
Jackson  v.  King,  4  Cowen,  207. 

"  1  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity,  238. 


136  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

from  facts  that  establish  its  existence  merely  in  regard  to  cer- 
tain subjects  or  relations.  No  one  imagines  a  general  or  a 
statesman  to  be  necessarily  non  compos,  because  the  latter 
may  have  shown  himself  incapable  of  conducting  a  campaign, 
and  the  former  of  controlling  the  destinies  of  an  empire.  And 
nothing  can  be  more  absurd,  as  well  as  unjust,  than  to  con- 
clude that  because  a  weak-minded  person  can  be  shown  to 
have  acted  shrewdly  in  small  and  familiar  matters,  he  must 
possess  a  legal  capacity  for  the  transaction  of  the  most  im- 
portant and  complicated  affairs.  Many  an  imbecile  is  per- 
fectly competent  to  purchase  the  necessaries  of  life,  or  make 
contracts  relative  to  personal  service,  who  could  not  be  trusted 
with  the  disposal  of  an  estate,  or  with  making  an  investment 
of  money.  We  cannot  help  concluding,  therefore,  that  the 
universal  application  of  the  rule,  compos,  or  non  compos,  is  re- 
pugnant to  the  most  obvious  principles  of  justice. 

§  121.  Imbeciles  in  the  third  degree,  and  others  of  what- 
ever grade  under  interdiction,  are  legally  incapable  of  con- 
tracting marriage  ;  for  since  they  are  presumed  to  be  incapa- 
ble of  transacting  business  of  the  smallest  amount,  they  must 
be  equally  so  of  becoming  a  party  to  a  contract  which  is  not 
only  to  affect  their  pecuniary  interests,  but  their  whole  future 
happiness  and  comfort.  When,  however,  the  mental  defi- 
ciency has  not  been  sufficient  to  provoke  interdiction,  though 
plain  enough  to  be  generally  recognized,  it,  very  properly, 
constitutes  no  legal  impediment  to  marriage,  but  on  proof  of 
fraud  or  circumvention,  the  marriage  has  been  pronounced 
by  the  courts,  null  and  void.^  It  is  obvious  that  no  general 
rule  can  be  applied  to  all  such  cases ;  for  while  marriage 
might  conduce  to  the  interests  of  each  party,  in  one  case,  in 
another,  it  might  be  equally  ruinous  to  the  interests  of  one  or 
both  parties.  Every  case  should  be  judged  on  its  own  merits, 
and  only  annulled  when  the  mind  of  either  party  is  proved  to 
have  been  operated  on  by  improper  influences. 


'  Portsmouth  v.  Portsmouth,  1  Haggard,  365 ;  Miss  Bagster's  case,  ante, 
§85. 


CHAPTER    V. 

PATHOLOGY    AND     SYMPTOMS    OF    MANIA. 

§  122.  While  medical  literature  is  far  from  being  deficient 
in  works  on  Insanity  considered  as  one  of  the  most  serious 
maladies  to  which  man  is  liable,  the  popular  notions  respect- 
ing it  are  peculiarly  loose  and  incorrect.  As  these,  however, 
are  the  source  of  many  of  the  faults  in  the  jurisprudence 
relating  to  this  affection,  it  is  necessary  to  enter  somewhat 
into  its  medical  history,  and  to  discuss  points  which  might 
seem,  at  first  sight,  to  be  of  an  exclusively  professional 
nature,  bat  a  proper  understanding  of  which  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  save  us  from  gross  mistakes  on  this  subject. 
Certainly,  no  greater  absurdity  can  be  imagined  than  that  of 
fixing  the  legal  relations  of  persons  in  a  particular  state  of 
mind,  while  entertaining  the  most  imperfect  notions  of  what 
that  state  really  is,  —  unless  it  may  be  that  of  pertinaciously 
clinging  to  those  notions,  and  discouraging  every  attempt  to 
correct  them,  after  the  progress  of  scientific  knowledge  has 
shown  them  to  be  erroneous.  Before  descifbing  the  phe- 
nomena of  mania,  it  should  be  distinctly  understood  that  it 
is,  first,  a  disease  of  the  brain  ;  and,  secondly,  that  in  its  vari- 
ous grades  and  forms,  it  observes  the  same  laws  as  diseases 
of  other  organs.  The  importance  of  these  propositions 
makes  it  proper  to  state  the  grounds  on  which  they  rest; 
for  until  they  are  clearly  recognized  and  appreciated,  it  will 
be  in  vain  to  expect  any  improvements  in  the  medical  juris- 
prudence of  insanity. 

§  123.  I.  Mania  arises  from  a  morbid  affection  of  the  brain. 
The  progress  of  pathological  anatomy  during  the  present 
century,   has  established    this  fact  beyond   the    reach   of   a 

12* 


138  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

reasonable  doubt.  It  can  hardly  be  necessary  at  the  present 
time,  to  prove  the  fact  of  the  dependence  of  the  mind  on  the 
brain  for  its  external  manifestations,  —  that,  in  short,  the 
brain  is  the  material  organ  of  the  intellectual  and  affective 
powers.  Whatever  opinion  may  be  entertained  of  the  nature 
of  the  mind,  it  is  generally  admitted  —  at  least  by  all  enlight- 
ened physiologists  —  that  it  must  of  necessity  be  put  in  con- 
nection with  matter,  and  that  the  brain  is  the  part  of  the 
body  by  means  of  which  this  connection  is  effected.  Little 
as  we  know  beyond  this  single  fact,  it  is  enough  to  warrant 
the  inference  that  derangement  of  the  structure,  or  of  the 
vital  actions  of  the  brain,  must  be  followed  by  abnormal 
manifestations  of  the  mind ;  and,  consequently,  that  the 
presence  of  the  effect  indicates  the  existence  of  the  cause. 
"Whether  the  morbid  action  arises  in  the  digestive,  or  some 
other  system,  and  is  reflected  thence  to  the  brain  by  means 
of  the  nervous  sympathies ;  or  arises  primarily  in  the»brain, 
the  soundness  of  the  above  principle  is  equally  untouched. 
This  leads  us  to  the  source  of  the  hesitation  that  has  been 
evinced  by  pathologists  to  consider  the  brain  as  the  seat  of 
insanity. 

§  124.  From  the  fact  that  organic  lesions  are  not  always 
discoverable  after  death  in  the  brains  of  the  subjects  of  in- 
sanity, it  has  been  inferred  that  the  brain  is  not  the  seat  of 
this  disease;  though,  if  this  fact  were  true,  —  it  being  also 
true  tiiat  no  other  organ  in  the  body  invariably  presents 
marks  of  orgaHic  derangement  in  insanity,  —  the  only  legiti- 
mate inference  would  have  been,  that,  in  some  cases,  it  is 
impossible  to  discover  such  lesions  by  any  means  in  our 
power.  The  strangest  theoretical  error  which  this  apparent 
soundness  of  the  brain  in  some  cases  has  occasioned,  is  that 
of  denying  the  existence  of  any  material  affection  at  all,  and 
attributing  the  disease  entirely  to  an  affection  of  the  imma- 
terial principle.  If  the  same  pathological  principles  had 
guided  men's  reasoning  respecting  this  disease,  that  they 
have  applied  to  the  investigation  of  others,  this  error  would 
never  have  been  committed.  It  will  scarcely  be  contended, 
at  the  present  day  at  least,  that  the  structural  changes,  found 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF  MANIA.  139 

after  death  from  any  disease,  are  the  primary  cause  of  the 
disturbances  manifested  by  symptoms  during  life;  or  that  if 
the  interior  could  be  inspected  at  the  beginning  of  the  dis- 
ease, any  of  these  structural  changes  would  be  discovered. 
It  is  now  a  well-recognized  principle,  that  such  changes  must 
be  preceded  by  some  change  in  the  vital  actions  of  the  part 
where  they  occur.  This  vital  change  is  now  generally  ex- 
pressed by  the  term  irritation,  and  nothing  is  implied  by  it 
relative  to  the  nature  of  this  change,  more  than  an  exaltation 
of  action.  Irritation,  then,  is  the  initial  stage  of  disease, — 
the  first  in  the  chain  of  events,  of  which  disorganization  is 
the  last, —  and,  of  course,  nothing  can  be  more  unphilo- 
sophical  than  to  attribute  disturbances  of  function  exclu- 
sively to  any  structural  changes  that  may  take  place  during 
the  progress  of  these  successive  stages.  The  departure  from 
the  normal  course  of  vital  action,  which  is  probably  as  unex- 
ceptionable a  definition  of  irritation  as  can  be  given,  is  suffi- 
cient to  derange  the  functions  of  the  part  in  which  it  occurs, 
without  producing  any  visible  change  in  its  appearance;  and 
hence,  we  may  oftentimes  explore  the  dead  body  with  the 
utmost  minuteness  and  skill,  without  being  enabled  to  infer 
from  any  thing  we  find,  an  adequate  cause  of  death.  Before 
this  can  be  found,  the  initial  stage  must  have  continued  more 
or  less  time;  and  though  it  always  tends  to  pass  into  the 
subsequent  stages,  yet  death  may  take  place  from  various 
causes,  before  they  are  developed  and  before  a  trace  of  their 
existence  can  be  detected. 

§  125.  There  is  this  peculiarity  in  the  pathology  of  insan- 
ity, that  while  the  irritation  deranges  the  mental  functions 
so  as  to  be  manifest  to  every  observer,  its  sympathetic  effects 
upon  the  rest  of  the  system  may  be  so  slight  as  to  contribute 
but  little,  comparatively,  by  their  reaction,  to  develop  the 
stage  of  inflammation.  The  consequence  is,  that  cerebral 
irritation,  sufficient  to  produce  insanity,  may  endure  for  years, 
and  death  occur  at  last  from  other  causes,  without  our  being 
able  to  discover  any  morbid  appearances.  Thus,  their  exist- 
ence, instead  of  being  essential  to  the  disease,  is  entirely  the 
result  of  accidental  circumstances.     The  probability  of  find- 


140  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ing  inflammation  or  eny  of  its  products,  will  depend  on  the 
duration  of  the  disease,  and  the  share  which  it  had  in  caus- 
ing the  death  of  the  patient.  If  it  have  existed  for  a  short 
time  only,  or  death  have  been  occasioned  by  some  other 
cause,  examination  will  be  likely  to  disclose  no  traces  of 
morbid  action  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  if  it  have  been  of  long 
standing  and  have  killed  the  patient  by  the  constitutional 
disturbances  it  has  produced,  they  will  generally  be  found 
more  or  less  abundantly.  From  not  properly  attending  to 
these  considerations,  pathologists  have  been  led  into  an 
egregious  error  by  the  absence  of  morbid  changes,  —  no  less 
.a  one  than  that  of  denying  the  disease  to  be  an  affection  of 
matter,  and  jumping  at  the  absurd  conclusion,  that  it  is  the 
spiritual  principle  alone  that  suffers. 

§  126.  It  is  not  now  denied,  however,  that  the  traces  of 
disease,  when  they  do  occur,  are  oftener  found  in  the  brain 
than  in  any  other  organ  ;  nor  that,  in  a  very  large  propor- 
tion of  the  whole  number  of  cases,  the  brain  actually  does 
show  evident  marks  of  having  been  diseased.  And  when 
we  bear  in  mind  the  limited  knowledge  of  the  cerebral  struc- 
ture which  pathologists  have  possessed  till  quite  lately,  and, 
consequendy,  the  difficulty  they  must  have  experienced  in 
detecting  changes  from  the  healthy  condition,  it  may  well 
be  concluded  that  the  absence  of  these  changes  might  be 
attributed,  in  not  a  few  instances,  to  the  fault  of  the  inquirer 
rather  than  to  the  nature  of  the  disease.  Certain  it  is,  that 
as  we  have  become  better  acquainted  with  the  anatomy  of 
the  brain  and  with  its  sensible  qualities,  and  been  more 
thorough  and  persevering  in  our  examinations,  the  rarer  it 
has  become  to  find  a  case  of  insanity  presenting  no  organic 
changes  after  death.  The  very  same  observers  who  once 
could  find  nothing  satisfactory  in  their  pathological  re- 
searches in  the  brains  of  the  insane,  have  changed  their 
views,  as  their  field  of  observation  has  enlarged,  and  their 
acquaintance  with  the  whole  subject  has  been  increased  with 
time  and  practice,  so  that  some  have  examined  hundreds  of 
subjects  without  finding  one  entirely  free  from  some  appre- 
ciable change. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF   MANIA.  141 

§  127.  II.  Insaiiity  observes  the  same  pathological  laws  as 
other  diseases.  Notwithstanding  the  air  of  mystery  which 
ignorance  and  superstition  have  thrown  around  this  disease, 
it  cannot  be  said  to  present  any  thing  very  strange  or  pecul- 
iar; nor  are  the  discussions  concerning  it  involved  in  the 
obscurity  generally  supposed  to  attend  them.  It  arises  from 
a  morbid  affection  of  organic  matter,  and  is  just  as  much, 
and  no  more,  an  event  of  special  providence,  as  other  dis- 
eases ;  and  to  attribute  it  to  the  visitation  of  God  in  a  pecul- 
iar sense,  is  a  questionable  proof  of  true  piety  as  well  as  of 
sound  philosophy.  It  follows  the  same  course  of  incubation, 
development,  and  termination  in  cure  or  death,  as  other  dis- 
eases ;  sometimes  lying  dormant  for  months  or  even  years, 
obscure  to  others,  and,  perhaps,  unsuspected  by  the  patient 
himself;  at  others,  suddenly  breaking  out  with  little  premoni- 
tion of  its  approach ;  and  again,  after  being  repeatedly 
warded  off  by  precautions  and  remedies,  finally  establishing 
itself  in  its  clearest  forms;  just  as  consumption,  for  instance, 
sometimes  begins  its  ravages  so  slowly  and  insidiously  as  to 
be  perceptible  only  to  the  most  practised  observer,  for  years 
together,  while  in  another  class  of  patients,  it  proceeds  from 
the  beginning  with  a  progress  as  rapid  as  it  is  painfully  mani- 
fest. But  its  presence  no  one  thinks  of  denying  in  the  former 
case,  merely  because  its  victim  enjoys  a  certain  degree  of 
health  and  activity,  though  it  would  be  no  greater  error  than 
to  deny  the  existence  of  insanity  while  the  operations  of 
the  mind  are  not  so  deeply  disturbed  as  to  be  perceptible  to 
the  casual  observer.  When  fully  developed,  too,  it  may,  like 
other  diseases,  give  rise  to  severe  constitutional  disturbance, 
or  it  may  scarcely  affect  the  system  at  large;  as  inflamma- 
tion of  the  digestive  organs  may  occasion  fever  and  intolera- 
ble pain,  or  lead  its  victim  slowly  to  the  grave,  hardly  aware 
of  its  presence,  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  comparative  health. 
Like  other  diseases,  insanity  is  made  the  object  of  remedial 
treatment,  and  often  yields  to  judicious  administration  of 
medicines,' — a  sufficient  proof  of  its  material  origin,  for 
though  the  rationale  of  the  operation  of  bathing,  bleeding, 
and  digitalis,  is  perfectly  obvious  in  cerebral  disease,  it  is  not 


142  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

SO  clear  how  they  restore  the  spmtual  principle  to  its  natural 
vigor.  It  may  proceed  through  its  successive  stages  with  a 
severity  ever  increasing  to  the  end,  or,  like  many  other  affec- 
tions of  the  nervous  system,  its  progress  may  be  interrupted 
by  periods,  more  or  less  long,  of  relaxation  of  its  ordinary 
force,  —  from  a  mere  abatement  of  the  constitutional  excite- 
ment and  mental  extravagance,  to  complete  intermission  of 
the  disease,  when  the  patient  is  apparently  restored  to  all  his 
original  soundness.  In  its  causes,  also,  insanity  is  under  the 
dominion  of  no  extraordinary  pathological  laws.  It  never 
arises  in  a  mysterious  way,  as  if  abstracted  from  the  ordinary 
relations  of  cause  and  effect,  as  it  would  do,  were  it  an  affec- 
tion of  an  immaterial  principle  ;  but  its  origin  may  be  readily 
accounted  for  in  the  same  way  as  that  of  other  diseases. 
Whether  proceeding  from  hereditary  predisposition,  or  ma- 
ternal influences  during  gestation;  from  the  cerebral  irrita- 
tion produced  by  disease  in  other  parts,  or  by  external  inju- 
ries ;  from  excessive  or  deficient  exercises  of  the  mind ;  from 
great  predominance  or  indulgence  of  some  faculties  with  a 
small  endowment  or  neglect  of  the  rest;  from  improper  or 
insufficient  nourishment  or  air;  from  the  unbridled  license 
of  the  passions ;  or  the  habitual  use  of  intoxicating  drinks ; 
we  see  the  influence  of  causes  precisely  analogous  to  those 
which  give  rise  to  other  diseases.  Mania  also  furnishes  an 
illustration  of  a  well-known  pathological  law,  in  its  tendency 
to  be  affected  by  remedies,  in  proportion  to  the  recency  of 
its  attack,  —  a  fact  which  is  totally  inexplicable  on  the  sup- 
position of  the  mind  itself  being  idiopathically  diseased.  In 
common  with  other  diseases  it  is  benefited  by  proper  air  and 
exercise,  cheerful  conversation,  friendly  sympathy  and  atten- 
tion, and  employments  which  furnish  a  healthful  play  to  the 
actions  of  the  whole  system,  and  abstract  the  patient  from 
the  contemplation  of  his  own  condition.  In  short,  through- 
out the  whole  history  of  mania,  in  its  various  forms,  we 
clearly  discover  the  evidence  of  a  bodily  disease,  —  of  a 
suffering  organ;  and  in  not  a  fact  respecting  it  can  we  dis- 
cover any  thing  anomalous,  or  at  variance  with  the  principles 
of  diseased  action.     If  this  truth  be  steadily  borne  in  mind, 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF   MANIA.  143 

it  will  be  a  faithful  light  to  our  steps;  and  no  one  at  all 
acquainted  with  the  subject,  can  question  the  importance  of 
the  influence  which  it  will  exert  on  judicial  investigations. 

§  128.  Mania,  then,  being  a  disease  and  governed  by  the 
same  pathological  laws  as  other  diseases,  it  will  be  incum- 
bent on  us  to  give  some  account  of  its  symptoms ;  and, 
since  we  ^consider  a  well-settled  belief  in  the  above  views 
as  having  an  important  bearing  on  the  course  of  legal  de- 
cisions, no  further  reason  will  be  necessary  for  going  more 
fully  into  this  part  of  the  subject  than  at  first  blush  might 
seem  proper  for  our  purpose.  So  closely  are  soundness  and 
unsoundness  of  mind  allied,  that  we  are  met  at  the  outset  by 
the  difficulty  already  hinted  at,  of  discriminating  in  some 
cases  between  mental  manifestations  modified  by  disease, 
and  those  that  are  peculiar,  though  natural  to  the  individual. 
Madness  is  not  indicated  so  much  by  any  particular  extrava- 
gance of  thought  or  feeling,  as  by  a  w^ell-marked  change  of 
chai-acter,  or  departure  from  the  ordinary  habits  of  thinking, 
feeling,  and  acting,  without  any  adequate  external  cause. 
To  lay  down,  therefore,  any  particular  definition  of  mania, 
founded  on  symptoms,  and  to  consider  every  person  mad 
who  may  happen  to  come  within  the  range  of  its  application, 
might  induce  the  ridiculous  consequence  of  making  a  large 
portion  of  mankind  of  unsound  mind.  Some  men's  ordinary 
habits  so  closely  resemble  the  behavior  of  the  mad,  that  a 
stranger  would  be  easily  deceived ;  as  in  the  opposite  case, 
where  the  confirmed  monomaniac,  by  carefully  abstaining 
from  the  mention  of  his  hallucinations,  has  the  semblance  of 
a  perfectly  rational  man.  Hence,  when  the  sanity  of  an 
individual  is  in  question,  instead  of  comparing  him  with  a 
fancied  standard  of  mental  soundness,  as  is  too  commonly 
the  custom,  his  natural  character  should  be  diligently  investi- 
gated, in  order  to  determine  whether  the  apparent  indication 
of  madness  is  not  merely  the  result  of  the  ordinary  and 
healthy  constitution  of  the  faculties.  In  a  word,  he  is  to  be 
compared  with  himself,  not  with  others,  and  if  there  have 
been  no  departure  from  his  ordinary  manifestations,  he  is  to 
be  judged  sane ;  although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  striking 


144  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSAXITT.  ^ 

peculiarities  of  character,  such  as  amount  to  eccenlricily, 
furnish  strong  ground  of  suspicion  of  predisposition  to 
madness. 

§  129.  For  the  first  announcement  of  this  great  principle, 
that,  in  doubtful  cases,  the  mind  of  the  supposed  lunatic 
should  be  compared  with  his  own  when  in  its  natural, 
habitual  state,  we  are  indebted  to  the  late  Dr.  Gooch ;  ^ 
though  it  has  been  since  developed  and  illustrated  with  an 
ability  worthy  of  its  importance,  by  Dr.  Andrew  Combe.  If 
the  truths  contained  in  the  following  extract  are  faithfully 
considered  by  the  medical  student,  he  may  be  spared  many 
an  awkward  mistake,  which  he  might  otherwise  have  com- 
mitted, and  may  save  many  a  sound  and  worthy  individual 
from  incalculable  pain  and  annoyance.  "  In  investigating 
the  nature  of  insanity,  the  first  caution  to  be  observed  is,  not 
to  confound  disorders  of  mental  functions  with  natural  quali- 
ties, which  sometimes  strongly  resemble  them.  Many  men 
in  the  full  enjoyment  of  health  are  remarkable  for  peculiari- 
ties and  idiosyncrasies  of  thought  and  feeling,  which  con- 
trast strongly  with  the  general  tone  and  usages  of  society ; 
but  they  are  not  on  that  account  to  be  held  as  insane,  be- 
cause the  singularity  for  which  they  are  distinguished  is 
with  them  a  natural  quality,  and  not  the  product  of  disease; 
and,  from  the  very  unlikeness  of  their  manifestations  to  the 
modes  of  feeling  and  acting  of  other  men,  such  persons  are, 
in  common  language,  said  to  be  eccentric.  It  is  true  that, 
on  the  principle  already  explained,  of  excess  in  size  of  some 
organs  over  the  rest  being  favorable  to  the  production  of 
insanity,  eccentricity  involves,  all  other  things  being  equal,  a 
greater  than  usual  susceptibility  to  mental  derangement; 
but  still  it  is  not  mere  strangeness  of  conduct  or  singularity 
of  mind  which  constitutes  its  presence.  It  is  the  prolonged 
departure,  without  an  adequate  external  cause,  from  the  state 
of  feeling  and  modes  of  thinking  usual  to  the  individual  when 
in  health,  that  is  the  true  feature  of  disorder  in  mind;  and  the 


'  London  Quarterly  Review,  xlii.  355. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF   MANIA.  145 

degree  at  which  this  disorder  ought  to  be  held  as  constitut- 
ing insanity,  is  a  question  of  another  kind,  on  which  we  can 
scarcely  hope  for  unanimity  of  sentiment  and  opinion.  Let 
the  disorder,  however,  be  ascertained  to  be  morbid  in  its 
nature,  and  the  chief  point  is  secured,  namely,  a  firm  basis 
for  an  accurate  diagnosis  ;  because  it  is  impossible  that  such 
derangement  can  occur  unless  in  consequence  of,  or  in  con- 
nection with,  a  morbid  condition  of  the  organ  of  mind  ;  and 
thus  the  abstract  mental  states,  which  are  justly  held  to 
indicate  lunacy  in  one,  may,  in  another,  speaking  relatively 
to  health,  be  the  strongest  proofs  of  perfect  soundness  of 
mind.  A  brusque,  rough  manner,  which  is  natural  to  one 
person,  indicates  nothing  but  mental  health  in  him;  but  if 
another  individual,  who  has  always  been  remarkable  for  a 
deferential  deportment  and  habitual  politeness,  lays  these 
qualities  aside,  and  without  provocation  or  other  adequate 
cause,  assumes  the  unpolished  forwardness  of  the  former, 
we  may  justly  infer,  that  his  mind  is  either  already  deranged 
or  on  the  point  of  becoming  so.  Or,  if  a  person  who  has 
been  noted  all  his  life  for  prudence,  steadiness,  regularity, 
and  sobriety,  suddenly  becomes,  without  any  adequate 
change  in  his  external  situation,  rash,  unsettled,  and  dissi- 
pated in  his  habits,  or  vice  versa,  every  one  recognizes  at 
once  these  changes,  accompanied  as  they  then  are  by  bodily 
symptoms,  as  evidences  of  the  presence  of  disease  affecting 
the  mind,  through  the  instrumentality  of  its  organs.  It  is, 
therefore,  I  repeat,  not  the  abstract  act  or  feeling  which  con- 
stitutes a  symptom;  it  is  the  departure  from  the  natural  and 
healthy  character,  temper,  and  habits,  that  gives  it  this  meaning ; 
and,  in  judging  of  a  man's  sanity,  it  is  consequently  as  essen- 
tial to  know  what  his  habitual  manifestations  were,  as  what 
his  present  symptoms  are."  ^  The  doctrine  here  laid  down 
received  the  sanction  of  Sir  Herbert  Jenner  Fust,  and  was 
allowed  to  govern  his  decision  in  a  case  of  considerable  ob- 
scurity.^ 


^  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  196. 
"  Muchmy  v.  Croft,  3  Curteis,  671  (1843). 

13 


146  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  130.  Mania,  under  whatever  form  it  may  appear,  is 
generally  preceded,  except  when  produced  by  injuries  or 
moral  shocks,  by  a  change  in  the  natural  condition  desig- 
nated by  writers  as  the  period  of  incubation.  In  the  follow- 
ing paragraphs  by  Georget,  we  have  a  most  accurate  and 
graphic  description  of  this  state.  "  Sometimes,"  says  he, 
"  the  action  of  the  cause  is  strong  and  rapid  ;  at  other  times, 
more  moderate  and  slow.  In  the  first  case,  madness  breaks 
out  at  the  end  of  some  hours  or  some  days,  after  a  state  of 
anxiety  and  uneasiness,  with  headache,  sleeplessness,  agita- 
tion, or  depression,  and  threatening  of  cerebral  congestion  ; 
the  patient  begins  to  babble,  cry,  sing,  and  becomes  agitated 
and  wild.  He  is  then  often  taken  for  a  person  in  a  state  of 
intoxication,  and  the  mistake  becomes  apparent  only  after 
examining  the  previous  circumstances  and  the  duration  of 
the  malady.  In  the  other  case,  thought  only  becomes  affected 
gradually,  and  often  very  slowly ;  the  patient  is  generally 
conscious  of  some  disorder  in  his  intellectual  faculties ;  he  is 
beset  by  new  and  odd  notions,  and  by  unusual  inclinations  ; 
he  feels  himself  changing  in  his  affections ;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  he  preserves  a  consciousness  of  his  condition,  is  vexed 
at  it,  and  tries  to  conceal  it ;  he  continues  his  occupations  as 
much  as  he  can  ;  and  lastly,  as  many  people  do  in  the  first 
stage  of  intoxication,  he  makes  every  effort  to  appear  reason- 
able. Meantime  his  health  continues  to  give  way,  and  he 
either  sleeps  less  or  loses  sleep  altogether;  the  appetite  di- 
minishes or  disappears ;  sometimes  digestion  is  difficult,  and 
constipation  supervenes  ;  embonpoi?it  decreases,  the  features 
alter,  the  monthly  discharge  becomes  irregular,  weak,  and  at 
last  is  suspended.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  observed 
something  unusual  and  even  extraordinary  in  the  tastes  of 
the  patient,  in  his  habits,  his  affections,  his  character,  and 
aptitude  for  business ;  if  he  was  gay  and  communicative,  he 
becomes  sad,  morose,  and  averse  to  society ;  if  he  was  orderly 
and  economical,  he  becomes  confused  and  prodigal ;  if  he 
had  long  abstained  from  the  pleasures  of  love,  he  becomes 
the  victim  of  insatiable  desires,  and  either  seeks  to  associate 
with  the  other  sex,  or  has  recourse  to  disgraceful  practices ; 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF  MANIA.  147 

if  he  was  moderate  in  his  political  and  religious  opinions,  he 
passes  to  an  extreme  exaggeration  in  both  ;  if  he  was  open 
and  candid,  he  becomes  suspicious  and  jealous  ;  if  a  wife, 
she  regards  her  husband  and  children  with  indifference ;  the 
merchant  fieglects  his  business;  tears  and  laughter  succeed 
each  other  without  apparent  motive  ;  the  exterior  of  candor 
and  modesty  gives  place  to  an  air  of  conceit  and  assurance, 
which,  especially  in  women,  astonishes  us.  But  all  these 
phenomena  are  less  prominent  than  they  may  appear  to  be 
here,  and  unless  the  individual  have  been  insane  before,  no 
one  may  suspect  the  nature  of  the  ailment  which  torments 
him  ;  all  the  questions  put  to  him  lead  to  no  results,  except 
that  of  fatiguing  and  giving  him  pain,  for  the  ignorance  that 
prevails  relative  to  madness  leads  the  friends  to  indulge  in 
offensive  insinuations,  and  to  charge  him  with  frivolous  accu- 
sations, from  not  perceiving  that  he  is  under  the  influence  of 
disease,  and  not  of  reason.  Sometimes  the  appetite  either 
remains  entire,  or  is  speedily  recovered,  as  well  as  digestion, 
nutrition,  etc.,  and  it  is  in  these  circumstances  that  the  con- 
duct of  the  patient  gives  rise  to  a  host  of  interpretations  on 
the  part  of  his  relatives  and  the  public." 

§  131.  "  This  period  of  incubation  of  mental  alienation, 
during  which  the  true  state  of  the  patient  is  generally  mis- 
understood, or  not  appreciated,  may  last  a  long  time.  Pinel 
relates,  that  a  man  who  believed  his  wife  to  have  been  ill 
only  six  months,  the  period  of  the  invasion  of  furious  de- 
lirium, admitted,  after  a  multiplicity  of  questions,  that  the 
disease  must  have  been  going  on  fifteen  years.  The  same 
author  mentions  elsewhere,  that  in  several  instances,  the 
maniacal  or  melancholic  state,  has  begun  four,  six,  ten,  or 
even  fifteen  or  twenty  years  previously.  It  is  often  easy  to 
go  back  months,  or  years,  in  this  way ;  and  we  finally  dis- 
cover that  circumstances,  taken  for  causes  by  the  friends,  are, 
frequently,  only  the  consequences  of  unobserved  disease.  In 
fact,  it  often  happens  at  that  period  of  the  malady,  that  a 
slight  contradiction,  or  paroxysm  of  anger,  or  some  cause 
equally  insignificant  to  a  person  in  good  health,  provokes  the 


148  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

immediate  and  complete  subversion  of  reason,  and  gives  rise 
to  mistakes  as  to  its  true  cause  and  duration."  ^ 

§  132.  No  fact  in  regard  to  insanity  is  better  established, 
than  this,  —  that  its  incubation  may  not  be  indicated  to  the 
casual  observer,  the  presence  of  the  disease  bein^first  made 
known  by  some  strong  and  striking  manifestations.  The 
patient  may  possess  sutficient  self-control  to  keep  his  morbid 
fancies  to  himself,  or  his  deviations  from  the  ordinary  line  of 
thinking  and  feeling  may  have  been  observed  only  by  his 
family  or  most  intimate  friends.  I  know  a  gentleman  •  of 
most  estimable  character,  in  whom  a  severe  attack  was  pre- 
ceded by  a  course  of  petty  larcenies  extending  over  several 
weeks,  while  creditably  discharging  the  duties  of  an  onerous 
and  responsible  office.  In  another  case  which  came  under 
my  observation,  the  patient,  who  was  a  sincerely  religious 
man,  holding  an  office  in  his  church,  and  supposed  by  the 
world  to  be  perfectly  sound  in  mind,  on  awaking  in  the 
morning,  would  begin  to  swear  terribly  to  himself,  and  so 
continue,  until  he  got  to  his  breakfast.  This  trait  preceded 
by  several  months  the  explosion  of  the  disease.  These  cases 
abundantly  illustrate  the  importance  of  bearing  in  mind 
this  character  of  insanity.  Great  injustice  would  often 
be  committed  by  regarding  the  patient  as  completely  sound 
and  responsible  up  to  the  moment  when  the  mental  disorder 
became  obvious  to  the  world.  In  a  large  proportion  of  cases 
it  is  impossible  to  fix  upon  the  moment  when  the  patient 
became  unequivocally  insane.  There  is  a  period  during 
which,  though  casual  acquaintances  may  observe  no  change, 
he  evinces  to  those  who  know  him  best,  peculiarities  of  man- 
ner, feeling,  or  conduct,  foreign  to  his  normal  character  and 
disposition ;  and  the  first  public  intimation  of  disorder  may 
be  some  fearful  outrage  which  becomes  the  subject  of  legal 
investigation. 

§  133.    Organic  diseases  of  the  brain  occasionally  give  rise 


'  Dictlonnaire  de  Medecine,  art.  Folie. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF   MANIA.  149 

to  moral  or* intellectual  disturbances,  long  before  the  appear- 
ance of  the  more  prominent,  unequivocal  symptoms.  The 
patient  loses  his  memory  more  or  less,  or  becomes  irresolute 
and  feeble,  readily  allowing  others  to  mould  him  to  their 
wishes  ;  or  presents  traits  of  moral  perversion  quite  foreign 
to  his  natural  character,  or  indulges  in  pursuits  unsuitable 
to  his  position  or  means.  Dr.  Devay,  of  Lyons,  has  reported 
the  case  of  a  woman  who,  though  possessing  a  competence, 
committed  a  petty  theft.  About  a  year  afterwards,  she 
began  to  feel  severe  and  almost  constant  pain  in  her  head, 
though  her  intellect  was  clear,  and  in  the  course  of  a  couple 
of  years  she  manifested  signs  of  cerebral  softening,  —  almost 
entire  blindness,  inability  to  walk,  mental  stupidity.  The 
same  gentleman  relates  that  he  was  visited,  one  day,  by  a 
man  of  most  estimable  character,  who  came  to  converse  with 
him  on  subjects  not  relating  to  his  health.  His  conversation 
was  clear,  but  he  had  complained  of  inaptitude  for  work. 
"While  occupied  in  writing  a  letter,"  says  the  Dr.,  "I  saw 
him  rise,  rummage  a  drawer,  and  open  a  note."  He  subse- 
quently died  of  cerebral  softening.  Another,  from  being  very 
discreet  and  wary  in  his  speech,  became  quite  free  in  his 
assertions,  and  inclined  to  exaggerate,  and  soon  after  was 
attacked  by  what  is  called  general  paralysis.^  A  person  high 
in  office,  says  Dr.  Brierre  de  Boismont,  had  performed  the 
duties  of  his  station  up  to  the  time  when  I  was  consulted; 
and  yet  the  details  which  were  furnished  to  me  by  his  wife, 
left  no  doubt  that  his  moral  and  affective  faculties  had  been 
for  some  time  impaired.  From  having  been  generous  and 
honest,  he  had,  for  more  than  six  years,  exhibited  a  degree  of 
sordid  avarice  and  unbridled  licentiousness.  With  the  prog- 
ress of  the  disease,  his  avarice  was  manifested  in  mean 
actions  ;  he  refused  to  pay  his  debts,  maintaining  that  he  had 
already  done  so ;  and  even  purloined  objects  from  the  houses 
of  his  acquaintances.  He  also  speaks  of  a  retired  public 
officer  who  commenced  a  series  of  thefts  eight  years  before 


Gazette  Medicale,  Jan.  4th  and  lltli,  1851.     Amcr.  Jour.  Ins.  vii.  36. 

13* 


150  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

he  was  attacked  with  general  paralysis.^  My  attention  was 
once  called  to  a  gentleman  who  had  been  placed  in  a  hospi- 
tal on  account  of  some  irregularities  of  conduct.  His  con- 
versation was  perfectly  correct  and  intelligent,  and  neither 
this  nor  his  letters  to  his  wife,  which  I  afterwards  read,  indi- 
cated the  least  intellectual  disturbance.  Yet  at  this  very 
time,  he  would  obey  the  calls  of  nature  almost  anywhere, 
and  go  about,  even  among  ladies,  with  his  trousers  not  ex- 
actly comme  il  faut.  The  mental  affection  soon  became 
obvious,  and  he  died,  at  last,  of  organic  disease  of  the 
brain. 

§  134.  Sooner  or  later  the  disorder  of  the  cerebral  func- 
tions becomes  of  a  more  obvious  and  positive  character. 
The  struggle  between  the  convictions  of  his  sounder  reason, 
and  the  impulses  of  this  new  condition  ceases,  and  the 
patient,  instead  of  contending  any  longer  against  the 
approaches  of  disease,  or  concealing  his  thoughts,  now 
believes  in  their  reality,  and  openly  and  strenuously  avows 
them,  except  when  induced  by  powerful  reasons  to  pursue 
a  contrary  course.  The  governing  principle  in  the  mind  is 
gone;  ideas  and  perceptions  occur  in  the  utmost  confusion 
and  rapidity,  and  are  connected  by  unnatural  and  incon- 
gruous relations.  The  attention  is  constantly  wandering 
from  one  idea  or  object  to  another;  external  impressions 
have  lost  their  ordinary  power,  being  overlooked  or  disre- 
garded amid  the  turmoil  that  prevails  within.  The  indi- 
vidual is  excited  to  action  by  strange  and  extraordinary 
motives,  or  by  impulses  that  he  finds  himself  unable  to  resist. 
His  passions  are  easily  aroused,  and  almost  instantly  reach 
their  maximum  of  strength  and  activity.  The  higher  affec- 
tions are  dormant,  while  all  his  relations  to  his  fellow  men 
are  viewed  through  a  medium  of  fear,  suspicion,  jealousy, 
and  distrust.  His  friends  and  relatives,  especially,  are  objects 
of  his  suspicion,  and  nothing  can  induce  him  to  view  them 
in  any  other  light,  than  as  enemies  to  his  moral  and  physical 


*  Gaz.  Med.  1847,  p.  393.     Amer.  Jour.  Ins.  vii.  42. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF   MANIA.  151 

welfare.  Maniacs,  when  they  recover,  sometimes  remember 
all  the  scenes  and  occurrences  of  their  disorder.  They  can 
tell  what  they  saw,  heard,  and  felt,  and  explain  the  motives 
that  governed  their  conduct.  In  some  cases,  however,  the 
exercise  of  memory  seems  to  be  more  or  less  suspended 
during  the  active  stage  of  the  disease,  and  the  patient  may 
recover  his  senses,  like  one  awakening  from  a  deep  sleep, 
unconscious  of  the  lapse  of  time,  and  every  thing  that  has 
happened. 

§  135.  The  symptoms  of  physical  derangement  are  also 
striking  and  numerous.  A  febrile  excitement  pervades  the 
system.  The  pulse  is  accelerated,  the  eye  has  a  wild  and 
glassy  look,  the  sensations  have  become  either  more  acute  or 
more  obscure,  besides  being  frequently  erroneous,  and  the 
patient  sometimes  complains  of  pain  in  the  head,  sense  of 
weight,  giddiness,  ringing  in  the  ears.  The  countenance 
greatly  changes,  and  though  varying  differently  in  the  differ- 
ent forms  of  insanity,  yet  in  all  it  genei-ally  bears  the  expres- 
sion of  physical  pain,  or  mental  disquiet.  A  singular  insen- 
sibility to  external  impressions  is  often  witnessed  in  this 
stage  of  mania,  by  means  of  which,  exposure  to  intense  cold, 
heat,  hunger,  and  thirst,  is  borne  to  a  wonderful  degree,  with- 
out producing  uneasiness,  or  even  consciousness  of  the  fact. 
The  muscular  power  is  sometimes  inordinately  developed, 
the  waking  moments  being  a  scene  of  almost  constant  rest- 
lessness and  agitation ;  while  at  others,  there  is  an  equally 
unnatural  sluggishness  and  indisposition  to  move  about. 
Hunger  and  thirst  are  seldom  unaffected,  the  patient  either 
taking  immense  quantities  of  food,  or  scarcely  sufficient  to 
supply  the  wants  of  nature.  The  maniacal  patient  sleeps 
less,  and  his  slumbers  are  disturbed  by  frightful  dreams. 

§  136.  Although  the  course  of  a  maniacal  attack  is  ordi- 
narily such  as  is  represented  above,  yet  sometimes,  especially 
on  the  application  of  a  powerfully  exciting  cause,  it  breaks 
out  suddenly  and  terminates  in  death  or  recovery  within 
a  very  few  days.  When  cases  of  this  description  are  sub- 
jected to  judicial  inquiry,  it  is  often  difficult  to  satisfy  a  jury 
of  the  genuineness  of  the  disease.     The  proofs,  though  suffi- 


152  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

cient  for  those  who  are  much  conversant  with  insanity,  are 
very  far  from  striking  others  with  equal  force.  Most  cases 
of  transitory  mania  belong  to  that  form  of  the  disease  to  be 
described  hereafter,  under  the  name  of  homicidal  monomania, 
and  are  supposed  to  be  unaccompanied  by  delusion,  or 
other  intellectual  disturbance.  There  is  a  smaller  class, 
however,  characterized  by  violence  and  confusion  of  mind, 
the  patient  being  apparently  under  the  dominion  of  some 
exclusive  and  overpowering  idea.  Their  medico-legal  impor- 
tance renders  no  apology  necessary  for  introducing  several 
of  these  cases. 

§  137.  A  syphilitic  patient  having  recovered  from  his  dis- 
order, was  about  to  quit  the  hospital,  when,  suddenly,  with- 
out the  least  premonition,  he  began  to  vociferate,  and  destroy 
the  furniture  of  his  room.  He  stripped  oflfall  his  clothes,  tore 
out  his  hair,  beat  his  head  against  the  walls,  and  tried  to  bite 
and  strike  all  who  approached  him.  He  seemed  to  be  ex- 
cessively frightened,  as  if  pursued  by  somebody  who  sought 
to  take  his  life.  His  pulse  was  hard  and  quick,  his  body 
was  covered  with  a  cold  sweat,  he  frothed  at  the  mouth,  and 
trembled  violently.  In  the  course  of  a  couple  of  hours,  he 
came  to  himself.  He  then  said  he  had  experienced  a  similar 
attack  four  or  five  years  before,  but  could  assign  no  cause  for 
either  of  them.^ 

§  138.  A  sober  and  industrious  shoemaker  arose  early  one 
morning,  to  go  to  his  work,  when  his  wife  was  struck  by  his 
incoherent  discourse  and  wild  looks.  He  seized  a  knife  and 
rushed  upon  her,  when  the  neighbors  seized  him  and  pre- 
vented any  damage.  His  face  was  red,  pulse  frequent  and 
rather  full,  body  covered  with  sweat,  his  eyes  flashed,  and 
his  look  was  wild.  About  noon  he  became  calm,  and  slept. 
In  the  evening,  he  had  recovered  his  faculties,  but  had  no 
idea  of  what  had  happened  to  him. 

§  139.  A  young  man  laid  down  one  evening  in  good  health. 
Some  persons  entering  the  room,  he  threw  at  them  whatever 


1  Jahn,  in  Berlin  Med.  Gazette,  No.  23,  1834. 


PATHOLOGY   AND   SYMPTOMS    OF   MANIA.  153 

he  could  lay  his  hands  upon,  until  he  fell  back  upon  his  bed 
exhausted  with  fatigue.  He  sang,  cursed,  and  tried  to  get  at 
his  sword.  He  knew  nobody.  His  face  was  not  red,  nor  his 
head  hot ;  but  his  eyes  were  wild,  and  his  pulse  rather  full. 
The  next  day  he  had  not  the  least  recollection  of  what  had 
occurred. 

§  140.  A  tailor  of  sober  and  industrious  habits,  after  return- 
ing one  morning  from  a  walk,  sat  down,  refused  to  eat,  then 
suddenly  began  to  upset  every  thing  in  the  room,  and  finally 
rushed  upon  his  wife,  when  the  neighbors  came  in.  The 
next  day  he  had  no  recollection  of  the  occurrence.^ 

§  141.  "  One  day,  while  passing  along  the  street,  I  was  re- 
quested to  come  in  and  see  a  man  named  D.,  of  a  bilious, 
nervous  temperament,  very  susceptible  of  impressions,  but 
robust  and  free  from  any  bodily  ailments.  He  was  breaking 
the  furniture,  tearing  up  his  clothes,  and  endeavoring  to 
assault  his  wife.  His  face  was  flushed,  his  eyes  wild,  veins 
and  muscles  swelled.  He  cried  and  sang.  On  seeing  me, 
for  whom  he  had  long  felt  a  great  regard,  he  seated  himself 
near  a  table,  which  he  kept  striking  with  his  fists.  We 
learned  from  his  friends,  that  nothing  had  occurred  to  which 
this  outbreak  could  be  attributed.  He  consented  to  be  bled, 
and  laid  his  arm  upon  the  table.  A  liberal  evacuation  sub- 
dued both  his  strength  and  the  mental  excitement,  and  he 
suffered  one  of  his  friends  to  approach  him.  He  soon  after 
came  to  himself,  and  promised  to  be  quiet.  In  the  evening, 
he  had  no  recollection  of  the  occurrence.  He  has  had  no  re- 
turn of  the  paroxysms."  2 

§  142.  A  young  Irish  laborer,  on  his  way  from  Stonington 
to  Providence,  R.  I.,  went  into  a  farmer's  house  towards  night- 
fall, got  some  bread  and  milk,  and  went  to  bed.  In  the  course 
of  an  hour  or  two,  he  came  down,  half-dressed,  into  the 
kitchen  where  the  family  still  were,  talking  wildly,  and  as  if 
apprehending  some  harm.     On  being  prevented  from  going 


^  These  cases  are  from  Marc.  ii.  511. 

*  Boileau  de  Castelnau,  Annales  D'llygiene,  xlv.  223. 


154  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

out,  he  rushed  through  the  window,  though  closed,  demolish- 
ing it  entirely,  ran  down  to  a  neighboring  factory  village, 
quite  naked,  and  was  there  secured.  Towards  morning,  he 
began  to  come  to  his  senses,  and  in  the  course  of  the  day,  had 
completely  recovered,  with  a  partial  recollection  of  what  had 
happened.     He  had  never  been  so  affected  before. 

§  143.  In  the  two  following  cases  we  have  examples  of 
transitory  mental  disturbance,  apparently  of  a  maniacal  char- 
acter. The  .evidence  is  not  so  satisfactory  as  would  have 
been  the  results  of  the  observation  of  persons  specially  ac- 
quainted with  insanity.  It  was  sufficient,  however,  to  deter 
the  jury  from  a  conviction,  and  in  the  absence  of  other  evi- 
dence, we  are  obliged  to  share  the  conclusions  of  the  jury. 

§  144.  In  March,  1843,  Mercer  was  tried  by  the  court  of 
oyer  and  terminer  of  New  Jersey,  for  the  murder  of  Heberton, 
on  the  10th  of  February  previous.  He  was  defended  by  his 
counsel  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  and  acquitted,  though  it  does 
not  appear  that  the  acquittal  was  on  this  ground.  We  shall 
only  notice  such  facts,  which  appeared  in  evidence,  as  have 
any  bearing  on  Mercer's  mental  condition.  On  the  8th  of 
February  he  was  itiformed  of  the  seduction  of  his  sister,  a 
young,  simple-minded  girl,  by  Heberton,  a  practised  libertine. 
The  communication  made  a  powerful  impression  upon  his 
feelings,  attended  with  manifestations  of  the  highest  mental 
excitement.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  he  was 
strongly  agitated  —  crying  and  cursing  —  sitting  still  and 
silent  for  a  minute  or  two,  and  then  violently  striding  through 
the  room  — insisting  on  calling  his  father  to  come  and  shoot 
his  sister,  who  had  ruined  and  disgraced  them  all  —  declaring 
that  he  would  go  and  kill  her  himself,  and  abusing  his 
friends  for  keeping  him  in  the  room.  He  did  not  seem  to 
understand  or  appreciate  any  thing  that  was  said  to  him,  nor 
know  what  he  himself  said  or  did.  On  being  told  that  the  law 
could  not  hold  Heberton,  he  became  quite  furious  and  wild. 
His  face  had  a  mottled  appearance,  and  his  eyes  were  wild 
and  staring.  He  complained  that  his  head  was  burning,  and 
bound  around  it  a  wet  handkerchief.  This  conduct  con- 
tinued in  the  evening.     Of  his   condition  during   the   next 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF   MANIA.'  155 

day  we  bear  nothing  from  the  witnesses,  until  late  in  the 
evening,  when  he  accosted  the  captain  of  the  watch,  in  an 
oyster-cellar,  and  without  any  previous  acquaintance  with 
him,  insisted  on  teih'ng  him  the  whole  story  of  his  sister's 
disgrace.  He  said  his  sister  was  crazy,  his  father  was  crazy, 
his  mother  was  crazy,  and  they  were  all  ruined.  He  imag- 
ined that  some  trunks  he  saw  in  the  street  were  Heberton's, 
and  wished  to  watch  them,  lest  be  might  elude  him.  His 
manner  was  wild,  and  bis  countenance  haggard.  He  called 
for  food  and  drink,  but  scarcely  tasted  of  either.  Another 
witness,  who  saw  him  the  same  evening,  described  his  man- 
ner as  being  very  wild  and  agitated.  He  said  somebody  was 
running  away  with  his  sister.  On  the  10th  he  passed  by  an 
acquaintance  without  seeming  to  notice  him  ;  on  meeting 
him  a  second  time  and  being  addressed,  he  looked  with 
a  vacant  stare,  turned  and  walked  away  in  a  wild  and 
hurried  manner.  Another  witness  saw  him  walking  up  and 
down  the  street,  his  face  red  on  one  side  and  white  on  the 
other,  looking  wild  and  agitated.  Witness  spoke  to  him 
about  some  business  Mercer  and  his  son  had  together,  hoping 
thereby  to  call  his  attention,  but  his  answers  were  quite 
strange  and  irrelevant.  He  spoke  of  men  with  whom  he  had 
no  acquaintance.  While  walking  in  the  streets  he  frequently 
changed  his  course,  and  looked  around  anxiously,  as  if  ex- 
pecting to  see  some  one.  That  evening  he  shot  Heberton, 
while  sitting  in  his  carriage  in  the  ferry-boat.  He  immedi- 
ately confessed  the  act,  and  made  no  attempt  to  escape. 
Soon  after,  he  asked  several  different  persons  for  a  fiddle, 
that  he  might  have  a  dance.  During  the  coroner's  inquest 
the  same  night,  he  sat  resting  his  head  on  his  arms  over  the 
back  of  a  chair,  recognizing  no  one.  In  the  night,  he  said 
his  sister  was  in  the  insane  asylum.  Shortly  after  his  com- 
mittal he  was  visited  by  a  physician,  who  had  been  previ- 
ously acquainted  with  him.  By  him,  Mercer  was  considered 
insane  on  the  strength  of  the  following  facts.  His  face  was 
flushed,  his  eye  wild  and  wandering,  his  manner  restless,  his 
conversation  was  incoherent  and  rambling,  and  he  miscalled 
persons    and    things  (this  fact   was   testified   to   by  several 


156  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

other  witnesses).  For  two  or  three  days  he  complained  of 
a  pain  in  his  head,  and  was  much  constipated.  Essentially 
the  same  was  the  testimony  of  two  other  witnesses  (not 
medical),  one  of  whom  thought  he  was  not  quite  himself,  till 
the  ISth.i 

§  145.  The  nature  of  the  exciting  cause  in  this  case,  ren- 
ders it  not  very  strange  that  Mercer  should  have  become 
insane,  and  the  circumstances  above  related,  touching  his 
appearance,  furnish  no  light  proof  that  such  was  actually  the 
fact.  It  certainly  is  not  very  far  from  the  ordinary  line  of 
occurrences,  that  a  high-spirited,  nervous  young  man,  sud- 
denly hearing  of  the  ruin  of  a  beloved  sister,  should  be  com- 
pletely overwhelmed  and  driven  from  his  propriety, —  that 
reason  should  depart,  and  the  passions  rage  with  intense  ex- 
citement. Why  the  disease  should  have  run  its  course  so 
rapidly,  we  know  not.  It  is  a  common  opinion,  however, 
that  this  character  of  short  duration  is  oftener  witnessed  in 
cases  which,  like  this,  have  been  attended  by  some  dreadful 
deed  of  violence.  Unquestionably,  Mercer  was  in  a  towering 
passion,  and  to  a  certain  degree,  at  least,  he  acted  as  if  under 
its  influence.  But  a  storm  of  passion  seldom,  if  ever,  con- 
tinues three  or  four  days  together.  After  the  first  outbreak, 
which  spends  its  fury  in  a  few  hours,  the  mind  settles  down 
into  a  state  of  fixed,  decided  determination,  forming  its  plans, 
and  steadily  and  consistently  pursuing  them.  How  different 
from  this  was  Mercer's  case!  At  no  time,  between  hearing 
of  his  sister's  infamy  and  revenging  her  wrongs,  did  he  act  with 
calmness,  deliberation,  and  coherence.  That  he  was  under  a 
high  degree  of  mental  excitement,  is  undeniable ;  that  he 
had  also  lost  his  reason,  or,  in  scientific  language,  was  labor- 
ing under  a  pathological  irritation  of  the  brain,  is  shown  by 
some  facts  that  cannot  well  be  explained  upon  any  other 
ground.  To  talk  wildly  and  incoherently,  to  imagine  that  a 
pile  of  trunks  he  happened  to  see  in  the  streets  were  Heber- 
ton's ;  that  his  family  were  all  crazy,  and  his  sister  in  a  hos- 


Keport  in  the  Dollar  Newspaper. 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF   MANIA.  157 

pital ;  to  be  constantly  miscalling  persons  and  things;  to 
talk  familiarly  of  men  whom  he  did  not  know ;  to  return 
irrelevant  answers  to  questions  on  business ;  and,  finally,  after 
accomplishing  the  terrible  act  of  revenge,  to  call  for  a  fiddle 
that  he  might  have  a  dance,  —  these  things  are  strongly  indi- 
cative of  insanity.  In  a  large  portion  of  cases  recently 
attacked,  which  come  into  hospitals  for  the  insane,  the  proofs 
of  insanity  are  not  more  strong  and  abundant  than  they  were 
in  Mercer's  case.  Very  often  the  disease  is  evinced,  not  so 
much  by  any  particular  word  or  act,  as  by  incoherent  and 
disjointed  discourse,  and  by  a  course  of  conduct  and  de- 
meanor at  variance  with  the  natural  character  of  the  indi- 
vidual. In  this  case,  too,  if  the  testimony  may  be  relied 
upon,  there  were  delusions,  and  these,  if  genuine,  can  only 
spring  from  insanity. 

§  146.  Very  similar  to  the  above,  in  many  of  its  features, 
was  the  case  of  Wood,  who  was  tried  for  the  murder  of  his 
daughter,  the  30th  of  September,  1839,  in  Philadelphia.  It 
appears  from  the  testimony,  that  Wood,  who  was  a  confec- 
tioner, and  considered  an  upright,  industrious  man,  had  for 
the  last  fifteen  years  suffered  much  from  diseases  of  a  ner- 
vous character,  such  as  neuralgia,  dyspepsia,  and  constipation, 
and  exhibited  much  mental  irritability.  About  a  year  before 
this  event,  while  making  some  alterations  in  his  house,  he 
interfered  with  his  workmen  in  a  very  unreasonable  manner, 
frequently  rubbing  his  hands  together,  and  exclaiming  he  was 
ruined.  Just  before  the  event,  he  went  to  New  York,  where 
he  was  disposed  to  make  some  strange  business  arrange- 
ments; but  suddenly  left  the  city,  neglecting  to  pay  his  board 
and  to  meet  an  engagement  with  a  person  whom  he  had  en- 
gaged to  see.  On  the  27th  of  September,  he  heard  of  the 
marriage  of  his  daughter  with  a  man  whom  he  regarded  as  a 
great  villain,  and  was  much  agitated  by  the  communication. 
He  walked  the  room  in  great  distress,  crying  and  moaning, 
and  exclaiming  that  he  was  a  lost,  ruined  man.  He  then 
shut  up  his  shop  and  went  running  through  the  streets. 
When  he  returned  home,  he  refused  for  half  an  hour  to  sit 
down,  and  when  he  did,  he    kept   moving  his  head  back- 

14 


158  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

wards  and  forwards.  So  strangely  did  he  appear,  that  his 
neighbors  requested  his  wife  to  remove  his  razors,  and  offered 
to  watch  him  through  the  night.  In  the  middle  of  the  night 
he  ordered  his  wife  to  go  to  the  front  window  and  call  his 
daughter  by  name,  for  he  heard  her  in  the  street  crying  to  get 
in.  On  the  28th,  he  was  very  importunate  to  see  his  davighter, 
who  had  not  been  at  home  since  her  marriage.  When  she 
appeared,  he  raised  his  hands,  uttered  a  wild  scream,  and  fell 
down  in  a  sort  of  fit,  gnashing  his  teeth,  and  appearing  to  be 
in  a  great  agony.  He  manifested  no  anger  towards  her,  but 
treated  her  with  his  usual  affection,  and,  on  parting,  they 
kissed  each  other.  In  the  afternoon  he  went  into  the  streets, 
looking  wild  and  agitated,  as  the  day  before.  A  colored  man 
whom  he  knew,  he  requested  to  come  to  his  house  the  next 
day,  though  it  was  Sunday,  as  he  was  to  entertain  a  large 
party.  In  the  night  he  arose,  went  to  his  daughter's  room, 
laid  his  head  down  by  the  side  of  hers,  crying  violently,  and 
manifesting  the  most  intense  fondness  for  her.  On  the  29th, 
he  was  met  in  the  street,  walking  rapidly  along,  by  his  family 
physician,  who,  noticing  his  strange  conduct,  beckoned  him 
to  come  to  him,  but  he  merely  put  up  his  hand,  made  a  rapid 
motion  with  it,  turned  round  and  went  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. On  the  morning  of  the  30th  he  appeared  quite  weak, 
and  drank  two  or  three  glasses  of  brandy.  While  his  wife 
and  a  man-servant  were  talking  in  the  kitchen  about  confin- 
ing him,  he  proceeded  to  his  daughter's  chamber  and  shot  her 
dead  with  a  pistol.  He  made  no  attempt  to  escape,  and 
confessed  that  he  was  the  murderer,  sauntering  about  the 
room  apparently  quite  unconcerned.  Shortly  he  laid  down 
upon  a  bed  and  moaned  heavily.  When  told  that  his 
daughter  was  dead,  he  expressed  himself  as  satisfied;  said 
he  should  not  long  survive ;  and  requested  to  be  buried  in  the 
same  grave.  He  then  described  the  manner  in  which  he  had 
accomplished  the  bloody  act.  It  appeared  also,  that  he  was 
a  kind,  amiable  man,  very  fond  of  his  children,  not  intem- 
perate, nor  accustomed  to  drink  spirituous  liquors  at  all,  and 
that  on  the  27th,  28th,  29th,  he  took  no  food,  except  a  very 
little  on  the  evening  of  the  29th.     On  his  mental  condition 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS   OF   MANIA.  159 

subsequently,  the  testimony  throws  no  light.     He  was  acquit- 
ted on  the  ground  of  insanity.^ 

§  147.  This  case  differs  from  Mercer's  in  the  important 
fact  that,  for  some  time  previous.  Wood  had  been  laboring 
under  a  certain  degree  of  mental  impairment,  and  was  appar- 
ently on  the  verge  of  insanity.  In  this  state  he  hears  of  the 
marriage  of  his  daughter,  which,  in  his  mind,  was  equivalent 
to  her  ruin  and  the  dishonor  of  himself  and  family.  Over- 
powered by  the  shock,  his  nervous  system  becomes  violently 
agitated,  and  reason  soon  ceases  to  control  his  movements. 
In  this  state  of  bewilderment  and  confusion,  he  wanders 
about,  without  aim  or  object,  till  at  last,  when  the  powers  of 
nature  are  about  to  yield  from  pure  exhaustion,  impelled  by 
no  passion,  and  actuated  by  no  rational  motive,  he  takes  the 
life  of  his  beloved  child.  That  he  did  not  act  from  passion, 
is  evident  from  the  fact  that  he  had  evinced  no  anger  towards 
her,  but,  on  the  contrary,  had  shown  the  strongest  affection. 
The  only  passion  which  could  have  actuated  him  at  that 
moment  was  revenge,  and  in  that  case,  the  object  of  his  fury 
would  have  been  the  daughter's  husband.  It  may  be  sup- 
posed, perhaps,  that  the  bloody  deed  was  perpetrated  under 
the  influence  of  the  liquor  he  drank ;  or,  at  any  rate,  that  it 
would  not  otherwise  have  been  done.  This,  no  doubt,  is 
possible,  but  the  true  question  at  issue  is,  whether  or  not  he 
was  insane  for  two  or  three  days  previous  to  the  criminal  act. 
If  he  were,  then  the  intoxication  was  the  effect  of  insanity, 
and  he  was  no  more  accountable  for  the  former  than  for  the 
latter.  A  fondness  of  strong  drinks  is  a  not  uncommon  ac- 
companiment of  mania,  and  a  person  may  drink  while  insane, 
who  never  drank  before.  The  conditions  of  this  case  were  all 
favorable  to  the  production  of  insanity,  —  a  highly  irritable, 
nervous  temperament,  a  morbid  apprehension  of  coming  ills, 
and  a  powerfully  exciting  cause  of  the  disease.  Where  is 
the  wonder,  then,  that  Wood  should  have  become  insane, 
and  while  so,  that  he  should  have  committed  any  imaginable 
folly  or  crime  ? 

.     ^  Report  in  the  Spirit  of  the  Times,  Philadelphia. 


160  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  148.  The  mental  disorders  are,  of  course,  as  numerous 
and  various  as  the  menial  constitutions  of  the  insane  them- 
selves ;  and  to  consider  any  particular  association  of  them 
as  characteristic  of  the  state  of  mind  called  mania,  would 
be  only  to  blend  things  together  that  have  no  uniform  nor 
necessary  relations  to  one  another ;  and  would  convey  no 
more  really  valuable  information,  than  it  would  to  marshal 
forth  every  symptom  that  has  at  any  time  been  observed  in 
the  countless  disorders  of  digestion,  as  the  symptoms  of 
diseased  stomach.  The  only  use  which  the  physician 
makes  of  the  latter  is  to  refer  them  as  they  occur,  to  some 
particular  derangement  of  that  organ,  and  thus  establish  the 
ground  for  an  appropriate  and  eflicient  treatment.  There 
is  no  reason  why  the  same  process  should  not  be  pursued  in 
mania;  and  it  is  because  a  different  one  has  been  followed, 
that  the  common  notions  of  this  disease  are  so  loose  and 
incorrect,  as  not  only  to  be  of  little  service  in  judicial  discus- 
sions, but  absolutely  in  the  way  of  arriving  at  just  and  phi- 
losophical conclusions.  To  furnish  any  light  on  the  subject, 
it  would  be  our  duty  to  analyze  the  various  phenomena  of 
mania,  associate  them  by  some  natural  relations,  and  refer 
them,  as  far  as  our  knowledge  will  permit,  to  particular  facul- 
ties. It  is  proposed,  therefore,  following* this  idea  as  closely 
as  possible,  to  consider  mania  as  affecting  either  the  intellect- 
ual^ or  the  affective  faculties;  meaning  by  the  former,  those 
which  make  us  acquainted  with  the  existence  and  qualities 
of  external  objects  and  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect,  and 
conduct  us  to  the  knowledge  of  general  truths  ;  and  by  the 
latter,  those  sentiments,  propensities,  and  passions  necessary 
to  man  as  a  social  and  accountable  being.  It  is  not  intended 
to  convey  the  idea  that  mania  is  invariably  confined  to  one 
or  the  other  of  these  two  divisions  of  our  faculties  ;  for  though 
they  may  sometimes  be  separately  affected,  the  one  present- 
ing a  chaos  of  tunmlt  and  disorder,  -while  the  other  appar- 
ently retains  its  wonted  soundness  and  vigor,  yet  more  fre- 
quently, they  are  both  involved  in  the  general  derangement. 
But  unless  we  study  these  disorders  separately,  and  recog- 


PATHOLOGY   AND    SYMPTOMS    OF  MANIA.  161 

nize  their  independent  existence,  —  and  this  effect  it  is 
the  tendency  of  the  above  classification  to  produce  —  we 
never  shall  be  able  to  refer  them  to  their  true  source,  nor  dis- 
cover their  respective  influence  over  the  mental  manifesta- 
tions. 

14* 


CHAPTER    VI. 


INTELLECTUAL    MANIA. 


§  149.  Intellectual  mania  is  characterized  by  certain  hal- 
lucinations or  delusions,^  in  which  the  patient  is  impressed 
with  the  reality  of  facts  or  events  that  have  never  occurred, 
and  acts  more  or  less  in  accordance  with  such  belief;  or, 
having  adopted  some  notion  not  altogether  unfounded, 
carries  it  to  an  extravagant  and  absurd  extent.  It  may  be 
general,  involving  all  or  the  most  of  the  operations  of  the 
understanding;  or  partial,  being  confined  to  a  particular 
idea,  or  train  of  ideas. 


SECTION  I. 

GENERAL    INTELLECTUAL    MANIA. 

§  150.  The  general  description  of  mania  is  equally  appli- 
cable to  the  acute  state  of  this,  and  sometimes  of  other  forms 
of  the  disease.  It  is  not,  generally,  till  after  the  excitement 
has  somewhat  subsided,  that  the  distinctive  features  of  each 
become  very  manifest.  In  this  stage  of  general  intellectual 
mania,  many  glimpses  of  natural  soundness  may  be  discov- 
ered amid  the  intellectual  disorder.^    Questions  on  indifferent 

'  These  terms,  tbougli  they  have  long  held  a  place  in  medical  language, 
have  always  been  used  with  remarkable  diversity  and  vagueness  of  meaning. 
Without  troubling  the  reader  with  an  array  of  nosological  definitions,  it  will 
be  sufficient  to  say,  that  in  this  treatise,  the  latter  is  used  as  a  general  desig- 
nation of  all  those  notions  which  are  indicative  of  derangement  of  the  reflec- 
tive, as  the  former  is  of  the  perceptive  powers. 

*  Pinel,  Traite  sur  1' alienation  mentale,  142,  §  148. 


GENERAL  INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  163 

subjects  may  be  appropriately  answered;  many  of  the  patient's 
relations  to  surrounding  circumstances  may  still  be  perceived; 
•and  no  little  acuteness  and  ingenuity  are  often  manifested  in 
accommodating  the  real  and  true  to  the  delusions  under  which 
he  labors.  The  difficulty  is  to  fix  the  attention  on  a  partic- 
ular point,  the  mind  constantly  running  from  one  idea  to 
another,  or  absorbed  in  the  thoughts  which  happen,  for  the 
moment,  to  predominate  over  every  other. 

§  151.  In  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  of  the  mental 
constitution,  it  is  not  strange  to  find  considerable  diversity 
of  opinion  respecting  the  nature  or  cause  of  hallucinations  of 
the  senses  ;  yet,  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view,  it  is  impor- 
tant that  they  should  be  correctly  understood.  Hoft'bauer^ 
says  that  they  consist  in  a  vicious  relation  between  the  im- 
agination and  the  senses,  in  consequence  of  which  the  patient 
mistakes  the  creations  of  the  one  for  objects  really  perceived 
by  the  others.  Esquirol,  not  entirely  satisfied  with  this  ex- 
planation, divides  them  into  two  classes,  termed  by  him, 
illusive  sensalions,  and  hallucinations?  The  first  arise  in  the 
senses,  as  when  a  maniac  mistakes  a  window  for  a  door, 
passes  through  it,  and  is  precipitated  to  the  ground;  or  takes 
the  clouds  which  he  sees  in  the  sky  for  contending  armies ; 
or  believes  his  legs  are  made  of  glass ;  or  his  head  turned 
round.  In  all  these  instances,  the  error  refers  to  the  real 
impression  which  is  ill-perceived  ;  there  is  an  error  of  sensa- 
tion, a  vicious  relation  between  the  sense  which  actually 
perceives  and  the  intellect  which  judges  falsely  of  the  exter- 
nal object.  In  the  second,  on  the  contrary,  the  senses  have 
no  share ;  the  imagination  alone  is  exalted ;  the  brain  is 
exclusively  the  seat  of  the  disturbance ;  the  patient  mistak- 
ing the  creations  of  his  imagination  for  objects  actually 
present  to  his  senses.  He  sees  images  and  apparitions  amid 
the  thickest  darkness ;  hears  sounds  and  voices  in  the  most 
perfect  silence  ;  and  smells  odors  in  the  absence  of  all  odor- 
ous bodies.     This  distinction  does  not  seem  to  be  well  sup- 


^  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  84.  2  ijem,  §  82,  note. 


164  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OEV  INSANITY. 

ported.       That  the  functions  of  the   senses  are   sometimes 
greatly   jDcrverted,  there   can  be  no  question;  but   it   needs 
more  evidence    than  we    yet    have,  to  prove  that  such  per-  ' 
versions  bear  much  if  any  part  in  producing  these  illusions; 
more  especially  as  Esquirol  admits  that,  in  what  he  terms 
hallucinations,  an  exalted  imagination  is  sufficient  of  itself 
to  produce  a  very  similar  effect.     In  old  age,  where,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  decay  of  the  senses,  wrong  impressions  are 
being   constantly   received,   they    nevertheless    give    rise   to 
none  of  these  delusions.     When  the  hero  of  Cervantes  did 
battle  with  the  sheep  and  the  windmills,  it  will  not  be  con- 
tended that  he  was  laboring  under  any  special  optical  in- 
firmity which  conveyed  false  impressions  of  outward  objects, 
because  on  most  occasions,  the  action  of  his  senses  was  un- 
equivocally sound.     Ready  as  he  was  to  mistake  a  company 
of  peaceable  shepherds    for    the  creations  of   his  disordered 
intellect,  he  never  imagined  Sancho  to  be  any  other  than  his 
faithful    squire,   for  the   reason  that    his    reflective    faculties 
were  not  so  far  subverted  as  to  be  incapable  of  any  healthy 
action.     Besides,  if  erroneous  sensation  has  any  thing  to  do 
with    producing  these  illusions,    we  must  go  the  length    of 
asserting,  that  at  such  times  all  the  senses  are  disordered,  or 
deny  that  the  errors  of  one  may  be  corrected  by  the  others. 
It   is   not  so   strange  that  vision    should   sometimes    be  so 
affected  as  to  deceive  a  person  with  the  idea  that  his  legs  are 
made  of  glass  or  butter,  but  it  certainly  is  very  strange,  that 
on  such  occasions,  the  other  senses  should  all  return  equally 
false  impressions  ;  the  touch  being  unable  to  distinguish  the 
feel  of  flesh  and  blood,  and  the  hearing  the  sound  produced 
by  striking  them,  while  they  retain  this  power  in  regard  to 
every   other   part  of  the   body.     These  illusions  appear   to 
result  from  a  morbid  excitement  of  the  perceptive  faculties, 
whereby  they  are  stimulated  by  outward  impressions  to  in- 
voluntary and  irresistible  activity,  while  a  coexistent  impair- 
ment  of  the  reflective   faculties    prevents   them  from  being 
considered  as  illusions  and  not  actual  realities.     The  physi- 
cian will  not   unfrequently  hear   a   patient   complaining  of 
seeing  colors  of  the  utmost  beauty  and  variety  of  combina- 


GENERAL   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  165 

tion  passing  and  repassing  before  his  eyes,  or  forms  of  ob- 
jects of  every  possible  description,  whether  his  eyes  be  open 
or  shut,  the  room  dark  or  light.  His  understanding  being 
sound,  he  is  not  deceived,  but  believes  them  to  be  what  they 
actually  are,  merely  illusions ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  were 
unsound,  then  these  illusions  would  be  taken  for  realities, 
and  he  would  conduct  accordingly.  Ben  Jonson  would  keep 
awake  an  entire  night,  gazing  at  armies  of  Turks  and  Tar- 
tars, Carthaginians  and  Romans  contending  around  his 
great  toe ;  in  which  amusement  there  is  no  evidence  of 
mania,  but  merely  of  a  morbid  activity  of  the  internal  per- 
ceptive organs.  The  apparitions  of  Nicolai  of  Berlin,  and 
others  of  a  similar  kind,  arose,  no  doubt,  from  the  same 
cause.  Indeed  unnatural  excitement  of  these  organs  in  in- 
sanity is  sometimes  so  obvious  and  well-marked,  as  to  be 
immediately  recognized  and  properly  understood.  Rush 
gives  the  case  of  a  young  woman  who  delighted  her  visitors 
with  her  efforts  in  singing  and  poetry,  though  previously  she 
had  never  manifested  any  talent  for  either;  and  the  author 
once  attended  an  insane  patient  of  feeble  intellect  and  defec- 
tive education,  who  occupied  much  of  her  time  in  making 
verses,  though  she  had  not  shown  the  slightest  trace  of  such 
a  power  before  the  invasion  of  her  disease.  The  faculty  of 
construction,  too,  is  occasionally  heightened  to  a  wonderful 
degree.  Pinel  speaks  of  a  maniac  who  believed  he  had  dis- 
covered the  perpetual  motion ;  and  in  the  course  of  his  re- 
searches he  constructed  some  very  ingenious  machines. 
The  common  and  essential  element,  then,  in  the  production  of 
hallucinations  and  illusive  sensations,  is  an  impairment  of 
the  reJlecLive  faculties  accompanied  by  morbid  activity  of 
the  perceptive  faculties.  The  only  real  difference  between 
them  is,  that  in  the  latter,  the  morbid  activity  of  the  percep- 
tive faculties  requires  to  be  excited  by  outward  impressions, 
while  in  the  former,  this  effect  is  produced  by  the  remem- 
brance of  past  impressions,  —  a  distinction  that  can  be  of 
but  little  if  any  importance,  in  judicial  investigations.  We 
have  been  thus  particular  in  showing  the  true  origin  of  hal- 
lucinations, that  any  mistake  arising  from  wrong  views  of 


166  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

their  nature  might  be  avoided,  —  an  event  not  altogether 
beyond  the  limits  of  possibility,  for  one  instance  has  come 
to  our  own  knowledge,  where  it  was  attempted,  in  a  court  of 
justice  in  a  neighboring  State,  to  measure  the  extent  of  the 
•insanity  by  the  comparative  number  of  the  senses  supposed 
to  be  deranged  in  the  hallucination. 

§  152.  Hallucinations  of  the  senses  occur  in  a  large  pro- 
portion of  maniacs.  In  the  early  stage  of  acute  mania  they 
are  generally  numerous  and  changing,  and  somewhat  masked 
by  the  more  conspicuous  symptoms.  In  chronic  mania  they 
are  more  simple,  uniform,  and  obvious.  Occasionally,  how- 
ever, this  rule  is  reversed,  the  hallucinations  being  very  dis- 
tinct and  vivid  from  the  beginning  of  the  disease.  And  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind,  that  when  it  is  the  predominant 
feature  of  the  mental  disorder,  the  patient  is  disposed  to 
conceal  it  from  others  as  long  as  he  retains  sufficient  control 
over  his  thoughts.  A  little  strangeness  of  demeanor  may, 
for  months,  be  the  only  perceptible  deviation  from  the  natural 
condition,  the  reason,  in  the  mean  while,  struggling  with  the 
suggestions  of  the  hallucinated  sense,  ^till  it  finally  yields, 
and  the  patient,  in  obedience  to  some  voice  or  vision,  com- 
mits a  sudden  and  fearful  act  of  violence.  In  the  stillness  of 
night  they  are  more  common  and  often  more  vivid  than 
during  the  day.  For  the  most  part  their  occurrence  is  irre- 
spective of  times  and  seasons,  and  whether  in  solitude,  in  the 
church,  in  the  gay  assembly,  in  the  midst  of  animated  con- 
versation, in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  or  of  business,  the  atten- 
tion may  be  arrested  at  once,  and  the  whole  soul  engrossed 
by  the  powerful  appeal  to  the  senses.  When  the  patient 
describes  his  hallucinations,  there  is  a  remarkable  air  of  sin- 
cerity and  frankness  in  his  manner,  which  no  art  of  simula- 
tion can  successfully  imitate. 

§  153.  To  determine  exactly  what  mental  impairment  it  is 
which  is  essential  to  insanity,  metaphysicians  and  physiolo- 
gists have  long  and  anxiously  labored  with  hardly  the  shadow 
of  success.  The  various  definitions  and  explanations  to 
which  their  inquiries  have  given  rise,  display  some  ingenuity, 
but  would  scarcely  be  worth  considering  in  this  place,  were 


GENERAL   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  167 

they  not  capable  of  an  injurious  application  injudicial  inves- 
tigations. It  has  been  said  that  insanity  consists  essentially 
in  diseased  perception,  —  that  this  is  the  common  attribute  of 
its  various  kinds  and  degrees.  We  have  seen,  above,  how- 
ever, that  in  a  state  of  perfect  mental  soundness,  the  percep- 
tions may  be  deeply  disordered,  insomuch  as  to  give  rise  to 
strange  and  most  extraordinary  impressions,  while  many  a 
mad  man  may  be  found  who  evinces  no  one  single  error  of 
perception.  The  doctrine  that  insanity  consists  in  false  judg- 
ments, conveys  no  more  satisfactory  notion  of  its  essential 
characters,  for  though  there  most  certainly  is  false  judgment 
in  every  case  of  insanity,  it  is  far  from  being  confined  to  this 
condition  of  the  mind.  Every  one  is  occasionally  guilty  of 
some  gross  "error  of  judgment  on  which  he  may  reason  accu- 
rately and  arrive  at  specious  conclusions,  without  being  con- 
sidered at  the  time  madder  than  his  neighbors.  Locke,  as  if 
strongly  impressed  with  the  curious  fact  of  the  coexistence  of 
absurd  fancies  with  the  power  of  reasoning  shrewdly  and  per- 
tinently to  a  certain  extent,  which  is  occasionally  observed  in 
the  insane,  remarked  that  they  did  not  seem  to  have  lost  the 
faculty  of  reasoning,  "  but  having  joined  together  some  ideas 
very  wrongly,  they  mistake  them  for  truths,  and  they  err  as 
men  do  that  argue  right  from  wrong  principles."^  If  Locke 
had  possessed  any  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity,  if  he 
had  even  spent  an  hour  in  a  well-managed  hospital  for  the 
insane,  he  never  would  have  adopted  this  opinion,  for  nothing 
can  be  further  from  the  truth,  than  the  idea  that  generally 
madmen  reason  correctly  from  wrong  premises.  The  lady 
who  imagined  that  a  tooth  which  a  dentist  had  removed,  had 
slipped  from  his  fingers  and  stuck  in  her  throat,  and  insisted 
that  she  could  not  swallow  a  morsel,  while  she  ate  and  drank 
heartily,  was  as  wrong  in  her  conclusion  as  she  was  in  her 
premises;  and  the  man  who,  like  Bellingham,  imagines  that 
the  government  has  been  culpably  negligent  of  his  private 
interests,  and  thence  proceeds  to  take  the  life  of  a  person 


On  the  Human  Understanding,  Book  II.  ch.  xi.  §  13. 


168  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDEXCE   OF   INSANITY. 

whom  he  believes  to  be  perfectly  innocent,  in  order  that  he 
may  have  an  opportunity  of  bringing  his  affairs  before  the 
country,  errs*in  every  stage  of  his  reasoning.  Indeed,  it  is 
matter  of  common  observation,  that  maniacs  display  their 
insanity,  not  more  in  the  delusions  which  they  entertain, 
than  in  the  course  they  pursue  in  order  to  accomplish  their 
objects.  The  last  and  most  ably-supported  speculation  on  this 
subject  is  that  of  Dr.  Conolly,  who  makes  insanity  to  con- 
sist in  "  the  impairment  of  any  one  or  more  of  the  faculties  of 
the  mind,  accompanied  with,  or  inducing  a  defect  in  the 
comparing  faculty."  ^  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  power 
of  comparison  is  often,  perhaps  generally,  affected  in  insanity; 
but  it  may  be  questioned  whether  this  author  has  not  referred 
many  phenomena  to  this  faculty  of  the  mind,  which  more 
properly  belong  to  some  other.  And  even  when  the  mental 
disturbance  does  unquestionably  flow  from  defect  in  the  com- 
paring power,  it  would  seem  as  if  this  defect  were  but  the 
consequence  of  one  affecting  more  deeply  the  secret  springs 
of  thought.  It  is  said  that  the  celebrated  Pascal  sometimes 
believed  that  he  was  near  the  brink  of  a  fearful  precipice,  and 
that  his  attendants,  to  allay  his  apprehension  of  falling. down 
it,  were  accustomed  to  place  a  chair  near  him,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  supposed  precipice.  "  He  then  compared  what 
was  done  with  what  appeared  to  him,"  says  Dr.  Conolly, 
"and  drew  the  just  conclusion,  that  a  chair  could  not  stand 
upon  air,  beyond  the  brink  of  a  precipice,  and  that  he  was 
not  therefore  in  real  danger."  "  Whenever  the  comparison 
could  be  made,"  he  adds,  "  the  delusion  yet  remaining,  he 
was  not  sane  on  the  subject  of  the  precipice."  ^  Now  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  jn  both  instances,  Pascal  saw  the  chair, 
and  was  sensible  that  it  was  in  the  direction  of  the  precipice, 
and  that  the  real  difference  between  them  was,  that  in  the 
former  he  could,  in  the  latter  he  could  not,  draiu  the  just  con- 
clusion that  a  chair  could  not  stand  upon  air.  It  is  evident 
that,  in  this  case  at  least,  and  there  is  much  reason  to  believe 


^  Indications  of  Insanity,  300.  ^  Idem,  316. 


PARTIAL    INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  169 

the  fact  is  a  general  one  —  the  faculty  of  the  mind,  primi- 
tively affected,  was  that  which  recognizes  the  relations  of 
cause  and  effect.  We  might  multiply  examples  of  this  fond- 
ness for  definitions,  but  enough  has  been  said  on  this  point, 
to  convince  the  student  of  legal  medicine  how  barren  of  all 
practical  benefit  such  speculations  are,  and  to  place  him  on 
his  guard  against  their  admission  in  judicial  investigations, 
as  tests,  or  criteria  of  insanity. 

§  154.  It  is  not  to  be  understood  that,  in  this  form  of 
mania,  the  derangement  is  confined  to  the  intellectual  fac- 
ulties, the  moral  continuing  to  be  exercised  with  their  ordi- 
nary soundness.  On  the  contrary,  the  moral  faculties  seldom 
escape  its  influence;  and  one  of  the  earliest  symptoms  of 
the  disease  is  an  unaccountable  change  in  the  patient's  social 
and  domestic  feelings.  He  becomes  indifferent  to  those  whom 
he  loved  the  most ;  the  mother  thinks  no  longer  of  her  chil- 
dren, or  regards  them  with  loathing;  the  child  forgets  his 
parents ;  the  husband  is  insensible  to  the  endearments  of  his 
wife ;  and  love,  attachment,  and  friendship  are  replaced  by 
hatred,  jealousy,  and  indifference.  These  traits,  however,  are 
not  so  prominent  as  the  intellectual  disorders  (except  in  the 
earliest  stage  of  the  disease),  and  besides,  are  very  different 
from  those  w^hich  characterize  that  form  of  mental  derange- 
ment to  be  presently  delcribed  under  the  title  of  moral 
mania. 


SECTION   n. 

PARTIAL     INTELLECTUAL    MANIA. 

§  155.  By  the  ancients  this  form  of  the  disease  was  called 
Melancholia,  on  the  supposition  that  it  was  always  attended 
by  dejection  of  mind  and  gloomy  ideas.  This  term  was 
used  and  so  understood  by  modern  writers,  till  Esquirol 
proved  its  improper  application  by  showing  that  the  ideas 
are  not  always  gloomy,  but  frequently  of  a  gay  and  cheerful 
nature.  He  substituted  the  term  Monomania,  which  is  now 
in  general  use ;  and  though  possessing  a  more  correct  and. 

15 


170  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

definite  signification,  it  embraces,  besides  the  cases  which 
come  under  the  present  division,  a  class  that  will  be  treated 
of  under  a  different  head.  Still,  for  convenience'  sake,  the 
use  of  the  term  will  be  continued,  with  the  understanding 
that  it  always  refers  to  that  form  of  insanity  which  is  the  im- 
mediate subject  of  discussion. 

§  156.  Monomania  is  often  described  as  a  derangement 
of  any  one  or  few  of  the  intellectaal  faculties,  but  incorrectly, 
upon  our  views  of  the  constitution  of  those  faculties,  many 
of  which  may  be  simultaneously  deranged  by  the  action  of 
disease,  without  necessarily  producing  insanity.  This  point 
has  been  already  established,  when  speaking  of  those  affec- 
tions of  the  perceptive  faculties  which  give  rise  to  apparitions, 
and  change,  to  appearance,  the  outward  qualities  of  objects. 
(§  151.)  A  multitude  of  cases  are  recorded,  in  which  the 
faculty  of  language  too  has  been  wholly  or  partially  lost, 
while  the  soundness  of  the  reasoning  powers  remained 
unimpaired  ;  indeed  there  is  not  a  single  perceptive  faculty 
whose  functions  have  not  been  sometimes  obliterated  or 
diminished,  without  being  accompanied  by  insane  delusion. 
It  is  evident  that  before  a  person  can  be  insane,  partially  or 
generally,. the  mental  faculty  or  faculties  must  be  deranged, 
by  which  we  discern  the  relations  of  things,  and  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  of  general  truths.  * 

§  157.  The  most  simple  form  of  this  disorder  is  that  in 
which  the  patient  has  imbibed  some  single  notion  contradic- 
tory to  common  sense  and  to  his  own  experience,  and  which 
seems  to  be,  and  sometimes  no  doubt  really  is,  attended  by 
errors  of  sensation.  Thus,  thousands  have  believed  their  legs 
were  made  of  glass,  or  that  snakes,  fish,  or  eels  had  taken  up 
their  abode  in  their  stomach  or  bowels.  In  many  such  cases 
the  hallucination  is  excited  and  maintained  by  impressions 
propagated  from  diseased  parts,  the  presence  of  which  has 
been  revealed  by  dissection  after  death.  EsquiroP  has  re- 
lated numerous  cases  in  proof  of  this  proposition,  among  which 


>  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  211-213. 


•  PARTIAL   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  171 

is  that  of  a  woman  who  insisted  she  was  pregnant  with  the 
devil,  in  whose  womb  there  was  found,  after  death,  a  mass  of 
hydatids ;  of  another,  in  the  Salpetriere,  who  imagined  that 
a  regiment  of  soldiers  lay  concealed  in  her  belly,  and  that  she 
could  feel  them'  struggling  and  fighting  with  each  other  ;  and 
of  another,  who  believed  that  the  apostles  and  evangelists 
had  taken  up  their  abode  in  her  bowels  and  were  occasion- 
ally visited  by  the  pope  and  the  patriarchs  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, in  both  of  whom,  the  intestines  were  found  agglu- 
tinated together  in  consequence  of  chronic  peritonitis.  That 
these  hallucinations  are  not  always  connected  with  corporeal 
impressions  of  this  kind,  seems  to  be  proved  by  the  fact,  that 
they  are  sometimes  dissipated  by  the  skilful  application  of 
arguments,  or  manoeuvres,  by  which  the  patients  are  made  to 
believe  themselves  cured  of  their  complaint.  The  story  of 
the  "  Turned  Head,"  in  the  "  Diary  of  a  Physician,"  ludicrous 
as  it  is,  is  scarcely  a  caricature  of  the  truth  ;  and  one  of  M. 
Manry's  patients,  who,  after  thinking  himself  cured  of  a  ser- 
pent in  his  bowels  by  means  of  a  pretended  surgical  opera- 
tion, suddenly  took  up  the  idea,  that  the  creature  had  left  its 
ova  behind  ready  to  be  hatched  into  a  brood  of  young  ones, 
was  again  restored  by  the  dexterous  reply  of  his  physician, 
that  the  snake  was  a  male.^  In  this  class  of  cases,  the  mind 
is  not  observed  to  have  lost  any  of  its  original  vigor,  and  its 
soundness  on  every  other  topic  remains  unimpaired,  though 
there  unquestionably  does  exist  some  derangement  in  the 
reflective  faculties. 

§  158.  In  another  class  of  cases,  the  monomania  takes  a 
little  wider  range,  involving  a  train  of  morbid  ideas,  instead 
of  being  limited  to  a  single  point.  The  patient  imbibes 
some  notion  connected  with  the  various  relations  of  persons, 
events,  time,  space,  resistance,  etc.,  of  the  most  absurd  and 
unfounded  nature,  and  endeavors,  in  some  measure,  to  regu- 
late his  conduct  accordingly  ;  though,  in  most  respects,  it 
is  grossly  inconsistent  with  his  delusion.     It  is  certainly  not 


*  Medlco-Cbirurgical  Review,  N.  s.,  xxi.  524. 


172  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

one  of  the  least  curious  phenomena  of  our  mental  consti- 
tution, that  these  delusions  will  sometimes  continue  for 
years  together,  unaffected  by  time,  and  proceeding  parallel, 
as  it  were,  with  the  most  sound  and  healthy  operations  of 
the  mind,  though  more  often,  the  predominant  idea,  instead 
of  enduring  in  this  manner  is  freqently  changing,  one  insane 
notion  disappearing  to  give  place  to  another  and  another. 
Rush  says  that  he  knew  one  clergyman  and  had  heard  of 
another,  who  were  deranged  at  all  times,  except  when  they 
ascended  the  pulpit,  where  they  discovered,  in  their  prayers 
and  sermons,  all  the  usual  marks  of  a  sound  and  correct 
mind  ;  and  he  speaks  of  a  judge  who  was  rational  and  sen- 
sible upon  the  bench,  but  constantly  insane  when  off  it.^ 
The  celebrated  case  of  the  E.ev.  Simon  Browne  is  another 
remarkable  instance  of  this  kind.  For  many  years  before 
his  death,  he  entertained  the  belief  that  "  he  had  lost  his 
rational  soul,"  though  during  that  time  he  evinced  great 
ability  both  in  his  ordinary  conversation  and  in  his  writings. 
Having  discontinued  all  public  or  private  worship,  he  ex- 
plained to  his  friends,  that  "  he  had  fallen  under  the  sensible 
displeasure  of  God,  who  had  caused  his  rational  soul  gradu- 
ally to  perish,  and  left  him  only  an  animal  life  in  common 
with  brutes ;  that  it  was  therefore  profane  in  him  to  pray, 
and  incongruous  to  be  present  at  the  prayers  of  others."  In 
a  book  of  some  merit  which  he  dedicated  to  the  queen  he 
speaks  of  himself  as  "  once  a  rnan  ;  and  of  some  little  name; 
but  of  no  worth,  as  his  present  unparalleled  case  makes  but 
too  manifest;  for,  by  the  immediate  hand  of  an  avenging 
God,  his  very  thinking  substance  has  for  more  than  seven- 
teen years  been  wasting  away,  till  it  is  wholly  perished  out 
of  him,  if  it  be  not  utterly  come  to  nothing."^ 

§  1'j9.  The  operations  of  the  understanding,  oven  on  sub- 
jects connected  with  the  insane  belief,  are  sometimes  not 
impaired  in  an  appreciable  degree ;  on  the  contrary,  we  are 

'  On  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  204. 

*  An   account   of  this   case   may  be   found   in   the  Gentleman's  Maga- 
zine, Oct.  1702,  and  in  the  Adventurer,  No.  88. 


PARTIAL    INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  173 

occasionally  struck  with  the  acateness  of  the  reasoning  power 
displayed  by  monomaniacs.  Muratori  relates  the  case  of  a 
Jesuit,  named  Sgambari,  who  believed  himself  a  cardinal, 
and  claimed  to  be  addressed  by  the  title  of  eminence.  A 
friend  was  anxious  to  convince  him  of  his  error,  and  obtained 
a  patient  hearing  of  his  remarks.  When  he  had  finished,  the 
madman  replied  :  '•  Either  you  consider  me  insane  or  rational ; 
on  the  latter  supposition,  you  do  me  injustice  by  your  remon- 
strances; on  the  former,  I  hardly  know  which  is  the  most 
mad,  I,  for  believing  myself  a  cardinal,  or  you,  for  thinking 
to  cure  a  madman  by  such  reasonings."  ^ 

§  160.  Though  monomaniacs  are  generally  ready  enough 
to  declare  their  predominant  idea,  yet  when  sufficient  induce- 
ment exists,  such  as  interest,  fear  of  ridicule,  etc.,  they  will 
occasionally  conceal  it;  and  this,  too,  without  the  occurrence 
of  a  lucid  interval,  and  while  they  believe  in  its  reality  as 
firmly  as  ever.  Chambeyron,  the  French  translatcTr  of  Hoff- 
bauer's  treatise,  speaks  of  "a  woman  who  on  her  admission 
to  the  Saltpetriere  told  one  of  the  overseers,  '  that  she  was  an 
apostle,  and  that  Louis  XVIII.  had  remembered  her  in  his 
will.'"  "The  next  day,"  says  he,  "at  my  visit,  I  asked  her 
reasons  for  entering  the  hospital.  '  If  I  tell  you,'  said  she, 
'you  will  think  me  mad.'  On  my  protesting  to  the  contrary, 
however,  she  replied,  'well,  I  am  remembered  in  the  will  of 
Louis  XVIII.'  Of  the  other  notion  whose  absurdity,  was 
more  palpable,  she  said  not  a  word.  Now  [a  few  days  after] 
she  denied  that  she  ever  entertained  either  notion,  though  her 
conduct  and  conversation  prove  that  she  still  believes  them 
both."  Some  cases  of  a  similar  kind  are  also  related  in 
Erskine's  speech  in  the  defence  of  Hadfield.  Georget  speaks 
of  a  lady  who  thought  she  was  deprived  of  the  power  of  sen- 
sation, and  professed  to  feel  neither  fatigue  nor  the  ordinary 
wants  of  nature,  comparing  herself  to  a  machine  moved  by 
springs.  Believing  she  never  should  recover,  she  made 
several  attempts  at  suicide;    at  times  she  was  greatly  agi- 


*  Hoffbauer,  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  86,  note. 
15* 


174  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

tated,  and  abused  her  female  companion.  And  yet  this  lady 
received  visits,  and  sometimes  passed  whole  evenings  with 
persons  of  her  acquaintance  without  manifesting  the  slightest 
disorder  in  her  mental  faculties.^ 

§  161.  It  has  just  been  stated  (§  151),  that  any  one  of 
the  perceptive  faculties  might  be  disordered,  without  any 
derangement  of  the  reflective  or  reasoning  powers.  The 
true  nature  of  these  cases  is  generally  quite  obvious,  but  as 
those  in  which  the  faculty  of  language  is  affected,  might,  by 
the  careless  or  incompetent  observer,  be  mistaken  for  insanity, 
they  require  a  particular  notice  in  this  place.  It  is  a  curious, 
though  well-established  fact,  instances  of  which  are  related 
numerous  enough  to  fill  a  volume,  that  the  faculty  of  language^ 
or  the  power  of  representing  thoughts  by  appropriate  articu- 
late or  written  signs,  may  be  utterly  or  partially  lost,  the 
other  mental  powers  remaining  sound.  This  disorder  either 
arises  froin  slight  congestion  in  the  brain,  or  is  the  sequel  of 
traumatic  or  pathological  lesions  of  this  organ,  especially  of 
apoplexy.  The  patient  is  observed  to  be  more  or  less  inca- 
pable of  communicating  his  thoughts  and  feelings  by  spoken 
or  written  language,  the  words  appearing  to  be  arbitrary 
signs  totally  unconnected  with  ideas.  When  a  word  is 
pronounced  slowly  and  distinctly,  he  may  be  able  to  repeat 
it  once  or  twice,  seldom  oftener,  or  he  may  be  utiable  to 
articulate  at  all.  In  some  cases  the  power  of  language  is 
soon  and  completely  regained  ;  in  some,  a  slight  stammer- 
ing or  hesitancy  is  observed,  as  long  as  they  live  ;  while  in  a 
few  the  pov^er  never  spontaneously  returns,  the  person  being 
obliged  to  learn  to  read  and  write,  as  if  he  had  never  known 
how  before.  Mr.  Hood  relates  a  case  ^  in  which  the  patient, 
a  blacksmith,  lost  the  memory  of  all  words  except  yes  and  no, 
while  he  comprehended  distinctly  whatever  was  said  to  him. 
Though  able  to  understand  what  was  read  to  him  from  a 
book,  he   could    not  himself  read.     When  a  name  was  pro- 


'  Nouvelle  discussion  medico,  lejr-  23. 
*  Phrenological  Transactions,  255. 


PARTIAL    INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  175 

nonnced,  he  would  repeat  it  once  or  twice,  but  before  he 
could  do  it  a  third  time,  it  was  utterly  gone.  Within  a  few 
days  of  the  first  attack,  he  would  go  to  his  shop  and  attend 
to  his  workmen,  but  though  he  lived  three  years  afterwards, 
his  power  of  language  though  much  improved,  was  always 
greatly  impaired.  Another  case  has  been  related  ^  where  the 
patient  received  -an  injury  on  the  head  by  falling  from  a 
coach-box,  one  effect  of  which  was  the  loss  of  the  use  of  all 
language,  but  the  word  oui.  In  other  respects  his  mind  was 
entirely  sound.  In  some  cases,  this  loss  of  the  memory  of 
words  is  confined  to  common  and  proper  nouns.  This  hap- 
pened to  the  celebrated  naturalist  Brousonnet  who  entirely 
recovered  from  an  attack  of  apoplexy,  except  that  he  could 
never  after  utter  nor  write  the  names  of  persons  or  things, 
though  other  parts  of  speech  were  at  his  command  in  abun- 
dance. When  he  wished  to  designate  an  individual,  he 
described  his  figure,  his  qualities,  atul  occupation.  He  rec- 
ognized the  name  at  once,  when  pointed  out  to  him  in  a 
book,  though  it  never  would  occur  spontaneously  to  his 
memory.^  In  other  cases  of  this  kind,  the  patient  is  observed 
to  have  forgotten  every  thing  but  substantives.  One  is 
mentioned  whose  "  apprehension  of  the  use  and  importance 
of  substantives  was  keen  and  unimpaired,  but  he  could  not 
succeed  in  perceiving  the  modifying  influence  of  articles, 
adjectives,  or  adverbs.  Of  verbs  he  had  a  very  imperfect 
recollection."  ^  Esquirol  had  a  patient  who  recollected  no 
words  but  substantives,  and  but  few  of  them,  using  gen- 
erally abstract  terms,  corresponding  to  states  of  the  mind, 
the  ordinary  events  of  life,  etc.,  but  not  indicating  the  objects 
by  which  he  was  surrounded,  or  those  presented  to  his  senses. 
Thus,  when  asked ^low  he  was,  he  would  reply  —  "  malheur, 
injustice,  audacite,  courage,  piete,  mort."* 

§  ir52.    In   the  simplest   form    of   monomania,  the   under- 
standing appears  to  be,  and  probably  is,  tolerably  sound  on 


*  Jour,  de  la  Soc.  Phrenol.  no.  2,  art.  5. 
^  Cuvier,  Eloges  historicjues,  i.  341. 

*  W.  A.  F.  Browne.     Edin.  Phrenol.  Jour.  viii.  415.  *  Idem. 


176  MEDICAL.  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

• 

all  subjects  but  those  connected  with  the  hallucination. 
When,  however,  the  disorder  is  more  complicated,  involving 
a  longer  train  of  morbid  ideas,  we  have  the  high  authority  of 
Georget  for  believing,  that  though  the  patient  may  reason 
on  many  subjects  unconnected  with  the  particular  illusion 
on  which  the  insanity  turns,  the  understanding  is  more  ex- 
tensively deranged,  than  is  generally  suspeqted.  If  we  could 
follow  these  people  to  the  privacy  of  their  own  dwellings, 
narrowly  observe  their  intercourse  with  their  friends  and 
neighbors,  and  converse  vrith  them  on  the  subjects  nearest  to 
their  thoughts,  we  should  generally  detect  some  perversity  of 
feeling  or  action,  altogether  foreign  to  the  ordinary  character. 
Cases  illustrative  of  this  remark  will  frequently  occur  to  the 
reader  in  the  course  of  this  work;  and  it  is  not  necessary  to 
insist  on  the  importance  of  this  fact  in  estimating  the  degree 
of  criminal  responsibility  remaining  in  monomaniacs.  It  is 
a  fact  that  must  never  be  forgotten,  that  the  phenomena  of 
insanity  do  not  lie  on  the  surface,  any  more  than  those  of 
other  diseases,  but  oftentimes  can  be  discovered  only  by 
means  of  close  and  patient  examination. 


CHAPTEU    VII.- 


MORAL    MANIA. 


§  163,  Thus  far  mania  has  been  considered  as  affecting 
the  intellectual  faculties  only ;  but  a  more  serious  error  on 
this  subject  can  scarcely  be  committed,  than  that  of  limiting 
its  influence  to  them.  It  will  not  be  denied  that  the  propen- 
sities and  sentiments  are  also  integral  portions  of  our  mental 
constitution  ;  and  no  enlightened  physiologist  can  doubt  that 
their  manifestations  are  dependent  on  the  cerebral  organism. 
Here,  then,  we  have  the  only  essential  conditions  of  insanity, 
—  a  material  structure  connected  with  mental  manifesta- 
tions ;  and  until  it  is  satisfactorily  proved  that  this  structure 
enjoys  a  perfect  immunity  from  morbid  action,  we  are  bound 
to  believe  that  it  is  liable  to  disease,  and,  consequently,  that 
the  affective,  as  well  as  intellectual  faculties,  are  subject  to 
derangement.  In  fact,  it  has  always  been  observed,  that 
insanity  as  often  affects  the  moral,  as  it  does  the  intellectual 
perceptions.  In  many  cases  there  is  evinced  some  moral 
obliquity  quite  unnatural  to  the  individual,  a  loss  of  his  ordi- 
nary interests  in  the  relations  of  father,  son,  husband,  or 
brother,  long  before  a  single  word  escapes  from  his  lips, 
"sounding  to  folly."  Through  the  course  of  the  disease,  the 
moral  and  intellectual  impairments  \>voceed  pari  passu,  while 
the  return  of  the  aftections  to  their  natural  channels,  is  one 
of  the  strongest  indications  of  approaching  recovery.  Such 
being  the  fact,  it  ought  not  to  be  a  matter  of  surprise,  that  in 
some  cases  the  aberration  should  be  confined  to  the  moral 
impairment,  the  intellectual,  if  there  be  any,  being  too  slight 
to  be  easily  discerned. 

§  164.    The  doctrine  that  insanity  may  be  confined  appar- 


178  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ently  to  the  affective  powers,  has  been  stoutly  resisted  by 
lawyers,  by  whom,  daring  the  last  twenty  years,  it  has  been 
often  pronounced  to  be  without  any  foundation- in  true  meta- 
physics, and  dangerous  in  its  consequences.  They  contend 
'  that  insanity — such,  at  any  rate,  as  annuls  criminal  respon- 
sibility —  necessarily  implies  intellectual  disturbance,  and 
that  unless  this  be  established,  a  person  can  claim  no  exemp- 
tion from  the  ordinary  consequences  of  crime.  If  the  intel- 
lect be  sound,  they  say,  it  perceives  all  the  relations  of  the 
criminal  act;  there  is*  no  reasoning  right  from  wrong  prem- 
ises, nor  wrong  from  right  premises;  and  thus  the  individual 
acts  solely  in  accordance  with  his  own  good  will  and  pleas- 
ure. If  he  blindly  follows  the  guidance  of  his  passions,  un- 
heeding the  voice  of  conscience  or  common  sense,  we  are  not 
warranted  in  taking  his  case  out  of  the  category  of  ordinary 
crime.  In  fact,  every  alleged  case  of  moral  insanity  may  be 
paralleled  by  one  of  proper  moral  depravity  universally  recog- 
nized and  admitted  as  such.'^  By  those  who  reason  thns,  the 
admission  that  the  intellect  may,  possibly,  be  disturbed, 
though  the  fact  cannot  be  demonstrated,  is  deemed  to  be 
insufficient.  Because,  the  intellectual  disturbance  must  be 
manifested  in  an  inability  to  recognize  some  of  the  qualities 
of  crime,  and  therefore  so  long  as  these  are  all  correctly  dis- 
cerned, there  can  be  no  intellectual  disturbance,  —  none, 
certainly,  which  a  court  of  law  need  take  into  account. 

§  165.  A  formal  refutation  of  such  views  may  be  deemed 
superfluous  by  all  who  have  much  practical  acquaintance 
with  the  insane,  but  unfortunately,  we  are  obliged  to  address 
those  who,  without  such  knowledge,  undertake  to  lay  down 
opinions,  ex  cathedra,  on  the  effects  of  insanity  on  the  men- 
tal constitution.  If  we  choose  to  indulge  in  metaphysical 
subtleties,  we  may,  no  doubt,  arrive  at  one  of  two  conclu- 
sions, equally  false;  either  that  all  criminals  are  insane,  or 
that  every  insane  person,  unless  actually  raving,  is  responsi- 
ble for  any  criminal  act  he  may  commit.  But  common  sense 
and  professional  experience  teach  us  that  there  is  a  distinc- 
tion—  obvious  enough  for  all  practical  purposes  —  between 
the  depravity  which  belongs  to  the  characjj^icof  the  man,  and 


MORAL    MANIA.  179 

that  which  is  the  result  of  diseasCj  or  congenital  deficiency. 
Here  it  is  enough  to  say,  that  the  former  is  marked  by 
method,  object,  motive,  deliberation,  coolness,  and  consis- 
tency ;  the  latter  by  impulse,  agitation,  nervous  excitement, 
and  unnatural  conduct.  It  is  not  generally  understood  that 
in  a  large  proportion  of  the  insane  (leaving  out  of  view  the 
imbecile  and  demented),  we  observe  no  delusion,  nor  hallu- 
cination, nor,  it  may  be,  any  other  derangement  of  the  intel- 
lectual faculties.  ^Sorae  of  them  may  not  evince  all  their 
natural  strength  and  sagacity  of  mind,  but  their  discourse  is 
always  coherent,  correct,  and  pertinent,  exhibiting  nothing 
that,  in  itself,  can  be  regarded  as  indicative  of  disease.  Oth- 
ers may  show  a  degree  of  shrewdness,  promptitude,  and 
vigor,  scarcely  manifested  in  their  best  estate.  Now,  the 
insanity  of  these  people  is  not  questioned/^  They  are  re- 
garded as  unfit  to  be  at  large,  and  by  universal  consent  are 
confined  in  establishments  for  the  insane.  Their  disorder  is 
exhibited  not  in  intellectual  aberration,  but  in  morbid  exalta- 
tion or  depression  of  spirits,  so  that  they  are  ardent,  san- 
guine, aWd'  Tull  of  schemes  of  advancement,  or  sunk  in  the 
lowest  depths  of  despondency  and  revolving  thoughts  of  self- 
destruction  ;  in  unnatural  indulgence  of  appetite ;  in  moral 
perversions  which  render  them  quarrelsome,  vindictive,  sav- 
age, impatient  of  contradiction,  careless  of  appearances,  re- 
gardless of  domestic  proprieties,  and  indifferent  to  the  feel- 
ings of  others. 

§  166.  For  a  different  purpose,  it  has  been  said  that  the 
very  fact  of  a  person's  being  under  the  undivided  dominion  of 
the  affective  powers,  and  yielding  to  their  paramount  influ- 
ence, is,  of  itself,  sufficient  proof  of  intellectual  impairment. 
This  position  can  hardly  be  maintained,  without  ignoring  a 
matter  of  common  observation  —  that,  within  certain  limits, 
the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties  act  independently  of  each 
other.  Everybody  knows  that  the  practical  conclusions  of 
men,  their  views  of  the  future,  their  judgments  of  one 
another,  are  determined  very  often  more  by  the  state  of  their 
feelings  than  by  any  process  of  reflection,  —  those  feelings 
which  are  governed,  in  a  great  degree,  by  the  condition  of 


180  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

the  nervous  system.  The  starving  man  who  steals  the  means 
of  sustenance  is  the  same  person  who,  but  the  other  day, 
while  easy  and  comfortable,  would  have  recoiled  from  the 
imputation  of  such  an  act  with  indignation.  One  must  be 
happily  constituted,  who  has  not  sometimes  experienced  the 
utmost  hope  and  confidence  from  a  state  of  facts  which,  at 
another  time,  without  any  change  of  circumstances,  furnished 
only  materials  of  doubt  and  despondency.  In  these  cases,  it 
is  obvious  enough  that  there  is  no  change  in  the  intellect. 
It  is  the  appetite,  the  emotions,  the  passions  that  have 
changed,  and  so  far  as  the  intellect  is  concerned,  it  is  imma- 
terial whether  that  change  results  from  the  normal  or  the 
abnormal  movements  of  the  nervous  system. 

§  167.  But  whether  there  may  or  may  not  be  some  small 
degree  of  intellectual  disturbance  in  the  class  of  cases  referred 
to,  is  a  question  which,  practically,  is  of  trivial  importance. 
The  main  truth  will  scarcely  be  denied,  that  the  disturbance 
of  the  moral  or  affective  powers  is  obvious  and  extensive, 
while  that  of  the  "intellect  is  very  slight  at  the  most.  The 
essential  question  is,  not  whether  the  intellect  is  impaired,  but 
whether  the  affective  powers  are  so  deranged  as  to  overpower 
any  resistance  made  by  the  intellect.  It  is  a  matter  of  relative 
power,  and  hence  it  is  quite  immaterial  whether  the  result 
proceeds  from  impaired  intellect,  or  irresistible  activity  of  the 
affective  powers.  To  say,  in  reply,  that  all  crime  proceeds 
from  this  inordinate  force  of  the  passions  and  propensities, 
overpowering  the  conscience  and  judgment,  is  only  to  utter  a 
truism  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  real  question  at  issue,  namely, 
whether  this  predominance  of  the  moral  over  the  intellectual 
is,  or  is  not,  the  result  of  disease  ?  A  stronger  objection  con- 
sists in  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  sometimes  between 
ordinary  depravity  and  the  impulses  of  disease  —  a  difficulty 
we  are  not  disposed  to  ignore.  But  the  difficulty  of  drawing 
the  line  between  two  classes  of  phenomena  does  not  prove, 
certainly,  that  there  is  no  difference  between  them.  Nature 
makes  no  dividing  lines,  and  our  divisions  override  one 
another  at  numerous  points.  But  instead  of  rejecting  all 
classification,  we   recognize   the  difficulty,  and  endeavor  to 


MORAL   MANIA.  181 

obviate  it  by  larger  knowledge  and  deeper  insight.  Under  a 
mode  of  criminal  procedure,  which  would  permit  a  satisfac- 
tory observation  of  doubtful  cases,  we  might  not  avoid  all 
difficulty,  but  we  should  seldom  commit  a  gross  injustice. 
Objection  has  been  also  taken  to  the  name  given  to  this 
form  of  mental  disorder,  and  the  aid  of  ridicule  has  been 
invoked  to  add  new  odium  to  a  defence  already  viewed  with 
suspicion  and  distrust.  Among  those  even  who  admit  the 
thing,  are  many  who  regret  the  name.  There  seems,  how- 
ever, to  be  no  substantial  reason  for  this  objection.  The 
division  of  the  mental  faculties  into  moral  and  intellectual,  is 
very  old  and  very  well  founded,  and  it  seems  natural  and 
proper  that  the  same  names  should  be  applied  to  their  respec- 
tive disorders.  The  effect  of  association  might  have  been 
avoided  by  using  the  term  affective^  but  the  thing  itself  would 
remain,  and  there,  probably,  the  objection  really  lies. 

§  168.  To  moral  mania,  as  a  distinct  form  of  the  disease, 
the  attention  of  the  profession  was  first  directed  by  the  cele- 
brated Pinel,  in  the  beginning  of  the  present  century.  Par- 
ticipating in  the  common  belief,  he  found,  to  his  great  sur- 
prise, on  resuming  his  researches  at  the  Bicetre,  that  there 
were  many  maniacs  who  betrayed  no  lesion  whatever  of 
the  understanding,  but  were  under  the  dominion  of  instinc- 
tive and  abstract  fury,  as  if  the  affective  faculties  alone  had 
sustained  injury.  This  form  of  mental  disorder  he  desig- 
nated as  manie  sans  delire.  The  examples  which  he  gives 
being  chieHy  characterized  by  violent  anger  and  unbounded 
fury,  by  no  means  furnished  suitable  illustrations  of  the 
affection  now  styled  moral  insanity,  though  they  do  illus- 
trate a  particular  form  of  that  disorder.  This  defect,  how- 
ever, has  been  amply  supplied  by  the  researches  of  others, 
which  have  made  us  acquainted  with  a  great  number  and 
variety  of  cases,  in  which  the  affective  faculties,  either  singly 
or  collectively,  were  deranged,  independently  of  any  appre- 
ciable lesion  of  the  intellect.  The  reality  and  importance 
of  this  distinction  which  thus  establishes  two  classes  of 
mania,  is  now  generally  acknowledged  by  practical  observers, 
among  whom  it  is  sufficient  to  mention  Esquirol,  Georget, 

16 


182  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

Gall,  Marc,  Rush,  Reil,  Hoff  bauer,  Andrew  Combe,  Conolly, 
and  Prichard,  though  some  of  them  are  inclined  to  doubt 
whether  the  integrity  of  the  understanding  is  so  fully  pre- 
served in  moral  mania,  as  Pinel  believed.  Still,  its  apparent 
soundness,  and  the  difficulty,  at  least,  of  establishing  the 
existence  of  any  intellectual  derangement,  while  the  mgral 
powers  are  unequivocally  and  deeply  deranged,  render  it  no 
less  important  in  its  legal  relations,  than  if  the  understanding 
were  unequivocally  affected.  It  is  defined  by  Prichard,  who 
has  strongly  insisted  on  the  necessity  of  assigning  it  a  more 
distinct  and  conspicuous  place,  than  it  has  hitherto  received, 
as  "  consisting  in  a  morbid  perversion  of  the  natural  feelings, 
affections,  inclinations,  temper,  habits,  and  moral  dispositions, 
without  any  notable  lesion  of  the  intellect  or  knowing  and 
reasoning  faculties,  and  particularly  without  any  maniacal 
hallucination."  ^  It  will  be  convenient,  even  if  not  scientifi- 
cally precise,  to  consider  it  under  two  divisions,  according 
as  it  is  general  or  partial. 


SECTION  I. 

GENERAL   MORAL   MANIA. 

§  169.  One  form  of  this  condition  is  thus  vividly  de- 
scribed by  Prichard.  "  There  are  many  individuals  living  at 
large,  and  not  entirely  separated  from  society,  who  are  affect- 
ed in  a  certain  degree  by  this  modification  of  insanity.  They 
are  reputed  persons  of  singular,  wayward,  and  eccentric  char- 
acter. An  attentive  observer  may  often  recognize  something 
remarkable  in  their  manner  of  existence,  Avhich  leads  him  to 
entertain  doubts  of  their  entire  sanity,  and  circumstances  are 
sometimes  discovered  on  inquiry  which  assist  in  determining 
his  opinion.  In  many  instances  it  is  found  that  there  is  an 
hereditary  tendency  to  madness  in  the  family,  or  that  sev- 
eral relatives  of  the  person  affected  have  labored  under  dis- 

'  Cyclop.  Prac.  Med.  iii.  826. 


GENERAL   MORAL   MANIA.  183 

eases  of  the  brain.  The  individual  himself  is  discovered,  in 
a  former  period  of  life,  to  have  sustained  an  attack  of  mad- 
ness of  a  decided  character.  His  temper  and  dispositions 
are  found  on  inquiry  to  have  undergone  a  change;  to  be  not 
what  they  were  previously  to  a  certain  time  ;  he  has  become 
an  altered  man  ;  and  this  difference  has  perhaps  been  noted 
from  the  period  when  he  sustained  some  reverse  of  fortune 
which  deeply  affected  him,  or  since  the  loss  of  some  beloved 
relative.  In  other  instances,  the  alteration  in  his  character 
has  ensued  immediately  on  some  severe  shock  which  his 
bodily  constitution  has  undergone.  This  has  either  been  a 
disorder  affecting  the  head,  a  slight  attack  of  paralysis,  a 
fit  of  epilepsy,  or  some  fever  or  inflammatory  disorder,  which 
has  produced  a  perceptible  change  in  the  habitual  state  of  the 
constitution.  In  some  cases  the  alteration  in  temper  and 
habits  has  been  gradual  and  imperceptible,  and  it  seems  only 
to  have  consisted  in  an  exaltation  or  increase  of  peculiarities 
which  were  always  more  or  less  natural  or  habi'tual."  "  Indi- 
viduals laboring  under  this  disorder  are  capable  of  reasoning 
or  supporting  an  argument  on  any  subject  within  their  sphere 
of  knowledge  that  may  be  presented  to  them,  and  they  often 
display  great  ingenuity  in  giving  reasons  for  their  eccentric 
conduct,  and  in  accounting  for  and  justifying  the  state  of 
moral  feeling  under  which  they  appear  to  exist.  In  one 
sense,  indeed,  their  intellectual  faculties  may  be  termed 
unsound,  but  it  is  the  same  sense  in  which  persons  under  the 
influence  of  strong  passions  may  be  generally  said  to  have 
their  judgment  warped,  and  the  sane  or  healthy  exercise  of 
their  understandings  impeded.  They  think  and  act  under  the 
influence  of  strongly  excited  feelings,  and  a  person  sane  is 
under  such  circumstances  proverbially  liable  to  error  both  in 
judgment  and  conduct."  ^  It  was  this  class  of  persons,  un- 
doubtedly, that  suggested  the  following  description  in  a  work 
published  in  the  beginning  of  the  present  century.  "  Among 
the  varieties  of  maniacs  met  with  in  medical  practice,  there  is 


^  Op.  cit.  sup.  p.  826. 


184  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

one,  which,  though  by  no  means  rare,  has  been  little  noticed 
by  writers  on  this  subject:  I  refer  to  those  cases  in  which  the 
individuals  perform  most  of  the  common  duties  of  life  with 
propriety,  and  some  of  them,  indeed,  with  scrupulous  exact- 
ness, who  exhibit  no  strongly  marked  features  of  either  tem- 
perament, no  traits  of  superior  or  defective  mental  endowment, 
but  yet  take  violent  antipathies,  harbor  unjust  suspicions,  in- 
dulge strong  propensities,  affect  singularity  in  dress,  gait, 
and  phraseology;  are  proud,  conceited,  and  ostentatious; 
easily  excited  and  with  difficulty  appeased  ;  dead  to  sensi- 
bility, delicacy,  and  refinement;  obstinately  riveted  to  the 
most  absurd  opinions  ;  prone  to  controversy,  and  yet  inca- 
pable of  reasoning;  always  the  hero  of  their  own  tale,  using 
hyperbolic,  high-flown  language  to  express  the  most  simple 
ideas,  accompanied  by  unnatural  gesticulation,  inordinate 
action,  and  frequently  by  the  most  alarming  expression  of 
countenance.  On  some  occasions  they  suspect  sinister  inten- 
tions on  the  most  trivial  grounds;  on  others  are  a  prey  to  fear 
and  a  dread  from  the  most  ridiculous  and  imaginary  sources; 
now  embracing  every  opportunity  of  exhibiting  romantic 
courage  and  feats  of  hardihood,  then  indulg  ng  themselves  in 
all  manner  of  excesses.  Persons  of  this  description,  to  the 
casual  observer,  might  appear  actuated  by  a  bad  heart,  but 
the  experienced  physician  knows  it  is  the  head  which  is  defec- 
tive. They  seem  as  if  constantly  affected  by  a  greater  or  less 
degree  of  stimulation  from  intoxicating  liquors,  while  the 
expression  of  countenance  furnishes  an  infallible  proof  of 
mental  disease.  If  subjected  to  moral  restraint,  or  a  medical 
regimen,  they  yield  with  reluctance  to  the  means  proposed, 
and  generally  refuse  and  resist,  on  the  ground  that  such 
means  are  unnecessary  where  no  disease  exists;  and  when, 
by  the  system  adopted,  they  are  so  far  recovered,  as  to  be 
enabled  to  suppress  the  exhibition  of  the  former  peculiarities, 
and  are  again  fit  to  be  restored  to  society,  the  physician,  and 
those  friends  who  put  them  under  the  physician's  care,  are 
generally  ever  after  objects  of  enmity  and  frequently  of 
revenge."^ 

*  Cox,  J.  M.,  Practical  Observations  on  Insanity.    London,  1804. 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  185 

§  170,  Heinroth  and  Hoffbauer  both  recognize  a  form  of 
mental  alienation  consisting  exclusively  of  morbid  excitement 
of  the  passions  and  feelings.  "  It  i^  clear,"  says  the  latter, 
"that  mania  may  exist  uncomplicated  with  mental  delusion  ; 
it  is  in  fact  only  a  kind  of  moral  exaltation  {tollheit),  a  state 
in  which  the  reason  has  lost  its  empire  over  the  passions  and 
the  actions  by  which  they  are  manifested,  to  such  a  degree 
that  the  individual  can  neither  repress  the  former,  nor  abstain 
from  the  latter.  It  does  not  follow  that  he  may  not  be  in 
possession  of  his  senses  and  even  his  usual  intelligence,  since, 
in  order  to  resist  the  impulses  of  the  passions,  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient that  the  reason  should  impart  its  counsels  ;  we  must 
have  the  necessary  power  to  obey  them.  The  maniac  may 
judge  correctly  of  his  actions  without  being  in  a  condition  to 
repress  his  passions,  and  to  abstain  from  the  acts  of  violence 
to  which  they  impel  him."^  Subsequently  he  observes,  that 
when  mania  proceeds  from  inordinate  passions,  "its  more 
immediate  cause  lies  in  the  physical  temperament,  or  in  cer- 
tain moral  affections  wh'ich  induce  frequent  occasions  of  anger. 
In  every  other  respect,  the  maniac  may  be  master  of  his  pro- 
pensities and  the  actions  to  which  they  lead  ;  he  may  judge 
and  act  rationally.  He  is  irrational  only  in  his  paroxysms  of 
fury,  and  then  his  errors  of  judgment  are  rather  the  effect 
than  the  cause  of  his  furious  transports."  ^ 

§  171.  There  is  another  very  common  and  well-marked 
form  of  insanity,  the  manifestations  of  which  are  chiefly 
confined  to  the  moral  sentiments.  Its  characteristic  feature 
is  that  of  excitement  alternating  with  depression,  the  two 
conditions  varying  considerably,  in  different  cases,  in  point 
of  intensity,  and  also  —  as  well  as  the  intervening  interval  — 
in  point  of  duration.  The  general  traits  of  the  first-men- 
tioned condition,  are  an  unusual  flow  of  spirits,  great  self- 
confidence,  sanguine  anticipations  of  the  future,  restlessness 
both  of  body  and  mind,  and  untiring  loquacity.  Usually, 
these  traits  are  only  strong  enough  at  first  to  modify  the  ordi- 


'  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  122.  ^  Ibid.  §  126. 

16* 


186  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

nary  character  of  the  individual,  without  raising  the  slightest 
euspicion,  and  not  uncommonly  giving  the   impression   that 
the  person   has  been  indulging  too  freely  in  drink.     Sooner 
or  later,  they  become  more  strikingly  developed,  and  exert  an 
unmistakable  influence  upon  the  conduct  and  discourse.     He 
engages   in   enterprises,  moral,  social,  or  commercial,  either 
manifestly    beyond    his    means,   or,  in    one   way    or  another, 
inappropriate   to    his    condition.     Especially  is    he    bent  on 
speculation,  and   nothing  comes  amiss  capable  of  gratifying 
this  passion.     Whether  it  be  a  farm  or  a  ship,  a  mill  privilege 
or  a  city  lot,  a  parcel  of  trumpery  jewelry,  or  the  odds  and 
ends  of  a  twopenny  auction,  he  is  equally  ready  to  buy,  and 
equally  sanguine  of   getting   a    good    bargain.     He  is  con- 
stantly yielding  to  some  new  fancy,  and  ardently  prosecuting 
some  of  the  countless  schemes  that   swarm  in   his  teeming 
brain.     He  frequents  company  either  above  or  below  his  own 
grade,  while  perhaps  he  amazes  and   mortifies  his  friends,  by 
the   levity  of    his  manners,  if  not  the   laxity  of  his   morals. 
His  moveujents  are  abrupt,  rapid,  and  unseasonable.     He  is 
fond  of  taking  long  journeys,  and  horse  flesh  suffers  under  his 
hands.      He  sleeps  much  less   than    he  usually  does,  and  is 
fond  of  being  up  at  night,  roaming  about  the  house  or  neigh- 
borhood.     He  is  always  ready  with   plausible  reasons  for  his 
strangest  conduct,  sufficient  to  silence,  if  not  to  satisfy,  any 
troublesome  inquirer,  while  his  discourse  is  entirely  free  from 
delusion,   or   obvious    incoherence.     With    all    this   there   is 
generally  an  utter  disregard  of  the  feelings  of  others,  an  im- 
perious and   even  tyrannical  deportment  towards  those  who 
are  dept'iident  upon   him,  and  a  disposition  to  trample  upon 
all   domestic   conveniences    and    proprieties.      The    slightest 
.attempt  to   restrain    or  control    his    movements,  or   evt-n    to 
administer  advice,  is  met  by  the  fiercest   hostility,  and  any 
intimation   of  mental   infirmity   provokes   his    hottest  wrath. 
The   most  common   moral  trait  is  an   utter  disregard  of  ve- 
jacity.  (^\)  lie  seems  more  natural  and  easy  than  to  tell  the 
truth,  and  between  exaggeration,  false  coloring,  and  perverted 
facts* his  statements  are  totally  unworthy  of  credit^ 

^  172.    To  this  the  state  of  dej)ression  presents  a  complete 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  187 

contrast,  every  trait  here  mentioned  being  replaced  by  its 
opjjoriite.  Seldom  5?peaking  except  when  spoken  to,  and 
apparently  absorbed  in  his  own  gloomy  reflections,  he  is 
silent  and  quiet  in  the  midst  of  company,  and  as  if  over- 
wheltned  by  a  sense  of  inability,  he  reluctantly  engages  in 
any  occupation  beyond  the  most  ordinary  routine,  and  often 
is  scarcely  persuaded  to  perform  the  most  necessary  duties. 
All  nature  without  and  within  him  is  shrouded  in  gloom,  a 
terrible  evil  seems  to  be  impending  over  him,  the  future 
reveals  not  a  single  gleam  of  hope,  and  were  he  called  on  to 
lay  down  his  life,  he  would  hardly  hesitate  to  obey.  His 
conduct  during  the  excited  state  is  now  viewed  in  its  true 
light,  and  is  the  subject  of  bitter  reflections.  He  wonders 
that  he  should  have  done  such  things, and,  in  some  instances, 
begs  his  friends  to  keep  him  in  future  from  similar  exhibi- 
tions by  seasonable  measures  of  restraint.  With  the  mental 
dejection  there  is  often  some  bodily  ailment,  and  he  loses 
both  flesh  and  strength.  Either  this  or  a  total  paralysis  of 
the  will  may  keep  him  in  bed  much  of  the  time,  and  inca- 
pacitate him  for  the  slightest  effort. 

§  173.  In  point  of  duration  the  two  states  are  generally 
equal  as  compared  with  each  other  in  the  same  case,  though 
varying,  in  different  cases,  from  one  month  to  a  couple  of 
years.  In  point  of  severity,  too,  they  are  subject  to  the  same 
rule.  The  excitement  may  be  confined  to  an  unusual  flow 
of  spirits,  to  an  increase  of  self-confidence,  and  a  fondness 
of  self-magnification,  while  the  patient  attends  to  his  ordi- 
nary duties,  evincing  no  loss  of  his  usual  intelligence  and 
discretioti.  Or  it  may  be  manifested  by  boisterous  and  vio- 
lent conduct,  by  a  disposition  to  engage  in  foolish  enterprises, 
and  an  utter  abandoimient  of  all  regular  and  appropriate 
employment.  So,  too,  the  state  of  depression  may  vary  from 
what  passes  merely  for  low  spirits,  to  the  most  profound  and 
painful  melancholy  attended  with  the  keenest  distress  and 
disposing  to  suicidal  attempts. 

§  174.  The  interval  between  these  two  conditions,  when 
the  individual  appears  to  be  perfectly  rational  and  natural, 
also  presents  the  same  kind  of  uniformity,  in  the  same  case, 


188  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDEXCE    OF    INSANITY. 

and  the  same  kind  of  diversity  in  different  cases.  In  many, 
and  perhaps  the  majority  of  cases,  it  has  no  appreciable 
duration  as  a  distinct  condition,  ihe  periods  of  excitement 
and  depression  passing  into  each  other,  with  scarcely  an 
interval  between.  In  others  it  may  continue  as  It^ng,  or  even 
longer,  than  either  of  these  states,  although,  as  is  more  fre- 
quently the  case,  it  is  considerably  shorter.  Generally,  the 
lucid  interval  follows  the  excitetnent  and  precedes  the  de- 
pression, but  sometinies  the  excitement  passes  abruptly  into 
depression,  and  this  more  gradually  is  followed  by  the  lucid 
interval. 

§  175.  Another  feature  worthy  of  notice,  is  that  the  dura- 
tion of  these  several  states  occasionally  changes,  in  the  same 
individual.  In  one  case  that  came  under  my  observation,  they 
gradually  changed  within  four  or  five  years,  from,  one  month 
to  eight  or  ten.  Generally,  the  longer  the  duration  of  the 
excitement  and  depression,  the  less  prominent  and  distinct  is 
the  lucid  interval. 

§  176.  This  form  of  mental  disease,  when  the  periodicity 
is  once  fairly  established,  is  peculiarly  intractable  to  treat- 
ment, and  may  continue  for  years;  but  then  it  finally  as- 
sumes a  more  continuous  and  uniform  character,  until  its 
original  phasis  entirely  disappears.^ 

§  177.  The  contrast  often  presented  in  moral  mania  be- 
tween the  state  of  the  intellectual  and  that  of  the  moral 
faculties,  is  one  of  its  most  striking  features.  These  patients 
can  reason  logically  and  acutely  on  any  subject  within  their 
knowledge,  and  extol  the  beauties  of  virtue,  while  their  con- 
duct is  hlled  with  acts  of  folly,  and  at  war  with  every  princi- 
ple of  moral  propriety.  Their  moral  nature  seems  to  have 
undergone  an  entire  revolution.  The  sentiments  of  truth, 
honor,  honesty,  benevolence,  purity,  have  given  place  to  men- 


^  Since  the  above  was  written,  this  form  of  insanity  has  been  described 
by  Baillarufcr  under  the  name  of  Falle  a  duubte  jhrine,  and  by  Falret  under 
the  name  of  FuUe  circulalre.  I  am  not  aware  that  it  lias  been  noticed  by 
any  others,  though  it  is  perfectly  familiar  to  all  much  conversant  with  the 
insane  in  this  country. 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  189 

dacity,  dishonesty,  obscenity,  and  selfishness,  and  all  sense  of 
shame  and  self-controi  has  disappeared,  while  the  intellect 
has  lost  none  of  its  usual  power  to  argue,  convince,  please, 
and  charm.  I  once  asked  a  patient  who  was  constantly 
saying  or  doing  something  to  annoy  or  disturb  others,  while 
his  intellect  was  apparently  as  free  from  delusion  or  any 
other  impairment  as  ever,  whether,  in  committing  his  aggres- 
sive acts,  he  felt  constrained  by  an  irresistible  impulse,  con- 
trary to  his  convictions  of  right,  or  was  not  aware,  at  the 
moment,  that  he  was  doing  wrong.  His  reply  should  sink 
deep  into  the  hearts  of  those  who  legislate  for,  or  sit  in  judg- 
ment on  the  insane.  "  1  neither  acted  from  an  irresistible 
impulse,  nor  upon  the  belief  that  I  was  doing  right.  I  knew 
perfectly  well  T  was  doing  wrong,  and  I  might  have  refrained 
if  I  had  pleased.  I  did  thus  and  so,  because  I  loved  to  do  it. 
It  gave  me  an  indescribable  pleasure  to  do  wrong."  Yet  this 
man  when  well,  is  kind  and  benevolent,  and  in  his  whole 
walk  and  conversation  a  model  of  propriety. 

§  178.  In  nothing,  however,  is  the  intellectual  soundness 
more  strikingly  evinced  than  in  the  ingenuity  with  which 
these  persons  endeavor  to  explain  the  folly  and  absurdity  of 
their  acts,  and  reconcile  them  to  the  ordinary  rules  of  human 
action.  By  denying  entirely  some  alleged  circumstances  in 
a  particular  transaction,  adding  a  little  to  one  and  subtracting 
a  little  from  another,  and  giving  a  peculiar  coloring  to  the 
whole,  they  will  convince  the  unguarded  observer  that  there 
is  some  mistake  about  the  matter,  —  that  they  acted  pre- 
cisely as  any  one  else  would  under  similar  circumstances, 
and  that  they  are  the  victims  of  misrepresentation  and  un- 
kindness. 

§  179.  There  is,  unquestionably,  a  great  tendency  in  this 
afl'ection  to  pass  into  intellectual  mania,  which  we  have  seen 
is  no  less  strongly  characterized  by  moral  perversities  than 
by  delusions ;  and  Georget  actually  describes  it  as  belong- 
ing to  the  initiatory  stage  or  incubation  of  the  latter  dis- 
order. Without  stopping  to  discuss  the  correctness  of  this 
view,  the  fact  that  it  may  continue  for  an  indefinite  length  of 
time  and  become  the  object  of  judicial  investigation,  gives 


190  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

it  incalculable  importance  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view, 
and  entitles  it  to  a  prominent  pla(!ic  in  a  work  like  the 
present. 

§  180.  The'  form  of  mental  disorder  which  we  are  now 
considering,  has  been  so  little  noticed  by  writers  until  quite 
recently,  while  an  ample  knowledge  of  its  phenomena  is  es- 
sential to  the  correct  administration  of  justice,  that  no  further 
apology  is  needed  for  illustrating  it  with  several  examples 
collected  from  the  observations  of  others.  The  first  is  re- 
lated by  Pinel  as  belonging  to  his  mcuiie  sans  delire.  "  An 
only  son  of  a  weak  and  indulgent  mother  was  encouraged 
in  the  gratification  of  every  caprice  and  passion  of  which  an 
untutored  and  violent  temper  was  susceptible.  The  impetu- 
osity of  his  disposition  increased  with  his  years.  The 
money  with  which  he  was  lavishly  supplied  removed  every 
obstacle  to  the  indulgence  of  his  wild  desires.  Every  in- 
stance of  opposition  or  resistance  roused  him  to  acts  of  fury. 
Fie  assaulted  his  adversaries  with  the  audacity  of  a  savage ; 
sought  to  reign  by  force,  and  was  perpetually  embroiled  in 
disputes  and  quarrels.  If  a  dog,  a  horse,  or  any  other  animal 
olT'cnded  him,  he  instantly  put  it  to  death.  If  ever  he  went 
to  a  fete  or  any  other  public  meeting,  he  was  sure  to  excite 
such  tumults  and  quarrels  as  terminated  in  actual  pugilistic 
encounters,  and  he  generally  left  the  scene  with  a  bloody 
nose.  This  wayward  youth,  however,  when  unmoved  by 
passions,  possessed  a  perfectly  sound  judgment.  When  he 
became  of  age,  he  succeeded  to  the  possession  of  an  exten- 
sive domain.  He  proved  himself  fully  competent  -to  the 
management  of  his  estate,  as  well  as  to  the  discharge  of  his 
relative  duties,  and  he  even  distinguished  himself  by  acts  of 
beneficence  and  compassion.  Wounds,  law-suits,  and  pecun- 
iary comj)ensations  were  generally  the  consequences  of  his 
unhappy  propensity  to  quarrel.  But  an  act  of  notoriety  put 
an  end  to  his  career  of  violence.  Enraged  with  a  woman 
who  had  used  ofTrnsive  language  to  him,  he  precipitated  her 
into  a  well.  Prosecution  was  commenced  against  him ; 
and  on  the  deposition  of  a  great  many  witnesses  who  gave 
evidence  to  his  furious  deportment,  he  was  condemned   to 


GENERAL   MORAL  MANIA.  IDl 

perpetual  confinement  in  the  Bicetre."  ^  In  this  instance 
there  was  something  more  than  the  unrestrained  indulgence 
of  strong  passions,  though,  no  doubt,  the  passions  gf  this 
person  were  naturally  remarkably  strong  and  active ;  the 
understanding,  though  sound,  was  incapable  of  restraining 
their  impulses,  for  the  reason  that  they  were  excited  by 
disease,  and,  therefore,  beyond  its  control.  The  constant  ex- 
citement of  passions  already  too  much  developed  by  means 
of  a  vicious  education,  led  to  that  condition  of  mind  in  which 
the  healthy  balance  of  the  affective  and  intellectual  faculties 
is  destroyed,  —  in  other  words,  to  moral  mania.  A  case  of 
a  very  similar  character  to  this,  and  to  which  the  rank  of  the 
person  and  the  disastrous  results  of  the  aflfection,  have  given 
a  melancholy  preeminence  over  all  others  in  the  medico-legal 
history  of  the  disease,  is  that  of  Earl  Ferrers,  who  was  exe- 
cuted in  1760,  for  the  murder  of  his  steward.  It  differs 
from  the  above  in  exhibiting  a  more  advanced  stage  of  the 
disease,  and  in  more  distinctly  revealing  its  approximation  to 
intellectual  mania  by  the  unfounded  notions  which  the 
patient  had  imbibed.  Though  his  reasoning  powers  were 
sound  and  his  conversation  rational,  he  imagined  that  his 
relatives  had  formed  a  conspiracy  against  him  in  which  his 
victim  was  an  accomplice;  and  his  conduct  in  many  respects 
was  so  wild  and  strange,  as  to  excite  in  those  who  were  in 
the  habit  of  meeting  him,  a  suspicion,  and  even  conviction  of 
his  insanity.^ 

§  181.  The  following  case  which  came  under  the  obser- 
vation of  the  writer,  strikingly  exhibits  the  prominent  feat- 
ures of  moral  mania.  This  person,  while  yet  a  youth,  had 
several  paroxysms  of  mental  disorder,  which  were  accompa- 
nied by  such  a  spirit  of  violence  and  mischief,  as  to  require 
his  close  confinement  at  home.     He  got  married,  however, 


'  Sur  1' Alienation  Mentale,  156,  §  159. 

-  A  report  of  Earl  Ferrers'  trial  may  be  found  in  Hargrave's  State  Trials, 
and  it  is  noticed  at  considerable  length  in  Smollet's  Continuation  of  Hume's 
History  of  England.  Some  valuable  comments  on  this  case,  are  contained  in 
Combe's  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  204. 


192  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

went  into  the  back  settlements,  and,  by  means  of  his  industry 
and  energy,  he  accumulated  some  property,  while  he  was 
respected  for  his  many  virtues.  Every  two  or  three  years 
he  had  an  attack  of  his  mental  disorder,  when  he  neglected 
his  usual  employments,  launched  into  speculations  of  every 
kind,  and  projected  schemes  for  making  money.  He  talked 
loud  and  fast,  became  irritable  and  despotic,  impatient  of 
contradiction  and  easily  offended.  At  the  same  time,  he 
conceived  a  high  idea  of  his  religious  attainments,  and  fre- 
quented religious  meetings  where  he  was  distinguished  by 
the  fervor  of  his  exhortations  and  prayers.  Finally,  having 
squandered  the  most  of  his  property,  and  treated  his  wife 
quite  roiighly,  she  had  him  placed  in  an  hospital.  He  came 
in  breathing  out  threatenings  and  slaughter  against  all  who 
had  any  hand  in  the  measure,  while  he  explained,  with  great 
plausibility,  every  incident  which  had  been  represented  as 
indicative  of  insanity.  He  continued  to  be  wild  and  turbu- 
lent, and  was  a  perpetual  source  of  strife  and  trouble.  His 
principal  employment  was  to  make  mischief,  by  fomenting 
troubles  between  fellow-patients,  disaffecting  them  towards 
the  physicians  and  attendants,  and,  in  one  way  or  another, 
annoying  everybody  around  him.  He  set  at  nought  every 
rule  of  propriety,  while  incessantly  charging  others  with  mis- 
behavior and  representing  himself  as  an  object  of  persecution 
and  abuse.  From  cursing  and  swearing,  it  was  an  easy 
transition  to  praying;  and,  whether  entertaining  others  with 
coarse  and  vulgar  talk,  or  a  strain  of  religious  discourse 
calculated  to  deceive  the  very  elect,  he  seemed  to  be  equally 
pleased.  He  stole  whatever  he  could  lay  his  hands  upon, 
and  hoarded  all  kinds  of  worthless  things.  In  the  course  of 
four  or  five  months,  his  natural  character  began  to  return, 
and  in  two  or  three  more  he  went  home  quite  restored.  In 
about  two  years  he  was  again  attacked,  and  again  was 
placed  in  the  hospitak 

§  182.  The  following  case  from  Metzger  is  cited  by 
Hoffbauer,  who  observes  that  the  patient  labored  under  no 
delusion,  properly  speaking,  but  was  only  not  master  of  his 
actions. 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  193 

§  183.  A  Russian  colonel  came  to  Konigsberg  to  receive  an 
inheritance,  and  committed  there  so  many  acts  of  violence, 
that  he  was  summoned  before  the  tribunal  of  justice.  His 
conduct  before  the  magistrates  was  equally  unreasonable. 
He  had  become  so  much  an  object  of  dread  at  Konigsberg, 
that  nobody  would  execute  any  commission  for  him,  —  the 
.very  chimney-sweepers  required  a  guard  if  sent  to  sweep  his 
chimneys.  At  last,  after  several  complaints  made  against 
him,  he  was  arrested  because  he  had  threatened  to  stab  his 
landlord  with  a  pitchfork  for  demanding  his  rent,  and  pursued 
him  with  that  intent.  "In  going  into  the  prison,"  says 
Metziger,  '^  I  saw  an  old  man  with  white  hair,  of  a  respect- 
able appearance,  who  received  me  politely.  I  first  inquired 
concerning  his  health.  '  I  am  ill,  through  old  age,'  he  replied, 
'and  tormented  with  gout,  with  the  stone,  and  with  the 
scurvy,  evils  for  which  I  can  have  no  remedy.'  He  desired 
to  know  who  had  sent  me  to  see  him  ;  I  told  him  it  was  the 
tribunal.  '  I  ought  to  be  judged,'  he  replied,  '  by  a  French 
tribunal,'  and  he  pretended  that  I  should  find  proof  of  what 
he  said  in  a  writing  which  he  forced  me  to  take.  At  last 
I  informed  him  of  the  reason  of  his  arrest.  His  eyes  then 
sparkled,  and  he  said  in  French,  with  much  volubility,  that 

M.  M and   were  his    mortal   enemies  ;   that 

they  had  several  times  tried  to  ruin  him  ;  that  he  had  expe- 
rienced much  injustice  and  opposition  on  the  part  of  the 
tribunal ;  •and  that  they  had  disposed,  as  they  pleased,  of  his 
brother's  inheritance.  Being  asked  what  were  his  occupa- 
tions, he  replied,  'that  he  was,  as  every  honest  man  should 
be,  free  and  content,  even  in  prison  ;  that  he  amused  himself 
with  poetry,  and  copied  verses  relating  to  his  situation.'  "  ^ 

§  184.  The  following  cases  are  taken  from  Prlchard. 
"  I.  K.,  a  farmer,  several  of  whose  relatives  had  been  the 
subjects  of  mental  derangement,  was  a  man  of  sober  and 
domestic  habits,  and  frugal  and  steady  in  his  conduct,  until 
about  his  forty-fifth  year,  when  his  disposition  appeared  to 


»  Op.  cit.  fup.  §  126. 

17 


194  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

have  become  suddenly  changed  in  a  manner  which  excited 
the  surprise  of  his  friends  and  neighbors,  and  occasioned 
grief  and  vexation  in  his  family.  He  became  wild,  excitable, 
thoughtless,  full  of  schemes  and  absurd  projects.  He  would 
set  out  and  make  long  journeys  into  distant  parts  of  the 
country  to  purchase  cattle  and  farming-stock,  of  which  he 
had  no  means  of  disposing  ;  he  bought  a  number  of  carriages, 
hired  an  expensive  house  ready  furnished,  which  had  been 
inhabited  by  a  person  much  above  his  rank,  and  was  unsuit- 
able to  his  condition  ;  he  was  irascible  and  impetuous,  quar- 
relled with  his  neighbors,  and  committed  an  assault  upon 
the  clergyman  of  the  parish,  for  which  he  was  indicted  and 
bound  to  take  his  trial.  At  length  his  wife  became  con- 
vinced that  he  was  mad,  and  made  application  for  his  con- 
finement in  a  lunatic  asylum,  which  was  consequently 
effected.  The  medical  practitioners  who  examined  him  were 
convinced  of  his  insanity,  by  comparing  his  late  wild  habits 
and  unaccountable  conduct  with  the  former  tenor  of  his 
life,  taking  into  consideration  the  tendency  to  disease  which 
was  known  to  prevail  in  his  family.  The  change  in  his  char- 
acter alone  had  produced  a  full  conviction  of  his  madness  in 
his  friends  and  relatives.  When  questioned  as  to  the  motives 
which  induced  him  to  some  of  his  late  proceedings,  he  gave 
clear  and  distinct  replies,  and  assigned,  with  great  ingenuity, 
some  plausible  reason  for  almost  every  part  of  his  conduct." 

§  185.  "  Abraham  B.,  a  working  tradesman  of.  industri- 
ous and  sober  habits,  conducted  himself  with  propriety  until 
about  forty-six  years  of  age,  and  had  accumulated  a  con- 
siderable property  from  the  fruits  of  his  exertions.  About 
that  period  he  lost  his  wife,  and  after  her  death  became  more 
and  more  penurious.  At  length  he  denied  himself  the  comforts, 
and,  in  a  great  measure,  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  became 
half-starved  and  diseased  ;  his  body  was  emaciated  and  beset 
with  scaly  eruptions.  Mr.  S.,  a  gentleman  who  had  long 
known  him,  hearing  of  the  condition  into  which  he  had  sunk, 
sent  a  medical  practitioner  to  visit  him,  by  whose  advice  B. 
was  removed  from  a  miserable  dirty  lodging  to  a  lunatic 
asylum.     Mr.  S.,  who  was  present  on  the  occasion,  observed 


GENERAL   MORAL   MANIA.  195 

that   Abraham   B.,  previously  to    his  quitting    the    room    in 
which  he  had  immured  himself,  kept  his  eyes  fixed  on  an  old 
trunk  in  the  corner  of  the  apartment.     This  was  afterwards 
emptied  of  its  contents,  and  in  it  were  found,  in  the  midst  of 
various  articles,  dirty  bank-notes,  which  had  been  thrown  into 
it  apparently  at  different  times  to  the  value  of  more  than  a 
thousand  pounds.     Abraham  B.,  after  his  removal  to  an  asy- 
lum where  he  had  wholesome  food  and  exercise,  soon  began 
to  recover  from  his  bodily  infirmities,  and  at  length  became 
anxious  to  be  at  large.     The  writer  of  this  article  visited  him 
and  conversed  with  him  for  some  time,  in  order  to  ascertain 
his   mental  condition.     He  betrayed  no  sign  of  intellectual 
delusion,  nor  did  it  appear  that  any  thing  of  that  description 
had  ever  been  a  part  of  his  complaint.     His  replies  to  ques- 
tions  were  rational   accordinaf  to   the   extent  of  his  natural 
capacity.     He  was  determined  to  go  and  manage  his  prop- 
erty, and  get  a  wife  who  should  take  care  of  him.     In  a  few 
days  after  his  release  he  was  married  to  a  servant  belonging 
to  the  lunatic  asylum  where  he  had  been  confined.     His  new 
wife  found  after  some  months  that  it  was  impossible  to  endure 
the  strange  conduct  of  her  husband,  and  after  various  expedi- 
ents, brought  him  back  to  the  asylum,  with  a  certificate  from 
a  medical  man,  who  had  examined  him  and  declared  him  to 
be  insane.     He  still  remains  in  confinement,  and  his  derange- 
ment is  now  more  complete  than  formerly,  as  it  plainly  in- 
volves his  intellect."  ^ 

§  186.  These  are  no  uncommon  instances  of  that  con- 
dition of  mind  so  often  mistaken  for  any  thing  rather  than 
what  it  really  is  —  mental  derangement.  Its  true  nature 
was  here  recognized  by  intelligent  practitioners  who  looked 
beyond  the  circle  of  a  definition,  and  might  have  been  recog- 
nized, perhaps,  by  .others  of  narrower  views,  in  a  calm  inves- 
tigation for  therapeutical  purposes  ;  but,  amid  the  excitement 
produced  by  great  criminal  acts,  and  the  struggles  between 
knowledge  and  ignorance,  truth  and  prejudice,  that  spring  up 


1  Op.  cit.  sup.  831. 


196  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

in  judicial  investigations,  how  seldonn,  alas,  has  it  been  dis- 
cerned. The  following  cases  in  which  this  perversion  of  the 
moral  faculties  was  accompanied  in  its  latter  stages,  by  delu- 
sions, furnish  a  striking  illustration  of  this  form  of  dis- 
ease, as  well  as  its  intimate  connection  with  intellectual 
mania. 

§  187.  Col.  M.  was  a  man  of  superior  intellectual  powers, 
and  moved  in  the  higher  walks  of  society.  He  was  a  lawyer 
by  profession,  and  was  appointed  District  Attorney  in  one  of 
the  South-western  States  by  President  Jackson  whom  he  had 
previously  served  in  a  military  capacity.  Towards  the  me- 
ridian of  life,  his  conduct  became  so  disorderly  and  boister- 
ous, that  he  was  often  confined  in  jails,  or  hospitals  for  the 
insane.  On  one  of  these  occasions  he  cut  off  his  nose,  and 
subsequently  came  to  Boston  in  order  to  have  it  replaced  by 
'  Dr.  J.  Mason  Warren,  by  means  of  the  rhinoplastic  operation 
which  proved  quite  successful.  While  in  Boston  he  made 
the  acquaintance  of  Dr.  Bell  of  the  McLean  Asylum,  for  the 
purpose,  as  he  declared,  of  getting  his  aid  in  obtaining  redress 
for  the  wrongs  he  had  sustained  in  being  placed  under  guardi- 
anship and  confined  in  jails  and  hospitals,  his  object  being, 
not  to  retaliate,  but  to  protect  his  future  reputation.  The 
Dr.  has  kindly  furnished  such  particulars  of  his  case  as  came 
to  his  knowledge  from  various  sources.  "  I  inferred  that  he 
was  naturally  of  a  proud,  arrogant,  and  extravagant  spirit 
which  was  kept  in  check,  while  she  lived,  by  the  discretion 
of  his  wife.  He  was  sensual,  but  not  intemperate,  until  his 
nervous  system  had  become  excited.  His  peculiar  theory 
was,  that,  while  he  admitted  that  he  had  held  —  and,  towards 
the  last  of  my  interview,  avowed  that  he  then  held  —  certain 
fanciful  notions  which  we  might  term  delusions,  if  we  pleased, 
still  they  were  such  as  did  not  interfere  with  his  right  to 
entire  liberty  of  action.  '  For  instance,'  said  he,  '  I  feel  that  I 
am  cousin  to  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  to  Napoleon.  It 
seems  ridiculous.  I  can't  make  it  out  by  any  kind  of  proof. 
I  even  laugh  at  it.  But  still,  I  dwell  upon  it  as  a  reality.  It 
concerns  nobody  else.  It  has  in  it  no  dangerous  element. 
Why,  then,  should  I  be  interfered  with  for  harboring  a  delu- 


GENERAL  MORAL  MANIA.  197 

sion,  if  you  choose  to  call  it  so,  no  more  absurd  than  a  thou- 
sand religious  sects  feel  themselves  happy  in  resting  upon.' 
He  would  often  argue  thus :  '  I  protest  agaitist  being  called 
insane  on  account  of  my  ideas.  For  ray  actions  I  am  ac- 
countable. I  never  yet  claimed  —  I  never  will  claim  — 
immunity  as  an  irresponsible  being.  I  will  permit  no  one  to 
set  up  such  a  defence  for  me.  Try  me  by  the  laws  of  the 
land  and  the  strict  rules  of  evidence,  and  I  will  abide  by  the 
result,  as  a  good  citizen,  but  I  must  have  opportunity  to 
argue  my  own  cause,  and  examine  the  witnesses  brought 
against  me.' 

"  He  had  often  been  arrested  for  assault  and  battery,  but 
always  continued  to  beat  the  complainants,  by  his  familiarity 
with  legal  proceedings,  and  by  his  quick  perception  of  what- 
ever made  for  or  against  himself.  If,  in  his  best  estate,  he 
had  been  counsel  for  another  party,  he  could  not  have  man- 
aged the  case  better  than  he  did  his  own.  However  wild, 
extravagant,  and  boisterous,  at  hotels  and  such  places,  of 
which  he  was  the  terror,  as  soon  as  he  was  in  the  atmosphere 
of  a  court  of  justice,  he  became  calm,  dignified,  and  respect- 
ful, but  tenacious  to  the  last  degree.  For  example,  when 
Carried  before  the  police  judge  in  New  York,  on  a  warrant, 
the  printed  form  of  which  had  been  in  use  for  twenty  years, 
setting  forth  that  in  consequence  of  insanity  '  or  otherwise,' 
he  was  dangerous  to  be  at  large,  he,  at  once,  advocated  suc- 
cessfully his  constitutional  right  to  have  the  offence  set  forth 
specifically  and  precisely. 

"  He  had  most  carefully  considered  the  extent  of  his 
rights,  —  the  precise  amount  of  force  justifiable  in  ejecting  an 
unwelcome  guest,  or,  what  was  a  more  common  event,  in 
resisting  an  ejectment;  the  obligation  of  inn-holders  to  re- 
ceive applicants,  and  the  value  of  proving  the  first  blow  in 
defence  of  assaults.  On  one  occasion,  thinking  the  hack- 
men  and  cabmen  of  New  York  were  insolent  and  exacting  in 
regard  to  the  right  of  way,  he  armed  himself  with  a  heavy 
whip,  took  a  good  witness  by  his  side,  and  drove  through 
Broadway  in  a  strong  carriage,  running  against  every  char- 
ioteer who  failed   to    give    him  his  exact  half  of  the  road, 

17* 


198  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

This  of  course  produced  a  collision  of  tongues  as  well  as 
wheels.  His  peculiarly  sarcastic  language  tempted  a  touch 
of  the  whip  from  some  of  his  opponents,  and  upon  this,  our 
hero  turned  to  and  thrashed  them  within  an  inch  of  their 
lives.  They  appealed  to  the  courts,  but  his  witness  soon  and 
truly  proved  the  aggression  on  them. 

"  While  in  the  Pennsylvania  hospital  for  the  insane,  and 
again,  I  believe,  while  in  the  jail  in  Washington,  he  got  dis- 
charged by  means  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  which  he  was 
allowed  to  sue  out.  When  thus  brought  before  the  court,  he 
argued  his  case  upon  the  settled  legal  doctrine,  that  an  ability 
to  distinguish  right  from  wrong  is  the  sole  test  of  sanity.  Of 
course,  no  judge  did  or  could  hesitate  in  opinion,  that  a  gen- 
tleman who  was  able  to  make  an  elegant  and  an  astute  argu- 
ment on  the  nature,  origin,  and  protection  of  the  rights  of 
the  subject,  could,  by  any  means,  be  within  the  category  of 
individuals  intellectually  incapable  of  discriminating  between 
right  and  wrong.  In  fact,  processes  of  detention  as  a  luna- 
tic, held,  in  his  case,  only  until  he  could  get  before  some  tri- 
bunal. And  yet  when  thus  turned  loose  upon  society,  he 
was  a  passionate,  dangerous  lunatic.  When  hard  pushed  by 
evidence  of  extravagant  and  boisterous  conduct,*  he  wouUl 
attribute  the  fact  to  his  having  unfortunately  taken  a  little 
too  much  wine  (which  was  probably  true  to  some  extent), 
comprehending  perfectly  that  an  offence  of  that  kind  would 
be  foUov^ed  by  a  much  lighter  consequence  —  a  mere  fine,  in 
fact  —  than  seclusion  as  a  lunatic.  When  the  self-mutilation 
was  alluded  to,  he  would  most  frankly  attribute  it  to  his 
ignorance  of  physiological  laws,  and  allege  that  his  lost  organ 
being  covered  with  blotches  and  carbuncles,  he  cut  it  off, 
absurdly  supposing  that  nature  had  a  renewing  power,  as  in 
the  growth  of  the  hair. 

"  After  he  became  so  wild  in  his  conduct  in  Boston,  as 
to  be  a  universal  annoyance,  I  advised  his  friends  in  Mis- 
souri to  place  him  under  care  as  a  lunatic.  They  replied 
that  the  thing  was  impracticable;  that  no  institution  had 
been  found  able  to  hold  him,  and  they  would  not  arouse  his 
vindictive  feelings  by  any  further  trials  of  that  sort.     His 


GENERAL   MORAL   MANIA.  199 

intemperate  habits  increased,  and  his  delusions  became  more 
palpable,  yet  without  affecting  his  intellectual  power.  The 
idea  returned,  that  parts  of  his  face,  if  removed,  would  grow 
again,  and  he  cut  out  the  cicatrix  on  his  forehead  whence  the 
nasal  flap  had  been  taken.  Fortunately,  death  stepped  in 
at  this  point,  and  removed  a  man  whose  fate  was  so  melan- 
choly, for  under  all  the  ravages  of  mental  disease,  there  Vv^ere 
traces  of  noble  sentiments  and  lofty  aspirations." 

§  188.    There   is   another  form   of    moral    insanity  deeply 
interesting  in  its  medico-legal  relations,  that  has  been  almost 
entirely  overlooked.     It  is  a  fact  well-established  in  this  coun- 
try at  least,  that  masturbation,  or  self-pollution  is  a  prolific 
cause  of  mental  derangement  in  young  subjects.     It  deserves 
our  special  attention  for  the  reason,  that,  although  the  intel- 
lect finally  suffere  deeply  and  rapidly,  yet  in   its   initiatory 
stage,  the  moral  and  affective  powers  may  be  seriously  per- 
verted, while  the  conduct  and  conversation  of  the  individual 
may   be   outwardly   marked   by   his  usual  propriety.     Long 
before  any  intellectual  aberration  is  observed,  and  while  the 
patient  is  merely  moody  and  reserved,  his  mind  may  be  tor- 
tured by  fears  and  suspicions  that  mar  his  peace  and  some- 
times lead  him   to  acts  of  violence.     Dr.   Bell,  the  accom- 
plished  physician  of  the    McLean    Asylum,    Massachusetts, 
observes  that  he  knew  "  a  pious,  intelligent  student,  pursuing 
his  daily   avocations  to   the    satisfaction  of  his  friends  and 
instructors,  who  nightly  slept  with  a  weapon  under  his  pillow 
to  protect  himself  from  an  attack  from  one  whom  he  had 
scarcely  seen,  and  to  whom  he  had  never  spoken  ;  and  when 
convinced  of  his  delusion  by  proofs  so  overpowering  that  his 
mind  was  obliged  to  acknowledge  its  assent,  he  merely  trans- 
ferred his  suspicions  to  another  equally  innocent  individual." 
Had  this  young  man  met  the  object  of  his  suspicions  and 
shot  him  dead,  how  few  could  have  been  brought  to  believe 
that  he  acted  under  the  influence   of  insanity,  and  was  con- 
sequently irresponsible  !     How  feeble  would   have   been  any 
evidence  of  his  insanity  but  such  as  had  reference  ex]>ressly 
to  the  particular  form  under  which  he  was  laboring!     Such  a 
case  as  this  should  make  a  strong  impression  on  the  mind  of 


200  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  medical  jurist.  When  an  act  of  violence  is  committed 
by  a-  young  subject  without  any  apparent  motive,  and  with- 
out any  obvious  signs  of  insanity,  it  should  always  be  ascer- 
tained, if  possible,  whether  he  has  been  addicted  to  mastur- 
bation, and  whether  he  has  shown  any  of  those  changes  of 
temper  and  habit  which  generally  accompany  the  incipient 
stage  of  this  form  of  mental  derangement.  If  it  appear  that 
he  has  practised  this  vice,  and  especially  if  he  have  also  man- 
ifested its  usual  moral  effects,  then  is  there  strong  ground  for 
believing  that  his  mind  was  possessed  by  a  delusion  which 
further  inquiry  may  bring  to  light.  This  form  of  disease  is 
not  yet,  perhaps,  sufficiently  understood  to  warrant  us  in 
furnishing  an  exact  detail  of  its  phenomena.  Reference  must 
be  had  to  the  opinions  of  those  who  have  had  opportunities 
of  observing  it,  and  to  the  few  valuable  contributions  that 
have  been  made  to  the  subject.^ 

•  §  189.  A  very  common  feature  of  moral  mania,  as  has 
been  already  stated,  is  a  deep  perversion  of  the  social  affec- 
tions, whereby  the  feelings  of  kindness  and  attachment  that 
flow  from  the  relations  of  father,  husband,  and  child,  are 
replaced  by  a  perpetual  inclination  to  tease,  worry,  and  em- 
bitter the  existence  of  others.  The  ordinary  scene  of  its 
manifestations  is  the  patient's  own  domestic  circle,  the  peace 
and  happiness  of  which  are  effectually  destroyed  by  the  out- 
breakings  of  his  ungovernable  temper,  and  even  by  acts  of 
brutal  ferocity.  Frederic  William  of  Prussia,  father  of  Fred- 
eric the  Great,  undoubtedly  labored  under  this  form  of  moral 
mania ;  and  it  furnishes  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  his 
brutal  treatment  of  his  son  and  his  utter  disregard  of  the 
feelings  or  comfort  of  any  other  member  of  his  family. 
About  a  dozen  years  before  his  death,  his  health  gave  way 
under  his   constant  debauches  in   drunkenness,  he    became 


^  An  Hour's  Conference  wltli  Fathers  and  Sons  in  relation  to  a  common 
and  fatal  Indulgence  of  Youth.  By  L.  V.  Bell,  M.  D.,  Superintendent  of  the 
McLean  Asylum,  1840.  Hints  to  the  Young,  in  relation  to  Health  of  Body 
and  Mind.  By  S.  B.  Woodward,  M.  D.,  Superintendent  of  the  Mass.  Lun. 
Hospital.     See  also  Dr.  Bell's  last  Report  (1843),  pp.  39,  40. 


GENERAL   MORAL   MANIA.  201 

hypochondriacal,  and  redoubled  his  usual  religious  austeri- 
ties. He  forbade  his  family  to  talk  of  any  subject  but  relig- 
ion, read  them  daily  sermons,  and  compelled  them  to  sing, 
punishing  with  the  utmost  severity  any  inattention  to  these 
exercises.  The  prince  and  his  eldest  sister  soon  began  to 
attract  a  disproportionate  share  of  his  hostility.  He  obliged 
them  to  eat  and  drink  unwholesome  or  nauseous  articles, 
and  would  even  spit  in  their  dishes,  addressing  them  only  in 
the  language  of  invective,  and  at  times  endeavoring  to  strike 
them  with  his  crutch.  About  this  time  he  attempted  to 
strangle  himself,  and  would  have  accomplished  his  design, 
had  not  the  queen  come  to  his  assistance.  His  brutality 
towards  the  prince  at  last  arrived  to  such  a  pitch,  that  he, 
one  morning,  seized  him  by  the  collar  as  he  entered  his  bed- 
chamber, and  began  beating  him  with  a  cane  in  the  crudest 
manner,  till  obliged  to  desist  from  ^:)ure  exhaustion.  On 
another  occasion,  shortly  after,  he  seized  his  son  by  the  hair 
and  threw  him  on  the  ground,  beating  him  till  he  was  tired, 
when  he  dragged  him  to  a  window  apparently  for  the  pur- 
pose of  throwing  him  out.  A  servant,  hearing  the  cries  of 
the  prince,  came  to  his  assistance,  and  delivered  him  from  his 
hands.  Not  satisfied  with  treating  him  in  this  barbarous 
manner,  he  endeavored,  though  unsuccessfully,  by  a  similar 
course  of  conduct,  to  make  him  sign  an  act  renouncing  his 
claim  to  the  succession  of  the  Prussian  throne,  in  favor  of 
his  brother.  To  obtain  this  end,  though  in  a  different  man- 
ner, he  connived  at  the  prince's  attempts  to  escape  from  his 
tyranny,  in  order  that  he  might  procure  from  a  court-martial 
a  sentence  of  death,  and  this  even  he  was  anxious  to  antici- 
pate, by  endeavoring,  first  to  strangle  him,  and  afterwards  to 
run  him  through  the  body  with  his  sword.  Being  diverted, 
much  against  his  will,  by  the  interposition  of  the  emperor, 
from  carrying  the  sentence  of  death  into  execution,  he  kept 
him  in  confinement,  and  turned  all  his  thoughts  towards 
converting  him  to  Christianity.  At  this  time,  we  first  find 
mention  of  any  delusion  connected  with  his  son,  though  it 
probably  existed  before.  In  his  correspondence  with  the 
chaplain  to  whom  he  had  intrusted  the  charge  of  converting 


202  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

the  prince,  be  speaks  of  him  as  one  who  had  committed 
many  and  heinous  sins  against  God  and  the  king,  as  having 
a  hardened  heart  and  being  in  the  fangs  of  satan.  Even 
after  he  became  satisfied  with  the  repentance  of  the  prince, 
he  showed  no  disposition  to  ^elax  the  severities  of  his  con- 
finement. He  was  kept  in  a  miserable  room,  deprived  of 
all  the  comforts  and  many  of  the  necessaries  of  life,  denied 
the  use  of  pens,  ink,  and  paper,  and  allowed  scarcely  food 
enough  to  prevent  starvation.  His  treatment  of  the  princess 
was  no  less  barbarous.  On  the  occasion  of  her  brother's 
attempted  escape,  of  which  he  thought  her  cognizant,  he 
knocked  her  down,  and  trampled  her  under  foot.  She  was 
also  confined,  and  every  effort  used  to  make  her  situation 
thoroughly  wretched,  —  and  though,  after  a  few  years,  he 
relaxed  his  persecution  of  his  children,  the  general  tenor  of 
his  conduct  towards  his  family  and  others,  evinced  little  im- 
provement in  his  disorder,  till  the  day  of  his  death.^ 

§  190.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  affection  above 
described,  is  far  more  common  in  the  ordinary  walks  of 
society,  than  is  generally  imagined.  It  is  so  imperfectly 
understood,  however,  that  those  singular  freaks  of  conduct 
and  whimsical  notions  which  would  unquestionably  subject 
a  person  to  the  imputation  of  insanity,  were  there  the  slight- 
est aberration  of  reason,  are  set  down  to  eccentricity  of  tem- 
per, or  inherently  vicious  dispositions.  The  suspicion  that 
they  spring  from  insanity,  is  immediately  dispelled  by  calling 
to  mind  the  general  correctness  of  his  views,  and  the  steadi- 
ness and  sagacity  with  which  he  pursues  his  daily  avoca- 
tions. And  so  intimately  connected  are  the  ideas  of  insanity 
and  delusion  in  the  common  mind,  that  it  requires  no  little 
courage  and  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  practitioner  who 
ventures,  in  a  given  case,  to  declare  the  existence  of  the 
former,  independently  of  the  latter.     The  consequences   of 


'  Lord  Dover's  Life  of  Frederic  IL  King  of  Prussia,  a'oI.  1,  B.  1,  chap. 
2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7.  The  narrative  of  the  jii'ineess  in  her  Memoirs  of  the  Mar- 
gravine of  Bareith  conveys  a  far  stronger  impression  of  the  king's  insanity 
than  the  above  selected  incidents. 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA.  203 

these  erroneous  views  are  often  strikingly  and  painfully 
exhibited,  when  a  person  thus  affected  becomes  the  object  of 
a  legal  procedure.  While  he  may  be  described  by  one,  as 
acute  and  methodical  in  his  business,  and  rational  in  his 
discourse,  and  believed  to  be  perfectly  sane ;  another  will 
testify  to  the  strangest  freaks  that  ever  a  madman  played, 
and  thence  deduce  the  conviction  of  his  insanity  ;  while  one 
represents  him  as  social  and  kindly  in  his  disposition,  ready 
to  assist  and  oblige,  and  to  accommodate  himself  to  the 
varying  humors  of  those  about  him,  it  will  be  testified  by 
another,  that  in  his  domestic  relations,  his  former  cheerful- 
ness has  given  way  to  gloom  and  moroseness,  that  equa- 
nimity of  temper  has  been  replaced  by  frequent  gusts  of  pas- 
sion, and  that  the  warm  affections,  which  spring  from  the 
relations  of  parent  and  child,  husband  and  wife,  have  been 
transformed  into  indifference  or  hate.  These  are  the  cases 
that  confound  the  wise  and  defy  the  scrutiny  of  the  skilful, 
while  they  tempt  the  superficial  and  conceited  to  betray  their 
ignorance,  under  the  delusion  of  superior  penetration  ;  which 
tarnish  many  a  professional  reputation,  and  expose  even  the 
pretensions  of  true  science  to  popular  mockery  and  derision.^ 


SECTION  11. 

PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA. 

§  191.  In  this  form  of  insanity,  the  derangement  is  con- 
fined to  one  or  a  few  of  the  affective  faculties,  the  rest  of  the 
moral  and  intellectual  constitution  preserving  its  ordinary 
integrity.  An  exaltation  of  the  vital  forces  in  any  part  of 
the  cerebral  organism,  must  necessarily  be  followed  by  in- 
creased activity  and  energy  in  the  manifestations  of  the  fac- 


^  Many  striking  cases  of  moral  mania  miglit  have  been  related  •vvhicli  have 
come  under  the  author's  own  observation,  but  as  this  could  not  be  done 
without  giving  pain,  probably,  to  the  patients  themselves  or  their  friends,  it 
was  deemed  advisable  to  draw  almost  entirely  from  foreign  sources. 


204  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

ulty  connected  with  it,  and  which  may  even  be  carried  to 
such  a  pitch  as  to  be  beyond  the  control  of  any  other  power, 
like  the  working  of  a  blind,  instinctive  impulse.  Accord- 
ingly, we  see  the  faculty  thus  affected,  prompting  the  indi- 
vidual to  action  by  a  kind  of  instinctive  irresistibility,  and 
while  he  retains  the  most  perfect  consciousness  of  the  im- 
propriety and  even  enormity  of  his  conduct,  he  deliberately 
and  perseveringly  pursues  it.  With  no  extraordinary  tempta- 
tions to  sin,  but  on  the  contrary,  with  every  inducement  to 
refrain  from  it,  and  apparently  in  the  full  possession  of  his 
reason,  he  commits  a  crime  whose  motives  are  equally  inex- 
plicable to  himself  and  to  others.  The  ends  of  justice  re- 
quire that  this  class  of  cases  should  be  viewed  in  their  true 
light ;  and  while  it  is  not  denied  that  their  similarity  to  othet 
cases  in  which  mental  unsoundness  is  never  supposed  to 
have  existed,  renders  such  a  view  difficult,  yet  this  very  diffi- 
culty is  a  fresh  reason  for  extending  our  inquiries  and  increas- 
ing our  information.  In  the  account  now  to  be  given  of  par- 
tial moral  mania,  those  forms  of  it  only  will  be  noticed  which 
have  the  most  important  legal  relations. 

§  192.  Instances  of  an  irresistible  propensity  to  steal,  un- 
accompanied by  any  intellectual  alienation,  are  related  on 
good  authority,  and  are  by  no  means  rare.  "  There  are 
persons,"  says  Dr.  Rush,  "  who  are  moral  to  the  highest 
degree  as  to  certain  duties,  but  who,  nevertheless,  live  under 
the  influence  of  some  one  vice.  In  one  instance,  a  woman 
was  exemplary  in  her  obedience  to  every  command  of  the 
moral  law,  except  one,  —  she  could  not  refrain  from  stealing. 
What  made  thi,s  vice  more  remarkable  was,  that  she  was  in 
easy  circumstances,  and  not  addicted  to  extravagance  in 
any  thing.  Such  was  the  propensity  to  this  vice,  that  when 
she  could  lay  her  hands  on  nothing  more  valuable,  she  would 
often  at  the  table  of  a  friend,  fill  her  pockets  secretly  with 
bread.  She  both  confessed  and  lamented  her  crime."  ^  I 
knew  a  very  worthy  clergyman  who,  towards  the  latter  part 
of  his  life,  became  addicted  to  stealing  articles  of  trivial  value, 

'  Medical  Inquiries  and  Observations,  1. 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  205 

such  as  the  samples  of  corn,  beans,  etc.,  which  the  village 
shopkeeper  exposed  in  his  window.  He  took  them  home  and 
put  them  in  his  garret,  but  never  appropriated  them  to  any 
purpose.  Cases  like  this  are  so  common  that  they  must 
have  come  within  the  personal  knowledge  of  every  reader 
who  has  seen  much  of  the  world,  so  that  it  will  be  unneces- 
sary to  mention  them  more  particularly.^  One  of  them  which 
caused  much  discussion  at  the  time  (April,  1853),  drew  the 
following  remarks  from  the  London  Times  :  "  It  is  an  in- 
stance of  that  not  very  uncommon  monomania  which  leads 
persons  otherwise  estimable  and  well-conducted,  to  pilfer 
articles  of  a  trifling  value,  in  obedience  to  the  impulses  of  a 
diseased  imagination.  The  fact  is  notorious,  that  many  per- 
sons of  high  rank  and  ample  means  have  been  aflected  with 
this  strange  disorder.  Every  one  who  is  acquainted  with 
London  society  could  at  once  furnish  a  dozen  names  of  ladies 
who  have  been  notorious  for  abstracting  articles  of  trifling 
value  from  the  shops  where  they  habitually  dealt.  Their 
modus  operandi  was  so  well  known,  that  on  their  return  from 
their  drives,  their  relatives  took  care  to  ascertain  the  nature 
of  their  paltry  peculations,  inquired  from  the  coachman  the 
houses  at  which  he  had  been  ordered  to  stop;  and,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  reimbursed  the  tradesmen  to  the  full  value  of 
the  pilfered  goods.  In  other  cases,  a  hint  was  given  to  the 
various  shopkeepers  at  whose  houses  those  monomaniacs 
made  their  purchases,  and  they  were  simply  forewarned  to 
notice  what  was  taken  away,  and  to  furnish  the  bill,  which 
was  paid  as  soon  as  furnished  —  and,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
by  the  pilferer  herself,  without  any  feeling  of  shame  or  emo- 
tion of  any  kind."  It  would  be  difficult  to  prove  directly, 
that  this  propensity,  continuing,  perhaps,  during  a  whole 
life,  and  in  a  state  of  apparently  perfect  health,  is,  notwith- 
standing, a  consequence  of  diseased  or  abnormal  action  in 
the  brain,  but  the  presumptive  evidence  in  favor  of  this 
explanation  is   certainly   strong.     First,  it  is  very  often  ob- 

*  In   Gall's  large  work,  On  the  Functions  of  the  Brain,  Iv.  131,  Boston 
edition,  the  reader  will  find  a  considerable  number  of  these  cases  related. 

18 


206  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

served  in  abnormal  conformations  of  the  head,  and  accom- 
panied by  an  imbecile  condition  of  the  understanding.  Gall 
and  Spnrzheim  saw  in  the  prison  of  Berne  a  boy  twelve 
years  old,  who  could  never  refrain  from  stealing.  He  is 
described  as  "  ill-organized  and  rickety."  At  Haina  they 
were  shown  an  obstinate  robber  whom  no  corporal  punish- 
ment could  correct.  He  appeared  about  sixteen  years  of 
age,  though  he  was  in  fact  twenty-six ;  his  head  was  round, 
and  about  the  size  of  a  child's  one  year  old.  He  was  also 
deaf  and  dumb,  a  common  accompaniment  of  mental  imbe- 
cility. An  instructive  case  has  been  lately  recorded,  in  which 
this  propensity  seemed  to  be  the  result  of  a  rickety  and 
scrofulous  constitution.!  Secondly,  this  propensity  to  steal 
is  not  unfrequently  observed  in  undoubted  mania.  Pinel 
says  it  is  a  matter  of  common  observation,  that  some  mani- 
acs who,  in  their  lucid  intervals,  are  justly  considered  models 
of  probity,  cannot  refrain  from  stealing  and  cheating  during 
the  paroxysm.^  Gall  mentions  the  case  of  two  citizens  of 
Vienna,  who,  on  becoming  insane,  were  distinguished  in  the 
hospital  for  an  extraordinary  propensity  to  steal,  though 
previously  they  had  lived  irreproachable  lives.  They  wan- 
dered over  the  house  from  morning  till  night,  picking  up 
whatever  they  could  lay  their  hands  upon,  —  straw,  rags, 
clothes,  wood,  etc.,  which  they  carefully  concealed  in  their 
room.^  A  propensity  to  theft  is  recognized  by  Prichard,  as 
being  often  a  feature  of  moral  mania,  and,  sometimes,  the 
leading,  if  not  the  sole  character  of  the  disease,  and  he  men- 
tions a  lunatic  who  would  never  eat  his  food,  unless  he  had 
previously  stolen  it,  and  accordingly  his  keeper  was  obliged 
to  put  it  into  some  corner  within  his  reach,  in  order  that  he 
might  discover  and  take  it  furtively."^  Thirdly,  it  has  been 
known  to  follow  diseases  or  injuries  of  the  brain,  and  there- 
fore to  be  dependent  on  morbid  action.  Acrel  mentions  the 
case  of  a  young  man,  who  after  receiving  a  severe  wound 
on  the  temple,  for  which  he  was  trepanned,  manifested  an 


^  Phrenological  Journal,  x.  459.  ^  Op.  cit.  sup.  §  132. 

3  Ibid.  iv.  131.  *  Ibid.  829. 


PARTIAL  MORAL   MANIA.  207 

invincible  propensity  to  steal,  which  was  quite  contrary  to 
his  ordinary  disposition.  After  committing  several  larcenies, 
he  was  imprisoned,  and  would  have  been  punished  accord- 
ing to  law,  had  not  Acrel  declared  him  insane,  and  attributed 
his  unfortunate  propensity  to  a  disorder  of  the  brain.  In  the 
Journal  de  Paris,  March  29th,  1816,  appeared  the  following 
paragraph  :  "  An  ex-commissary  of  police  at  Toulouse,  Beau- 
Conseil,  has  just  been  condemned  to  eight  years'  confinement 
and  hard  labor,  and  to  the  pillory,  for  having,  while  in  office, 
stolen  some  pieces  of  plate  from  an  inn.  The  accused  per- 
sisted to  the  last  in  an  odd  kind  of  defence  ;  he  did  not  deny 
the  crime,  but  attributed  it  to  mental  derangement  produced 
by  wounds  he  had  received  at  Marseilles  in  1815."  i  The 
late  Dr.  Smith,  of  New  Haven,  Connecticut,  once  observed 
a  similar  effect  consecutive  to  an  attack  of  typhoid  fever. 
"  One  patient  in  particular,  who  had  been  extremely  sick 
with  this  disease,  after  his  recovery,  had  a  strong  propensity 
to  steal,  and  did  in  effect  take  some  articles  of  clothing 
from  a  young  man  to  whom  he  was  under  great  obligations 
for  the  care  which  he  had  taken  of  him  during  his  sickness. 
He  at  length  stole  a  horse  and  some  money,  was  detected 
and  punished.  I  took  some  pains  to  inquire  into  the  young 
man's  former  character,  and  found  it  good,  and  that  his 
family  were  respectable."  ^  Fourthly,  this  propensity  to  steal 
is  sometimes  followed  by  general  mania.  Fodere  relates  the 
case  of  a  female  servant  in  his  own  family,  who  could  not 
help  stealing  secretly  from  himself  and  others,  articles,  even 
of  a  trifling  value;  though  she  was  intelligent,  modest,  and 
religious,  and  was  all  the  while  conscious  of  and  admitted 
the  turpitude  of  her  actions.  He  placed  her  in  a  hospital, 
considering  her  insane,  and  after  apparent  restoration  and  a 
long  trial,  he  again  took  her  into  his  service.  Gradually,  in 
spite  of  herself,  the  instinct  again  mastered  her,  and  in  the 
midst  of  an  incessant  struggle  between  her  vicious  propen- 
sity on  the  one  hand  and  a  conscientious  horror  of  her  con- 


*  Quoted  by  Gall  in  Ibid.  141. 

'  Medical  and  Surgical  Memoirs,  62. 


208  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

dition  on  the  other,  she  was  suddenly  attacked  with  mania, 
and  died  in  one  of  its  paroxysms.^  Fifthlyj  it  seems  some- 
times to  be  the  result  of  a  sudden  and  temporary  confusion 
of  mind,  like  that  of  mania.  The  following  was  related  by 
Dr.  Boys  de  Loury,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Society  of  Medicine 
of  Paris,  in  July,  1851.  "  A  female  servant,  gaining  honestly 
her  livelihood,  was  detained  at  St.  Lazare,  on  the  charge  of 
stealing  a  small  quantity  of  bacon.  The  money  had  been 
given  her  to  purchase  the  article.  She  recollected  having 
turned  from  the  street  leading  to  the  market,  but  could  not 
tell  why  ;  and  did  not  recollect  having  seen  the  seller,  nor 
indeed  any  event  that  occurred.  She  was  greatly  afflicted  at 
the  idea  of  disgrace  to  her  family.  She  experienced  fre- 
quently great  heat  in  her  head,  was  tormented  with  dreams 
of  fire,  of  blood,  and  of  frightful  noises.  In  consideration  of 
the  small  value  of  the  article  stolen,  of  her  previous  good  con- 
duct, and  of  the  certificates  of  several  physicians  who  stated 
that  they  had  seen  this  female  frequently  in  a  state  of  high 
mental  excitement,  I  was  induced  to  admit,  and  so  to  certify, 
that  she  had  been  in  a  state  of  transient  mental  alienation, 
when  she  committed  the  robbery,  and  the  court  dismissed 
the  complaint."  Another  woman  aged  thirty,  engaged  in  a 
flourishing  mercantile  business,  stole  several  articles  from  the 
table  of  the  restaurant  where  she  dined.  She  could  give  no 
reason  for  it,  and  her  reputation  was  unblemished.  It  seemed 
that  owing  to  family  troubles,  she  had  been  seized  with  vio- 
lent nervous  affections,  complained  much  of  her  head,  and 
had  exhibited  marks  of  high  excitement.  The  opinion  was 
given  that  she  committed  the  act  under  a  momentary  seizure 
of  insanity,  and  the  court  discharged  her.^  Sixthly,  this  pro- 
pensity is  sometimes  produced  by  certain  physiological 
changes  in  the  animal  economy.  Gall  met  with  four  exam- 
ples of  women  who,  when  pregnant,  were  violently  impelled 
to  steal,  though  perfectly  upright  at  other  times.  Friedreich 
gives  the  case  of  a  pregnant  woman  who,  otherwise  perfectly 

^  Traitfe  de  medicine  legale,  i.  237. 

2  Am.  Jour.  Ins.  ix.  76,  from  Revue  Med.  Sept.  16,  1851.    ^ 


PARTIAL  MOEAL   MANIA.  209 

honest  and  respectable,  suddenly  conceived  a  violent  longing 
for  some  apples  from  a  particular  orchard,  two  or  three  miles 
distant.  Notwithstanding  the  entreaties  of  her  parents  and 
husband  not  to  risk  her  character  and  heahh,  and  their 
promises  to  procure  the  apples  for  her  in  the  morning,  she 
started  off  in  company  with  her  husband,  at  nine  o'clock  of 
a  cold  September  night,  and  was  detected  by  the  owner  in 
the  act  of  stealing  the  apples.  She  was  tried  and  convicted 
of  theft,  but  subsequently  a  medical  commission  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  supreme  court  to  examine  and  report  upon 
her  case.  Their  inquiries  resulted  in  the  opinion  that  she 
was  not  morally  free,  and  consequently  not  legally  respon- 
sible, while  under  the  influence  of  those  desires  peculiar  to 
pregnancy.  They  added  that  if  Eve  had  been  in  the  condi- 
tion of  the  accused,  when  she  plucked  the  forbidden  fruit 
from  the  tree,  the  curse  of  original  sin  would  never  have 
fallen  on  the  race.^ 

§  193.  An  inordinate  propensity  to  lying  is  also  of  no 
uncommon  occurrence  in  society;  and  most  of  the  readers 
of  this  work  have  probably  met  with  instances  of  it  in  people 
whose  morals  in  other  respects  were  irreproachable,  and 
whose  education  had  not  been  neglected.  The  maxim  of 
Jeremy  Bentham,  that  it  is  easier  for  men  to  speak  the  truth, 
and  therefore  they  are  more  inclined  to  do  so,  than  to  utter 
falsehood,  seems,  in  them,  to  be  completely  reversed,  for 
they  find  nothing  more  difficult  than  to  tell  the  truth.  In 
repeating  a  story  which  they  have  heard  from  others,  they 
are  sure  to  embellish  it  w^ith  exaggerations  and  additions, 
till  it  can  scarcely  be  recognized,  and  are  never  known  to 
tell  the  same  story  twice  alike.  Not  even  is  the  slightest 
groundwork  of  truth  necessary,  in  order  to  call  forth  the 
inventions  of  their  perverted  minds;  for  they  as  often  flow 
spontaneously,  in  the  greatest  profusion,  as  when  based  on 
some  little  foundation  in  fact.  This  propensity  seems  to 
result  from  an  inability  to  tell  the  truth,  rather  than  from 
any  other  cause ;  as  it  can  be  traced  to  no  adequate  motive, 

■^  Handbuch  der  gericht.  Psycliologie,  691. 

18* 


210  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  is  often  indulged  when  truth  would  serve  the  interests 
of  the  individual  better.  Like  that  last  mentioned,  it  is 
liable  to  degenerate  into  unequivocal  mania,  of  which  it  is 
sometimes  a  preliminary  symptom,  and  is  also  quite  a  com- 
mon feature  in  this  disease,  —  a  circumstance  which  Rush 
considers  as  proof  of  its  physical  origin. 

§  194.  We  are  not  prepared  to  go  the  length  of  referring 
all  the  instances  of  these  two  propensities  thus  manifested, 
to  the  influence  of  disease,  but  they  cannot  all  be  attributed 
to  faults  of  education,  to  evil  example,  or  to  innate  depravity, 
without  doing  violence  to  the  testimony  of  every  day's  expe- 
rience. It  may  be  difficult  no  doubt,  in  many  cases,  to  dis- 
tinguish them  in  respect  to  their  physical  or  moral  origin,  but 
the  distinction  is  no  less  real  on  that  account;  the  same 
principles  are  to  guide  us  that  regulate  our  decision  in  ques- 
tions touching  any  other  form  of  insanity;  and  if  common 
sense  and  professional  intelligence  preside  over  our  delib- 
erations, the  final  judgment  will  not  often  be  wrong.  Where 
the  propensity  to  steal  is  manifested  in  a  person  whose  moral 
character  has  previously  been  irreproachable,  and  whose 
social  position  and  pecuniary  means  render  indulgence  in 
this  vice  peculiarly  degrading  and  unnecessary,  his  plea  of 
having  committed  the  larceny  while  deprived,  in  a  measure, 
of  his  moral  liberty,  deserves  to  be  respectfully  considered. 
If  the  object  stolen  is  of  trifling  value,  or  incapable  of  being 
turned  to  any  purpose  of  use  or  ornament;  if  the  oflence 
have  been  preceded  by  others  of  a  similar  kind ;  and  espec- 
ially if,  in  addition  to  these  circumstances,  the  individual  be 
a  woman  in  a  state  of  pregnancy,  there  can  scarcely  be  a 
doubt  that  the  plea  should  be  admitted.  We  must  not  over- 
look the  fact,  however,  that  objects  which  are  utterly  value- 
less to  some  men,  are  exceedingly  prized  by  others ;  and  it  is 
a  lamentable  truth  that  some  persons,  in  their  eagerness  to 
get  possession  of  certain  objects  that  gratify  a  favorite  pas- 
sion or  taste,  seem  to  lose  sight  all  at  once  of  the  ordinary 
distinctions  of  mevm  and  tuum.  A  celebrated  anatomist  of 
irreproachable  character  was  so  anxious  to  enrich  his  cabinet 
with  a  valuable  specimen  of  pathological  anatomy  which  had 


PARTIAL  MORAL  MANIA.  211 

smitten  his  fancy,  that  he  actually  directed  one  of  his  pupils 
to  visit  the  place  and  steal  it  for  hira.  The  commission, 
however,  was  not  executed.  "  If  the  larceny  had  been  at- 
tempted only,"  says  Marc,  who  relates  the  anecdote,  and  was 
himself  the  pupil  charged  with  the  commission,  "and  the 
attempt  had  been  discovered,  neither  the  professor  or  the 
pupil  could  have  been  deemed  excusable."  ^ 

§  195.  Morbid  activity  of  the  sexual  propensity  is  unfor- 
tunately of  such  common  occurrence,  that  it  has  been  gen- 
erally noticed  by  medical  writers,  though  its  medico-legal 
importance  has  never  been  so  strongly  felt  as  it  deserves. 
This  affection,  in  a  state  of  the  most  unbridled  excitement, 
filling  the  mind  with  a  crowd  of  voluptuous  images,  and 
ever'hurrying  its  victim  to  acts  of  the  grossest  licentiousness, 
though  without  any  lesion  of  the  intellectual  powers,  is  now 
known  and  described  by  the  name  of  aidoiomania.  We  can- 
not convey  a  better  notion  of  the  phenomena  of  this  disorder, 
than  by  quoting  a  few  examples  from  Gall,  by  whom  it  w^as 
first  extensively  observed  and  its  true  nature  discovered.  Its 
milder' forms  and  early  stages,  when  not  beyond  the  control 
of  medical  and  moral  treatment,  are  illustrated  in  the  follow- 
ing cases. 

§  196.  "  A  robust  and  plethoric  young  man  came  to 
reside  in  Vienna.  Having  no  liaisons^  he  was  unusually  con- 
tinent, and  was  soon  attacked  with  erotic  mania."  Gall, 
pursuing  the  treatment  indicated  by  his  peculiar  views  of 
the  origin  of  the  disease,  succeeded  in  restoring  him  in  a  few 
days  to  perfect  health. 

§  197.  "  A  well  educated,  clever  young  man,  who,  from 
his  infancy  almost,  had  felt  strong  erotic  impulses,  succeeded 
in  controlling  them  to  a  certain  extent,  by  means  of  equally 
strong  devotional  feelings.  After  his  situation  permitted 
him  to  indulge  without  constraint  in  the  pleasures  of  love, 
he  soon  made  the  fearful  discovery,  that  it  was  often  difficult 
for  him  to  withdraw  his  mind  from  the  voluptuous  images 
that  haunted  it,  and  fix  it  on  the  important  and  even  urgent 

^  Marc,  de  la  Folie,  etc.  ii.  259. 


212  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   IM'SANITY. 

concerns  of  his  business.  His  whole  being  was  absorbed 
in  sensuality."  He  obtained  relief  by  an  assiduous  pur- 
suit of  scientific  objects,  and  by  finding  out  new  occupa- 
tions. 

§  198.  "  A  very  intelligent  lady  was  tormented,  like  the 
subject  of  the  last-mentioned  case,  from  infancy,  with  the 
most  inordinate  desires.  Her  excellent  education  alone 
saved  her  from  the  rash  indulgences  to  which  her  tempera- 
ment so  violently  urged  her.  Arrived  at  maturity,  she  aban- 
doned herself  to  the  gratification  of  her  desires,  but  this 
only  increased  their  intensity.  Frequently,  she  saw  herself 
on  the  verge  of  madness,  and  in  despair,  she  left  her  house 
and  the  city,  and  took-  refuge  with  her  mother  who  resided 
in  the  country,  where  the  absence  of  objects  to  excite  desire, 
the  greater  severity  of  manners,  and  the  culture  of  a  garden, 
prevented  the  explosion  of  the  disease.  After  having  changed 
her  residence  for  that  of  a  large  city,  she  was,  after  a  while 
threatened  with  a  relapse,  and  again  she  took  refuge  with 
her  mother.  On  her  return  to  Paris,  she  came  to  me,  and 
complained  like  a  woman  in  perfect  despair.  '  Everywhere,' 
she  exclaimed,  '  I  see  nothing  but  the  most  lascivious  images; 
the  demon  of  lust  unremittedly  pursues  me,  at  the  table, 
and  even  in  my  sleep.  I  am  an  object  of  disgust  to  myself, 
and  feel  that  I  can  no  longer  escape  either  madness  or 
death.' "  i 

§  199.  In  the  following  cases,  the  mind  was  finally  over- 
whelmed by  the  force  of  this  frightful  propensity,  and  sunk 
into  complete  and  violent  madness.  "  A  man  had  lived  many 
years  in  a  happy  and  fruitful  union,  and  had  acquired  by  his 
industry  a  respectable  fortune.  After  having  retired  from 
business  and  led  an  idle  life,  his  predominant  propensity 
gradually  obtained  the  mastery  over  him,  and  he  yielded  to 
his  desires,  to  such  a  degree,  that,  though  still  in  possession 
of  his  reason,  he  looked  on  every  woman  as  a  victim  des- 
tined to  gratify  his  sensual  appetite.  The  moment  he  per- 
ceived a  female  from  his  window,  he  announced  to  his  wife 

^  Sur  les  Fonctions,  iii.  317-319. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  213 

and  daughters,  with  an  air  of  the  utmost  delight,  the  bliss 
that  awaited  him.  Finally,  this  partial  mania  degenerated 
into  general  mania,  and  shortly  after,  he  died  in  an  insane 
hospital  at  Vienna."  ^ 

'  §  200.  Pinel  has  related  a  very  similar  case.  "  A  man 
had  creditably  filled  his  place  in  society  till  his  fiftieth  year. 
He  was  then  smitten  with  an  immoderate  passion  for  vene- 
real pleasures ;  he  frequented  places  of  debauchery,  where 
he  gave  himself  up  to  the  utmost  excesses;  and  then  re- 
turned to  the  society  of  his  friends,  to  paint  the  charms  of 
pure  and  spotless  love."  His  disorder  gradually  increased ; 
his  seclusion  became  necessary ;  and  he  soon  became  a  vic- 
tim of  furious  mania. 

§  201.  Many  more  cases  like  these  might  be  quoted,  particu- 
larly from  the  writings  of  Esquirol,  Georget,  and  Marc,  but  the 
above  are  sufficient  to  illustrate  a  truth  as  generally  recog- 
nized as  any  other  in  pathology,  and  to  convince  the  most 
skeptical  mind,  that  if  insanity,  —  or,  in  more  explicit 
terms,  morbid  action  in  the  brain  inducing  a  deprivation  of 
moral  liberty,  —  ever  exists,  it  does  in  what  is  called  aidoio- 
mania. 

§  202.  A  morbid  propensity  to  incendiarism,  or  pijro- 
mania,  as  it  has  been  termed,  where  the  person,  though  other- 
wise rational,  is  borne  on  by  an  irresistible  power,  to  the 
commission  of  this  crime,  has  received  the  attention  of  medi- 
cal jurists  in  Europe,  by  most  of  whom  it  has  been  regarded 
as  a  distinct  form  of  insanity,  annulling  responsibility  for  the 
acts  to  which  it  leads.  Numerous  cases  have  been  related, 
and  their  medico-legal  relations  amply  discussed  by  Platner,^ 
Vogel,'^  Masius,*  Henke,^  Gall,''  Marc,*"  Friedreich,^  and  others. 

1  Op.  cit.  sup.  ill.  320. 

*  Quffistiones  Medicinaj'ForensIs,  1824. 

^  Beitr.  zur  gericbtsiirztl  Lehere  d.  Zurechnungsfahigkeit,  p.  10,  1825. 

*  System  der  gerichtlichen  Arzneykunde  fiir  Rechtsgelehrte,  1818. 
^  Abhandl.  gerichtl.  Medic,  iii.  1824. 

*  Sur  les  Fonctions,  iv.  157-160. 
'  Annalesd'llygiene,  x.  357. 

^  Handbuchdergericht.Psychologie,  393-435. 


214  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

In  a  few  of  these  cases  the  morbid  propensity  is  excited  by 
the  ordinary  causes  of  insanity;  in  a  larger  class  it  is  excited 
by  that  constitutional  disturbance  which  often  accompanies 
the  menstrual  periods  ;  but  in  the  largest  class  of  all,  it  occurs 
at  the  age  of  puberty,  and  seems  to  be  connected  with  re- 
tarded evolution  of  the  sexual  organs.  The  case  of  Maria 
Franc,  quoted  by  Gall  from  a  German  journal,  who  was  exe- 
cuted for  house-burning,  may  be  referred  to  the  first  class. 
She  was  a  peasant  of  little  education,  and,  in  consequence 
of  an  unhappy  marriage,  had  abandoned  herself  to  habits  of 
intemperate  drinking.  In  this  state  a  fire  occurred  in  which 
she  had  no  share.  "  From  the  moment  she  witnessed  this 
fearful  sight,  she  felt  a  desire  to  fire  houses,  which,  whenever 
she  had  drunk  a  few  coppers'  worth  of  spirit,  was  converted 
into  an  irresistible  impulse.  She  could  give  no  other  reason, 
nor  show  any  other  motive  for  firing  so  many  houses  than 
this  impulse  which  drove  her  to  it.  Notwithstanding  the 
fear,  the  terror,  and  the  repentance  she  felt  in  every  instance, 
she  went  and  did  it  afresh,"  In  other  respects  her  mind  was 
sound.  Within  five  years  slie  fired  twelve  houses,  and  was 
arrested  on  the  thirteenth  attempt.^ 

§  203.  Among  numerous  other  cases  of  this  kind  that 
have  been  reported,  we  have  room  for  only  two  more.  Eve 
Schebomska,  twenty-two  years  of  age,  was  guilty  of  four 
incendiary  acts,  to  which  she  said  she  was  impelled  by  an 
inward  agitation  that  tormented  her.  This  agitation  which, 
however,  did  not  prevent  her  from  performing  her  domestic 
labors,  was  greatly  augmented,  according  to  the  testimony 
of  her  mistress,  when  she  had  been  some  time  without 
seeing  her  lover.-  A  peasant  girl,  named  Kalinovska,  seven- 
teen years  of  age,  while  returning  from  a  dance,  where  she 
had  got  quite  heated,  was  suddenly  seized  with  a  desire  to 
burn  a  building.  She  struggled  with  the  desire  for  three 
days,  when  she  yielded,  and  she  declared  that  on  seeing  the 
flames  burst  out  she  experienced  a  joy  such  as  she  had  never 
felt  before.^ 

*  Op.  tit.  sup.  iv.  158.       *  Klein,  Annalen,  xvi.  141.       ^  Ibid.  B.  xii.  53. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  215 

§  204.  In  tho  following  cases  the  incendiary  propensity- 
was  excited  by  disordered  menstruation,  accompanied  in 
some  of  them  by  other  pathological  conditions.  A  servant 
girl,  named  Weber,  aged  twenty-two  years,  committed  three 
incendiary  acts.  Her  mistress  had  observed  that  she  was 
sad  ;  that  she  would  frequently  seem  as  if  buried  in  thought, 
and  would  cry  out  in  her  sleep.  It  appeared  in  evidence  that 
she  had  had  a  disease  two  years  before,  that  was  accom- 
panied by  violent  pains  in  the  head,  disordered  circulation, 
insensibility,  and  epileptic  fits  ;  and  that  since  then  menstru- 
ation had  ceased.^  The  servant  girl  -of  a  peasant,  seventeen 
years  old,  that  had  been  guilty  of  two  incendiary  acts,  de- 
clared that  she  was  constantly  beset  by  an  inward  voice  that 
commanded  her  to  burn  and  then  destroy  herself.  The  first 
fire  she  regarded  with  dalmness  and  even  pleasure.  The 
second  time,  she  gave  the  alarm  herself,  and  immediately 
after  tried  to  hang  herself.  She  .had  never  manifested  any 
mental  disorder,  but  from  her  fourth  year  she  had  been  sub- 
ject to  spasms  which  finally  degenerated  into  epileptic  fits 
that  were  unusually  violent  whenever  they  coincided  with  the 
menstrual  period.  A  very  severe  fit  occurred  but  a  few  days 
previous  to  the  second  incendiary  act.  The  faculty  of  Leipzig, 
who  were  consulted  respecting  the  case,  terminate  their 
report  with  saying,  that  "  in  consideration  of  the  physical 
state  of  the  accused,  they  do  not  consider  it  probable,  that,  at 
the  periods  when  she  committed  the  incendiary  acts,  she  en- 
joyed the  free  use  of  her  mental  faculties."  ^ 

§  205.  The  following  examples  of  the  last  class  of  cases 
will  show  the  nature  of  the  exciting  causes  of  the  incendiary 
Impulse,  and  the  physical  imperfections  of  its  subjects.  A 
servant  girl  was  committed  for  two  incendiary  attempts  on 
the  premises  of  her  master,  in  a  German  village,  in  1830. 
On  her  examination  before  the  magistrate  she  denied  the 
charge,  but  subsequently  confessed  it  while  in  prison.  She 
assigned  no  reason  for  her  conduct,  acknowledged  that  she 


'  Ibid.  B.  xiii.  131.  ^  Plainer,  Op.  cit.  sup.  V.  li. 


216  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

had  been  well  treated  by  her  employers,  and  they  expressed 
themselves  perfectly  satisfied  with  her.  It  appeared  in  evi- 
dence that  she  was  in  her  twentieth  year;  that  she  had  never 
menstruated;  that  since  her  thirteenth  year,  she  had  fre- 
quently had  epileptic  fits,  two  of  which  occurred  on  the  day 
these  fittempts  were  made,  one  in  the  interval  between  them, 
the  other  after  the  last;  and  that  for  several  days  subse- 
quently she  had  two  fits  daily  in  prison.  It  also  appeared 
that  she  had  been  guilty  of  other  incendiary  acts  when  in  the 
service  of  a  different  family.  On  one  occasion  she  declared 
"that  she  felt  badly,  and  that  when  she  felt  so,  she  knew  not 
what  she  did."  The  physicians  by  whom  she  was  examined, 
and  who  made  reports  to  the  proper  authorities,  stated  that 
she  was  quiet  in  her  demeanor,  betraying  no  indication  of  a 
malicious  disposition,  inclined  to  talk  to  herself,  and,  in  re- 
gard to  mental  capacity,  obviously  stupid  and  dull.  They 
concluded  that  she  was  not  responsible  for  criminal  acts,  and 
that  those  she  was  charged  with  proceeded  from  an  incen- 
diary impulse  which  was  a  consequence  of  "interrupted 
physical  evolution."  She  was  accordingly  released  by  the 
court.  Under  appropriate  treatment  the  menses  were  soon 
established,  after  which  she  had  no  return  of  her  epilepsy, 
nor  her  pyromania.^ 

§  206.  A  girl,  fifteen  years  old,  named  Graborkwa,  while  suf- 
fering from  nostalgia,  or  homesickness,  made  two  incendiary 
attempts  in  order  that  she  might  be  able  to  leave  the  service 
of  her  employers.  She  stated  that  from  the  moment  she 
entered  their  service,  she  was  unceasingly  beset  by  the  desire 
of  burning  buildings.  It  seemed  as  if  a  shade  that  was  con- 
stantly before  her,  impelled  her  to  acts  of  incendiarism.  It 
appeared  that  she  had  long  suffered  violent  pains  in  her  head, 
and  had  never  menstruated.^ 

§  207.  Dr.  King  of  Brighton,  England,  has  reported  the  case 
of  a  servant  girl,  between  sixteen  and  seventeen,  who  was 
tried  for  setting  fire  to  her  master's  house.    She  had  previously 

^  Neues  Archiv  des  Criminalrechts.  xiv.  393. 
'  Klein,  Annalen,  xii.  126. 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA,  217 

borne  a  good  character,  and  had  no  apparent  motive  for  the 
act.  It  appeared  that  about  a  year  before,  she  entered  an 
infirmary,  where  .she  had,  in  succession,  low  fever,  measles, 
scarlet  fever,  and  strong  symptoms  of  consumption  —  cough, 
expectoration,  night  sweats,  and  diarrhoea.  She  had  never 
menstruated,  had  always  been  of  a  reserved,  taciturn  dispo- 
sition, and  had  conducted  herself  in  an  eccentric  manner  on 
many  occasions.     She  was  acquitted.^ 

§  208.  A  servant  girl,  seventeen  years  old,  was  guilty  of  in- 
cendiarism, for  The  purpose,  as  she  stated,  of  being  sent  back 
to  her  parents.  She  exhibited  no  sign  of  mental  derange- 
ment, though  of  very  limited  capacity.  She  was  unusually 
short  in  stature,  the  sexual  organs  showed  no  signs  of  devel- 
opment, and  the  menses  had  never  appeared.^ 

§  209.  That  the  evolution  of  the  sexual  functions  is  very 
often  attended  by  more  or  less  constitutional  disturbance, 
especially  in  the  female  sex,  is  now  a  well-established  physi- 
ological truth.  The  shock  seems  to  be  felt  chiefly  by  the 
nervous  system,  which  experiences  almost  every  form  of 
irritation,  varying,  in  severity,  from  the  slightest  hysteric 
symptoms,  to  tetanus,  St.  Vitus's  dance,  and  epilepsy.  And 
when  we  bear  in  mind,  also,  that  general  mania  is  sotnetimes 
produced  by  this  great  physiological  change,  it  cannot  be 
deemed  an  extraordinary  fact  that  partial  mania,  exciting  to 
acts  of  incendiarism  or  murder,  should  be  one  of  its  effects. 
Still  we  would  not  be  understood  as  favoring  the  opinion 
that  every  youth  between  the  age  of  twelve  and  fifteen, 
guilty  of  incendiarism,  is  a  subject  of  pyromania.  The 
general  principle  of  the  power  of  the  change  in  question  to 
produce  this  disorder,  is  not  alone  sufficient.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  trace  the  connection  between  them  in  the  particular 
case,  and  unless  this  can  be  done,  we  have  no  right  to  claim 
the  benefit  of  the  general  truth.  To  aid  us  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  this  point,  it  will  be  well  to  bear  in  mind  the  foUow- 


'  London  Medical  Gazette,  xii.  80. 
"  Platner,  Op.  cit.  sup.  xv. 

19 


218  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

ing  considerations,  laid    down  by  Henke,^  and  adopted  by 
Marc,  in  his  excellent  paper  on  this  disorder.^ 

§  210.  1.  To  prove  the  existence  of  pyrornania,  produced 
by  the  sexual  evolution,  the  age  should  correspond  with 
that  of  puberty,  which  is  between  twelve  and  fifteen.  Some- 
times, however,  it  may  occur,  especially  in  females,  as  early 
as  the  eleventh  or  tenth  year,  and,  therefore,  if  the  symp- 
toms are  well  marked,  we  have  a  right  to  attribute  them  to 
this  cause. 

2.  There  should  be  present  symptoms  of  irregular  develop- 
ment; of  marked  critical  movements,  by  means  of  which 
nature  seeks  to  complete  the  evolution.  These  general 
signs  are,  either  a  rapid  increase  of  stature,  or  a  less  growth 
and  sexual  development  than  is  common  at  the  age  of  the 
individual ;  an  unusual  lassitude  and  sense  of  weight  and 
pain  in  the  limbs ;  glandular  swellings ;  cutaneous  erup- 
tions, etc. 

3.  If,  within  a  short  time  of  the  incendiary  act,  there  are 
symptoms  of  development  in  the  sexual  organs,  such  as 
efforts  of  menstruation  in  girls,  they  deserve  the  greatest 
attention.  They  will  strongly  confirm  the  conclusions  that 
might  be  drawn  from  the  other  symptoms,  that  the  work  of 
evolution  disturbed  the  functions  of  the  brain.  Any  irregu- 
larity whatever  of  the  menstrual  discharge,  is  a  fact  of  the 
greatest  importance  in  determining  the  mental  condition  of 
incendiary  girls. 

4.  Symptoms  of  disturbance  in  the  circulating  system, 
such  as  irregularity  of  the  pulse,  determination  of  blood  to 
the  head,  pains  in  the  head,  vertigo,  stupor,  a  sense  of  op- 
pression and  distress  in  the  chest,  are  indicative  in  young 
subjects  of  an  arrest  or  disturbance  of  the  development  of 
the  sexual  functions,  and  therefore  require  attention. 

5.  For  the  same  reason,  symptoms  of  disturbance  in  the 
nervous  system,  such   as  trembling,  involuntary  motions  of 


^  Op.  cit.  sup. 

*  Considerations  medicp-legales  sur  la  monomania  et  partlculicrement  sur 
la  monomania  incendiaire.     Annales  d'Hygiene,  x.  357-473. 


PARTIAL  MORAL   MANIA.  219 

the  muscles,  spasms,  and  convulsions  of  every  kind,  even  to 
epilepsy,  are  no  less  worthy  of  attention. 

6.  Even  in  the  absence  of  all  other  symptoms,  derange- 
ment of  the  intellectual  or  moral  powers  would  be  strong 
proof,  in  these  cases,  of  the  existence  of  pyromania.  Of  the 
two,  the  latter  is  far  the  more  common,  and  is  indicated  by 
a  change  in  the  moral  character.  The  patient  is  sometimes 
irascible,  quarrelsome ;  at  others,  sad,  silent,  and  weeping 
without  the  slightest  motive.  He  seems  to  be  buried  in  a 
profound  revery,  and  suddenly  starts  up  in  a  fright,  cries  out 
in  his  sleep,  etc.  These  symptoms  may  have  disappeared 
and  reappeared,  or  degenerated  at  last,  into  intellectual 
mania. 

7.  The  absence  of  positive  symptoms  of  mental  disorder, 
as  well  as  the  presence  of  those  which  appear  to  show  that 
the  reason  is  sound,  is  not  incompatible  with  the  loss  of 
moral  liberty.  The  remarks  of  Marc  on  this  point  deserve 
to  be  quoted  in  full.  "  Even  when,  previously  to  the  incen- 
diary act,  they  hav&  shown  no  evident  trace  of  mental  aliena- 
tion, and  been  capable  of  attending  to  their  customary 
duties  ;  when,  on  their  examinations,  they  have  answered 
pertinently  to  questions  addressed  to  them ;  when  they  have 
avowed  that  they  were  influenced  by  a  desire  of  revenge ; 
we  cannot  conclude  with  certainty,  that  they  were  in  posses- 
sion of  all  their  moral  liberty,  and  that,  consequently,  they 
should  incur  the  full  penalty  of  the  crime.  These  unfortu- 
nates may  be  governed  by  a  single  fixed  idea,  not  discovered 
till  after  the  execution  of  the  criminal  act.  Pyromania  re- 
sulting from  a  pathological  cause,  may  increase  in  severity, 
as  this  cause  itself  is  aggravated,  and  suddenly  be  converted 
into  an  irresistible  propensity,  immediately  followed  by  its 
gratification."  ^. 

§  211.  If  the  above  considerations  are  carefully  pondered 
by  the  medical  jurist,  he  will  be  in  little  danger  of  mistake, 
in  determining  the  question  whether  or  not  the  incendiary 


^  Op.  cit.  sup.  45  7» 


220  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

act  is  excited  by  a  pathological  condition  of  the  nervous 
system,  incident  to  the  evolution  of  the  sexual  functions.  If 
it  be  decided  in  the  affirmative,  the  acquittal  of  the  accused 
should  follow  as  a  matter  of  course,  though  it  might  not 
square  with  the  technical  definitions  of  insanity,  and  the 
usual  subtleties  respecting  moral  liberty  and  freedom  of  the 
will.  In  the  north  of  Germany,  where  pyromania  in  young 
subjects  is  remarkably  frequent,  the  court  is  generally  gov- 
erned by  the  opinions  of  the  medical  experts,  and  thus  the 
accused  escapes  the  ignominious  fate  which  is  almost  inevi- 
table wherever  the  spirit  of  the  English  common  law  pre- 
vails. 

§  212.  The  last  and  most  important  form  of  moral  mania 
that  will  be  noticed,  consists  in  a  morbid  activity  of  the 
■propensity  to  destroy;  where  the  individual,  without  provo- 
cation or  any  other  rational  motive,  apparently  in  the  full 
possession  of  his  reason,  and  oftentimes,  in  spite  of  his  most 
strenuous  efforts  to  the  contrary,  imbrues  his  hands  in  the 
blood  of  others;  oftener  than  otherwise,  of  the  partner  of 
his  bosom,  of  the  children  of. his  affections,  of  those,  in  short, 
who  are  most  dear  and  cherished  around  him.  The  facts 
here  alluded  to  are  of  painful  frequency,  and  the  gross  mis- 
understanding of  their  true  nature,  almost  universally  preva- 
lent, excepting  among  a  few  in  the  higher  walks  of  the  pro- 
fessions, leads  to  equally  painful  results.  In  the  absence 
of  any  pathological  explanation  of  this  horrid  phenomenon, 
the  mind  seeks  in  vain,  among  secondary  causes,  for  a 
rational  mode  of  accounting  for  it,  and  is  content  to  resort  to 
that  time-honored  solution  of  all  the  mysteries  of  human 
delinquency,  the  instigation  of  the  devil.  Of  the  double 
homicide  to  which  this  affection  gives  rise,  there  can  be  no 
question  which  is  most  to  be  deplored,  for,  shocking  as  it  is 
for  one  bearing  the  image  of  his  Maker  to  take  the  life  of  a 
fellow-being  with  brutal  ferocity,  how  shall  we  characterize 
the  deliberate  perpetration  of  the  same  deed,  under  the 
sanction  of  law  and  of  the  popular  approbation  ?  We  trust, 
however,  that  the  ample  researches  of  writers  of  unques- 
tionable veracity  and  ability,  which  are  now  just  reaching 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  221 

the  attention  of  the  legal  profession,  will  be  soon  followed 
by  a  conviction  of  past  errors,  and  a  more  rational  adminis- 
tration of  the  criminal  law.  For  the  purpose  of  contributing 
to  this  object,  it  will  be  necessary  to  bring  fully  before  the 
reader  the  result  of  these  researches,  and,  in  view  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  subject,  to  risk  the  charge  of  prolixity  by  the 
number  and  length  of  the  quotations. 

§  213.  The  form  of  disease  now  under  consideration  was 
first  distinctly  described  by  Pinel;  and  though  its  existence 
as  a  distinct  form  of  monomania  was,  for  a  long  time  after, 
doubted,  it  has  subsequently  been  admitted  by  the  principal 
writers  on  insanity ;  by  Gall  and  Spurzheim,  EsquiroV  Geor- 
get.  Marc,  Andral,  Orfila,  and  Broussais  in  France  ;  by  Con- 
olly,  Combe,  and  Prichard  in  England;  by  Hoffbauer, 
Platner,  EthmuUer,  Henke,  and  Friedreich  in  Germany  ;  by 
Otto  of  Copenhagen  ;  and  by  Rush  in  this  country.  It  has 
received  the  various  appellations  of  monomame-homicide^ 
monomanie-meiirtriere,  melancolie-homicide^  homicidal  insan- 
ity, instinctive  monomania.  Esquirol,  in  his  valuable  memoir, 
first  published  in  the  shape  of  a  note  in  the  French  transla- 
tion of  HofFbauer's  work,  observes  that  homicidal  insanity, 
or  monomanie-Iiomicide,  as  he  terms  it,  presents  two  distinct 
forms,  in  one  of  which  the  monomaniac  is  always  influenced 
by  avowed  motives  more  or  less  irrational,  and  is  generally 
regarded  as  mad  ;  in  the  other,  there  are  no  motives  acknowl- 
edged, nor  to  be  discerned,  the  individual  being  impelled  by 
a  blind,  irresistible  impulse.  It  is  with  the  latter  only  that 
we  are  concerned,  for  the  other  is  clearly  a  form  of  partial 
intellectual  mania ;  but  as  this  division  has  not  been  strictly 
made  by  nature,  cases  often  occurring  that  do  not  clearly 
come  under  either  category,  the  subject  will  be  better  eluci- 
dated by  noticing  all  the  forms  of  this  affection,  and  seeing 
how  intimately  they  are  connected  together. 

^  It  is  worthy  of  mention,  that  though  Esquirol,  in  his  article  Manie,  in  the 
Did.  Med.  Sci,  expressed  his  disbelief  in  the  existence  of  homicidal  insanity 
unconnected  with  other  mental  alienation,  he  since  not  only  retracted  his 
opinion,  but  has  published  the  very  best  contribution  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
subject. 

19* 


222  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  214.  In  the  first  group  of  cases  we  have  the  simplest 
form  of  homicidal  insanity,  —  that  in  which  the  desire  to 
destroy  life  is  not  only  prompted  by  no  motive  whatever, 
and  solely  by  a  violent  impulse,  but  without  any  appreciable 
disorder  of  mind  or  body. 

"  In  a  respectable  house  in  Germany,  the  mother  of  the 
family  returning  home  one  day,  met  a  servant,  against  whom 
she  had  no  cause  of  complaint,  in  the  greatest  agitation;  she 
begged  to  speak  with  her  mistress  alone,  threw  herself  upon 
her  knees,  and  entreated  that  she  might  be  sent  out  of  the 
house.  Her  mistress,  astonished,  inquired  the  reason,  and 
learned  that  whenever  this  unhappy  servant  undressed  the 
lady's  child,  she  was  struck  by  the  whiteness  of  its  flesh  and 
experienced  the  almost  irresistible  desire  to  tear  it  in  pieces. 
She  felt  afraid  that  she  could  not  resist  the  impulse,  and  pre- 
ferred to  leave  the  house."  "  This  circumstance,"  says  the 
narrator,  "  occurred  in  the  family  of  Baron  Humboldt,  and 
this  illustrious  person  permitted  me  to  add  his  testimony."  ^ 

§  215.  "  A  young  lady  who  had  been  placed  in  a  maison 
de  sante,  experienced  homicidal  desires,  for  which  she  could 
assign  no  motive.  She  was  rational  on  every  subject,  and 
whenever  she  felt  the  approach  of  this  dreadful  propensity, 
she  shed  tears,  entreated  to  have  the  strait-waistcoat  put  on, 
and  to  be  carefully  guarded  till  the  paroxysm,  which  some- 
times lasted  several  days,  had  passed."  ^ 

§  216.  "  M.  R.,  a  distinguished  chemist  and  a  poet,  of  a 
naturally  mild  and  sociable  disposition,  committed  himself  a 
prisoner  in  one  of  the  maisons  de  sante  of  the  faubourg  St. 
Antoine.  Tormented  by  the  desire  of  killing,  he  prostrated 
himself  at  the  foot  of  the  altar,  and  implored  the  divine 
assistance  to  deliver  him  from  such  an  atrocious  propensity, 
of  the  cause  of  which  he  could  give  no  account.  When  he 
felt  that  he  was  likely  to  yield  to  the  violence  of  this  inclina- 
tion, he  hastened  to  the  head  of  the  establishment,  and 
requested  him  to  tie  his  thumbs  together  with  a  ribbon.    This 

slight  ligature  was  sufficient  to   calm  the  unhappy  R.,  who 

. • 

'  Marc,  consultation  medico-legale,  pour  11.  Cornier,  p.  52.         ^  Idem. 


PARTIAL  MORAL   MANIA.  223 

subsequently  endeavored  to  kill  one  of  his  friends,  and  finally 
perished  in  a  fit  of  maniacal  fury."  ^ 

§  217.  The  following  case  is  recorded  by  Gall,  who  de- 
rived it  from  a  German  paper  of  April  13,  1820.  "A  car- 
rier, belonging  to  the  bailiwick  of  Frendenstadt,  who  had 
quitted  his  family  in  perfect  health,  was  suddenly  attacked 
by  a  paroxysm  of  furious  madness,  on  the  route  between 
Aalen  and  Gemunde.  His  first  insane  act  was  to  shut  him- 
self up  in  the  stable  wath  his  three  horses,  to  which  he  gave 
no  fodder;' and  when  departing  he  harnessed  only  two  of 
his  horses,  accompanying  the  carriage,  mounted  on  the  other. 
At  Moglengen  he  abused  a  woman  ;  at  Unterbobingen,  he 
alighted,  and  walked  before  his  horses  with  a  hatchet  in  his 
hand.  On  the  route  between  the  last  place  and  Hussenhofen, 
the  first  person  he  met  with  was  a  woman  whom  he  struck 
several  times  with  his  hatchet,  and  left  her  lying  in  a  ditch 
by  the  road  side.  Next,  he  encountered  a  lad  thirteen  years 
old  whose  head  he  split  open  ;  and  shortly  after  he  split  the 
skull  of  a  man,  thirty  years  old,  and  scattered  his  brains  in 
the  road  ;  and  after  hacking  the  body,  he  left  his  hatchet 
and  carriage,  and  thus  unarmed  proceeded  towards  Hus- 
senhofen. He  met  two  Jews  on  the  road,  whom  he  attacked, 
but  who,  after  a  short  struggle,  escaped  him.  Near  Hus- 
senhofen, he  assaulted  a  peasant  who  screamed  till  several 
persons  came  to  his  aid,  who  siecured  the  maniac  and  carried 
him  to  Gemunde.  They  afterwards  led  him  to  the  bodies  of 
his  victims,  when  he  observed,  '  It  is  not  I,  but  my  bad  spirit, 
that  has  committed  these  murders.'  "  ^ 

§  218.  William  Brown  was  tried  at  Maidstone,  England, 
in  1812,  for  strangling  a  child  whom  he  accidentally  met  one 
morning  while  walking  in  the  country.  He  took  up  the 
body  and  laid  it  on  some  steps,  and  then  went  and  told  what 
he  had  done,  requesting  to  be  taken  into  custody.  On  the 
trial,  he  said  he  had  never  seen  the  child  before,  had  no 
malice  against  it,  and  could  assign  no  motive  for  the  dread- 
ful act.    He  bore  an  exemplary  character,  and  had  never  been 

'  Marc,  op.  cit.  65.  ^  Sur  les  Fonctions,  etc.  iv.  103. 


224  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

suspected  of  being  insane.^  It  is  needless  to  say  that  he  was 
hanged. 

§  219.  A  country  gentleman,  enjoying  good  health  and 
easy  circumstances,  consulted  Esquirol  in  regard  to  his  sin- 
gular and  unhappy  condition.  He  related  that  he  had  read 
the  indictment  of  Henriette  Cornier,  which,  however,  did  not 
very  strongly  excite  his  attention.  In  the  course  of  the  night 
he  suddenly  awoke  with  the  thought  of  killing  his  wife  who 
was  lying  beside  him.  He  left  his  wife's  bed  for  a  time,  but 
within  three  wrecks  the  same  idea  seized  upon  his  mind 
three  times,  and  always  in  the  night.  During  the  day,  con- 
siderable exercise  and  occupation  preserved  him  from  this 
fearful  inclination.  He  evinced  not  the  slightest  mental  dis- 
order; his  business  was  prosperous;  he  had  never  expe- 
rienced any  domestic  chagrins;  and  he  had  no  cause  of  com- 
plaint or  jealousy  in  regard  to  his  wife  whom  he  loved,  and 
with  whom  he  never  had  had  the  least  disagreement.  With 
the  exception  of  a  light  headache  occasionally,  he  had  always 
been  well  and  free  from  pain.  He  is  sad  and  troubled  about 
his  condition,  and  has  quitted  his  wife  for  fear  lest  he  might 
yield  to  the  force  of  his  desire.^ 

§  220.  In  most  cases  of  homicidal  insanity  the  presence 
of  some  physical  or  moral  disorder  may  be  detected  ;  and 
though  none  is  mentioned  in  those  above  related,  there  is 
reason  to  suppose  that  it  might  have  been  ascertained  by  a 
more  thorough  examination.  It  is  a  curious  fact,  however, 
that  homicidal  desires  of  the  intensest  kind  will  sometimes 
flit  through  the  mind,  while  the  individual,  though  capable 
of  judging  of  his  feelings,  is  unconscious  of  being  otherwise 
than  perfectly  well.  Marc,  the  distinguished  medical  jurist, 
relates,  that  passing  over  a  bridge  in  Paris  one  day,  he  ob- 
served a  lad  sitting  on  the  parapet  of  the  bridge,  eating  his 
breakfast,  when  he  was  seized  with  an  almost  irresistible 
desire  to  push  him  over  into  the  river.     The  idea  was  but  a 


^  Knapp  and  Baldwin's  Newgate  Calender,  iv.  80. 
^  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  830. 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA.  225 

flash,  but  it  filled  him  with  such  horror,  that  he  rapidly 
crossed  over  to  the  opposite  trottoir,  and  got  out  of  the  way 
as  quick  as  possible.  Talma,  the  actor,  also  assured  him,  on 
hearing  the  story,  that  he  had  experienced  the  same  propen- 
sity under  very  similar  circumstances.^  In  the  following 
group  of  cases  the  homicidal  fit  was  obviously  accompanied 
or  preceded  by  disease  or  physical  disorder  of  some  kind. 

§  221.  The  following  case  is  related  by  Gall,  who  ob- 
tained it  from  Dr.  Zimmermann  of  Krumback.  "  A  peasant, 
born  at  Krumback,  Swabia,  who  never  enjoyed  very  good 
health,  twenty-seven  years  old,  and  unmarried,  had  been 
subject  from  his  ninth  year  to  frequent  epileptic  fits.  Two 
years  ago,  his  disease  changed  its  character  without  any 
apparent  cause,  and  ever  since,  instead  of  a  fit  of  epilepsy, 
this  man  has  been  attacked  with  an  irresistible  inclination  to 
commit  murder.  He  felt  the  approach  of  the  fit  many  hours, 
and  sometimes  a  whole  day,  before  its  invasion,  and  from 
the  commencement  of  this  presentiment,  he  begged  to  be 
secured  and  chained  that  he  might  not  commit  some  dread- 
ful de^d.  '  When  the  fit  comes  on,'  says  he,  '  I  feel  under  a 
necessity  to  kill,  even  if  it  were  a  child.'  His  parents,  whom 
he  tenderly  loved,  would  be  the  first  victims  of  this  murder- 
ous propensity.  '  My  mother,'  he  cries  out  with  a  frightful 
voice,  '  save  yourself,  or  I  must  kill  you.'  Before  the  fit  he 
complains  of  being  exceedingly  sleepy,  without  being  able  to 
sleep ;  he  feels  depressed,  and  experiences  slight  twitchings 
of  the  limbs.  During  the  fit,  he  preserves  his  consciousness, 
and  kiiows  perfectly  well  that  in  committing  a  murder,  he  is 
guilty  of  an  atrocious  crime.  When  he  is  disabled  from 
doing  injury,  he  makes  the  most  frightful  contortions  and 
grimaces,  singing  or  talking  in  rhyme.  The  fit  lasts  from 
one  to  two  days.  W^hen  it  is  over,  he  cries  out,  '  Now 
unbind  me.  Alas  !  I  have  cruelly  suffered,  but  I  rejoice  that 
I  have  killed  nobody.'  "  ^ 

§  222.    On  the  fifteenth  February,  1826,  Jacques  Mounin, 


'  Marc,  de  la  Folie,  etc.  ii.  478.  -  Gall,  op.  cit.  iv.  104. 


226  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

after  many  acts  of  violence  and  fury,  escaped  from  his 
family  who  wished  to  restrain  him,  scaled  the  walls  of  several 
adjoining  properties,  and  took  to  the  fields,  without  shoes, 
hat,  or  weapons  of  any  kind.  His  flight  having  excited 
considerable  alarm,  as  after  some  epileptic  attacks  he  had 
formerly  given  many  signs  of  a  blind  fury,  the  local  authori- 
ties were  informed,  and  several  persons  despatched  after  him 
as  quickly  as  possible.  On  arriving  at  a  field,  where  many 
laborers  were  at  work  at  a  distance  from  one  another,  Mounin 
first  threatened  a  man  who  was  driving  a  cart,  and  imme- 
diately after  pursued  Joseph  Faucher  and  pelted  him  with 
stones.  The  latter  having  escaped,  he  then  approached  an 
old  man  almost  blind,  named  Mayet,  whom  he  knocked 
down  and  killed  by  beating  on  the  head  with  a  large  stone. 
He  next  attacked  a  man  who  was  digging  at  a  little  distance, 
and  killed  him  w^th  a  spade.  A  few  minutes  afterwards  he 
met  Propheti  on  horseback,  whom  he  struck  down  with 
stones,  but  was  obliged  to  leave  him  in  consequence  of  the 
cries  of  his  victim.  He  then  chased  some  children  who 
saved  themselves  by  hard  running,  but  he  overtook  a  man 
at  work  and  slew  him.  On  being  questioned  during  his 
confinement,  Mounin  said  he  well  recollected  having  killed 
the  three. men,  and  especially  one,  a  relative  of  his  own, 
whom  he  greatly  regretted ;  he  added  that  in  his  paroxysms 
of  phrensy  he  saw  nothing  but  flames,  and  that  blood  was 
then  most  delightful  to  his  sight.  At  the  end  of  a  few  days' 
imprisonment,  he  seemed  to  have  entirely  recovered  his 
reason,  but  subsequently  he  relapsed.  The  court  declined 
trying  him,  under  the  conviction  that  he  was  insane  while 
committing  the  murders  above  mentioned.^ 

§  223.  "  Frederick  Jensen,  a  workman,  thirty-seven  years 
old,  had  for  some  time  suffered  from  fits  of  giddiness,  which 
always  obliged  him  to  seize  hold  of  the  nearest  objects.  In 
the  spring  of  1828,  he  lost  a  beloved  daughter,  which  afflicted 
him  very  much.  The  state  of  his  health  was  nevertheless 
perfect  in  mind  as  well  as  in  body,  when  he,  one  day  (Sun- 

'  Georget,  Discussion  medico-legale,  etc.  153. 


PARTIAL   MORAL    MANIA.  227 

day,  28th  September,  1828)  after  dinner,  told  his  wife  that 
he  would  take  a  walk  with  his  son,  a  boy  ten  years  old.  He 
did  so,  and  went  with  him  to  the  green  which  encircles  the 
citadel.  When  he  came  there,  —  he  now  relates,  'a  strange 
confusion  came  over  me;'  it  appeared  like  a  matter  of  abso- 
lute necessity  to  him  to  drown  his  son  and  himself  in  the 
waters  at  the  citadel.  Quite  unconscious  of  what  he  was 
doing,  he  ran  towards  the  water  with  the  boy  in  his  hand. 
A  man,  surprised  at  his  behavior,  stopped  him  there,  took  the 
boy  from  him,  and  tried  to  persuade  him  to  leave  the  water; 
but  he  became  angry,  and  answered  that  he  intended  to  take 
a  walk,  and  asked,  '  whether  anybody  had  a  right  to  forbid 
him  to  do  so?'  The  man  left  him,  but  took  the  boy  along 
with  him.  An  hour  afterwards  he  was  taken  out  of  the 
water,  into  which  he  had  thrown  himself,  and  taken  to 
prison.  As  he  still  showed  symptoms  of  insanity,  he  was 
bled  and  purged,  and  two  days  after,  was  brought  into  the 
hospital,  and  committed  to  the  care  of  ray  friend.  Dr.  Wendt, 
who  has  perfectly  cured  him,  and  who  kindly  afforded  me 
the  opportunity  to  see  and  to  speak  with  him.  He  now  very 
quietly  tells  the  whole  event  himself,  but  is  not  able  to 
explain  the  cause  of  the  suddenly  rising  desire  to  kill  him- 
self and  the  boy  whom  he  loved  heartily.  This  cause  is 
only  to  be  sought  in  congestion  of  blood  in  the  brain,  the 
same  which  before  had  caused  his  giddiness ;  and  whether 
we  adopt  an  organ  of  destructiveness  in  the  brain  or  not,  it 
is  to  be  assumed  that  the  propensity  to  kill  himself  and  the 
son  arose  from  a  morbid  excitation  of  a  certain  part  of  the 
brain.  The  disposition  to  congestion  originated  from  a  fall 
he  suffered  on  the  head  in  1820."  ^ 

§  224.  A  patient  of  Mr.  Daniel  of  Newport  Pagnell,  Eng- 
land, was  suffering  under  a  derangement  of  the  digestive 
organs,  which  rendered  him  irritable  and  desponding.  "  One 
day,"  says  Mr.  D.,  "  I  called  upon  him,  and  found  him  in  a 
state  of  great  agitation,  —  countenance  flushed,  eyes  unu- 
sually bright  and  shining,  pulse  rapid,  breathing  hurried  and 

^  Dr.  Otto,  in  the  Edinburgh  Phrenological  Journal,  vi.  611. 


228  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

disturbed,  as  though  he  were  just  recovering  from  some  vio- 
lent mental  commotion.  He  assured  me  that  nothing  had 
occurred  to  disturb  his  equanimity,  at  least  as  far  as  his 
family  or  business  v^'as  concerned;  'for  all  that,'  said  he,  'I 
have  undergone  a  great  trial,  a  trial  which  fills  me  with  hor- 
ror when  I  reflect  upon  it.  I  was  lying  on  the  sofa,  and  my 
wife  and  children  were  sitting  by  the  fire;  I  had  been  talking 
to  them  very  comfortably,  when  suddenly  my  eye  caught  the 
poker,  —  a  desire  came  upon  me  I  could  not  control;  it  was 
a  desire  to  shed  blood.  I  combated  with  it  as  long  as  I 
could.  I  shut  my  eyes  and  tried  to  think  of  something  else, 
but-  it  was  of  no  use ;  the  more  1  tried,  the  worse  I  became, 
until,  at  last,  I  could  bear  it  no  longer,  and  with  a  voice  of 
thunder,  I  ordered  them  all  out  of  the  room.  Oh,  had  they 
resisted  —  had  they  opposed  me,  I  should  have  murdered 
them  every  one  —  I  must  have  done  it;  no  tongue  can  tell 
how  I  thirsted  to  do  it.'  On  another  occasion  he  met  his 
youngest  child,  a  sweet  girl  about  six  years  old,  on  the  land- 
ing of  the  staircase,  where  was  a  sash  window,  looking  into 
the  yard,  being  at  an  altitude  of  fifteen  or  sixteen  feet  from 
the  ground.  An  impulse  came  upon  him  at  that  moment; 
he  actually  seized  the  child  by  the  arm,  and  had  his  hand 
upon  the  frame  of  the  window,  when  his  better  feelings  mas- 
tered the  desire,  and  he  rushed  into  his  bedroom,  and  lay  all 
day  in  a  state  of  horror  and  distraction."  ^ 

§  225.  Dr.  Bucknill  relates  the  following  case  which  came 
under  his  own  observation.  "  An  agricultural  laborer,  of 
steady  and  industrious  habits,  had  thought,  talked,  and  read 
much  on  religious  subjects;  two  years  before  his  admission 
into  the  asylum,  he  left  the  Church  .of  England  and  joined 
the  Independents ;  twelve  months  after  that,  he  became 
restless,  gloomy,  and  reserved,  irregular  at  his  labors,  and 
distressed  about  his  soul.  He  was  fully  conscious  of  his 
state,  and  Iffeid  great  hopes  of  being  cured  in  the  asylum. 
He  had  shown  no  outward  disposition  to  suicide  or  violence, 


^  American  Jour.  Insanity,  iii.  13. 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA.  229 

but  had  the  constant  feeling  that  he  must  destroy  some  one. 
None  of  his  relations  had  been  insane.  On  admission,  he 
was  twenty-six  years  of  age,  a  fine,  powerful  man,  six  feet 
high,  with  more  than  the  average  intelligence  of  his  class. 
He  was  aware  that  his  mind  was  affected,  and  said,  '  that  his 
head  was  filled  with  vain  and  evil  thoughts,  and  that  the 
more  he  strove  to  get  near  the  Scriptures,  the  further  he  was 
from  them  ;  he  felt  a  strong  desire  to  commit  murder,  which 
he  struggled  against,  and  thought  a  temptation  from  the 
devil.'  His  head  was  hot  and  he  had  some  pain  in  it,  but 
was  otherwise  in  good  health.  In  the  course  of  a  month  he 
improved  greatly,  but  relapsed  after  a  visit  from  his  friends; 
he,  however,  again  improved,  lost  all  his  bad  thoughts,  and 
for  some  weeks,  labored  at  spade  husbandry.  Whilst  thus 
engaged,  he  one  day  came  to  the  physician,  and  begged  to 
be  taken  from  the  garden  and  placed  in  a  safe  ward,  as  he 
had  experienced  the  strongest  desire  to  kill  some  of  the 
patients  with  his  spade.  His  request  was  complied  with, 
and  from  this  time,  he  never  again  lost  the  homicidal  feeling. 
To  avoid  the  murderous  assault  to  which  he  found  himself 
urged,  he  often  requested  to  be  locked  in  his  bedroom,  and 
still  more  frequently  tied  his  own  hands  together  with  a  piece 
of  packthread  which  he  could  have  snapped  with  the  great- 
est facility,  but  which,  he  said,  enabled  him  to  resist  the 
temptation  ;  he  was  sad  and  morose,  but  never  displayed  the 
slightest  violence.  Six  months  after  his  admission,  he  was 
attacked  with  pneumonia,  first  of  one  lung,  and  then  of 
the  other,  partial  softening  took  place,  followed  by  hemor- 
rhage, of  which  he  died.  On  post-mortem  examination,  the 
membranes  of  the  brain  and  the  brain  itself  bore  evident 
traces  of  disordered  nutrition  ;  the  arachnoid  was  thick  and 
opaque,  and  the  cerebral  convolutions  at  the  vertex  were 
atrophied."  ^ 

§  226.  Another  curious  form  of  homicidal  insanity  occurs 
in  women,  and  seems  to  be  connected  with  those  changes 
in  the  system  produced  by  menstruation  and  lactation.     It  is 

*  Unsoundness  of  mind  in  relation  to  criminal  acts,  p.  89. 
20 


230  MEDICAL   JUKISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

a  little  remarkable  that  with  few  exceptions,  the  victim  se- 
lected by  the  patient  is  always  her  own,  or  some  other  young 
child.  Among  several  cases  which  Esquirol  has  related  at 
length,  are  the  two  following,  which  are  abridged  from  his 
memoir. 

§  227.  Madam  N.,  whom  Esquirol  received  into  his  hos- 
pital, and  whom  he  describes  as  being  perfectly  rational  in 
her  conversation  and  conduct,  and  of  a  mild,  affable,  and 
industrious  disposition,  very  calmly  related  to  him  the  cir- 
cumstances connected  with  a  strong  inclination  she  felt  to 
kill  her  child.  After  her  last  accouchement,  fourteen  months 
before,  she  had  several  hysterical  fits,  and  was  much  troubled 
with  pains  in  the  head,  stomach,  and  bowels;  with  vertigo, 
and  ringing  in  the  ears.  These  mostly  disappeared,  but  she 
then  became  exceedingly  capricious  in  her  temper  and  affec- 
tions, being  alternately  gay  and  sad,  confiding  and  jealous, 
resolute  and  weak.  In  this  condition,  she  heard  of  the  mur- 
der committed  by  Henriette  Cornier,  when  she  was  imme- 
diately seized  with  the  idea  of  killing  her  infant,  and  one  day 
when  her  child  entered  the  room,  she  felt  the  most  violent  de- 
sire to  assassinate  it.  '  I  repelled  the  idea,'  said  she,  '  and  coolly 
inquired  of  myself,  why  I  should  conceive  such  cruel  designs 
—  what  could  put  them  into  my  imagination?  I  could  find 
no  answer.  The  same  desire  returned ;  I  feebly  resisted  it, 
was  overcome,  and  proceeded  to  consummate  the  crime.  A 
new  effort  arrested  my  steps,  I  raised  the  knife  to  my  own 
throat,  saying  to  myself,  better  perish  yourself,  bad  woman.' 
When  asked  the  cause  of  these  evil  thoughts,  she  replied, 
that  something  behind  her  back  urged  her  on.  During  the 
first  fortnight  of  her  stay  in  the  hospital,  she  was  afflicted  by 
a  return  of  the  physical  disturbances  with  which  she  was  at 
first  attacked,  but  at  the  end  of  six  weeks  was  so  much 
better,  in  consequence  of  a  proper  medical  treatment,  that 
she  received  her  husband  and  child  with  joy,  and  lavished  on 
the  latter  the  tenderest  caresses.  Suddenly  she  perceived 
a  cutting  instrument,  and  was  seized  with  the  desire  of 
snatching  it  up  and  committing  two  murders  at  once,  —  a 
thought  which  she  suppressed  only  by  flying  from  the  room. 


PARTIAL   MORAL    MANIA.  231 

The  symptoms  of  physical  disturbance  now  again  made 
their  appearance,  during  which  she  was  informed  that  her 
child  was  sick,  and  while  extremely  distressed  and  weeping 
at  the  news,  '  she  felt  a  violent  desire,'  to  use  her  own  expres- 
sion, '  to  stab  or  stifle  it  in  her  arms.'  After  about  three 
months'  residence  at  the  hospital,  she  went  away  restored, 
and  continued  well.^ 

§  228.  A  girl  fourteen  years  old,  of  strong  constitution 
and  difficult  temper,  enjoyed  apparently  good  health,  though 
she  had  not  menstruated.  Once  a  month  she  complained 
of  pain  in  the  head,  her  eyes  were  red,  she  was  irascible, 
gloomy,  and  restless  ;  every  thing  went  wrong  with  her,  and 
she  was  particularly  inclined  to  dispute  with  her  mother 
who  was  always  the  object  of  her  threats  and  abuse ;  and 
finally  she  became  most  violently  angry,  sometimes  attempt- 
ing her  own  life,  and  sometimes  her  mother's.  When  the  fit 
arrived  to  this  degree,  the  blood  escaped  from  her  mouth, 
nose,  or  eyes ;  she  wept  and  trembled  ;  the  extremities  be- 
came cold,  and  affected  with  convulsive  pains;  and  her 
mind  was  filled  with  distress.  The  fit,  which  altogether  con- 
tinued one  or  two  days,  being  over,  she  recovered  her  affec- 
tion for  her  mother,  and  asked  her  forgiveness.  She  did  not 
recollect  all  the  circumstances  of  these  fits,  and  denied  with 
feelings  of  surprise  and  regret  some  of  the  particulars  which 
were  related  to  her.  At  the  age  of  sixteen  years,  these  fits 
of  anger  were  often  replaced  by  hysteric  convulsions;  the 
disease  diminished  progressively,  but  did  not  cease  till  she 
was  seventeen  years  old,  when  the  menses  appeared.  She 
afterwards  married,  and  became  an  excellent  mother.^ 

§  229.  Almira  Brixey  was  a  maid-servant  in  a  respectable 
English  family,  and  one  day,  in  the  spring  of  1845,  while  the 
nurse  was  out  of  the  room,  she  obtained  a  knife  from  the 
kitchen  and  cut  the  throat  of  her  master's  infant  child.  She 
then  went  down  stairs  and  told  what  she  had  done,  inquiring 
with  some  anxiety  whether  she  would  be  hanged  or  trans- 
ported.    No  delusions  were  detected,  nor  had  she  manifested 

1  Des  Malad.  Ment.  ii.  821.  ^  i^jem.  ij.  814. 


232  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

any  other  mental  peculiarity  except  some  violence  of  temper 
about  trivial  matters,  a  short  time  before.  She  had  expressed 
a  little  dissatisfaction  with  her  share  of  her  mistress's  cast-off' 
dresses,  but  beyond  this,  there  did  not  appear  to  be  a  shadow 
of  a  motive.  There  was  some  proof,  though  not  very  definite, 
that  she  had  labored  under  some  menstrual  disorders.  She 
was  acquitted  and  sent  to  Bethlehem  hospital.^ 

§  230.  Esquirol  relates  another  case  communicated  to 
him  by  Dr.  Barbier  of  Amiens,  which  will  be  briefly  noticed. 
This  lady.  Marguerite  Molliens,  twenty-four  years  old,  had 
suffered  for  three  years  past  pains  in  the. epigastrium,  and 
right  side  of  the  abdomen  ;  headache,  vertigo,  noise  in  the 
ears,  disturbance  of  vision,  palpitation  of  the  heart,  con- 
strictions of  the  throat,  and  trembling  of  the  limbs.  Her  first 
child,  which  lived  but  three  months,  she  loved  and  deeply 
regretted.  Nine  months  ago  she  had  another  child.  On  the 
fifth  day  of  her  confinement  she  heard  of  Cornier's  case,  and 
was  so  deeply  impressed  with  the  story,  that  her  thoughts 
dwelt  upon  it,  and  from  that  moment  she  feared  lest  she  also 
might  be  similarly  tempted.  In  spite  of  all  her  efforts,  she 
gradually  familiarized  herself  with  the  idea  of  killing  her 
child.  One  day  while  dressing  it,  the  thought  of  murdering 
it  seized  upon  her  mind  and  became  a  violent  desire.  She 
turned  around,  and  perceiving  a  kitchen-knife  on  a  table  near 
her,  her  arm  was  involuntarily  carried  towards  it.  She  saw 
that  she  could  no  longer  control  herself,  and  cried  out  for 
assistance.  The  neighbors  came  in  and  she  soon  became 
calm.  Shortly  after,  she  was  separated  from  her  child  and 
sent  to  a  hospital,  where  she  finally  recovered.  It  is  worthy 
of  note  that  when  the  pains  in  the  head  and  epigastrium, 
from  which  she  suffered  greatly  in  the  hospital,  were  worst, 
then  the  bad  thoughts  appeared  to  be  most  imperious.^ 

§  231.  Dr.  Otto,  of  Copenhagen,  relates  that  a  female, 
who  was  received  into  a  lying-in  hospital  of  which  he  was 
physician,  requested  a  private  conference  with  him  pre- 
viously to  her  accouchement.     She  appeared  to  be  in  great 

*  Lond.  Med.  Gaz.  xxxvi.  166.  ^  pgg^  Malad.  Ment.  ii.  825. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  233 

agitation  and  embarrassment,  and  earnestly  begged  of  him 
that  she  might  not  be  left  in  the  same  chamber  with  other 
women  and  their  infants,  as  it  would  be  utterly  impossible 
for  her  to  resist  the  propensity  she  felt  to  destroy  the  latter. 
Her  request  was  granted  and  she  was  carefully  watched. 
Her  delivery  was  easy,  and  the  child  was  kept  from  her  and 
afterwards  sent  to  her  mother.  The  young  woman  on  leav- 
ing the  hospital  went  into  service,  and  would  not  return  to 
her  mother's,  lest 'she  might  be  tempted  to  destroy  her  infant. 
She  declared  that  the  sight  of  a  very  young  infant  kindled 
up  a  violent  propensity  to  destroy  its  life.  This  woman 
was  a  peasant  who  had  been  seduced,  but  had  never  led  a 
dissolute  life,  nor  was  in  any  way  of  corrupt  manners.  She 
bad  not  been  reproached,  nor  ill-treated  by  her  parents, 
during  pregnancy,  nor  was  there  the  least  cause  for  anxiety 
on  account  of  the  child,  as  her  mother  had  engaged  to  pro- 
vide for  it.  She  entered  into  the  service  of  a  clergyman, 
and  enjoyed  good  health.  Some  time  afterwards  she  in- 
formed the  doctor  that  she  had  lost  nearly  all  propensity  to 
infanticide.^ 

§  232.  The  next  case  is  recorded  by  Dr.  Michu.  "  A 
country  woman,  twenty-four  years  of  age,  of  a  bilious,  san- 
guine temperament,  of  simple  and  regular  habits,  but  re- 
served and  sullen  manners,  had  been  ten  days  confined 
with  her  first  child,  when  suddenly  having  her  eyes  fixed 
upon  it,  she  was  seized  with  the  desire  of  strangling  it. 
This  idea  made  her  shudder;  she  carried  the  infant  to  its 
cradle,  and  went  out  in  order  to  get  rid  of  so  horrid  a 
thought.  The  cries  of  the  little  being  who  required  nourish- 
ment, recalled  her  to  the  house ;  she  experienced  still  more 
strongly  the  impulse  to  destroy  it.  She  hastened  away 
again  haunted  by  the  dread  of  committing  a  crime  so  horri- 
ble;  she  raised  her  eyes  to  heaven,  went  to  the  church  and 
prayed.  The  whole  day  was  passed  by  this  unhappy  mother 
in  a  constant  struggle  between  the  desire  of  taking  away  the 
life  of  her  infant  and  the  dread  of  yielding  to  the  impulse. 

*  Medico-Chirurgical  Review,  O.  S.,  xiii.  441. 

20* 


234  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

She  concealed  her  agitation  until  evening,  when  her  confes- 
sor, a  respectable  old  man,  was  the  first  to  receive  her  con- 
fidence. He  soothed  her  feelings,  and  counselled  her  to  have 
medical  assistance.  '  When  we  arrived  at  her  house,'  says 
Michu,  '  she  appeared  gloomy  and  depressed,  and  ashamed 
of  her  situation.'  Being  reminded  of  the  tenderness  due  from 
a  mother  to  her  child,  she  replied  :  '  I  know  how  much  a 
mother  ought  to  love  her  child  ;  but  if  I  do  not  love  mine,  it 
does  not  depend  upon  me.'  She  soon  after  recovered,  the 
infant,  in  the  mean  time,  having  been  removed  from  her 
sight."  1 

§  233.  Gall  says  he  knew  a  woman,  then  twenty-six  years 
old,  who  had  experienced,  especially  at  the  menstrual  periods, 
inexpressible  torture,  and  the  fearful  temptation  to  destroy 
herself,  and  to  kill  her  husband  and  children,  who  were  ex- 
ceedingly dear  to  her.  She  shuddered  with  terror,  as  she 
described  the  struggle  that  took  place  within  her,  between 
her  sense  of  duty  and  of  religion,  and  the  impulse  that  urged 
her  to  this  atrocious  act.  For  a  long  time,  she  dared  not 
bathe  her  youngest  child,  because  an  internal  voice  constantly 
said  to  her,  'let  him  slip,  let  him  slip.'  Frequently  she  had 
hardly  the  strength  and  time  to  throw  away  a  knife  which 
she  was  tempted  to  plunge  into  her  own  breast  and  her  chil- 
dren's. Whenever  she  entered  the  chamber  of  her  children, 
or  husband,  and  found  them  asleep,  she  was  instantly  pos- 
sessed with  the  desire  of  killing  them.  Sometimes  she  pre- 
cipitately shut  behind  her  the  door  of  their  chamber  and 
threw  away  the  key,  to  remove  the  possibility  of  returning  to 
them  during  the  night,  if  she  should  fail  to  resist  this  infernal 
temptation."  2 

§  234.  Another  phase  of  homicidal  mania  occurs  in  puer- 
peral women,  within  a  few  M^eeks  or  days  after  delivery. 
Sometimes  it  is  accompanied  by  obvious  bodily  and  mental 
disturbance,  but  frequently  the  homicidal  act  furnishes  the 
first  suspicion  of  derangement.      Sonjetimes,  the  wretched 


'  Memoir  sur  la  monomanie-homicide,  99. 
'^  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  110. 


PARTIAL  MORAL   MANIA.  235 

mother  is  conscious  of  the  propensity  to  destroy  her  new-born 
offspring,  strives  against  it,  and  begs  that  it  may  be  removed 
from  her  sight;  sometimes  the  propensity  arises  suddenly, 
and  overpowers  all  resistance  at  once.  After  the  act  is  ac- 
complished, she  may  be  conscious  of  what  she  has  done,  and 
be  able  to  describe  her  sensations ;  or  she  may  awake  as 
from  a  dream,  with  little  or  no  consciousness  of  the  terrible 
deed. 

§  235.  Lord  Hale  relates,  that  "  in  1688,  at  Aylesbury,  a 
married  woman  of  good  reputation,  being  delivered  of  a 
child,  and  having  tiot  slept  many  nights,  fell  into  a  temporary 
phrensy,  and  killed  her  infant  in  the  absence  of  any  com- 
pany, but  company  coming  in,  she  told  them  she  had  killed 
her  infant,  and  there  it  lay  ;  she  was  brought  to  jail  presently, 
and  after  some  sleep  she  recovered  her  understanding,  but 
marvelled  how  or  why  she  came  thither;  she  was  indicted 
for  murder,  and  the  jury  found  her  not  guilty,  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  all  who  heard  it."  ^ 

§  236.  A  young  and  hitherto  wealthy  woman,  the  mother 
of  two  children  in  humble  life,  but  not  indigence,  applied  to 
the  Hitchin  Dispensary,  in  consequence  of  the  most  misera- 
ble feelings  of  gloom  and  despondency,  accompanied  by  a 
strong,  and,  according  to  her  own  account,  an  almost  irre- 
sistible propensity,  or  temptation,  as  she  termed  it,  to  destroy 
her  infant.  The  feeling  first  came  upon  her  about  a  week 
before,  when  the  child  was  a  month  old ;  and  she  now  sunk 
into  a  state  of  extreme  dejection.  She  begged  to  be  contin- 
ually watched,  lest  she  should  yield  to  this  strange  propensity. 
Her  appetite  was  bad,  bowels  loose,  stools  dark  and  ofTen- 
sive  ;  she  had  occasionally  discharged  portions  of  tape-worms 
from  her  bowels.  Pulse  natural,  sleeps  ill.  This  condition 
lasted  from  October  1824  until  March  1825,  when  the  patient 
took  the  smallpox.  During  the  eruption,  the  mind  was  serene 
and  happy,  and  she  was  free  from  the  dreadful  temptation,  by 
which  she  had  been  previously  harassed;  but  upon  the  sub- 
sidence of  the  smallpox,  the  disease  returned  with  its  former 

1  1  Pleas  of  the  Crown,  36. 


236  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

horrors.  About  the  middle  of  April,  the  disease,  without  any 
apparent  cause,  began  to  decline,  and  she  was,  at  the  end  of 
the  month,  discharged  from  the  dispensary,  at  her  own  re- 
quest. She  remained  free  from  any  disorder  till  the  spring  of 
this  year,  1S28,  when  she  had  another  child ;  and  about  a 
month  after  the  birth  of  it,  she  was  assailed  by  the  propensity 
to  destroy  it.  The  symptoms  continued  till  the  child  was 
half  a  year  old ;  and  from  that  time  have  gradually  declined. 
Occasionally,  a  sort  of  change  takes  place  for  a  few  days ; 
the  propensity  to  destroy  the  infant  entirely  subsides,  and  the 
place  of  it  is  supplied  by  an  equally  strong  disposition  to 
suicide.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  during  the  most  dis- 
tressing periods  of  her  disease,  she  is  perfectly  aware  of  the 
atrocity  of  the  act  to  which  she  is  so  powerfully  impelled, 
and  prays  fervently  to  be  enabled  to  withstand  so  great  a 
temptation. 1 

§  237.  Martha  Prior,  wife  of  a  laboring  man,  showing 
symptoms  of  mania,  soon  after  delivery,  her  physician  or- 
dered her  to  be  watched,  and  not  allowed  to  have  the  child. 
On  the  13th  day  after  delivery,  while  her  attendants  w^ere  out 
of  the  way,  she  ordered  her  little  daughter  to  bring  her  the 
child,  and  soon  after,  a  razor,  saying  she  wanted  to  cut  the 
hard  skin  from  her  hands.  She  instantly  cut  off  the  child's 
head.  To  those  who  first  came  in,  she  seemed  calm  and  col- 
lected, said  it  was  what  she,  all  along,  had  been  intending  to 
do;  and  added,  that  she  would  not  care  if  any  one  served 
her  the  same.  Her  mind  had  previously  been  quite  unsteady. 
She  often  said,  she  knew  she  was  going  to  die,  and  was 
certain  she  was  going  to  hell.  She  had  borne  a  good  char- 
acter.2 

§  238.  In  another  class  of  cases,  the  exciting  cause  of  the 
homicidal  propensity  is  of  a  moral  nature,  operating  upon 
some  peculiar  physical  predisposition,  and  sometimes  fol- 
lowed by  more  or  less  physical  disturbance.  Instead  of  being 
urged  on  by  a  sudden,  imperious  impulse  to  kill,  the  subjects 

^  Prichard,  Insanity  in  relation  to  Jurisprudence,  122. 
^  Jour.  Psycol.  Medicine,  i.  478. 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA.  237 

of  this  form  of  the  affection,  after  suffering  for  a  certain 
period  much  gloom  of  mind  and  depression  of  spirits,  feel  as 
if  bound  by  a  sense  of  necessity  to  destroy  life,  and  proceed 
to  the  fulfilment  of  their  destiny  with  the  utmost  calmness 
and  deliberation.  So  reluctant  have  courts  and  juries  usu- 
ally been  to  receive  the  plea  of  insanity  in  defence  of  crime, 
deliberately  planned  and  executed  by  a  mind  in  which  no 
derangement  of  intellect  has  ever,  been  perceived,  that  it  is 
of  the  greatest  importance  that  the  nature  of  these  cases 
should  not  be  misunderstood.  They  are  of  not  unfrequent 
occurrence,  and  are  often  attended  by  such  horrid,  heart- 
rending circumstances,  that  nothing  but  the  plainest  and 
strongest  conviction  of  their  true  character  can  ever  save 
their  subjects  from  the  last  penalty  of  the  law.  The  near 
affinity  of  this  form  of  the  affection  to  those  already  de- 
scribed will  be  manifest,  upon  a  careful  consideration  of  the 
few  cases  here  given. 

§  239.  The  following  is  related  by  Dr.  Otto  of  a  surgeon 
who  had  served  in  several  campaigns  against  the  French. 
"  He  always  appeared  of  a  lively  and  cheerful  disposition, 
till  certain  pecuniary  matters  ruffled  his  temper  and  made 
him  thoughtful  and  melancholy.  He  was  now  frequently 
observed  to  be  studying  the  Scriptures,  and  reciting  passages 
from  the  Bible.  He  was  happily  married,  and  had  four 
children.  One  morning  he  summoned  his  wife  and  children 
into  the  court  of  the  house,  and  there  informed  them  that 
it  was  his  intention  to  kill  them  all,  and  afterwards  himself. 
He  descanted  coolly  on  the  propriety  of  homicide,  and  told 
his  wife  she  must  first  be  a  spectator  of  the  destruction!  of 
her  children,  and  then  her  own  turn  would  come.  The 
woman  appears  to  have  possessed  great  presence  of  mind, 
and  acted  with  great  prudence  on  such  a  trying  occasion. 
She  entirely  coincided  in  the  justness  of  her  husband's  sen- 
timents, and  cheerfally  agreed  to  the  proposed  tragedy.  But 
she  appeared  suddenly  to  recollect  that  it  would  be  proper 
for  herself,  as  well  as  the  children,  to  confess  and  take  the 
sacrament  previous  to  their  appearing  before  their  final 
judge, —  a  ceremony  which  would  necessarily  require  several 


23S  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

• 

days'  preparation.  The  monomaniac  replied  that  this  was 
a  reasonable  and  proper  procedure ;  but,  in  the  mean  time, 
it  would  be  absolutely  necessary  that  he  took  some  person's 
life  that  day.  With  this  pm-pose  in  view,  he  instantly  set  oft' 
for  Salzbourg.  His  wife,  having  placed  the  children  in  secu- 
rity, made  the  best  of  her  way  to  the  above-mentioned  town, 
and  went  directly  to  professor  O.,  the  friend  of  her  husband, 
for  advice.  The  monomaniac  had  already  been  there,  and 
not  finding  the  professor  at  home,  had  gone  away.  The 
woman  now  recollected  and  told  the  professor,  that  her  hus- 
band had  threatened  his  life  for  some  imaginary  slight;  but, 
at  that  time,  she  thought  he  was  in  jest.  About  midday  the 
monomaniac  came  back  to  the  professor's  residence,  and 
appeared  quite  calm  and  peaceable.  The  professor  invited 
him  to  go  and  see  the  hospital  of  the  town  where  he  had  a 
curious  dissection  to  make,  and  they  sat  down  to  take  some 
refreshments  before  proceeding  thither.  At  this  repast,  the 
monomaniac  informed  his  host  that  he  had  lately  been  most 
immoderately  disposed  to  commit  homicide,  and  that  he  had 
actually  murdered  a  peasant  that  morning  on  his  way  to 
town.  He  confessed,  also,  that  he  had  entered  a  coffee-house 
for  the  purpose  of  committing  a  second  act  of  this  kind,  but 
had  been  diverted  from  his  purpose.  The  murder  of  the 
peasant  was  a  fiction,  as  was  afterwards  proved.  The  pro- 
fessor now  turned  the  discourse  to  other  subjects,  and  on  all 
other  topics  the  monomaniac  was  perfectly  rational.  They  now 
set  off"  for  the  hospital,  and  in  their  way  thither  the  monoma- 
niac met  with  an  old  acquaintance  and  fellow-campaigner. 
Wiiile  they  were  greeting  each  other,  the  monomaniac  sud- 
denly struck  his  friend  a  violent  blow  on  the  pit  of  the  stomach, 
exclaiming  in  a  burst  of  laughter,  that  he  had  done  it  for 
him,  as  he  had  hit  the  cceliac  plexus.  The  professor  repri- 
manded him  in  strong  terms  for  this  dishonorable  and  cruel 
act,  at  which  the  monomaniac  was  much  surprised,  and  in- 
formed his  preceptor  that  he  was  irresistibly  led  to  commit 
homicide,  and  cared  not  who  was  the  victim  of  this  propen- 
sity. The  professor  now  asked  him,  somewhat  tauntingly,  if 
he  had  not  a  design  against  his  life.     The  monomaniac  ac- 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA.  239 

knowledged  it;  but  added  that  he  had  sufficient  control  over 
himself  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  his  benefactor.  The 
professor  took  his  arm,  and  they  proceeded  to  the  hospital, 
where  the  monomaniac  was  immediately  confined.  He 
almost  instantly  became  furiously  maniacal,  and  in  a  few 
months  after  died."  ^ 

§  240.  Gall  quotes  an  account  of  Catherine  Hansterin, 
who,  in  consequence  of  being  detected  in  a  petty  theft  which 
was  reported  to  her  husband,  a  man  of  harsh  and  austere 
manners,  of  whom  she  stood  greatly  in  fear  on  account  of  his 
cruel  treatment  of  her,  became  exceedingly  melancholy  and 
depressed.  After  suffering  much  and  long  from  her  cruel 
husband,  she  determined  to  leave  him,  and  accordingly  de- 
parted, taking  her  infant  two  and  a  half  months  old,  and  her 
little  girl  who  had  declared  she  would  rather  die  tlian  be 
left  behind  with  her  father.  "  The  thought  v^hich  this  reply 
brought  to  her  mind,  the  distress  that  afflicted  her,  the  fear 
of  what  would  happen  to  her  children  in  case  of  her  death, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  her  ardent  desire  to  terminate  her  own 
existence ;  —  all  these  united,  gave  rise  to  the  barbarous 
design  of  drowning  her  two  children.  Having  arrived  at  the 
bank  of  the  Danube,  she  made  her  little  girl  kneel  down 
and  pray  God  for  a  good  death.  She  then  placed  the 
infant  in  the  hands'  of  her  sister,  blessed  them  both,  and 
making  the  sign  of  the  cross,  pushed  them  into  the  river. 
This  done,  she  returned  to  the  village  and  told  what  had 
passed."  ^ 

§  241.  Dr.  Otto  has  published  the  case  of  Peter  Neilsen, 
a  joiner,  aged  forty-seven  years,  who  drowned  four  of  his 
seven  children.  He  appears  to  have  experienced  some  mis- 
fortunes, but  was  not  in  positive  want  of  the  necessaries 
of  life  at  the  moment  when  he  committed  the  horrid  deed. 
Many  persons  who  conversed  with  him  on  the  same  day 
both  before  and  after  the  transaction,  testified  that  he  was 
not  intoxicated,  nor  the  least  agitated  in  mind.     He  was,  on 

^  Medico-Cliirurgical  Review,  o.  s.  xiii.  44G. 
2  Op.  cit.  iv.  152. 


240  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  contrary,  placid  and  tranquil.  No  domestic  altercations, 
of  any  moment,  had  occurred,  but  he  was  disconcerted  at 
not  readily  getting  a  new  lodging  on  being  turned  out  of 
that  which  he  previously  occupied.  His  love  to  his  children 
was  testified  to  by  all.  He  confessed  that  the  idea  of  kill- 
ing his  children  came  into  his  head  on  the  morning  of  the 
day  that  he  put  the  idea  into  execution,  and  that  the  impulse 
was  quite  irresistible.  He  determined  to  drown  the  three 
younger  boys  and  spare  the  daughter  who  was  older.  But 
she  insisted  on  accompanying  her  father  and  brothers  in  the 
walk  he  proposed,  and  though  he  endeavored  to  persuade  her 
to  return,  she  would  not.  He  averred  that  his  motive  for 
destroying  the  boys  was  the  fear  of  not  being  able  to  main- 
tain them  ;  whereas  he  would  have  spared  the  girl,  not  be- 
cause he  loved  her  more,  but  because  she  was  better  able  to 
maintain  herself.  Having  arrived  at  a  turf-pit  he  first  em- 
braced his  children,  and  then  pushed  them  all  into  the  water. 
He  stood  by  unmoved,  and  saw  them  struggle  and  sink.  He 
then  returned  quietly  to  the  town  and  told  what  he  had  done. 
He  was  then  led  back  to  the  turf-pit,  and  beheld  the  dead 
bodies  of  his  children  without  evincing  any  emotion.  For  a 
moment  he  wept,  when  he  saw  the  bodies  opened  (for  the 
purpose  of  niedico-legal  proof  of  the  kind  of  death),  but  soon 
regained  his  tranquillity.  He  affirmed'  that  he  did  not  de- 
stroy his  offspring  in  order  to  procure  happiness  for  them  in 
heaven,  nor  from  any  desire  to  be  put  to  death  himself,  as  he 
wished  to  live.^- 

§  242.  The  case  of  Henriette  Cornier,  which  occurred  in 
Paris  a  few  years  since,  has,  in  consequence  of  the  imposing 
weight  of  medical  opinions  that  were  delivered  on  her  trial, 
and  of  the  discussions  to  which  ifr  gave  rise  in  the  various 
shapes  of  reports,  newspaper  criticisms,  and  elaborate  treatises 
from  some  of  the  most  distinguished  physicians  of  that 
capital,  contributed,  more  than  any  other  single  event,  to 
advance  our  knowledge  of  homicidal  insanity.  A  case  so 
celebrated  deserves  a  particular  notice  here.     The  facts  as 

^  Edinburgli  Phrenological  Journal,  v.  87. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  241 

related  below  are  contained  in  the  indictment  [acte  d'  accu- 
sation), which  is  given  at  length  by  Georget  in  his  account 
of  the  trial.i 

§  243.  Henriette  Cornier,  a  female  servant  aged  twenty- 
seven  years,  was  of  a  mild  and  lively  disposition,  full  of 
gaiety,  and  remarkably  fond  of  children.  In  the  month  of 
June,  1825,  a  singular  change  was  observed  in  her  character ; 
she  became  silent,  melancholy,  absorbed  in  reverie,  and  finally 
sank  into  a  kind  of  stupor.  She  was  dismissed  from  her 
place,  but  her  friends  could  obtain  from  her  no  account  of 
the  causes  of  her  mental  dejection.  In  the  month  of  Sep- 
tember she  made  an  attempt  to  commit  suicide,  but  was 
prevented.  In  the  following  October  she  entered  into  the 
service  of  dame  Fournier,  but  there  she  still  presented  the 
melancholy  and  desponding  disposition.  Dame  Fournier 
observed  her  peculiar  dejection,  and  endeavored  in  vain  to 
ascertain  its  cause ;  the  girl  would  talk  only  of  her  misfor- 
tune in  losing  her  parents  at  an  early  age,  and  of  the  bad 
treatment  she  received  from  her  guardian.  On  the  4th  of 
November,  her  conduct  not  having  been  previously  different 
from  what  it  usually  was,  she  suddenly  conceived  and  im- 
mediately executed  the  act  for  which  she  was  committed. 

§  244.  About  noon  her  mistress  went  out  to  walk,  having 
told  Cornier  to  prepare  dinner  at  the  usual  hour,  and  to  go  to 
a  neighboring  shop  kept  by  dame  Belon,  to  buy  some  cheese. 
She  had  frequently  gone  to  this  shop,  and  had  always  mani- 
fested great  fondness  for  Belon's  little  girl,  a  beautiful  child 
nineteen  months'  old.  On  this  day  she  displayed  her  usual 
fondness  for  it,  and  persuaded  its  mother,  who  at  first  was 
rather  unwilling,  to  let  her  take  it  out  to  walk.  Cornier  then 
hastened  back  to  her  mistress's  house  with  the  child,  and 
laying  it  across  her  own  bed,  severed  its  head  from  its  body 
with  a  large  kitchen  knife.  She  subsequently  declared  that 
while  executing  this  horrid  deed,  she  felt  no  particular  emo- 
tion,—  neither  of  pleasure,  nor  of  pain.  Shortly  after,  she 
said,  the    sight    of   the    horrible    spectacle    before    her  eyes 

^  Discussion  medico-legale,  70. 

21 


242  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

brought  her  to  herself,  aud  she  expressed  some  emotions  of 
fear,  but  they  were  of  short  duration.  At  the  end  of  two 
hours,  during  which  time  she  had  remained  chiefly  in  her 
own  chamber,  dame  Belon  came  and  inquired  for  her  child, 
from  the  bottom  of  the  staircase.  "  Your  child  is  dead," 
said  Henriette.  The  mother,  who  at  first  thought  she  was 
only  in  jest,  soon  became  alarmed,  and  pushed  forward  into 
the  chamber,  where  she  witnessed  the  bloody  sight  of  the 
mutilated  fragments  of  her  child.  At  that  moment,  Cornier 
snatched  up  the  head  of  the  murdered  child,  and  threw  it  into 
the  street,  from  the  open  window.  The  mother  rushed  out 
of  the  house,  struck  with  horror.  An  alarm  was  raised ;  the 
father  of  the  child  and  the  officers  of  justice  with  a  crowd  of 
persons  entered  the  room.  Henriette  was  found  sitting  on  a 
chair  near  the  body  of  the  child,  gazing  at  it,  with  the  bloody 
knife  by  her,  her  hands  and  clothes  covered  with  blood.  She 
made  no  attempt  to  escape,  nor  to  deny  the  crime  ;  she  con- 
fessed all  the  circumstances,  even  her  premeditated  design, 
and  the  perfidy  of  her  caresses,  which  had  persuaded  the 
unhappy  mother  to  intrust  her  with  the  child.  It  was  found 
impossible  to  excite  in  her  the  slightest  emotion  of  remorse 
or  grief;  to  all  that  was  said,  she  replied,  with  indifference, 
"  I  intended  to  kill  the  child."  When  closely  and  earnestly 
interrogated,  as  to  her  motives  for  committing  this  dreadful 
act,  she  replied  that  she  had  no  particular  reason  for  it ;  that 
the  idea  had  taken  possession  of  her  mind,  and  that  she  was 
destined  to  do  it.  When  asked  why  she  threw  the  head  into 
the  street,  she  answered  that  it  was  for  the  purpose  of  attract- 
ing public  attention,  so  that  people  might  come  up  to  her 
chamber  and  see  that  she  alone  was  guilty.  The  nature  of 
her  extraordinary  replies,  the  want  of  motives  for  such  an 
atrocious  deed,  the  absence  of  every  kind  of  emotion,  and 
the  state  of  stupor  in  which  she  remained,  fixed  the  attention 
of  the  medical  men  who  were  called  in,  and  impressed  them 
with  the  belief  that  she  was  mad.  On  the  examination 
before  the  magistrate,  she  confirmed  the  above  statements 
respecting  her  mental  condition,  adding,  among  other  things, 
that  she  had  been  unhappily  married  seven  years  before; 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  243 

that  she  attempted  to  drown  herself  "  because  she  was 
eniiuied  at  changing  her  place  of  service  so  often ;"  that  she 
knew  her  crime  deserved  death,  and  she  desired  it. 

§  245.  She  was  tried  for  the  first  time,  on  the  27th  of 
February,  1826.  She  then  appeared  to  be  in  a  state  of  great 
nervous  irritation  ;  her  limbs  trembled  ;  her  eyes  were  fixed  ; 
and  her  understanding  was  dull  and  stupid.  A  few  days 
previous,  the  court,  at  the  request  of  her  counsel,  appointed 
a  medical  commission  consisting  of  Adelon,  Esquirol,  and 
Leveille,  to  examine  the  accused  and  all  the  documents  of 
the  case,  and  report  on  her  "  present  moral  state."  Accord- 
ingly they  reported  that  they  were  unable  to  detect  any  sign 
or  proof  of  mental  derangement;  but  added  that  it  is  ex- 
tremely difficult  in  some  cases,  to  establish  the  existence  of 
insanity,  it  requiring  a  long  intimacy  with  the  individual  and 
numerous  opportunities  of  watching  him  under  every  variety 
of  circumstance,  none  of  which  they  had  possessed  in  this 
case.  In  fine,  they  reported  that  though  they  could  not 
adduce  any  positive  proof  of  her  insanity,  yet  they  were 
equally  unable  to  pronounce  her  sane. 

§  246.  This  report  not  being  satisfactory,  the  trial  was 
postponed  to  another  session,  and  the  prisoner  was  sent  to 
the  Salpetriere  to  be  observed  by  the  above-named  physi- 
cians. After  recapitulating  their  observations,  which  were 
continued  three  months,  they  came  to  the  following  con- 
clusions:  "first,  that  during  the  whole  time  Cornier  was 
under  examination,  from  the  2oth  of  February  to  the  3d  of 
June,  they  had  observed  in  regard  to  her  moral  state,  great 
mental  dejection,  extreme  dulness  of  mind,  and  profound 
chagrin ;  secondly,  that  the  present  situation  of  Cornier 
sufficiently  explains  Jier  moral  state,  and  thus  does  not  of 
itself  indicate  mental  alienation  either  general  or  partial." 
They  also  added  that  it  was  due  to  the  cause  of  justice  and 
to  their  own  conscience,  to  declare  that  their  judgment  of 
her  actual  moral  condition  could  not  be  considered  final,  if 
it  were  proved,  as  stated  in  the  acte  iV accusation,  that  long 
before  the  4th  of  November,  the  character  and  habits  had 
changed ;  that  she  had  become  sad,  gloomy,  silent,  and  rest- 


244  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

less ;  for  then  that  which  might  be  attributed  to  her  present 
situation,  could  be  only  the  continuation  of  a  melancholy 
state  that  had  existed  for  a  year.^ 

Cornier  was  again  brought  to  trial  on  the  24th  of  June, 
and  the  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  "committing 
homicide  voluntarily,  but  not  with  premeditation  ; "  ^  and  ac- 
cordingly she  was  sentenced  to  hard  labor  for  life. 

§  247.  Sometimes  the  individual  confesses  a  motive  for 
the  homicidal  act,  which  is  rational  and  well  founded,  but 
altogether  inadequate  to  lead  to  such  an  action  in  a  sound 
mind.  There  are  seldom  wanting  other  circumstances  in 
the  previous  conduct,  conversation,  or  bodily  health,  to  con- 
firm and  establish  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  presence 
of  insanity,  the  suspicion'  of  which  is  thus  excited.  All 
doubt  of  the  correctness  of  this  conclusion  is  removed  in  the 
first  of  the  following  cases,  which  is  introduced  to  illustrate 
this  form  of  the  disorder,  by  the  pathological  changes  dis- 
covered after  death,  and  in  the  second  by  the  previous  exist- 
ence of  insanity. 

§  248.  At  Rouen,  in  1820,  a  young  man  named  Trestel, 
seventeen  or  eighteen  years  old,  whose  family  was  respecta- 
ble and  in  easy  circumstances,  obtained  an  almost  complete 
meeting  of  its  various  members  to  the  number  of  thirteen, 
and  endeavored  to  poison  them  all  by  putting  arsenic  into 
the  soup.     The  severe  vomiting  which  it  produced,  however, 

^  Georget  justly  observes  that  the  meaning  of  the  committee  would  have 
been  better  expressed  in  the  fallowing  language  :  "  The  present  moral  state 
of  Henriette  Cornier  is  doubtful.  It  may  be  the  result  either  of  a  painful 
moral  affection,  or  of  melancholy  ;  which  it  really  is,  the  nature  of  the  prior 
circimistances  must  decide.  If,  several  months  before  the  4th  of  November, 
her  characte'r  had  changed ;  if  she  became  sad  and  gloomy  without  cause ; 
if  she  had  a  motiveless  propensity  to  suicide ;  and,  finally,  if  the  homicide 
she  committed  was  without  cause,  and  under  the  circumstances  related  in  the 
acte  (ruccusation,  it  is  certain  that  she  has  been  and  still  is  laboring  under  a 
kind  of  mental  alienation." 

*  This  verdict  is  very  properly  censured  by  Georget,  who  says,  that  if  the 
accused  Avas  mad,  she  ought  to  have  been  acquitted ;  and  that  if  not  mad, 
Bhe  acted  from  premeditation,  and  should  have  sufTered  the  punishment  of 
death. 


VARTIAL   MORAL    MANIA.  245 

was  the  means  of  saving  all  their  lives.  It  appeared  in  evi- 
dence, that  Trestel  was  so  imbecile  at  fifteen  years  of  age, 
that  he  was  incapable  of  executing  the  slightest  commissions; 
that  he  had  strange  and  incoherent  ideas  ;  that  he  was  sad, 
taciturn,  and  incapable  of  being  instructed  ;  that  he  was  in 
the  habit  of  addressing  letters  to  an  imaginary  female  whom 
he  was  in  love  with.  On  the  trial,  as  well  as  on  the  previous 
examination,  Trestel  alleged  as  his  motive  for  committing 
the  crime,  that  his  father  had  frequently  threatened  to  send 
him  to  sea.  Notwithstanding  these  strong  indications  of 
mental  deficiency  and  alienation,  he  was  convicted  and  sen- 
tenced to  be  executed  ;  but  on  the  day  appointed  for  the  exe- 
cution, he  killed  himself  by  taking  poison.  His  body  w^as 
examined  by  Dr.  Vingtrinier,  surgeon  of  the  prisons,  in  the 
presence  of  three  other  medical  men,  and  there  was  found 
inflammation  of  the  arachnoid  membrane  of  the  brain,  char- 
acterized by  thickening,  induration,  and  redness,  and  by  its 
almost  entire  adhesion  to  the  pia  mater.  In  short,  not  one 
of  the  four  physicians  had  the  least  doubt  of  the  existence  of 
arachnoid  inflammation  of  very  long  standing.  However 
uncertain  other  symptoms  and  .tests  of  insanity  may  be,  this 
at  least  is  sure ;  and  we  are  left  with  the  comfortable  reHec- 
tion,  that  an  unfortunate  youth  paid  the  last  penalty  of  the 
law  for  the  consequences  of  bodily  disease.^ 

§  249.  "  A  Portuguese,  by  the  name  of  Rabello,  was 
employed  by  a  mechanic  in  the  western  part  of  Litchfield 
county,  Connecticut,  to  assist  him  as  a  shoemaker.  He  had 
been  in  the  neighboring  towns,  and  his  conduct  appeared 
singular,  but  usually  inoffensive.  In  the  family  of  the  me- 
chanic he  had  appeafed  pleasant,  and  grateful  for  the  kind- 
ness which  had  been  extended  to  him.  One  day,  a  little  son 
of  his  new  employer  accidentally  stepped  upon  his  toes. 
The  lad  was  only  twelve  years  old.  Rabello  was  exceed- 
ingly angry,  and  in  the  moment  of  his  rage  threatened  the 
boy's  life.  The  next  day  he  appeared  sullen,  refused  his 
food,  and  looked  wild  and  malicious.     The  following  morn- 


'  Georget,  Discussion  mediro-legale  sur  la  Folie,  G5, 165. 
21* 


246  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

ing,  he  went  to  the  barn-yard  with  the  boy,  seized  an  axe, 
and  killed  him  on  the  spot,  mangling  him  in  the  most  shock- 
ing manner.  He  went  deliberately  away  from  the  house, 
but  was  soon  overtaken  by  those  in  pursuit.  He  acknowl- 
edged that  he  killed  the  boy,  and  gave  as  a  reason  that  he 
stepped  on  his  toes.  It  was  found,  from  the  evidence  pro- 
duced at  his  trial,  that  this  was  an  offence  considered  most 
heinous,  and  not  to  be  forgiven.  Many  instances  were  given 
in  which  the  same  accident  had  produced  the  same  excite- 
ment of  temper,  often  accompanied  with  threats.  One  of 
the  physicians  who  visited  him  in  jail,  stepped,  apparently 
by  accident,  upon  his  toes  while  counting  his  pulse.  The 
pulse,  he  declared,  rose  immediately  forty  strokes  in  a  min- 
ute, his  countenance  flashed  up,  and  he  appeared  instantly 
in  a  rage."  ^  Insanity  was  pleaded  in  defence  on  his  trial, 
and  on  this  ground  he  was  acquitted  by  the  jury.  It  ap- 
peared in  evidence,  that  his  life  and  conduct  had  been  marked 
by  much  singularity  during  his  residence  in  this  country; 
and  after  the  trial  it  was  ascertained  from  the  Portuguese 
consul  at  New  York,  that  he  had  been  previously  deranged. 
He  had  been  employed  as  g,  clerk  in  a  mercantile  house  at 
Madeira,  to  which  place  he  had  returned  a  "little  deranged," 
after  having  been  to  Brazil.  From  Madeira  he  went  to  Phil- 
adelphia, where  he  got  employment  as  a  clerk  in  the  house 
of  some  merchants,  natives  of  Madeira,  who  knew  he  had 
been  a  little  deranged,  but  supposed  he  had  recovered.  One 
day  one  of  the  house  came  in  and  asked  him  if  anybody  had 
called,  when  Rabello  told  him  he  would  break  his  head,  if  he 
asked  him  any  such  questions.  During  the  rest  of  his  life,  in 
jail,  he  was  raving  a  large  part  of  the  time. 

§  250.  There  is  another  class  of  homicidal  cases,  not  un- 
frequent  of  late,  which  may,  most  properly,  be  considered  in 
this  connection.  I  refer  to  those  juvenile  delinquents  by 
whom  the  fatal  act  is  committed  before  or  about  the  age  of 
puberty.     Deliberately  and  quietly  they  seek  the  means  and 

^  Dr.  Woodward's  Reports  and  other  documents  relating  to  the  State 
Lunatic  Hospital  at  Worcester,  Mass.,  177. 


PARTIAL  MORAL   MANIA.  247 

opportunity  for  accomplishing  their  purpose,  they  make  no 
attempt  to  escape,  confess  what  they  have  done,  but  give 
no  uniform  or  intelligible  account  of  their  motives.  These 
cases  cannot  be  referred  to  moral  imbecility,  because  the  act 
is  at  variance  with  their  habitual  conduct  and  character;  nor 
to  intellectual  mania,  because  they  exhibit  no  trace  of  delu- 
sion or  other  intellectual  disturbance  ;  nor  to  moral  depravity, 
because  their  previous  life  presents  no  indications  of  de- 
pravity, and  no  apparent  motive  can  be  detected.  In  some, 
.there  is  reason  for  suspecting  the  sexual  evolution  described 
above  (§  210),  and  in  others,  the  influence  of  physical  disor- 
ders;  but  there  remains  a  portion  in  which  we  can  find  no 
clew  of  this  kind.  The  following  will  sufficiently  illustrate 
this  form  of  disorder. 

§  251.  A.  B.  a  girl  about  fourteen  years  old,  when  alone, 
one  day,  with  her  infant  half-brother,  gave  it  a  dose  of  arse- 
nic which  she  had  bought  a  short  time  previously.  The  child 
died,  and  she  made  known  her  own  agency  in  the  event,  but 
never  assigned  any  motive  or  explanation  of  her  conduct. 
Her  person  was  well  formed  and  well  developed,  her  counte- 
nance pleasing  and  intelligent,  and  her  manners  modest  and 
respectful.  It  did  not  appear  that  she  had  ever  suffered  any 
physical  or  mental  disorder,  or  expressed  any  feeling  of  dis- 
like towards  the  child  or  any  other  member  of  the  family. 
The  only  facts  that  appeared  in  evidence,  which  could  be 
supposed  to  have  any  bearing  upon  the  event,  were  that  she 
had  received  but  little  education,  had  always  been  exposed 
to  low  associations,  and  about  this  time  had  taken  an  active 
part  in  spiritual  rappings,  as  a  medium,  in  which  capacity 
she  predicted  the  death  of  this  child  within  a  week  or  two. 
If  her  character  had  not  previously  been  fair,  it  might  be  sup- 
posed that  she  was  governed  by  the  design  of  verifying  her 
own  prediction,  but  under  the  actual  circumstances,  this  sup- 
position requires  a  step  in-  crime  scarcely  warranted  by  our 
knowledge  of  human  nature.  She  was  acquitted,  from  some 
defect  in  the  evidence  relative  to  the  act.^ 

^  For  other  cases,  see  Taylor's  Med.  Jurisp.  p.  645  ;  Annates  d'Hygiene, 
viii.  397. 


248  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  252.  Dr.  Wigan  states  that  many  of  these  juvenile  delin- 
quents, who  came  under  his  observation,  had  been  subject  to 
nasal  hemorrhage,  which  had  recurred  with  considerable  regu- 
larity, and  that  it  was  generally  after  its  temporary  suspen- 
sion that  the  criminal  act  was  committed.  To  the  question 
put  to  these  persons,  why  did  you  do  this  thing,  he  could 
never  obtain  any  other  answer  than  the  following,  — "  I  do 
not  know  —  I  had  no  motive  —  I  believed  I  was  bound  to  do 
something."  He  thinks  the  irresistible  impulse  depends  upon 
a  local  congestion  of  the  brain,  and  does  not  show  itself  until 
about  two  years  after  puberty.^ 

§  253.  Sometimes  the  homicidal  act  is  accompanied,  and 
perhaps  excited,  by  a  momentary  hallucination.  Cases  of 
this  kind  seem  to  form  the  connecting  link  between  the  forms 
of  the  disease  already  noticed,  and  those  hereafter  described 
in  which  the  homicidal  act  is  prompted  by  persistent  delu- 
sions. In  the  following  case  there  was  also  some  previous 
mental  disturbance  which,  under  other  circumstances,  might 
have  been  (*ntirely  overlooked.  L.  M.,  a  ship  carpenter,  aged 
thirty-one,  became  interested  in  a  "  revival  of  religion."  In 
the  course  of  a  week  or  two,  he  lost  his  interest  in  the  revi- 
val, and  became  depressed,  but  continued  to  work  at  his 
trade.  This  depression,  at  the  end  of  a  few  weeks,  was  fol- 
lowed by  considerable  hilarity  and  nervous  irritability,  unat- 
tended, however,  by  violence,  or  any  desire  to  do  harm. 
After  this  had  continued  a  week  or  two,  he  went  out  one 
day  into  the  field  with  his  father,  to  work  upon  hay.  On 
their  way,  he  suddenly  exclaimed,  "there  is  the  devil  I"  and 
at  the  same  moment  thrust  a  pitchfork  into  his  father,  killing 
him  on  the  spot.  No  judicial  proceeding  was  instituted,  and 
in  the  course  of  two  or  three  days,  he  was  sent  to  the  McLean 
Asylum  for  the  Insane,  from  which  he  was  discharged  as  re- 
covered, after  a  stay  of  about  five  and  a  half  months.  "  Dur- 
ing the  first  two  or  three  months,"  says  Dr.  Bell,  who  com- 
municates the  case,  "  he  was  somewhat  dull  and  dejected,  but 
not  more  so,  perhaps,  than  would  have  been  natural  under 


Journal  of  Psychological  Medicine,  1849. 


PARTIAL   MORAL   MANIA. 


249 


the  circumstances.  He  employed  himself  diligently  every 
day.  He  gradually  became  more  active,  but  never  evinced 
an  ordinary  share  of  spirits,  nor  interested  himself  in  the 
affairs  of  the  world.  Nothing  which  he  said  or  did,  from  first 
to  last,  showed  the  least  incoherence,  impertinence,  or  delu- 
sion. His  disposition  was  kind,  and  his  temper  equable,  and 
no  other  nervous  disorder  was  observed  beyond  some  slow- 
ness of  apprehension  and  sluggishness  of  the  mental  opera- 
tions. His  bodily  health  was  uniformly  good.  He  after- 
wards led  a  quiet,  blameless  life  in  his  native  town,  occasion- 
ally having  a  week  or  two  of  mental  depression.  At  the  end 
of  eighteen  years,  he  was  seized  with  an  attack  of  acute 
mania,  was  sent  to  a  hospital  directly,  and  soon  after  died. 
Four  of  this  man's  uncles  and  two  of  his  aunts  have  been 
insane,  and  in  all  of  them,  the  disease  was  preceded  by  unu- 
sual attention  to  religious  subjects." 

§  254.  In  the  last  phasis  of  the  murderous  propensity  that 
will  be  noticed,  though  it  is  not  properly  homicidal  mania, 
there  exists  some  delusion,  and  the  individual  acts  from 
motives  —  absurd  and  unfounded  it  is  true  —  but  still  mo- 
tives to  him.  In  consequence  of  the  universal  prevalence, 
in  some  shape  or  other  of  religious  fanaticism,  and  of  the 
excitement  of  the  religious  sentiments  thereby  produced,  a 
perversion  of  these  sentiments  is  one  of  the  most  common 
exciting  causes  of  the  murderous  propensity  in  this  class  of 
cases.  When  thus  excited  its  fury  knows  no  restraints,  and 
whole  families  are  slaughtered  in  a  single  paroxysm.  Pinel 
gives  the  case  of  a  vine-dresser,  who  thought  himself  com- 
missioned to  procure  the  eternal  salvation  of  his  family  by 
killing  them,  or  by  the  baptism  of  blood,  as  he  called  it ;  and 
accordingly  executed  his  commission  so  far  as  to  kill  two  of 
his  children,  when  he  was  arrested  and  confined.  Fourteen 
years  after,  when  he  was  thought  to  be  convalescent,  he  con- 
ceived the  project  of  offering  up  an  expiatory  sacrifice,  by 
killing  all  who  might  come  within  his  reach,  and  he  suc- 
ceeded in  wounding  the  keeper  and  cutting  the  throats  of 
two  other  lunatics  before  he  was  arrested.^ 


Sur  r Alienation  Mentale,  §  130. 


250  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  255.  Sometimes  the  individual,  even  when  in  easy 
circumstances,  imagines  that  he  is  coming  to  want,  and  to 
avoid  this  calamity,  he  kills  his  family  and  generally  himself. 
The  following  case  presents  an  illustration  of  this  very  com- 
mon manifestation  of  mental  disorder. 

"  Captain  James  Purington,  of  Augusta,  Maine,  a  rich, 
Independent  farmer,  of  steady,  domestic  habits,  dark  com- 
plexion, grave  countenance,  reserved  in  company,  never 
looking  in  the  face  of  persons  he  addressed,  obstinate  in 
his  opinions,  though  he  frequently  changed  his  religious 
notions  voluntarily,  died  a  decided  believer  in  universal  sal- 
vation, often  expressed  anticipation  of  the  moment  when  his 
family  would  be  happy,  and  sometimes  how  happy  he  should 
be  if  they  should  die  at  once.  He  was  very  avaricious,  and 
elated  or  depressed  as  his  affairs  were  prosperous  or  adverse. 
In  August,  1805,  he  moved  to  a  new  farm,  which  he  rapidly 
improved.  He  seemed  happy  till  within  a  few  weeks  of  his 
death.  The  uncommon  drought  depressed  him  greatly,  lest 
his  family  should  suffer  for  want  of  bread,  and  his  cattle 
starve.  On  Sunday,  the  6th  of  July,  1806,  Mrs.  Purington 
and  the  eldest  daughter  being  at  church,  the  second  daughter 
saw  her  father  writing  a  letter  which  he,  perceiving  that  he 
had  been  overlooked,  attempted  to  hide.  She  asked  him 
what  he  had  been  writing.  He  said  '  nothing,'  and  asked 
for  his  butcher-knife,  saying  he  wanted  to  sharpen  it.  Hav- 
ing made  it  very  sharp,  he  stood  before  the  glass  and  seemed 
preparing  to  cut  his  throat.  His  daughter,  terrified,  cried, 
•  '  what  are  you  doing  ?  '  He  calmly  said,  '  nothing ; '  and  laid 
the  knife  away.  This  was  told  to  his  wife  ;  she  searched  for 
the  letter  and  found  it.  [It  was  addressed  to  his  brother,  and 
stated  that  he  was  about  going  a  long  journey,  and  directed 
him  to  take  charge  of  his  children.]  On  the  7th  of  July,  at 
dinner-time,  he  found  his  wife  sitting  in  the  barn  weeping; 
she  disclosed  the  cause;  he  said  he  did  not  intend  suicide  ; 
but  he  had  a  presentiment  his  death  was  near.  Towards  the 
close  of  the  following  day,  he  ground  the  axe  ;  when  the  fam- 
ily went  to  bed,  he  was  reading  the  Bible ;  it  was  found  open 
on  the  table  at  Ezekiel,  chap.  ix.     On  the  9th  of  July,  at  two 


PAKTIAL   MORAL   MANIA.  251 

o'clock  in  the  morning,  his  eldest  son  alarmed  the  neighbors ; 
they  found  Capt.  Purington  lying  on  his  face,  his  two  sons 
aged  five  and  eight  in  bed,  with  their  throats  cut;  the  razor 
on  the  table  by  his  side,  the  axe  near;  in  the  next  room,  Mrs. 
Purington,  aged  forty-four,  in  bed,  her  head  almost  severed 
from  the  body ;  near  her,  on  the  floor,  a  daughter  murdered, 
ten  years  old  ;  in  the  other  room  in  bed,  a  daughter  aged 
nineteen,  most  dreadfully  butchered  ;  the  second,  aged  fifteen, 
most  desperately  wounded,  reclining  her  head  on  the  infant, 
eighteen  months  old,  whose  throat  was  cut.  The  eldest  son 
was  wounded,  when  Capt.  Purington  attacked  and  dreadfully 
mangled  the  second,  twelve  years  old.  who  attempted  to 
escape  ;  Capt.  Purington  did  not  speak  a  word."  ^  ^ 

§  256.  The  various  forms  of  homicidal  insanity  have 
thus  been  illustrated,  by  selecting  a  few  cases  only,  from  a 
mass  that  would  fill  a  considerable  volume.^  Now,  however 
these  cases  may  differ  from  one  another,  whether  the  indi- 
vidual has  succumbed  to  the  propensity  to  kill  after  a  long 
struggle  with  his  better  nature,  or  has  yielded  to  it  at  once 
and  instantaneously ;  whether  harassed  by  previous  disease 
of  body  or  despondency  of  mind,  or  apparently  in  sound 
health  and  with  a  cheerful  disposition  ;  whether  his  passions 
have  been  tamed  by  the  discipline  of  a  good  education,  or 
allowed  to  seek  their  gratification  without  restraint;  they 
all,  except  the  last  two,  possess  one  feature  in  common,  the 
irresistible,  motiveless  impulse  to  destroy  life.  Before  enter- 
ing upon  any  discussion  relative  to  the  nature  of  these  forms 
of  insanity,  it  may  be  well  to  consider  the  following  analysis 
of  their  most  important  features. 


'  Parkaian  :  Illustrations  of  Insanity. 

^  Perhaps  the  most  extraordinary  case  on  record  of  homicidal  insanity 
accompanied  by  delusion,  is  one  related  by  Mr.  Scoresby,  the  Arctic  navi- 
gator, and  copied  into  Waldie's  Circulating  Library,  vol.  xii.  p.  258,  where 
the  captain  of  a  British  vessel  on  the  passage  from  St.  Andrews,  N.  B.,  to 
Ireland,  succeeded  in  getting  his  crew  into  his  power,  and  murdering  them 
all  in  detail,  excepting  one,  who  escaped  into  the  hold  desperately  wounded. 

*  They  who  are  desirous  of  extending  their  acquaintance  with  this  class  of 
cases,  will  find  the  later  ones  which  have  appeared  in  the  English  courts, 
noticed  in  Taylor's  MedicalJurisprudence,  635. 


252  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  257.  I.  In  nearly  all,  the  criminal  act  has  been  pre- 
ceded, either  by  some  well-marked  disturbance  of  the  health, 
originating  in  the  head,  digestive  system,  or  uterus,  or  by  an 
irritable,  gloomy,  dejected,  or  melancholy  state,  in  short,  by 
many  of  the  symptoms  of  the  incubation  of  mania.  The  ab- 
sence of  particulars  in  some  of  the  cases  we  find  recorded, 
leaves  us  in  doubt  how  general  this  change  really  is ;  but  a 
careful  examination  would,  no  doubt,  often,  if  not  always, 
show  its  existence  where,  apparentliji  it  has  never  taken 
place. 

II.  The  impulse  to  destroy  is  powerfully  excited  by  the 
sight  of  murderous  weapons,  by  favorable  opportunities  of 
accomplishing  the  act,  by  contradiction,  disgust,  or  some 
other  equally  trivial  and  even  imaginary  circumstance. 

III.  The  victims  of  the  homicidal  monomaniac  are  mostly 
either  entirely  unknown  or  indifferent  to  him,  or  they  are 
among  his  most  loved  and  cherished  objects  ;  and  it  is  re- 
markable how  often  they  are  children,  and  especially  his  own 
offspring. 

IV.  While  the  greater  number  deplore  the  terrible  pro- 
pensity by  which  they  are  controlled,  and  beg  to  be  subjected 
to  restraint,  a  few  diligently  conceal  it,  or  if  the}^  avow  it, 
declare  their  murderous  designs,  and  form  divers  schemes  for 
putting  them  in  execution,  testifying  no  sentiment  of  remorse 
or  grief. 

V.  The  most  of  them  having  gratified  their  propensity  to 
kill,  voluntarily  confess  the  act  and  quietly  give  themselves 
up  to  the  proper  authorities  ;  a  very  few  only  —  and  these,  to 
an  intelligent  observer,  may  show  the  strongest  indications  of 
insanity  —  fly,  and  persist  in  denying  the  act. 

VI.  While  the  criminal  act  itself  is,  in  some  instances,  the 
only  indication  of  insanity,  the  individual  appearing  rational, 
as  far  as  can  bo  learned,  both  before  and  after  the  act ;  in 
others,  it  is  followed  or  preceded,  or  both,  by  strange  be- 
havior, if  not  open  and  decided  insanity. 

VII.  Some  plead  insanity  in  defence  of  their  conduct,  or 
an  entire  ignorance  of  whajt  they  did ;  others  deny  that  they 
labored  under  any  such  condition,  and  at  most  acknowledge 
only  a  perturbation  of  mind. 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA.  253 

§  258.  Apart  from  the  obvious  similarity  of  all  these 
cases  to  those  where  the  murderous  propensity  coexists 
with  delusions,  as  in  the  last  two,  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  homicidal  act  is  perpetrated,  furnish  strong  ground 
for  believing,  that  they  depend  on  mental  alienation  in  some 
form  or  other;  so  different  are  these  circumstances  from 
those  which  attend  the  commission  of  crime.  In  homicidal 
insanity,  murder  is  committed  without  any  motive  whatever 
strictly  deserving  the  name;  or  at  most,  with  one  totally 
inadequate  to  produce  the  act  in  a  sane  mind.  On  the 
contrary,  murder  is  never  criminally  committed  without 
some  motive  adequate  to  the  purpose  in  the  mind  that  is 
actuated  by  it,  and  with  an  obvious  reference  to  the  ill-fated 
victim.  Thus,  the  motive  may  be  theft,  or  the  advancement 
of  any  personal  interest,  in  which  case  it  will  be  found  that 
the  victim  had  or  was  supposed  to  have  property,  or  was  an 
obstacle  to  the  designs  or  expectations  of  another.  Or  it 
may  be  revenge,  and  then  the  injury,  real  or  imaginary,  will 
be  found  to  have  been  received  by  the  murderer  from  the 
object  of  his  wrath.  In  short,  with  the  criminal,  murder  is 
always  a  means  for  accomplishing  some  selfish  object,  and 
is  frequently  accompanied  by  some  other  crime ;  whereas, 
with  the  homicidal  monomaniac,  murder  is  the  only  object 
in  view,  and  is  never  accompanied  by  any  other  improper 
act. 

§  259.  The  homicidal  monomaniac,  after  gratifying  his 
bloody  desires,  testifies  neither  remorse,  nor  repentance,  nor 
satisfaction,  and  if  judicially  condemned,  perhaps  acknowl- 
edges the  justice  of  the  sentence.  The  criminal  either  denies 
or  confesses  his  guilt;  if  the  latter,  he  either  humbly  sues  for 
mercy,  or  glories  in  his  crimes,  and  leaves  the  world  cursing 
his  judges,  and  with  his  last  breath  exclaiming  against  the 
injustice  of  his  fate. 

The  criminal  never  sheds  more  blood  than  is  necessary  for 
the  attainment  of  his  object;  the  homicidal  monomaniac 
often  sacrifices  all  within  his  reach  to  the  cravings  of  his 
murderous  propensity. 

The  criminal  lays  plans  for  the  execution  of  his  designs ; 

22 


254  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

time,  place,  and  weapons  are  all  suited  to  his  purpose  ;  and 
when  successful,  he  either  flies  from  the  scene  of  his  enor- 
mities, or  makes  every  etfort  to  avoid  discovery.  The  homi- 
cidal monomaniac,  on  the  contrary,  for  the  most  part,  con- 
sults none  of  the  usual  conveniences  of  crime  ;  he  falls  upon 
the  object  of  his  fury,  oftentimes  without  the  most  proper 
means  for  accomplishing  his  purpose ;  and  perhaps  in  the 
presence  of  a  multitude,  as  if  expressly  to  court  observa- 
tion ;  and  then  voluntarily  surrenders  himself  to  the  consti- 
tuted authorities.  When,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  he  does 
prepare  the  means,  and  calmly  and  deliberately  executes  his 
project,  his  subsequent  conduct  may  be  still  the  same  as  in 
the  former  instance. 

The  criminal  often  has  accomplices,  and  generally  vicious 
associates ;  the  homicidal  monomaniac  has  neither. 

The  acts  of  homicidal  insanity  are  generally,  perhaps 
always,  preceded  by  some  striking  peculiarities  in  the  con- 
duct or  character  of  the  individual,  strongly  contrasting 
with  his  natural  manifestations ;  while  those  of  the  criminal 
are  in  correspondence  with  the  tenor  of  his  past  history  or 
character. 

In  homicidal  insanity,  a  man  murders  his  wife,  children, 
or  others  to  whom  he  is  tenderly  attached;  this  the  criminal 
never  does,  unless  to  gratify  some  evil  passion,  or  gain  some 
other  selfish  end,  too  obvious  to  be  overlooked  on  the  slight- 
est investigation. 

§  260,  A  stronger  con,trast  than  is  presented,  in  every 
respect,  between  the  homicidal  act  of  the  real  criminal  and 
that  of  the  monomaniac,  can  hardly  be  imagined ;  and  yet 
we  arc  obliged  to  acknowledge  that  men  of  learning  and 
intelligejice  have  been  often  unable  or  unwilling  to  perceive 
it,  though,  undoubtedly,  the  number  of  such  is  fast  diminish- 
ing. Much  of  the  unw^illingness  manifested  by  jurors  to 
abide  by  the  result  to  which  the  above  distinctions  would 
necessarily  lead  them,  arises  from  those  feelings  of  horror 
and  indignation  excited  by  the  perpetration  of  cold-blooded 
murders,  which  incapacitate  them  from  discriminating  with 
their  usual  acuteness  between  the  various  causes  and  motives 


PARTIAL    MORAL   MANIA.  255 

of  haman  action.  Besides,  notwithstanding  the  great  simi- 
larity, for  the  most  part,  between  these  cases,  one  will 
occasionally  occur,  where,  from  defect  of  information,  no 
little  knowledge  of  insanity  and  of  human  nature  is  required 
to  find  one's  way  through  the  mists  of  doubt  and  obscurity 
in  which  it  is  involved.  When,  therefore,  as  in  the  case  of 
jurors  generally,  the  mind  is  not  fitted  by  any  of  this  prepara- 
tion so  necessary  to  a  successful  investigation  of  difficult 
cases,  it  seizes  only  on  some  of  the  most  obvious,  though 
perhaps  least  important  points  which  they  present,  and  of 
course  the  verdict  will  often  be  deplorably  at  variance  with 
the  dictates  of  true  science. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OP   MANIA. 

§  261.  MA'n  being  destined  for  the  social  condition,  has 
received  from  the  author  of  his  being  the  faculties  necessary 
for  discovering  and  understanding  his  relations  to  his  fellow 
men,  and  possesses  the  liberty,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  regu- 
lating his  conduct  agreeably  or  directly  opposed  to  their 
suggestions.  For  the  manner  in  which  this  power  is  used 
he  is  moraUjj  responsible,  the  elements  of  responsibility 
always  being  the  original  capacity,  the  healthy  action,  and 
the  cultivation  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties,  —  the 
measure  of  the  former  being  in  proportion  to  the  degree  in 
which  the  latter  are  possessed.  In  legal  responsibility,  the 
last  element  above  mentioned  is  not  admitted,  and  the  first 
to  a  very  limited  extent  only,  the  second  alone  being  abso- 
lutely essential.  The  relation  of  original  incapacity  to  legal 
responsibility  has  already  been  discussed,  when  treating  of 
MENTAL  DEFICIENCY  j  that  of  Cerebral  disease  now  comes  up 
for  consideration. 

§  262.  The  influence  of  this  condition  on  responsibility 
will  obviously  be  proportioned  to  its  severity  and  the  extent 
of  its  action  ;  and  though  we  cannot  hope  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  all  its  grades,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  may 
not  be  able  to  recognize  and  identify  some  of  the  more 
common  and  prominent.  If  men  had  agreed  to  receive 
some  particular  analysis  and  arrangement  of  the  aiTective 
and  intellectual  faculties,  and  to  assign  to  each  a  portion  of 
the  brain  as  its  material  organ,  we  might  then,  by  studying 
the  derangements  of  each  faculty,  ascertain,  in  some  measure, 
how  far  they  affect  the  actions  of  one  another.     But  as  no 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.     257 

such  unanimity  exists,  we  can  only  consider,  as  we  have  in 
a  preceding  chapter,  the  observations  that  have  been  made 
on  the  derangement  of  a  few  particular  faculties,  and  form 
our  opinions  relative  to  their  influence,  by  the  general  tenor 
of  human  experience. 


SECTION  I. 

LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES     OF     INTELLECTUAL    MANIA. 

§  263.  The  common  law  relating  to  insanity,  as  before 
intimated,  is  open  to  censure,  not  so  much  on  account  of 
the  manner  in  which  it  modifies  the  civil  and  criminal  respon- 
sibilities of  the  lunatic,  as  of  the  looseness,  inconsistency,  and 
incorrectness  of  the  principles  on  which  the  fact  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  disease  is  judicially  established.  The  disabilities 
it  imposes  on  this  unfortunate  class  of  our  fellow  men  are 
founded  in  the  most  humane  and  enlightened  views,  and 
have  for  their  object  the  promotion  of  their  highest  welfare. 
To  incapacitate  a  person  from  making  contracts,  bequeath- 
ing property,  and  performing  other  civil  acts,  who  has  lost  his 
natural  power  of  discerning  and  judging,  who  mistakes  one 
thing  for  another,  and  misapprehends  his  relations  to  those 
around  him,  is  the  greatest  mercy  he  could  receive,  instead  of 
being  an  arbitrary  restriction  of  his  rights. 

§  264.  In  opposition  to  that  principle  of  the  common  law, 
which  makes  the  lunatic  who  commits  a  trespass  on  the  per- 
sons or  property  of  others,  amenable  in  damages  to  be  re- 
covered by  a  civil  action,^  Hoffbauer  declares,  that  if  the 
patient  is  "so  deranged  that  he  is  no  longer  master  of  his 
actions,  he  is  under  no  responsibility,  nor  obliged  to  make 
reparation  for  injuries."  ^  He  gives  no  reason  for  this  opin- 
ion, and  we  are  unable  to  see  how  it  can  be  even  plausibly 


1   Weaver  v.  Ward,  Hobart,  134;  Butlerly  v.  Darling,  Com.  Pleas,  New 
York;  Nat.  Intelligencer,  March  30,  1841. 
"-  Op.  cit.  §  131. 

22* 


258  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

supported.  To  the  maniac,  who,  when  restored  to  his  senses, 
discovers  that  during  his  derangement  he  has  committed  an 
injury  to  his  neighbor's  property,  indemnity  for  which  will 
strip  him  of  his  own  possessions  and  reduce  him  to  absolute 
beggary,  his  recovery  must  seem  indeed  like  escaping  from 
one  evil  only  to  encounter  a  greater.  Such  a  possible  conse- 
quence of  madness,  it  is  certainly  painful  to  think  of;  but  as 
the  damage  is  produced  and  must  be  borne  by  one  party  or 
the  other,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  say  which  it  should  be ;  for 
though  it  may  be  hard  for  a  person  thus  to  suffer  for  actions 
committed  while  utterly  unconscious  of  their  nature,  it  would 
manifestly  be  the  height  of  injustice  to  make  another  suffer, 
who  was  equally  innocent  and  perhaps  equally  unconscious 
of  the  act. 

§  265.  There  is  one  operation  of  the  common  law,  how- 
ever, which  is  justly  a  cause  of  complaint,  namely,  that  by 
which  lunatics,  even  when  under  guardianship,  are  subject  to 
be  imprisoned  like  others,  in  default  of  satisfying  a  civil  exe- 
cution obtained  against  them;i  because,  whether  such  im- 
prisonment be  considered  as  a  penal  or  a  merely  coercive 
measure,  it  is  altogether  inapplicable  to  the  insane.  It  can- 
not coerce  one  who  has  no  control  over  his  own  property, 
and  whose  mental  condition  is  supposed  to  be  such  that  he 
is  unable  to  see  any  relation  between  the  means  and  the 
end;  and  to  punish  a  person  for  what  he  himself  had  no 
agency  whatever  in  doing,  is  a  violation  of  the  first  princi- 
ples of  justice.  To  incarcerate  some  madmen  in  a  common 
jail  would,  in  all  probability,  aggravate  their  disorder,  and  if 
the  confinement  were  protracted  to  the  extent  which  the  law 
would  allow,  render  it  utterly  incurable. 

§  266.  The  civil  disabilities  above  mentioned,  are  not  in- 
curred by  every  one  laboring  under  mental  derangement;  the 
measure  of  insanity  necessary  to  produce  this  effect,  or  in 
legal  phrase,  the  fact  of  the  party's  being  compos  or  no)i  com- 
pos mentis,  is  a  question  to  be  submitted  to  judicial  investi- 
gation, the  result  of  which  will  depend  on  the  views  of  indi- 

^  Shelford  on  Lunacy,  407  ;  Ex  parte  Leighlon,  14  Mass.  Rep.  207. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  259 

viduals  relative  to  the  effect  of  insanity  on  the  mental  opera- 
tions, and  to  the  respect  due  to  opinions  and  decisions 
already  promulgated.  General  intellectual  mania,  as  we 
have^  represented  it,  should  be  followed,  to  the  fullest  extent, 
by  the  legal  consequences  of  insanity ;  but  partial  intellectual 
mania  does  not  necessarily  render  a  person  7ion  compos,  or  so 
impaired  in  mind  as  to  be  no  longer  legally  responsible  for 
his  acts,  any  more  than  every  disease  of  the  lungs  or  stomach 
prevents  a  patient  from  attending  to  his  ordinary  aflairs,  and 
enjoying  a  certain  measure  of  health.  The  question  when 
mania  invalidates  a  person's  civil  acts  and  annuls  criminal 
responsibility,  and  when  it  does  not  affect  his  liability  in 
these  respects,  has  occasioned  considerable  discussion,  and  is 
certainly  the  most  delicate  and  important  that  the  whole 
range  of  this  subject  embraces.  No  general  principles  con- 
cerning it  are  to  be  found  in  the  common  law  except  Lord 
Hale's  (§8),  and  cases  seem  to  have  been  decided  with  but 
little  reference  to  one  another,  according  to  the  medical  or 
legal  views  which  happened  at  the  time  to  possess  the  minds 
of  the  court  and  jury.  As  insanity  has  become  better  known, 
decisions  have  occasionally  been  more  correct,  but  as  the 
prevalence  of  these  improvements  has  not  been  universal,  this 
branch  of  jurisprudence  has  often  retrograded,  and  thus  the 
mind  of  the  inquirer  is  confused  by  an  array  of  opinions  dia- 
metrically opposed.  Correct  general  principles  on  this  sub- 
ject, therefore,  are  yet  to  be  established ;  and  in  furtherance 
of  this  object,  we  shall  endeavor  to  lay  down  such  legal  con- 
sequences of  partial  intellectual  mania,  as  seem  to  be  war- 
ranted by  correct  medical  knowledge  of  insanity,  and  by 
enlightened  principles  of  justice. 

§  267.  We  see  some  persons  managing  their  affairs  with 
their  ordinary  shrewdness  and  discretion,  evincing  no  extra- 
ordinary exaltation  of  feeling  or  fancy,  and  on  all  but  one  or 
a  few  points,  in  the  perfect  enjoyment  of  their  reason.  It 
has  been  elsewhere  remarked  (§  158),  that  strange  as  it  may 
appear,  it  is  no  less  true,  that  notwithstanding  the  serious 
derangement  of  the  reasoning  power  which  a  person  must 
have   experienced,  who   entertains  the   strange   fancies  that 


260  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

sometimes  find  their  way  into  the  mind,  it  may  still  be  exer- 
cised on  all  other  subjects,  so  far  as  we.  can  see,  with  no 
diminution  of  its  natural  soundness.  The  celebrated  Pascal 
believed  at  times  that  he  was  sitting  on  the  brink  of  a  |_ireci- 
pice  over  which  he  was  momentarily  in  danger  of  falling,  and 
a  German  professor  of  law,  mentioned  by  Hoff'bauer,  thought 
the  freemasons  were  leagued  against  him,  while  he  dis- 
charged the  duties  of  his  chair  with  his  usual  ability;  and 
numberless  are  the  instances  of  worthy  people  who  have 
imagined  their  heads  turned  round,  or  their  limbs  made  of 
butter  or  glass,  who  nevertheless  manage  their  concerns  with 
their  ordinary  shrewdness.  A  surgical  friend  once  brought 
me  a  young  man  who  had  strongly  importuned  him  to  per- 
form some  operation  on  his  nose  which,  he  fancied,  had  got 
strangely  twisted,  though  to  everybody  else,  it  seemed  per- 
fectly right.  The  matter  gave  him  much  uneasiness,  but  in 
every  other  respect  he  was  fully  himself.  He  was  overseer  of 
a  cotton-mill,  and  discharged  his  duties  satisfactorily  to  his 
employers.  No  one  following  the  dictates  of  his  own  judg- 
ment, would  seriously  propose  to  invalidate  such  of  these 
men's  acts  as  manifestly  have  no  reference  to  the  crotchets 
they  have  imbibed.  To  deprive  them  of  the  management  of 
their  affairs,  under  the  show  of  affording  them  protection, 
would  be  to  inflict  a  certain  and  a  serious  injury,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preventing  a  much  smaller  one  that  might  never 
occur.  The  principle  that  we  v^'^ould  inculcate  is,  tliat  mono- 
mania invalidates  a  civil  act  only  when  such  act  clearly 
comes  within  the  circle  of  the  diseased  operations  of  the 
mind. 

§  268.  It  is  not  to  be  understood,  however,  that  in  every 
case  of  partial  mania  we  have  only  to  ascertain  the  insane 
delusion,  and  then  decide  whether  or  not  the  act  in  question 
could  have  come  within  the  range  of  its  influence.  In  many 
instances  the  delusion  is  frequently  changing,  in  which  case, 
it  is  not  only  difficult  to  determine  how  far  it  may  have  been 
connected  with  any  particular  act,  but  the  mind  in  respect 
to  other  operations,  has  lost  its  original  soundness,  to  such  a 
degree  that  it  cannot  be  trusted  in  the  transaction  of  impor- 


LEGAL    CO^rSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  261 

tant  affairs.  Still,  this  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  against  apply- 
ing the  general  principle  where  it  can  be  done  without  fear 
of  mi.stake.  In  doubtful  instances  we  nriust  be  governed  by 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  this  course,  with  all  its 
objections,  seems  far  more  rational  than  the  practice  of  uni- 
versal disqualification. 

§  269.  The  validity  of  a  marriage  contracted  in  a  state 
of  partial  mania,  is  not  to  be  determined  exactly  upon  the 
above  principles.  Here  it  is  not  sufficient  to  consider  merely 
the  connection  of  the  delusion  with  the  idea  of  being  mar- 
ried, nor  should  we  form  any  conclusion  in  favor  of  the 
capacity  of  the  deranged  party,  from  the  propriety  with 
which  he  conducts  himself  during  the  ceremony.  The  mere 
joining  of  hands  and  uttering  the  usual  responses  are  things 
not  worth  considering;  it  is  the  new  relations  which  the  mar- 
ried state  creates,  the  new  responsibilities  which  it  imposes, 
that  should  fix  our  attention,  as  the  only  points  in  regard  to 
which  the  question  of  capacity  can  be  properly  agitated.  -In 
other  contracts,  all  the  conditions  and  circumstances  may  be 
definite  and  brought  into  view  at  once,  and  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  to  comprehend  them  determined  with  comparative 
facility.  In  the  contract  of  marriage,  on  the  contrary,  there 
is  nothing  definite  or  certain  ;  the  obligations  which  it  im- 
poses do  not  admit  of  being  measured  and  discussed;  they 
are  of  an  abstract  kind,  and  constanlly  varying  with  every 
new  scene  and  condition  of  life.  With  these  views  we  are 
obliged  to  dissent  from  the  principle  laid  down  by  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts,  in  a  case  of  libel 
for  divorce  for  insanity  of  the  wife  at  the  time  of  the  mar- 
riage, that  "  the  fact  of  the  party's  being  able  to  go  through 
the  marriage  ceremony  with  propriety,  was  prima  facie  evi- 
dence of  sufficient  understanding  to  make  the  contract."  ^ 
If,  by  making  the  contract,  is  meant  merely  the  giving  of 
consent,  and  the  execution  of  certain  forms,  then,  indited, 
the  fact  of  the  party's  going  through  the  ceremony  with 
propriety,  may  be  some  evidence  of  sufficient  understand- 
ing  to   make  it;    but  if  the  expression  includes  the  slight- 

'  4  Pickerins,  32. 


263  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

est  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  relations  and  duties  that  follow, 
or  even  of  the  bonds  and  settlements  that  sometimes  accom- 
pany it,  then  the  fact  here  mentioned  is  no  evidence  at  all  of 
sufficient  capacity.  Sir  John  Nicholl,  looking  at  the  subject 
in  a  different  light,  has  very  properly  said,  that  "going 
through  the  ceremony  was  not  sufficient  to  establish  the 
capacity  of  the  party ;  and  that  foolish,  crazy  persons  might 
be  instructed  to  go  through  the  formality  of  the  ceremony, 
though  wholly  incapable  of  understanding  the  marriage  con- 
tract." ^  In  a  similar  case.  Lord  Stowell,  then  Sir  William 
Scott,  had  previously  observed,  on  the  fact  given  in  evidence 
that  the  party  "  had  manifested  perfect  propriety  of  behav- 
ior," during  the  ceremony,  "that  much  stress  was  not  to  be 
laid  on  that  circumstance ;  as  persons,  in  that  state,  will 
nevertheless  often  pursue  a  favorite  purpose,  with  the  com- 
posure and  regularity  of  apparently  sound  minds."  ^ 

§  270.  Within  a  few  years,  a  class  of  cases  has  made  its 
appearance,  exceedingly  embarrassing  to  the  medical  jurist. 
The  woman,  after  preparing  for  a  union  to  which  her  head 
and  heart  had  apparently  fully  consented,  and  going  through 
the  marriage  ceremony  with  the  utmost  propriety,  manifest- 
ing all  the  while  nothing  unusual  in  her  deportment,  imme- 
diately after  imbibes  an  insuperable  aversion  towards  her 
husband,  shuns  his  company,  and  perhaps  refuses  to  live 
with  him.  In  some  of  the  cases,  other  singularities  of  con- 
duct soon  appear,  one  after  another,  till  at  last  the  woman 
becomes  a  subject  of  unequivocal  insanity.  In  others,  how- 
ever, this  strong  repugnance  towards  the  husband  continues 
to  be  the  principal,  if  not  the  only  symptom,  of  mental  dis- 
order, but  so  closely  do  they  resemble  the  former  in  other 
respects,  that  we  can  have  no  hesitation  in  regarding  them 
as  merely  varieties  of  the  same  affection.  The  pathological 
character  of  these  cases  seems  to  be  sufficiently  obvious. 
From  some  cause  or  other,  the  patient  has  been  affected 
with  a  cerebral  irritation  not  sufficient  to  disturb  the  mental 
manifestations,  and    which,  under    favorable    circumstances, 

*  Browning  v.  Rearl,  2  Phillimore,  69. 
-  Turner  v.  Meyers,  1  Haggard,  414. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  263 

might  have  entirely  disappea'-ed.  In  this  condition,  marriage, 
with  the  crowd  of  new  thoughts  and  feelings  with  whicli  it  is 
preceded,  operates  as  a  powerfully  exciting  cause,  and  under 
its  influence  the  pathological  affection  is  completely  devel- 
oped. It  is  not  strange,  certainly,  that  marriage  should 
occasionally  find  a  female  brain  in  this  morbid  condition  ;  nor 
that,  in  case  of  such  a  conjunction,  the  result  here  mentioned 
should  follow.  The  legal  relations  of  these  cases  are  not  so 
satisfactorily  settled.  In  some  of  them,  a  close  scrutiny  of 
the  conduct  and  condition  previous  to  marriage,  may  detect 
indubitable  signs  of  insanity  ;  while  in  others  no  such  signs 
can  be  discovered,  though  subsequently  the  mental  disorder 
may  have  become  no  less  obvious.  Now,  are  we  prepared  to 
make  a  distinction  between  them?  to  grant  divorce  in  one 
class,  and  refuse  it  in  the  other  ?  This,  no  doubt,  would  be 
highly  convenient,  but  we  are  not  sure  that  it  would  be 
strictly  just.  While  we  see  not  how  legal  relief  can  be  with- 
held in  the  former  class,  yet  in  regard  to  the  latter,  we  recoil 
from  the  idea  of  depriving  a  woman  of  her  protection  and 
support,  at  the  very  moment  when  the  severest  of  earthly 
calamities  has  overtaken  her,  merely  on  the  strength  of  what 
we  may  call  a  pathological  abstraction.  How  these  cases 
have  been  regarded  by  the  courts,  we  have  had  no  means  of 
ascertaining. 

§  271.  The  principles  that  should  regulate  the  legal  rela- 
tions of  the  partially  insane  are  few  and  simple.  While  they 
should  be  left  in  possession  of  every  civil  right  that  they  arc 
not  clearly  incapable  of  exercising,  they  should  be  subjected 
to  the  performance  of  no  duties  involving  the  interests  or 
comfort  of  individuals,  which  may  be  equally  well  discharged 
by  others.  In  the  former  instance  we  continue  the  enjoy- 
ment of  a  right  that  has  never  been  abused ;  in  the  latter, 
we  refrain  from  imposing  duties  on  people  who  may  not  be 
qualified  to  perform  them.  We  cannot,  therefore,  agree  with 
HofTbauer,  that  a  monomaniac  should  be  allowed  to  manage 
the  affairs  of  another,  or  be  appointed  to  the  office  of  guar- 
dian, however  much  we  might  be  inclined  to  respect  the 
validity  of  his  civil  acts.     In  some  instances  it  is  impossible 


264  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

to  know  or  to  conjecture,  beforehand,  how  the  predominant 
idea  in  his  mind  may  be  affected  by  his  connection  with  per- 
sons and  things  that  have  hitherto  been  foreign  to  his 
thoughts;  while  in  others,  it  is  far  within  the  range  of  proba- 
bility that  the  consequences  will  be  ruinous  to  himself  and 
others.  Here,  for  example,  is  a  man  who  has  long  believed 
that  he  has  an  eel  in  his  stomach,  but  on  no  other  point  has 
he  manifested  the  slightest  mental  impairment.  If  a  mono- 
maniac is  ever  a  suitable  person  to  manage  the  affairs  of 
another,  it  would  seem,  at  first  thought,  that  this  one  certainly 
is;  yet  nothing  would  be  more  injudicious  than  to  intrust  him 
with  any  such  duty,  for  in  all  probability,  though  perfectly 
upright  in  his  dealings,  he  would  be  irresistibly  impelled  to 
dissipate  the  property  of  others,  as  he  always  has  his  own 
earnings,  in  constant  journeyings  from  one  empiric  to  another, 
in  purchasing  medicines,  and  consulting  physicians,  for  the 
purpose  of  getting  relieved  from  his  fancied  tormenter.  This 
exclusion,  as  Chambeyron,the  French  translator  of  Hoffbauer, 
justly  remarks,  does  the  monomaniac  no  wrong;  it  frees  him 
from  a  great  responsibility,  and  prevents  dangers,  possible  at 
least,  either  to  the  ward  or  to  him. 

§  272.  The  above  views,  though  not  yet  distinctly  re- 
ceived in  courts,  are  countenanced  by  many  distinguished 
physicians  and  jurists.  Hoffbauer  supports  them  to  the 
fullest  extent;  Esquirol  sanctions  them,  by  interposing  no 
word  of  disapprobation  ;  Georget  admits  them  in  application 
to  civil  cases;  and  Paris  and  Fonblanque  have  explicitly 
recognized  their  correctness  in  the  following  passage:  "When 
a  man  suffers  under  a  partial  derangement  of  intellect,  and 
on  one  point  only,  it  would  be  unjust  to  invalidate  acts 
which  were  totally  distinct  from,  and  uninfluenced  by  this  so 
limited  insanity  ;  but  if  the  act  done  bear  a  strict  and  evident 
reference  to  the  existing  mental  delusion,  we  cannot  see  why 
the  law  should  not  also  interpose  a  limited  protection,  and 
still  less  why  courts  of  equity,  which  in  their  ordinary  juris- 
diction relieve  against  mistake,  should  deny  their  aid  in  such 
cases."  ^ 

^  1  Medical  Jurisprudence,  302, 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  265 

§  273.  Mr.  Evans,  the  translator  of  Pothier's  Treatise  on 
Obligations,  expresses  an  opinion  on  this  subject,  no  less 
positive  and  precise.  "  I  cannot  but  think,"  he  says,  "  that 
a  mental  disorder  operating  on  partial  subjects,  should,  with 
regard  to  those  subjects,  be  attended  with  the  same  effects  as 
a  total  deprivation  of  reason  ;  and  that  on  the  other  hand, 
such  a  partial  disorder,  operating  only  upon  particular  sub- 
jects, should  not,  in  its  legal  effects,  have  an  influence  more 
extensive  than  the  subjects  to  which  it  applies  ;  and  that 
every  question  should  be  reduced  to  the  point,  whether  the 
act  under  consideration  proceeded  from,  a  mind  fully  capable, 
in  respect  of  that  act,  of  exercising  free,  sound,  and  discrimi- 
nating judgment;  but  in  case  the  infirmity  is  established  to 
exist,  the  tendency  of  it  to  direct  or  fetter  the  operations  of 
the  mind  should  be  in  general  regarded  as  sufficient  presump- 
tive evidence,  without  requiring  a  direct  and  positive  proof 
of  its  actual  operation."  ^ 

§  274.  It  has  been  already  remarked,  that  the  practice  of 
the  English  courts  in  regard  to  partial  insanity  has  been 
regulated  by  no  settled  principles.  Of  the  truth  of  this 
remark  we  have  a  striking  illustration  in  Greenwood's  case, 
which  is  so  often  cited.  Mr.  Greenwood  was  bred  to  the 
bar,  and  acted  as  chairman  at  the  quarter  sessions,  but 
becoming  diseased,  and  receiving  in  a  fever  a  draught  from 
the  hand  of  his  brother,  the  delirium,  taking  its  ground  then, 
connected  itself  with  that  idea ;  and  he  considered  his 
brother  as  having  given  him  a  potion,  with  a  view  to 
destroy  him.  He  recovered  in  all  other  respects,  but  that 
morbid  image  never  departed ;  and  that  idea  appeared  con- 
nected with  the  will  by  which  he  disinherited  his  brother. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  considered  so  necessary  to  have  some 
precise  rule,  that,  though  a  verdict  had  been  obtained  in  the 
common  pleas  against  the  will,  the  judge  strongly  advised 
the  jury  to  find  the  other  way,  and  they  did  accordingly  find 
in  favor  of  the  will.     Further  proceedings  took  place  after- 


^  2  Pothier  on  Obligations,  Appendix,  24. 

23 


266  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

wards,  and  concluded  in  a  compromise.^  No  one  would  be 
hardy  enough  to  affirm  that  Greenwood's  mind  was  perfectly- 
rational  and  sound,  and  as  his  insanity  displayed  itself  on 
all  topics  relating  to  his  brother,  every  act  involving  this 
brother's  interests,  to  go  no  further,  ought  consequently  to 
have  been  invalidated.  A  plainer  case  cannot  well  be 
imagined. 

§  275.  More  enlarged  and  correct  views  prevailed  in  the 
able  and  elaborate  judgment  delivered  by  Sir  John  Nicholl, 
in  the  case  of  Dew  v.  Clark^  where  the  existence  of  partial 
mania  is  recognized,  and  the  necessity  is  strongly  inculcated 
of  bearing  in  mind  the  fact  of  its  partial  operation  on  the 
understanding,  while  determining  its  influence  on  the  civil 
acts  of  the  individual.  The  point  at  issue  was  the  validity 
of  the  will  of  one  Scott  (who  left  personal  property  amount- 
ing nearly  to  .£40,000),  in  which  he  bequeathed  the  com- 
plainant who  was  his  daughter  and  only  child,  a  life  interest 
in  a  small  portion  of  his  estate,  the  most  of  which  was 
devised  to  his  nephews.  The  object  of  inquiry  was,  whether 
the  exti'aordinary  conduct  and  feelings  of  the  deceased 
towards  his  daughter  had  any  real  cause,  or  was  solely  the 
offspring  of  delusion  in  a  disordered  mind ;  and  to  this  end 
an  unparalleled  mass  of  evidence  was  offered  by  each  party. 
It  was  proved  by  the  nephews,  that  the  testator  had  con- 
siderable practice  as  a  surgeon  and  medical  electrician  from 
1785  to  1820,  and  that  at  all  times  down  to  the  latter  period 
when  he  had  a  paralytic  stroke,  he  managed  the  whole  of  his 
pecuniary  and  professional  affairs  in  a  rational  manner,  and 
rationally  conducted  all  manner  of  business.  They  admitted 
that  he  was  a  man  of  an  irritable  and  violent  temper ;  of 
great  pride  and  conceit ;  very  precise  in  all  his  domestic  and 
other  arrangements ;  very  impatient  of  contradiction,  and 
imbued  with  high  notions  of  parental  authority.  They 
represented  him  to  have  entertained  rigid  notions  of  the  total 


^  White  V.  WiUoUy  13  Vesey,  88,  and  Greenwood  v.  Greenwood,  3  Curteis, 
337. 
2  3  Addams,  79. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  267 

and  absolute  clepravity  of  human  nature  and  of  the  neces- 
sity of  sensible  conversion,  and  contended  that  all  the 
singularities  of  his  conduct  could  be  attributed  to  his  pecul- 
iar disposition  and  belief,  without  resorting  to  insanity  for 
an  explanation.  By  the  daughter,  it  was  shown,  by  a 
body  of  evidence  that  placed  the  fact  beyond  the  shadow 
of  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  from  an  early  period  of  her 
life,  he  manifested  an  insane  aversion  towards  her.  It  ap- 
pears that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  describing  her,  even  to  per- 
sons with  whom  he  was  not  intimately  acquainted,  as  sullen, 
perverse,  obstinate,  and  given  to  lying ;  as  a  fiend,  a  monster, 
a  very  devil,  the  special  property  of  satan ;  and  charging  her 
with  vices,  of  which  it  was  impossible  that  a  girl  of  her  age 
could  be  guilty.  The  peculiar  and  unequalled  depravity  of 
his  child,  her  vices,  obstinacy,  and  profligacy  were  topics  on 
which  he  was  constantly  dwelling,  and  his  general  deport- 
ment towards  her  not  only  negatived  all  idea  of  natural 
affection,  but  betrayed  a  most  fiend-like  temper.  His  man- 
ner towards  her  was  fiery  and  terrific;  the  instant  she  ap- 
peared, his  eye  flashed  with  rage  and  scorn,  and  he  spurned 
her  from  him  as  he  would  a  reptile.  He  compelled  her  to  do 
the  most  menial  offices,  such  as  sweeping  the  rooms,  scouring 
the  grates,  washing  the  linen  and  the  dishes  ;  to  live  in  the 
kitchen,  and  be  sparingly  fed.  He  once  stripped  her  naked, 
when  ten  or  eleven  years  old,  tied  her  to  a  bed-post,  and 
after  flogging  her  severely  with  a  large  rod  intertwisted  with 
brass  wire,  rubbed  her  back  with  brine.  Repeatedly,  and  on 
the  most  trivial  occasions,  he  struck  her  with  his  clinched 
fists,  cut  her  flesh  with  a  horsewhip,  tore  out  her  hair,  and 
once  aimed  at  her  a  blow  with  some  weapon  which  indented 
a  mahogany  table,  and  which  must  have  killed  her,  had  she 
not  avoided  it.  Now  it  was  abundantly  proved  that  there 
existed  no  real  cause  whatever  for  this  strange  antipathy,  but 
that  the  daughter  was  of  an  amiable,  obliging,  and  docile 
disposition,  —  that  she  had  always  shown  a  great  filial  affec- 
tion for  her  father,  —  that  she  conducted  at  home  and  abroad 
with  the  utmost  propriety  and  decorum, — that  she  was  a 
person   of   strictly  moral  and  religious  habits,  and  was   so 


268  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

considered  and  known  to  be  by  the  friends  of  tiie  deceased 
and  others  of  high  reputation  and  character.  The  court,  in 
making  up  its  decision,  declared  that  the  question  at  issue 
was,  "  not  whether  the  deceased's  insanity  in  certain  other 
particulars,  as  proved  by  the  daughter,  should  have  the  effect 
of  defeating  a  will  generally,  of  the  deceased,  or  even  this 
identical  will,  —  but  whether  his  insanity,  on  the  subject  of 
his  daughter,  should  have  the  effect  of  defeating,  not  so  much 
any  will  {a  will  generally)  of  the  deceased,  as  this  identical 
will."  Accordingly,  considering  it  proved  that  the  will  was 
the  direct,  unqualified  offspring  of  that  morbid  delusion  con- 
cerning the  daughter,  thus  put  into  act  and  energy,  it  was 
pronounced  to  be  null  and  void  in  law.  In  this  decision  we 
see  the  prevalence  of  those  more  correct  and  profound  views 
of  insanity,  which  have  resulted  from  the  inquiries  of  the  last 
few  years. 

§  276.  The  same  principle  had  been  previously  laid  down 
in  the  following  case  which  was  adjudicated  in  Kentucky, 
in  1822.  George  Moore  made  his  will  in  April,  1822,  and 
shortly  after  died.  It  was  the  validity  of  this  will  w^hich  was 
the  point  at  issue.  About  twenty-four  years  previous  to  his 
death,  he  had  a  dangerous  fever,  during  which  he  imbibed  a 
strong  antipathy  towards  his  brothers,  imagining  that  they  in- 
tended to  destroy  or  injure  him,  though  they  attended  him 
throughout  his  illness,  and  never  furnished  the  slightest  foun- 
dation for  his  belief.  This  antipathy  continued  to  the  day  of 
his  death,  with  a  single  exception,  when  he  made  a  will  in 
their  favor,  but  afterwards  cancelled.it.  When  asked  by  one 
of  the  witnesses  why  he  disinherited  his  brothers  he  became 
violently  excited,  and  declared  that  they  had  endeavored  to 
get  his  estate  before  his  death.  The  court,  in  its  decision, 
observe,  that  "  he  cannot  be  accounted  a  free  agent  in  making 
his  will,  so  far  as  his  relatives  are  concerned,  although  free  as 
to  the  rest  of  the  world.  But  however  free  he  may  have  been 
as  to  other  objects,  the  conclusion  is  irresistible,  that  this 
peculiar  defect  of  intellect  did  influence  his  acts  in  making 
his  will,  and  for  this  cause  it  ought  not  to  be  sustained.  It 
is  not  only  this  groundless  hatred  or  malice  to  his  brethren 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  269 

that  ought  to  affect  his  will,  but  also  his  fears  of  them,  which 
he  expressed  during  his  last  illness,  conceiving  that  they  were 
attempting  to  get  away  his  estate  before  his  death,  or  that 
they  were  lying  in  wait  to  shoot  him,  while  on  other  subjects 
he  spoke  rationally ;  all  of  which  are  strong  evidences  of  a 
derangement  in  one  department  of  his  mind,  unaccounta- 
ble indeed,  but  directly  influencing  and  operating  upon  the 
act  which  is  now  claimed  as  the  final  disposition  of  the 
estate."  i 

§  277.  Esquirol  has  related  a  case  of  a  very  similar  kind, 
where  a  person  conceived  an  antipathy  against  his  brothers, 
sisters,  and  other  relatives,  who,  he  believed,  were  seeking  to 
destroy  him.  Under  the  influence  of  this  delusion  he  made 
testamentary  dispositions,  and  Esquirol  being  consulted 
respecting  their  validity,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  tes- 
tator was  laboring  under  insanity .^ 

§  278.  On  the  other  hand,  testamentary  dispositions  which 
are  founded  on  motives  that  might  be  supposed  to  govern  a 
sane  mind,  and  present,  on  their  face,  no  indications  of 
insanity,  have  not  been  disturbed,  though  the  mind  were 
confessedly  laboring  under  some  degree  of  derangement. 
The  following  case  was  decided  in  strict  accordance  with 
this  principle. 

At  a  session  of  the  supreriie  court  of  Massachusetts,  in 
Worcester  county,  April,  1843,  the  probate  of  a  will  was 
contested  on  the  ground  of  the  insanity  of  the  testator  who 
had  bequeathed  the  most  of  his  property  to  a  nephew,  though 
having  children  of  his  own.  It  appeared  in  evidence,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  the  testator,  when  under  the  immediate 
influence  of  strong  drink,  to  which  he  was  intemperately 
addicted,  manifested  some  aberration  of  mind,  and  for  sev- 
eral years  before  his  death  had  persisted  in  the  declaration 
that  his  children  were  not  legitimate,  as  he  had  never  been 
married  to  their  mother.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appeared,  that 
his  only  son  was  intemperate,  and  neglected  and  abused  his 

'  Johnson  V.  Moore's  Heirs,  1  Little,  371. 
*  Annales  jj'  Hygiene  Publique,  iii.  370. 

23* 


270  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

parents ;  that  his  daughter,  her  husband  and  children,  also 
neglected  him ;  and  that  for  many  years,  there  was  no  inter- 
course among  the  various  members  of  the  family.  The 
nephew  had  always  maintained  friendly  relations  with  the 
testator  and  ministered  to  his  wants  and  infirmities.  Al- 
though he  had  lived  with  the  mother  of  his  children,  as  hus- 
oand  and  wife,  forty-nine  years,  yet  no  certificate  or  record 
of  the  marriage  could  be  found,  and  it  did  not  appear  very 
improbable  that  the  marriage  ceremony  had  never  been  per- 
formed. He  had  always  managed  his  property,  which  was 
of  considerable  amount,  prudently  and  intelligently,  and  the 
will  was  properly  drawn  and  executed,  giving  good  reasons 
also  for  its  bequests.  In  short,  it  was  a  rational  act,  ration- 
ally done,  and  was  established  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury.^ 

§  279.  Lord  Brougham,  however,  has  laid  dow-n  the  doc- 
trine, that  in  civil  cases,  partial  insanity  should  have  the 
same  legal  consequences,  as  the  general  form  of  the  disease. 
The  idea  of  partial  unsoundness,  in  the  common  acceptation, 
is  incompatible,  he  thinks,  with  the  unity  and  individuality  of 
the  mind.  If  the  mind  were  an  aggregate  of  several  facul- 
ties, one  or  more  of  them  might  certainly  become  unsound, 
while  the  rest  remained  unaffected,  and  it  would  be  very 
proper  to  consider  the  acts  of  the  individual,  in  reference  to 
this  point.  But  if  the  mind  is  indivisible,  we  are  unable  to 
limit  exactly  the  operation  of  any  unsoundness  by  which  it 
is  affected.  Delusion,  as  long  as  it  exists,  whether  much  or 
little  under  control,  is  a  manifestation  of  insanity,  and  hence 
no  confidence  can  be  placed  in  the  acts  or  any  act  of  a  dis- 
eased mind,  however  apparently  rational  that  act  may  appear 
to  be,  or  may  in  reality  be,  because  .we  have  no  security  that 
the  lurking  delusion,  the  real  unsoundness,  does  not  mingle 
itself  with,  or  occasion  the  act.  Hence,  if  a  person  believing 
himself  to  be  Emperor  of  Germany,  should  make  his  will, 
and  we  were  quite  convinced  that,  had  any  one  spoken  of  the 

^  For  the  facts  in  this  case,  I  am  Indebted"  to  Dr.  S.  B.  Woodward,  then 
Superintendent  of  the  Lunatic  Hospital  at  Worcester,  -who  gave  his  testi- 
mony on  the  trial,  as  an  expert. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  271 

German  diet,  or  abused  the  German  emperor,  the  testator's 
delusion  would  have  at  once  broken  forth,  then  we  must  pro- 
nounce the  will  void,  be  it  rational  and  efficacious  in  every 
respect  as  any  disposition  of  property  could  be.  Now,  the 
true  issue  in  the  case,  which  does  not  seem  to  be  very  clearly 
apprehended  by  his  Lordship,  is,  whether  or  not  the  admit- 
ted unsoundness  did  influence  the  testamentary  dispositions, 
and  on  this  point  evidence  is  sought  in  the  character  of  the 
will  itself.  The  attentive  reader  will  not  fail  to  see  the 
lamentable  inconsistency  of  the  doctrine  here  put  forth,  with 
that  which  the  same  person  has  promulgated  in  regard  to 
criminal  cases.     (§§37,39.)^ 

§  280.  It  must  now  be  regarded  as  the  settled  doctrine  of 
English  and  American  courts,  that  partial  insanity  may  or 
may  not  affect  the  validity  of  a  will.  But  it  is  not  so  well 
settled  that  a  will  is  necessarily  invalidated  by  the  presence 
of  mental  disease  possessing  a  wider  range  of  influence.  In 
the  judgment  just  referred  to.  Lord  Brougham  said  that,  in 
the  trial  of  the  case,  "there  was  a  manifest  disposition  to  lay 
down  a  rule  that  no  person  laboring  under  monomania,  or 
partial  insanity,  can  be  deemed  intestable,  unless  the  kind  of 
insanity  appears  on  the  face  of  the  will.  But  there  was 
wanting  the  courage  to  lay  down  a  proposition  which  would 
at  once,  have  been  rejected,  and  must  have  been  met  with 
the  question.  Could  any  court  admit  to  probate,  the  will  of 
the  man  who  said  (in  the  case  cited  by  Sir  John  Nicholl,  in 
Dew  V.  Clark),  '  I  am  the  Christ,'  although  that  will  bore  no 
marks  whatever  of  an  unsound  mind,  still  less  of  the  dread- 
ful delusion  under  which  the  party  labored."  Undoubtedly, 
many  a  man  whose  mind  is  swarming  with  delusions,  and 
whose  insanity  is  manifested,  in  some  way  or  other,  every 
hour  in  the  day,  may  make  a  will,  perfectly  correct  and  proper 
in  its  dispositions,  and  exhibiting  not  a  trace  of  disease, 
either  in  its  form  or  substance.  Is  such  a  will  to  stand  ? 
Practically,  perhaps,  there  would  be  no  difficulty.  If  the  tes- 
tator  had  shown,  in  his  discourse  or  his  conduct,  the  least 

^   Waring  v.  Waring,  6  Thornton's  Notes,  388. 


272  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

scintillation  of  reason,  his  case  would  be  regarded  as  one  of 
monomania,  and,  of  course,  subject  to  the  established  rule 
respecting  the  legal  effect  of  monomania.     This  result  was 
exemplified  in   Chambers   v.    The    Qiieenh   Proctor    (1840).i 
The  facts  were  established  that  on  the  12th,  13th,  and  14th 
of  November,  1839,  the  testator,  a  barrister,  entertained  the 
delusion,  among  others,  that  the  benchers  of  the  Inner  Tem- 
ple were  about  to  disbar  him  on  account  of  an  imaginary 
trivial  fraud  he  had  practised  upon  them,  and  that  in  conse- 
quence thereof,  he  was  a  lost  man,  and  must  be  got  out  of 
the  country ;  that  this  delusion  existed  in  the  latter  part  of 
1838  or  1839 ;  that  delusions  equally  gross  existed  at  a  pre- 
vious period  of  the  year  1838 ;  that  on  the  15th  of  Novem- 
ber, 1839,  he  executed   his  will ;  and  that  the   next  day  he 
committed   suicide.      The   court.    Sir    Herbert   Jenner,    pro- 
nounced in  favor  of  the  will,  on  the  following  grounds.     No 
delusion  was  proved  to   exist  on   the  10th,  11th,  or  12th  of 
November,  and  it  may  be  properly  inferred,  no  evidence  to 
the  contrary  appearing,  that  on  the  loth,  his  mind  was  in  the 
same  condition  as  on  the  11th.     The  continuance  of  insanity 
on  the  15th,  is  not  to  be  assumed,  merely  because  it  existed 
on  the  three  previous  days.     These  were  the  ostensible  rea- 
sons for  sustaining  the  will ;  the  real  one,  unquestionably, 
was,  that  it  was  a  rational  act,  rationally  done,  and  the  result 
would  have  been  the  same  if  the  testator,  instead  of  believing 
that  the  benchers  were  about  to   disbar  him,  had  imagined 
that  he  was  the  Christ.     Had  there  been  in  the  will  one 
word  "  sounding  to  folly,"  then,  certainly,  it  would  have  been 
assumed  that  the  delusion  continued  on  the  15th,  and  that 
the  act  of  suicide  on  the  16th  strengthened  this  assumption. 

§  281.  In  criminal  as  well  as  civil  cases,  it  is  important  to 
consider  the  operation  of  the  predominant  idea,  and  its  influ- 
ence on  the  act  in  question.  There  certainly  is  no  reason 
why  a  person  should  be  held  responsible  for  a  criminal  act 
that  springs  from  a  delusion  which  would  be  sufficient  to 
invalidate  any  civil  act  to  which  it  might  give  rise.    A  mono- 

'  2  Curteis,  415. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.     273 

maniac's  sense  of  the  fitness  of  things  is  not  different  when 
he  signs  a  ruinous  contract,  or  makes  a  will,  from  what  it  is 
when  he  commits  a  criminal  deed.  If  the  inability  to  dis- 
cern the  true  relations  of  things  is  the  ground  on  which  the 
former  are  invalidated,  it  ought  equally  to  annul  criminal 
responsibility ;  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  abstract  con- 
ceptions of  the  nature  and  consequences  of  crime  are  never 
affected  in  insanity,  or  are  compatible  with  a  degree  of  men- 
tal soundness  that  would  incapacitate  a  person  from  buying 
a  house  or  selling  a  lot  of  land.  It  is  yet  a  disputed  point, 
however,  whether  partial  mania  should  have  the  full  legal 
effect  of  insanity,  in  criminal  cases.  By  Hoffbauer,  Fodere, 
and  some  other  writers,  it  is  contended  that  the  same  princi- 
ple which  determines  the  effect  of  mania  in  civil,  should  also 
determine  its  effect  in  criminal  cases;  that  is,  that  criminal 
responsibility  should  be  annulled  only  when  the  act  comes 
within  the  range  of  the  diseased  operations  of  the  mind.  In 
favor  of  this  view,  it  has  been  urged,  that  the  connection  of 
the  morbid  delusion  with  the  criminal  act,  is  generally  very 
direct,  and  not  easily  mistaken.  A  remote  and  circuitous  as- 
sociation of  the  predominant  idea  with  the  deed  in  question, 
presents  fair  ground  for  suspicion,  because  the  further  the 
thoughts  of  the  monomaniac  wander  from  the  object  of  his 
delusion,  the  less  are  they  affected  by  its  influence.  If  a  man 
who  imagines  his  legs  are  made  of  glass,  should  see  another 
approaching  him  with  a  stick  for  the  purpose  of  breaking 
them,  he  could  not  help  resisting  even  to  bloodshed,  in  what 
would  be  to  him  an  act  of  self-defence,  but  it  would  require  a 
very  peculiar  concatenation  of  circumstances  to  warrant  us  in 
considering  a  rape  or  theft  as  the  offspring  of  this  hallucina- 
tion, because  the  idea  of  these  acts  would  carry  the  thoughts 
far  beyond  the  reach  of  its  influence. 

§  282.  Against  these  views  it  is  objected,  that,  it  is  not 
always  easy  to  trace  the  connection  between  the  predomi- 
nant idea  and  the  criminal  act.  The  links  that  connect  the 
thoughts  which  rise  successively  in  the  sound  mind,  defy  all 
our  penetration,  and  the  few  laws  we  have  established  are 
totally  inapplicable  to  the  associations  of  the  insane  mind. 


274  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

No  one  will  be  bold  enough  to  affirm  that  a  certain  idea  can- 
not possibly  be  connected  with  a  certain  other  idea,  in  a 
healthy  state  of  the  mind,  least  of  all  when  it  is  disordered 
by  disease ;  so  that  the  existence  of  partial  insanity  once 
established,  it  is  for  no  human  tribunal  arbitrarily  to  circum- 
scribe the  circle  of  its  diseased  operations.  A  case  is  on 
record  of  a  young  man  who  had  an  insane  passion  for  wind- 
mills. He  would  go  any  distance  to  see  a  windmill,  and 
would  sit  watching  one  for  days  together.  In  the  hope  of 
turning  his  mind  from  this  strange  fancy,  his  friends  removed 
him  to  a  place  where  there  were  no  mills.  Here  he  got  a 
child  into  a  wood,  and  attempted  to  murder  it,  in  the  hope 
that  he  would  be  removed,  as  a  punishment,  to  some  place 
where  there  were  windmills.^  The  connection  between  his 
delusion  and  the  criminal  act  would  never  have  been  discov- 
ered, certainly,  had  he  not  disclosed  it  himself.  We  must  re- 
member, also,  that  sometimes  the  predominant  idea  is  fre- 
quently changing,  and  at  others,  is  obstinately  concealed  by 
the  patient,  and  not  ascertained  till  after  his  restoration  to 
health. 

§  283.  Is  it  true  that  the  insane  judge  of  their  relations  to 
persons  and  things  not  immediately  connected  with  their 
delusions,  with  ordinary  clearness  and  accuracy?  Does  the 
cloud  that  settles  over  one  portion  of  their  mental  horizon, 
throw  no  shadow  over  the  rest  of  it?  This  question  involves 
a  matter  of  fact,  and  must  be  decided  solely  on  the  testimony 
of  those  who  have  had  abundant  opportunities  of  observing 
the  insane,  of  learning  their  habits,  their  modes  of  thinking 
and  feeling,  their  motives  and  impulses.  It  is  unquestiona- 
bly true  that  a  person  partially  insane  may,  to  a  certain 
extent,  be  quite  rational  in  his  conduct  and  conversation,  but 
the  same  is  equally  true  of  those  who  are  regarded  as  wholly 
insane.  Let  a  stranger  spend  an  hour  or  two  in  the  galleries 
of  an  asylum,  observing  the  manners  of  the  inmates,  and 
watching  them  while  engaged  in  their  labors,  amusements, 
and  conversation,  and  distinguish,  if  he  can,  the  wholly  from 

*  Lond.  Quar.  Rev,  Ixxiv. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  275 

the  partially  insane.  If  this  limited  power  of  speaking  and 
acting  correctly  does  not  invalidate  the  plea  of  insanity  as  it 
regards  the  one  class,  why  should  it  as  it  regards  the  other? 
Touching  this  phenomenon  there  are  two  facts  which  should 
be  duly  considered,  in  forming  our  opinion  of  its  relation  to 
legal  responsibility.  In  the  first  place,  this  apparent  ration- 
ality of  the  insane  is  usually  manifested  in  connection  with 
matters,  to  them  of  secondary  consequence,  not  calculated  to 
excite  much  interest,  nor  to  task  any  moral  or  intellectual 
faculty ;  but  the  moment  their  attention  is  engaged  with  top- 
ics of  an  opposite  character,  we  perceive  the  influence  of  dis- 
ease. A  word,  a  look,  by  some  bond  of  association,  may 
touch  a  discordant  string,  and  this  individual,  before  so  calm, 
so  cool  and  rational,  launches  into  a  strain  of  absurdities,  or 
explodes  in  a  storm  of  passion.  While  the  sea  is  smooth 
and  the  winds  light,  reason  easily  guides  the  helm  which  is 
wrenched  from  its  grasp  by  the  first  breeze  that  rufHes  the 
surface.  The  transition  from  the  apparently  sane  to  the 
insane,  is  perfectly  obvious  when  we  see  the  exciting  cause, 
and  the  patient  gives  audible  expression  to  his  thoughts. 
But  because  we  do  not  learn  these  intermediate  steps,  as  they 
often  are  not  manifested  by  any  sensible  marks,  does  it  fol- 
low that  the  final  act  to  which  they  lead,  is  entirely  free  from 
the  taint  of  insanity?  This  is  undoubtedly  possible,  but 
since  we  can  never  prove  the  fact,  and  the  other  event  is 
highly  probable,  we  are  bound  to  abide  by  the  known  general 
rule  and  not  the  doubtful  exception.  The  more  one  sees  of 
mental  disorder,  the  more,  we  apprehend,  is  he  disposed  to 
believe  that  this  integrity  of  some  of  the  functions  in  partial 
insanity,  is  rather  apparent  than  real,  —  that  the  disease, 
however  limited,  seldom,  if  ever,  fails  to  irradiate  its  morbific 
influence  to  a  greater  or  less  extent.  A  little  acquaintance 
with  monomaniacs  almost  always  brings  to  light  certain 
peculiarities  in  their  modes  of  thinking  or  acting,  or  certain 
inequalities  of  temper,  which  they  did  not  manifest  previous 
to  their  disease.  So  latent  is  this  effect  sometimes,  that  it 
will  evade  the  closest  observation,  until  a  suitable  opportu- 
nity occurs  for  its  development.     In  this  respect,  it  seems  to 


276  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSAXITT. 

follow  a  common  law  of  our  mental  constitution,  whose  fac- 
ulties require  a  certain  combination  of  circumstances  to 
arouse  them  into  activity,  and  develop  them  in  all  their 
energy  and  power.  How  often  do  we  find  patients  who, 
while  enjoying  the  quiet,  seclusion,  and  kindness  of  an  asy- 
lum, are  correct  in  their  deportment,  circumspect  in  their 
ways,  punctual  in  their  outgoings  and  incomings,  courteous 
and  obliging  in  their  manners;  but,  restored  to  the  bosom  of 
their  families,  become  overbearing,  contentious,  and  irascible, 
destroying  the  peace  and  threatening  the  lives  of  those  who 
should  be  most  dear  to  them.  In  most  monomaniacs  —  so 
far,  indeed,  as  our  experience  goes,  the  fact  is  almost  without 
an  exception  —  we  see,  as  it  regards  their  estimates  of  men 
and  things,  less  intellectual  discernment  and  a  lower  tone  of 
moral  feeling  than  they  manifested  in  their  sound  and  healthy 
condition.  Who  that  has  been  much  conversant  with  the 
insane,  has  not  been  surprised  at  times,  to  hear  persons  who 
have  always  talked  sensibly  and  discreetly  except  on  their 
weak  points,  unexpectedly  giving  utterance  to  sentiments 
that  betray  a  radical  perversion  of  their  moral  perceptions? 
Is  all  this  to  go  for  nothing  in  settling  the  measure  of  their 
legal  responsibility  ? 

§  2S4.  We  ought  also  to  bear  in  mind  a  fact  too  much 
overlooked,  that  much  of  the  ordinary  working  of  the  mind, 
whether  sane  or  insane,  becomes  somewhat  instinctive  and 
mechanical,  and  goes  on,  if  not  entirely  independent  of  the 
exercise  of  the  reasoning  powers,,  certainly  without  their 
close  and  active  supervision.  In  hospitals  for  the  insane, 
this  phenomenon  is  sometimes  witnessed  in  a  very  remark- 
able degree.  There  we  see  men  whose  understandings  are  a 
complete  wreck,  every  day  uttering  certain  mere  common- 
places of  conversation,  performing  certain  acts,  and  continu- 
ing certain  habits  which  to  a  stranger  would  convey  the  im- 
pression that  their  mental  disorder  is  very  partial  in  its  oper- 
ation. How  often  do  we  see  patients  in  that  state  of  fatuity 
which  is  the  sequel  of  long-continued  insanity,  playing  at 
draughts,  or  performing  on  some  musical  instrument  with  a 
very    creditable   degree   of  skill.     In    accordance,   therefore. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.     277 

with  this  law  of  our  intellectual  being,  an  insane  person  may 
be  quite  rational  in  some  respects,  simply  because  his  under- 
standing has  nothing  to  do  with  it.  He  thinks  and  acts  me- 
chanically. But  let  him  be  tried  on  something  that  requires  a 
fresh  and  active  exercise  of  thought;  something  that  requires 
control  of  his  feelings,  and  then  we  shall  see  how  feeble  is 
the  dominion  of  reason.  It  would  be  strange  indeed,  contrary 
to  all  our  analogies  of  morbid  action,  if  a  disease  so  serious  as 
to  completely  distort  the  perceptions  and  pervert  the  evidence 
of  the  senses  on  some  points,  should  leave  all  the  other  men- 
tal operations  perfectly  intact. 

§  285.  The  views  here  objected  to  have  found  a  strong 
opponent  in  Georget,  whose  practical  knowledge  of  the  subject 
and  acknowledged  acuteness  in  observing  the  manners  of  the 
insane,  entitle  his  opinions  to  great  consideration,  if  not  to 
entire  belief.  The  following  observations  of  his  should  never 
be  forgotten  in  forming  conclusions  on  this  disputed  point. 
"  In  conversing,"  says  he,  "  with  patients  on  topics  foreign  to 
their  morbid  delusions,  you  will  generally  find  no  difference 
between  them  and  other  people.  They  not  only  deal  in 
common-place  notions,  but  are  capable  of  appreciating  new 
facts  and  trains  of  reasoning.  Still  more,  they  retain  their 
sense  of  good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong,  and  of  social  usages, 
to  such  a  degree,  that  whenever  they  come  together,  forget- 
ting their  moral  sufferings  and  delusions,  they  conduct,  as 
they  otherwise  would,  inquiring  with  interest  for  one  another's 
health,  and  maintaining  the  ordinary  observances  of  society. 
They  have  special  reasons  even  for  regarding  themselves  with 
a  degree  of  complacency ;  since,  for  the  most  part,  they 
believe  that  they  are  victims  of  arbitrary  measures,  fraudu- 
lent contrivances,  and  projects  of  vengeance  or  cupidity,  and 
thus  they  sympathize  with  one  another  in  their  common  mis- 
fortunes. Accordingly,  the  inmates  of  lunatic  asylums  are 
rarely  known  to  commit  those  reprehensible  acts  which  are 
regarded  as  crimes  when  dictated  by  sound  reason,  though 
the  most  of  them  enjoy  considerable  freedom.  They  often 
talk  very  sensibly  of  their  interests,  and  some  even  manage 
their  property  perfectly  well." 

24 


278  MEDICAL  JUPJSPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

"  Those  patients  who  are  insane  on  one  point,  only  more 
or  less  limited,  may  have  experienced  some  severe  moral 
disorders  which  influence  the  conduct  and  actions  of  the 
individual,  without  materially  injuring  his  judgment.  Those 
who  conduct  themselves  so  well  in  the  asylum,  in  the  midst 
of  strangers  with  whom  they  have  no  relations,  and  against 
whom  they  have  conceived  no  prejudice  nor  cause  of  com- 
plaint, and  in  quiet  submission  to  the  rule  of  the  house,  are 
no  sooner  at  liberty,  in  the  bosom  of  their  families,  than 
their  conduct  becomes  insupportable  ;  they  are  irritated  by 
the  slightest  contradiction,  abasing  and  threatening  those 
who  address  to  them  the  slightest  observation,  and  working 
themselves  up  to  the  most  intolerable  excesses.  And  whether 
the  reprehensible  acts  they  then  commit  are  really  foreign  to 
the  predominant  idea  or  not,  ought  we  to  make  a  being 
responsible  for  them  whose  moral  nature  is  so  deeply  affect- 
ed? "^  These  facts,  it  cannot  be  denied,  furnish  strong 
ground  for  the  remark  with  which  Georget  closes  his  obser- 
vations on  this  point,  namely,  that  if,  in  following  the  rule 
that  partial  mania  excludes  the  idea  of  culpability,  "  the 
moralist  and  the  criminal  judge  run  the  risk  of  committing 
injustice  by  sparing  a  really  guilty  person,  certainly,  the  oppo- 
site course  would  lead  them  into  still  greater  errors." 

§  286.  Hoff'bauer  has  not  only  limited  the  exculpatory 
effects  of  partial  mania  to  the  acts  which  clearly  come  within 
its  influence,  but  has  laid  down  the  principle  that  in  the 
criminal  jurisprudence  of  this  condition,  the  predominant 
idea  should  be  considered  as  true ;  that  is,  that  the  acts  of 
the  patient  should  be  judged  as  if  he  had  really  been  in  the 
circumstances  he  imagined  himself  to  be  when  they  were 
committed.  This  view,  as  we  have  already  seen  (§  33),  was 
maintained  by  the  judges  of  England,  and  has  been  exten- 
sively received  ever  since.  To  the  world  at  large,  nothing 
can  be  more  reasonable  than  this  doctrine  of  regarding  the 
acts  of  the  insane  precisely  as  if  their  peculiar  belief  were 
real  and  true,  and  not  a  baseless  delusion.  If  a  man  really 
believes  that  another  is  ready  to  do  him  some  grievous  bodily 

^  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folie,  10,  14. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.     279 

injury,  it  is  right  and  proper  for  him  to  anticipate  the  blow  by 
killing  the  object  of  his  delusion,  but  not,  if  he  fancies  merely 
that  this  person  has  wronged  him,  or  is  exercising  over  him  a 
malign  influence.  "  If  a  man  had  the  delusion  that  his  head 
was  made  of  glass,  that  would  be  no  excuse  for  his  killing  a 
man ;  he  would  know  very  well,  that,  although  his  head  was 
made  of  glass,  that  was  no  reason  why  he  sho^ild  kill  another 
man,  and  that  it  was  a  wrong  act,  and  he  wotild  be  properly 
subjected  to  punishment  for  that-act. "  ^  In  other  words,  he 
may  do  with  impunity  just  what  any  other  person  would  be 
justified  in  doing  under  similar  circumstances  —  but  no  more. 
The  fallacy  of  this  reasoning  consists  in  the  idea,  that  insane 
people  always  reason  correctly  from  wrong  premises,  and 
therefore  it  is  inapplicable  to  the  numerous  instances  where 
the  premises  and  inferences  are  all  equally  wrong.  If  a  per- 
son imagines  he  heard  the  voice  of  God  commanding  him 
to  immolate  his  only  child,  and  he  accordingly  obeys,  it  may 
be  said  indeed  that  he  is  not  responsible  for  the  bloody  deed, 
because  it  would  have  been  perfectly  proper,  had  he  really 
heard  the  command;  but  are  we  to  be  told,  that  if  he  had 
killed  his  neighbor  for  a  fancied  petty  injury,  he  is  not  to  be 
absolved  from  punishment,  because  the  act  would  have  been 
highly  criminal,  even  though  he  might  have  really  received 
the  injury?  In  cases  like  the  latter,  the  insanity  manifests 
itself,  not  only  in  the  fancied  injury,  but  in  the  dispropor- 
tionate punishment  which  is  inflicted  upon  the  offender. 
Nothing  in  regard  to  insanity  is  better  established  than  the 
fact,  that  Avhen  the  mind  is  possessed  by  a  delusion,  the  con- 
clusions it  may  adopt  are  as  likely  to  be  absurd  as  logical  and 
wise.  The  character  of  the  conclusion,  so  far  as  we  are  con- 
cerned, is  an  accidental  feature  in  the  case,  and  therefore 
nothing  can  be  more  unphllosophical  or  unjust,  than  to  make 
it  the  criterion  of  legal  responsibility.  Two  men  in  affluent 
circumstances  imagine  that  they  are  coming  to  want,  and 
the  belief  fills  them  with  the  keenest  distress.  To  aU  appear- 
ance they  are  both  equally  insane,  equally  diseased  in  body, 
and  equally  wretched.     The  one   denies  himself  and  family 

*  Baron  Alderson,  in  Reg.  v.  Pate  (1850),  Times,  July  12,  1850. 


280  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

the  necessities  of  life,  and  they  are  indebted  for  their  con- 
tinued existence  to  the  charities  of  others.  The  other  slaugh- 
ters his  family  and  attempts  to  kill  himself.  Upon  the  prin- 
ciple in  question,  the  latter  is  held  guilty  of  murder,  while  the 
former  is  regarded  as  irresponsible  for  his  conduct.  The  turn 
which  the  delusion  takes  decides  the  question  of  guilty  or 
not  guilty.  Hadfield's  motive  for  shooting  at  the  king  was, 
that  certain  great  ends  might  be  attained  by  his  own  execu- 
tion which  he  supposed  would  follow.  Lawrence,  who 
attempted  to  take  the  life  of  President  Jackson,  imagined 
that  his  victim  stood  in  the  way  of  his  obtaining  certain 
imaginary  estates.  These  men  were  tried  and  acquitted, 
and  the  public  voice  has  abundantly  confirmed  the  correct- 
ness of  the  verdict.  Judged  however,  by  Hoffbauer's  prin- 
ciple, they  must  have  been  deemed  fully  responsible  for  their 
acts,  and  so  must  a  large  portion  of  those  lunatics  who,  for 
their  bloody  deeds,  have  been  consigned  to  the  hospital, 
instead  of  the  gallows.  TlTe  meaning  of  the  principle  is, 
that  when  a  person  who  is  admitted  to  be  insane,  inflicts  an 
injury  which,  in  the  judgment  of  a  benevolent  man,  is  dis- 
proportioned  to  the  provocation,  the  surplus  injury  is  to  be 
attributed  to  passion,  or  some  bad  motive,  and  the  lunatic 
must  be  punished  accordingly.  The  unsoundness  of  such 
views,  it  might  be  supposed,  would  have  been  shown  by  the 
most  superficial  knowledge  of  insanity.  When  a  person  is 
so  insane  as  to  imagine  that  another  is  disturbing  his  peace 
by  spells  and  incantations,  is  it  strange  that  at  the  same 
time,  his  notions  of  right  and  wrong  should  be  so  confused, 
that  he  thinks  himself  justified  in  sacrificing  his  disturber? 
It  certainly  would  be  far  more  strange  —  although  it  is  not 
denied  that  this  is  sometimes  the  case  —  if  a  person,  after 
adopting  a  gross  delusion,  should  reason  respecting  it  with 
all  the  clearness  and  sagacity  of  a  sound  mind.  In  all  my 
intercourse  with  the  insane,  I  never  succeeded  in  convincing 
one  that  the  vengeance  he  threatened  against  others  was 
greatly  disproportioned  to  the  alleged  offence,  besides  being 
wrong  and  unlawful.  On  the  contrary,  they  always  manifest 
the  strongest  possible  assurance  that  they  may  rightfully  do 
as  they  please  in  their  measures  of  retaliation. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL   MANIA.  281 

§  287.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose,  as  this  principle 
does,  that  the  insane  generally  act  from  well-defined,  tangible 
motives  or  reasons.  Some  unquestionably  do,  while  it  is 
just  as  certain  that  many  do  not.  It  is  often  impossible  for 
them  to  give  a  clear  and  consistent  reason  for  their  conduct. 
Their  discourse  on  this  point  is  vague,  obscure,  and  contra- 
dictory. From  want  of  sufficient  steadiness  or  concentra- 
tion of  mind,  or  both,  they  find  it  difficult  to  express  or 
explain  their  ideas,  and  for  a  similar  reason,  probably,  they 
are  singularly  unstable  and  changing  in  their  views.  They 
may  utter  certain  propositions,  and  may  give  their  assent  to 
others,  but  can  we  believe  that,  laboring  under  the  deficien- 
cies here  indicated,  their  perceptions  have  that  degree  of 
clearness  and  accuracy  which  is  essential  to  the  idea  of 
understanding  and  knowledge  ?  The  law  asks  whether  the 
party  knew  that  the  act  he  committed  was  wrong,  or  con- 
trary to  law,  etc.,  implying  that  the  reflective  powers  of  such 
a  person  are  not  essentially  changed,  but  only  conduct  to 
unsound  conclusions.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  seldom,  if 
ever,  do  the  insane,  before  committing  acts  of  violence,  reflect 
calmly  on  the  subject,  view  it  in  its  different  relations,  and 
thus  deliberately  form  the  simple,  intelligible  conclusion,  that 
the  act  they  meditate,  is  right.  The  notions  which  flit 
through  their  minds  are  too  vague  and  disjointed  to  be  prop- 
erly called  knowledg-e,  although  they  may  use  that  term 
themselves  in  speaking  of  their  views.  Were  it  otherwise, 
why  should  they,  on  recovery,  regard  the  whole  aspect  of  the 
subject  in  a  very  different  light,  and  be  as  much  astonished  as 
others  to  find  what  they  have  said  and  done  ?  The  truth  is, 
they  act  from  impulse  and  sudden  suggestions,  without  being 
very  conscious  at  the  time  of  what  they  are  doing,  or  if  they 
are,  without  being  able  to  explain  their  conduct  even  to  their 
own  satisfaction.  Many  of  those  who  attempt  suicide  are 
unable  to  assign  any  thing  like  a  reason  for  the  act.  They 
contemplate  it  but  a  moment,  perhaps,  before  proceeding  to 
carry  the  idea  into  execution,  and  then  sincerely  rejoice  that 
they  were  prevented  from  succeeding.  Homicidal  acts  are 
often  unquestionably  committed  by  the  insane,  in  a  similar 

24* 


282  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

state  of  mind.  In  general  mania,  especially  the  early  stage, 
the  mind  is  filled  with  vague  fears,  suspicions,  jealousy,  and 
distrust,  and  the  thoughts  are  sadly  confused.  The  patient 
believes  that  enemies  encompass  him  around,  bent  on  de- 
stroying his  reputation  or  his  life.  With  no  special  plan  in 
view,  he  arms  himself  with  swords  and  pistols,  and  accident 
or  some  unaccountable  caprice  finally  determines  the  victim. 
The  poor  maniac  can  no  more  give  a  reason  for  his  selection, 
than  he  can  for  the  groundless  fears  that  besiege  his  mind.  It 
is  a  fact  that  should  be  duly  pondered  by  those  who  would 
adopt  the  principle  we  are  now  contending  against  that  very 
often,  maniacs,  upon  recovery,  have  but  a  shadowy  recollec- 
tion of  the  violence  they  may  have  committed,  though  at  the 
time,  they  may  have  discoursed  about  it  wdth  some  degree 
of  coherence  and  pertinency.  By  some  even  Hofl'bauer's 
principle  is  considered  as  too  indulgent,  and  the  broad  ground 
is  taken  that  mere  delusion  is  not  a  sufficient  excuse  for  any 
crime  to  which  it  may  lead.  They  say  to  the  victim  of  a 
gross  delusion,  "  what  if  you  do  believe,  in  all  sincerity,  that 
you  are  compassed  about  by  people  who  seek  to  destroy  your 
peace,  to  injure  your  reputation,  or  to  poison  your  food.'  It 
is  very  wrong  in  them,  and  the  provocation  is  certainly  strong. 
No  wonder  you  are  angry  and  harbor  thoughts  of  revenge. 
But  other  men  have  enemies  and  encounter  provocations,  and 
they  control  their  passions  and  resist  the  impulse  to  retaliate. 
So  must  you.  Some  things  you  unfortunately  see  in  a  false 
light,  but,  in  other  respects  your  mind  is  clear,  and  yourmoa"al 
perceptions  are  supposed  to  be  undisturbed  by  morbid  pro- 
pensities or  irresistible  impulses.  You  have  no  right,  there- 
fore, to  take  the  law  into  your  own  hands,  and  if  you  revenge 
an  imaginary  wrong  in  a  way  that  would  subject  a  sane  per- 
son who  should  revenge  a  real  wrong,  to  extreme  punishment, 
tlien  the  law  should  hold  you  responsible  for  your  conduct." 
Of  course,  by  persons  holding  these  views,  the  acquittals  of 
Hadfield,  of  Bellingham,  of  Rogers,  and  of  every  person,  in 
fact,  for  w^hom  the  plea  of  insanity  was  successfully  used,  are 
regarded  as  great  mistakes,  so  much  the  more  serious,  as  they 
have  operated  as  inducements  to  similar  aggressions  from 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   INTELLECTUAL  MANIA.  283 

other  insane  persons.  This  reasoning  implies  two  things 
which  do  not  exist,  namely,  that,  outside  of  their  delusions,  the 
minds  of  the  insane  are  perfectly  sound  and  clear,  and  that 
they  always  reason  logically,  however  wrong  the  premises. 
But  the  idea  that  they  may  revenge  their  own  wrongs  is  a 
part  of  the  delusion.  They  are  no  more  responsible  for  one 
than  for  the  other,  for  both  are  equally  the  offspring  of  dis- 
ease. We  think  it  absurd  to  attempt  to  reason  an  insane 
person  out  of  his  delusions,  but  it  is  no  less  so  to  suppose  that 
in  his  conduct  towards  offenders  he  will  be  governed  by  the 
ordinary  moral  considerations. 

§  288.  The  radical  mistake  in  much  of  the  reasoning  on 
this  subject,  is  sufficient  to  vitiate  any  conclusions  formed 
under  its  influence,  relative  to  moral  responsibility.  This 
mistake  is  to  regard  the  operations  of  the  insane  mind  as 
governed  by  the  same  laws  of  association,  as  those  of  the 
sane  mind.  Their  motives  are  weighed  in  the  same  balance, 
they  are  supposed  to  be  equally  affected  by  the  same  moral 
considerations,  and  their  conclusions  are  expected  to  be 
equally  logical.  Such  views  of  the  mental  operations  in  in- 
sanity are  not  warranted  by  our  knowledge  of  the  disease. 
Nothing  can  be  more  unsafe  than  to  infer,  from  certain 
notions  or  plans  an  insane  person  may  have,  the  line  of  con- 
duct or  the  speculative  conclusions  he  may  adopt.  It  is  a 
fact  which  every  one,  much  conversant  with  the  insane,  must 
have  recognized,  that  their  mental  operations  are  marked  by 
a  kind  of  confusion  that  finds  its  analogy  only  in  dreaming. 
And  this  is  the  case,  not  only  with  the  wild  and  raving,  but 
to  a  degree  with  those  whose  insanity  is  apparently  confined 
within  a  narrow  circle,  and  who  would  not  be  readily 
recognized  to  be  insane,  by  the  world  at  large.  A  man 
was  once  placed  In  the  hospital  under  my  care,  who  con- 
tinued so  calm  and  quiet,  so  correct  in  his  deportment,  so 
gentlemanly  in  his  manners,  and  so  intelligent  and  rational 
in  his  discourse,  that,  for  some  time,  we  were  puzzled  to 
discover  why  he  should  have  been  sent  to  us,  not  having 
then  received  an  exact  history  of  his  case.  It  finally  ap- 
peared that  he  believed  his  wife  had  been  unfaithful  to  him, 


284  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

and  that  the  idea  gave  him  much  uneasiness.  When 
reminded  of  the  unsullied  reputation  of  his  wife,  and  the 
improbability  of  some  of  the  incidents  he  related,  he  always 
replied,  that  he  must  believe  what  he  saw  with  his  own 
eyes,  and  then  he  would  give  a  minute  account  of  the  cir- 
cumstances which,  if  he  had  really  Witnessed  them,  set  the 
question  at  rest.  For  several  weeks  he  exhibited  the  same 
quiet  and  correct  demeanor,  performing  divers  services  about 
the  house,  and  obtaining  the  favorable  regards  of  all  around 
him.  At  last,  he  became  rather  silent  and  sad,  and  after  a 
day  or  two,  he  was  observed  to  weep  much.  This  continued 
for  three  or  four  days,  when  he  resumed  his  usual  cheerful- 
ness, declaring  that  his  views  had  undergone  a  great  change, 
and  that  some  things  appeared  to  him  in  a  very  different 
light.  His  whole  belief  about  his  wife's  infidelity,  he  said, 
was  a  delusion,  and  never  had  the  slightest  foundation  in 
fact.  All  the  things  which  he  thought  he  saw„now  appeared 
to  him  like  a  dream,  and  he  could  give  no  other  account  of 
them.  In  dreaming  and  in  insanity  there  is  the  same  firm 
conviction  of  the  reality  of  false  impressions,  the  same  patches 
of  coherence  and  consistency,  the  same  embroilment  of  the 
thoughts,  the  same  absurdity  in  the  conclusions,  and  on  re- 
covery the  patient  often  feels  as  if  just  awoke  from  a  dream, 
wondering  how  he  could  have  had  such  thoughts  and  done 
such  acts.i  With  what  propriety  then  can  we  deem  the 
insane  responsible  for  any  of  the  views  they  may  adopt  ? 

^  This  character  of  insanity  is  admirably  represented  by  Sliakspeare, 
whose  delineations  of  this  disease  are  marked  by  his  usual  fidelity  to  nature. 
Lear,  on  suddenly  recovering,  knows  not,  at  first,  where  he  is,  or  where  he 
has  been;  he  scarcely  recognizes  his  own  friends,  and  almost  doubts  his  own 
identity. 

"  Pray,  do  not  mock  me. 
I  am  a  foolish,  fond  old  man. 
Fourscore  and  upwards;  and  to  deal  plainly, 
I  fear  I  am  not  in  my  perfect  mind. 
Jlethinks  I  should  know  you,  and  know  this  man; 
Yet  I  am  doubtful ;  for  I  am  mainly  ignorant 
What  place  this  is:  and  all  the  skill  I  have 
Remembers  not  these  garments 5  nor  I  know  not 
Where  I  did  lod^e  last  uiirht." 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL   MANIA.  285 


SECTION    II. 

LEGAL     COXSEQUEXCES    OF     MORAL     MANIA. 

§  289.  General  moral  mania  fm-nishes  good  ground  for 
invalidating  civil  acts,  for  notwithstanding  the  apparent  in- 
tegrity of  the  intellectual  powers,  it  is  probable  that  their 
operation  is  influenced  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  by  a 
derangement  of  the  moral  powers.  The  mutual  independ- 
ence of  these  two  portions  of  our  spiritual  nature  is  not 
absolute  and  unconditional,  but  is  always  liable  to  be  affected 
by  the  operation  of  the  organic  laws.  The  animal  economy 
is  a  whole;  no  part  of  it  can  exist  without  the  rest,  nor  be 
injured  or  abstracted  without  marring  the  energy  or  harmony 
of  the  whole  system  ;  and  though  each  part  is  so  far  inde- 
pendent of  the  others  as  to  contribute  its  distinct  share  in  the 
production  of  the  general  result,  even  sometimes  when  sur- 
rounded by  the  ravages  of  disease,  yet  the  general  law  is, 
that  disease  in  one  part  modifies  more  or  less  the  action  of 
all  the  rest,  and  especially  of  those  connected  with  it  by 
contiguity  or  by  resemblance  of  function.  Nature  has  estab- 
lished a  certain  adaptation  of  the  moral  and  intellectual 
faculties  to  one  another,  leading  to  that  harmony  of  action 
which  puts  them  in  proper  relation  to  external  things,  and 
we  can  scarcely  conceive  of  any  disturbance  of  their  equi- 
librium, that  will  not  more  or  less  impair  the  general  result. 
Amid  the  chaos  of  the  sentiments  and  passions  produced  by 
moral  mania,  the  power  of  the  intellect  must  necessarily 
suffer,  and  instead  of  accurately  examining  and  weighing  the 
suggestions  of  the  moral  powers,  it  is  influenced  by  motives 
which  may  be  rational  enough,  but  which  would  never  have 
been  adopted  in  a  perfectly  healthy  state.  It  is  hard  to  con- 
ceive, indeed,  that  with  an  understanding  technically  sound, 
the  relations  of  a  person  should  be  view^ed  in  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent light,  the  circle  of  his  rights  and  duties  broken  and  dis- 
torted, and  his  conduct  turned  into  a  course  altogether  foreign 
to  that  of  his  ordinary  habits  and  pursuits.    Notwithstanding 


286  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  correctness  of  his  conversation,  and  his  plausible  reasons 
for  his  singular  conduct,  a  strict  scrutiny  of  his  actions,  if  not 
his  words,  will  convince  us  that  in  particular  cases,  his 
notions  of  right  and  wrong  are  obscured  and  perverted,  and 
that  his  own  social  position  is  viewed  through  a  medium 
which  gives  a  false  coloring  to  its  whole  aspect.  Now, 
though  such  a  person  may  not  be  governed  by  any  blind, 
irresistible  impulse,  yet  to  judge  his  acts  by  the  standard  of 
sanity,  and  attribute  to  them  the  same  legal  consequences  as 
to  those  of  sane  men,  would  be  clearly  unjust,  because  their 
real  tendency  is  not  and  cannot  be  perceived  by  him.  Not 
that  his  abstract  notions  of  the  nature  of  crime  are  at  all  al- 
tered, for  they  are  not,  but  the  real  character  of  his  acts  being 
misconceived,  he  does  not  associate  them  with  their  ordinary 
moral  relations.  No  fear  of  punishment  restrains  him  from 
criminal  acts,  for  if  not  totally  unconscious  of  violating  any 
penal  laws,  he  thinks  he  is  acting  for  an  end  that  sanc- 
tifies the  means,  and  therefore  the  great  end  of  punish- 
ment, the  prevention  of  crime,  is  wholly  lost  in  his  case.  If 
there  were  no  other  reason  for  withholding  punishment  in 
cases  of  moral  mania,  this  alone  would  be  sufficient,  that 
the  fear  of  it,  which  with  others  is  a  powerful  preventive  of 
crime,  or  at  least  is  supposed  to  be,  in  the  most  popular 
theories  of  criminal  law,  does  not  and  cannot  exert  its  re- 
straining influence  on  the  mind.  No  one  would  think  of 
attributing  moral  guilt  to  Earl  Ferrers  for  entertaining  the 
insane  idea  that  his  steward  was  a  villain  conspiring  with  the 
earl's  relatives  against  his  comfort  and  interests  (§  180) ; 
why  then  should  it  be  charged  to  him  as  a  crime,  that,  amid 
the  tumult  of  his  passions  disturbing  the  healthy  exercise  of 
his  understanding,  he  acted  on  this  belief  and  made  himself 
the  avenger  of  his  own  wrongs  ?  Each  delusion  was  alike 
the  offspring  of  the  same  derangement,  and  it  is  unjust  and 
unphilosophical  to  regard  one  with  indifference  as  the  crotchet 
of  a  madman,  and  be  moved  with  horror  at  the  other  and 
visit  it  with  the  utmost  penalty  of  the  law,  as  the  act  of  a 
brutal  murderer. 

§  290.    Liberty  of  will  and  of  action  is  absolutely  essen- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL  MANIA.  287 

tial  to  criminal  responsibility.  Culpability  supposes  not  only 
a  clear  perception  of  the  consequences  of  criminal  acts,  but 
the  liberty,  unembarrassed  by  disease,  of  the  active  powers 
which  nature  has  given  us,  of  pursuing  that  course  which  is 
the  result  of  the  free  choice  of  the  intellectual  faculties.  It 
is  one  of  those  wise  provisions  in  the  arrangement  of  things, 
that  the  power  of  perceiving  the  good  and  the  evil,  is  never 
unassociated  with  that  of  obtaining  the  one  and  avoiding  the 
other.  When,  therefore,  disease  has  brought  upon  an  indi- 
vidual the  very  opposite  condition,  enlightened  jurisprudence 
will  hold  out  to  him  its  protection,  instead  of  crushing  him  as 
a  sacrifice  to  violated  justice.  That  the  subject  of  homicidal 
insanity  is  not  a  free  agent,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term, 
is  a  truth  that  must  not  be  obscured  by  theoretical  notions  of 
the  nature  of  insanity,  nor  by  apprehensions  of  injurious 
consequences  from  its  admission.  Amid  the  rapid  and 
tumultuous  succession  of  feelings  that  rush  into  •his  mind, 
the  reflective  powers  are  paralyzed,  and  his  movements  are 
solely  the  result  of  a  blind,  automatic  impulse,  with  which 
the  reason  has  as  little  to  do  as  with  the  movements  of 
a  new-born  infant.  That  the  notions  of  right  and  wrong 
continue  unimpaired  under  these  circumstances,  proves  only 
the  partial  operation  of  the  disease  ;  but  in  the  internal  strug- 
gle that  takes  place  between  the  affective  and  intellectual 
powers,  the  former  have. the  advantage  of  being  raised  to 
their  maximum  of  energy  by  the  excitement  of  disease,  which, 
on  the  other  hand,  rather  tends  to  diminish  the  activity  of  the 
latter.  We  have  seen  that  generally  after  the  fatal  act  has 
been  accomplished,  and  the  violence  of  the  paroxysm  sub- 
sided, the  monomaniac  has  gone  and  delivered  himself  into 
the  hands  of  justice,  as  if,  overwhelmed  with  horror  at  the 
enormity  of  his  action,  he  either  considered  his  own  life  the 
only  compensation  he  could  offer  in  return  ;  or,  it  may  be,  felt 
that  the  presence  of  his  fellow  men,  though  it  would  seal  his 
own  fate,  would  be  a  welcome  relief  from  the  crushing  agony 
of  his  own  spirit.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  however,  if 
occasionally,  the  tide  of  feeling  takes  a  different  course,  and 
the  murderer  is  prompted  to  avoid  what  he  cannot  help  think- 


288  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

ing  to  be  the  just  consequence  of  his  act,  by  flying  from  the 
bloody  scene,  and  even  denying  his  agency  in  it  altogether. 
Considering  the  diversity  of  habits,  sentiments,  and  education, 
uniformity  in  an  unessential  phenomenon  like  this,  is  not  to 
be  expected.  That  flying  from  [5ursuit  indicates  a  conscious- 
ness of  having  committed  a  reprehensible  act,  and  also  a  fear 
of  punishment,  is  not  denied,  but  it  has  never  been  contended 
that  the  opposite  course  implies  the  absence  of  all  ideas  of 
this  kind  from  the  mind  of  the  homicidal  monomaniac.  The 
real  point  at  issue  is,  whether  the  fear  of  punishment  or  even 
the  consciousness  of  wrongdoing  destroys  the  supposition  of 
insanity,  and  this  is  settled  by  the  well-known  fact  that  the 
inmates  of  lunatic  asylums,  after  having  committed  some 
reprehensible  acts,  will  often  persist  in  denying  their  agency 
in  them,  in  order  to  avoid  the  reprimand  or  privation  which 
they  know  would  follow  their  conviction.  If  insane  persons 
have  anyfational  ideas  at  all,  and  it  is  not  denied  that  they 
have,  it  is  not  strange  that  they  sometimes  are  conscious  of 
the  penal  consequences  of  their  acts,  and  use  the  intelligence 
of  a  brute  in  order  to.  avoid  them.  Besides,  in  moral  insanity 
the  intellectual  faculties  are  supposed  not  to  be  impaired,  and 
when  the  fury  of  the  paroxysm  which  has  borne  him  on,  in 
spite  of  every  attempt  at  resistance,  has  subsided,  the  homi- 
cidal fnonoraaniac  returns,  in  some  degree  at  least,  to  his  or- 
dinary habit  of  thinking  and  feeling.  He  regrets  the  havoc 
he  has  made,  foresees  its  disgraceful  consequences  to  himself, 
shudders  at  the  sight,  and  flies,  like  the  most  hardened  crimi- 
nal, to  avoid  them. 

§  291.  In  medical  science,  it  is  dangerous  to  reason  against 
facts.  Now  we  have  an  immense  mass  of  cases  related  by 
men  of  unquestionable  competence  and  veracity,  where  peo- 
ple are  irresistibhj  impelled  to  the  commission  of  criminal 
acts  while  fully  conscious  of  their  nature  and  consequences  ; 
and  the  force  of  these  facts  must  be  overcome  by  something 
more  than  angry  declamation  against  visionary  theories  and 
ill-judged  humanity.  They  are  not  fictions  invented  by 
medical  men  (as  was  rather  broadly  charged  upon  them  in 
some  of  the  late  trials  in  France),  for  the  purpose  of  puzzling 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL  MANIA.  289 

juries  and  defeating  the  ends  of  justice,  but  plain,  un- 
varnished facts  as  they  occurred  in  nature  ;  and  to  set  them 
aside  without  a  thorough  investigation,  as  unworthy  of 
influencing  our  decisions,  indicates  any  thing  rather  than 
that  spirit  of  sober  and  indefatigable  inquiry  which  should 
characterize  the  science  of  jurisprudence.  .We  need  have 
no  fear  that  the  truth  on  this  subject  will  not  finally  prevail, 
but  the  interests  of  humanity  require  that  this  event  should 
take  place  speedily. 

§  292.  The  distinction  between  crimes  and  the  effects  of 
homicidal  monomania  is  too  well  founded  to  be  set  aside  by 
mere  declamation,  or  appeals  to  popular  prejudices,  as  it  has 
repeatedly  been  in  courts  of  justice.  On  the  trial  of  Papa- 
voine  for  the  murder  of  two  young  children  near  Paris,  in 
1823,  the  advocate-general,  in  reply  to  the  counsel  of  the 
prisoner  who  had  pleaded  homicidal  insanity  in  his  defence, 
declared  that  Papavoine  committed  the  crime,  in  order  "  to 
gratify  an  inveterate  hatred  against  his  fellow  men,  trans- 
formed at  first,  into  a  weariness  of  his  own  life,  and  subse- 
quently into  an  instinct  of  ferocity  and  a  thirst  of  blood. 
Embittered  by  his  unhappy  condition,  excited  by  a  sense  of 
his  sufferings  and  misfortunes,  irritated  by  the  happiness  of 
others  which  awakened  in  him  only  ideas  of  fury,  and  drove 
him  into  seclusion  which  increased  the  perversity  of  his 
depraved  propensities,  he  arrived  at  that  pitch  of  brutal 
depravity  where  destruction  became  a  necessity,  and  the 
sight  of  blood  a  horrible  delight.  His  hateful  affections,, 
after  being  long  restrained,  finally  burst  forth  and  raised  in 
his  bosom  a'  necessity  of  killing,  which,  like  a  young  tiger, 
he  sought  to  gratify."^  That  beings  in  human  shape  have 
lived  who  delighted  in  the  shedding  of  blood,  and  found  a  pas- 
time in  beholding  the  dying  agonies  of  their  victims,  is  a 
melancholy  fact  too  well  established  by  the  Neros  and  Tibe- 
riuses  of  history.  For  such  we  have  no  disposition  to  urge 
the  plea  of  insanity,  for  though  we  are  willing  to  believe 
them  to   have  been  unhappily  constituted,  we  have  no  evi- 

^  Georget,  Examen  des  proces  criminelles. 
25 


290  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

dence  that  they  labored  under  cerebral  disease,  and  they  cer- 
tainly exhibited  none  of  its  phenomena.  Motives,  the  very 
slightest  no  doubt,  generally  existed  for  even  their  most  hor- 
rid atrocities,  and  even  when  they  were  entirely  wanting, 
there  was  still  a  conformity  of  their  bloody  deeds  with  the 
whole  tenor  of  their  natural  character.  They  followed  the 
bent  of  their  dispositions  as  manifested  from  childhood, 
glorying  in  their  preeminent  wickedness,  and  rendered 
familiar  with  crime  by  habit ;  and  though  conscience  might 
have  slumbered,  or  opposed  but  a  feeble  resistance  to  the 
force  of  their  passions,  yet  it  was  not  perverted  by  diseased 
action  so  as  to  be  blind  to  the  existence  of  moral  distinctions. 
In  homicidal  insanity,  on  the  contrary,  every  thing  is  differ- 
ent. The  criminal  act  for  which  its  subject  is  called  to  an 
account,  is  the  result  of  a  strong  and,  perhaps,  sudden  im- 
pulse opposed  to  his  natural  habits,  and  generally  preceded 
or  followed  by  some  derangement  of  the  healthy  actions  of 
the  brain  or  other  organ.  The  advocate-general  himself 
represented  Papavoine,  "  as  having  been  noted  for  his  un- 
social disposition,  for  avoiding  his  fellow-laborers,  for  walk- 
ing in  retired,  solitary  places,  appearing  to  be  much  absorbed 
in  the  vapors  of  a  black  melancholy."  This  is  not  a  picture 
of  those  human  fiends  to  whom  he  would  assimilate  Papa- 
voine, but  it  is  a  faithful  one  of  a  mind  over  which  the  clouds 
of  insanity  are  beginning  to  gather.  Where  is  the  similarity 
between  this  man,  who,  with  a  character  for  probity  and  in 
a  fit  of  melancholy,  is  irresistibly  hurried  to  ^he  commission 
of  a  horrible  deed,  and  those  wretches  who,  hardened  by  a 
life  of  crime,  commit  their  enormities  with  perfect  delibera- 
tion and  consciousness  of  their  nature. 

§  293.  It  has  been  also  urged  that  the  subjects  of  homi- 
cidal insanity  are,  no  less  than  criminals,  injurious  to  society, 
the  safety  of  which  implicitly  requires  their  extermination, 
upon  the  same  principle  that  we  do  not  hesitate  to  destroy  a 
dog  that  has  been  so  unfortunate  as  to  go  mad.  Sane  or 
insane,  criminal  or  not,  such  monsters  should  be  cut  off  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  and  it  is  a  misplaced  humanity  to  re- 
serve them  for  a  different  fate.     Such  language  might  have 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL   MANIA.  291 

been  expected  from  people  who  are  moved  only  by  the  feel- 
ings that  are  immediately  raised  by  the  sight  of  appalling 
crimes,  but  it  is  an  humiliating  truth  that  the  opinions  of 
those  who  are  in  the  habit  of  discriminating  between  various 
shades  of  guilt,  and  of  canvassing  motives,  are  too  often  but 
an  echo  to  the  popular  voice.  If  the  old  custom  of  smother- 
ing under  a  feather  bed  the  miserable  victims  of  hydropho- 
bia, be  now  considered  as  a  specimen  of  the  most  revolting 
barbarity,  we  cannot  see  why  the  punishment  of  insane 
offenders  should  be  regarded  under  a  more  favorable  aspect. 
Society  has  a  right  to  protect  itself  against  the  aggressions  of 
the  dangerously  insane ;  but  unnecessary  severity  in  its  pro- 
tective measures  often  defeats  the  very  purpose  in  view,  and 
indicates  a  want  of  humanity  and  intellectual  enlightenment. 
While  confinement  in  prisons  and  hospitals  furnishes  all  the 
restraint  which  the  necessity  of  their  case  requires,  it  is  idle 
to  urge  the  infliction  of  death  as  the  only  means  by  which 
society  can  be  effectually  shielded  from  a  repetition  of  their 
terrible  enormities.^ 

§  294.  One  of  the  principal  objects  of  punishment  should 
be  to  deter  from  the  commission  of  crime,  by  impressing  the 
mind  with  ideas  of  physical  and  moral  suffering  as  its  certain 
consequence ;  and  whenever  it  is  found  to  produce  a  very 
different  effect,  it  is  the  part  of  enlightened  legislation  to 
devise  ^ome  other  means  of  prevention.  Nothing  can  be 
more  absurd  than  to  inflict  the  very  punishment  which  the 
delusion  of  the  monomaniac  often  impels  him  to  seek,  —  to 
put  him  to  death,  who  voluntarily  surrenders  himself,  and 
imploringly  beseeches  it  as  the  only  object  he  had  at  heart 
in  perpetrating  a  horrid  crime.  What  is  it  but  converting  a 
dreadful  punishment  into  the  dearest  boon  that  earth  can 
offer  ?     Platner  has  related  the  case  of  a  man  who  shot  his 


^  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  when  a  person  charged  with  a  capital 
crime,  is  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  though  admitted  to  be  the 
author  of  the  crime,  it  is  rendered  obligatory  on  the  court  in  England,  by 
Stat.  39  and  40  Geo.  m.  c.  94,  and  by  similar  provisions  in  most  of  the 
United  States,  to  order  him  into  confinement. 


292  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OP   INSANITY. 

companion,  because  he  labored  under  the  delusion,  that  he  was 
endeavoring  to  deprive  him  of  life  by  means  of  witchcraft. 
He  knew  he  should  be  executed,  he  said,  but  it  was  a  thousand 
times  better  to  die  on  the  scaffold  than  to  perish  miserably 
through  the  arts  of  magic.^  A  few  years  ago,  a  young  man 
entered  a  shooting-gallery  in  Holborn,  took  up  a  pistol,  and 
deliberately  shot  the  proprietor,  who  subsequently  died  of  the 
wound.  He  said  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the  person,  —  he  shot 
him  simply  for  the  purpose  of  being  hanged  for  it.  He  had 
been  thinking  of  suicide  for  some  years.^  In  religious  mono- 
mania, it  is  not  uncommon  for  the  patient  to  believe  that  the 
joys  of  heaven  are  in  store  for  him,  and,  under  the  excite- 
ment of  this  insane  idea,  to  murder  a  fellow  creature,  in  order 
that  he  may  the  sooner  enter  on  their  fruition.  To  execute 
one  of  this  class,  is  to  perpetuate  an  evil  which  needs  only  a 
change  of  penal  consequences  to  be  effectually  remedied. 
A  kind  of  delusion  has  sometimes  prevailed  in  certain  parts 
of  Europe,  which  persuades  its  unfortunate  subjects  that 
-eternal  happiness  can  be  gained  by  being  executed  for  the 
murder  of  some  innocent  person.  The  idea  is  that  suicide 
being  itself  a  sin,  will  not  be  followed  by  the  happiness  they 
seek,  but  that  murder,  though  a  greater  crime,  can  be  repented 
of  before  the  time  of  execution.  This  delusion  prevailed 
epidemically  in  Denmark,  during  the  middle  of  the  last  cen- 
tury, and  to  avoid  sending  an  unprepared  person  out  of  the 
world,  the  victim  generally  selected  was  a  child.  Death,  of 
course,  was  no  punishment  in  this  case,  and  at  last,  the  king 
issued  an  ordinance  directing  that  the  guilty  should  be 
branded  on  the  forehead  with  a  hot  iron  and  whipped,  and 
be  imprisoned  for  life,  with  hard  labor.  Every  year,  on  the 
anniversary  of  their  crime,  they  were  to  be  whipped."  Lord 
Dover,  in  his  life  of  Frederic,  relates  that  such  was  the  sever- 
ity of  discipline  to  which  the  Prjissian  troops  at  Potsdam 
were  subjected,  that  many  wished  for  death   to   finish  their 


1  Quoted  by  Pagan,  Med.  Jur.  14  3. 

"  Taylor,  Med.  Jur.  G43. 

^  London  Quarterly  Kevicw,  xli.  219. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL  MANIA.  293 

intolerable  sufferings,  and  murdered  children  whom  they  had 
enticed  within  their  power,  in  order  to  obtain  from  justice  the 
stroke  they  dared  not  inflict  upon  themselves. ^  Abolish 
capital  punishment  in  such  cases,  and  the  delusion  will  dis- 
appear with  it ;  continue  it,  and  no  one  can  tell  when  the 
latter  will  end. 

§  295.  Not  only  is  the  moral  effect  of  punishment  totally 
lost  when  inflicted  on  the  subjects  of  homicidal  insanity, 
since  it  does  not  deter  other  madmen  from  committing 
similar  acts,  but  by  a  curious  law  of  morbid  action,  the  very 
publicity  obtained  for  them,  by  the  trial  and  excution  of  the 
actors,  leads  to  their  repetition  to  an  almost  incredible  extent. 
At  a  sitting  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Medicine  in  Paris, 
August  8th,  1826,  Esquirol  stated  that  since  the  trial  of 
Henriette  Cornier,  which  occurred  not  two  months  before, 
he  had  become  acquainted  with  six  instances  of  a  parallel 
nature.  Among  these  was  a  Protestant  minister  who  be- 
came affected  with  the  desire  of  destroying  a  favorite  child. 
He  struggled  against  this  terrible  inclination  for  fifteen  days, 
but  was  at  last  driven  to  the  attempt  on  his  child's  life,  in 
which  he  fortunately  failed.  Several  other  physicians,  on  the 
same  occasion,  bore  similar  testimony  relative  to  the  effect  of 
that  trial,  and  the  newspapers  about  that  period  teemed 
with  cases  of  child-murder  which  had  originated  in  the  same 
way. 

§  296.  It  should  not  be  forgotten,  that  well-grounded  sus- 
picion that  the  homicidal  act,  thus  punished,  was  the  result 
of  physical  disease,  instead  of  moral  depravity,  is  so  horrid 
as  to  excite,  in  whatever  mind  it  arises,  feelings  of  distrust 
and  jealousy,  towards  the  law  and  its  ministers,  infinitely 
more  to  be  dreaded  than  the  occasional  acquittal  of  a  suppo- 
sititious maniac.  When,  on  the  contrary,  the  distinction  is 
carefully  made  between  the  acts  of  a  sound  and  those  of  an 
unsound  mind,  and  a  decision  in  doubtful  cases  is  dispas- 
sionately and  deliberately  formed  upon  every  species  of  evi- 
dence calculated  to  throw  light  upon  it,  the  mind  is  impressed 

>  i.  321. 

25* 


294  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

with  a  new  sense  of  the  wisdom  and  majesty  of  the  laws, 
and  with  a  feeling  of  security  under  their  discriminating 
operation.  The  numerous  trials  for  witchcraft  in  a  former 
age,  and  the  occasional  condemnation  of  a  maniac  in  the 
present,  have  done  more  to  lessen  men's  respect  for  the  laws, 
than  all  its  overruled  "decisions  have  to  weaken  their  confi- 
dence in  its  certainty.  Insanity  is  a  disease,  before  the  pros- 
pect of  which  the  stoutest  heart  may  quail;  but  how  much 
more  appalling  is  it  made  by  the  reflection,  that  in  some  wild 
paroxysm,  it  may  be  followed  by  legal  consequences  that 
will  consign  its  unhappy  subject  to  an  ignominious  death. 
In  cases  of  simulated  madness,  the  purposes  of  justice  are 
more  fully  answered  by  receiving  and  examining  all  the  evi- 
dence and  patiently  showing  its  value  and  bearings,  and  thus 
laying  open  the  imposition  to  the  conviction  of  all,  than  by 
repelling  the  plea  with  idle  declamation  on  its  injurious  ten- 
dency. Not  only  does  the  criminal  obtain  his  deserts,  by 
such  a  course,  but  the  most  cunning  device  of  his  ingenuity 
is  seen  to  be  baffled,  and  the  plea  that  should  ever  shield 
the  innocent  from  destruction  is  ineffectually  urged  to  protect 
the  guilty.  Every  murmur  at  the  injustice  of  the  sentence  is 
hushed,  all  scruples  are  removed,  and  all  fears  are  dissipated, 
that  a  fellow  being  has  been  sacrificed,  whose  only  crime 
was  the  misfortune  of  laboring  under  disease  of  the  brain. 
Besides,  what  if  amid  the  obscurity  in  which  a  case  may 
sometimes  be  involved,  a  guilty  person  do  escape,  —  though 
this  event  must  be  of  very  rare  occurrence,  —  is  it  not  a 
maxim  in  legal  practice  that  it  is  better  for  ten  guilty  persons 
to  escape  punishment  than  for  one  innocent  person  to  suffer? 
And  though  he  escape  the  sentence  of  the  law,  yet  society  is 
perfectly  secure  from  the  effects  of  mistake,  because  the  very 
plea  by  which  he  obtains  his  acquittal,  consigns  him  to  con- 
finement and  surveillance. 

§  297.  In  those  cases  where  there  are  some  but  not  per- 
fectly satisfactory  indications  of  insanity,  the  trial  or  sentence 
should  be  postponed,  in  order  that  opportunity  may  be 
afforded  to  those  who  are  properly  qualified,  for  observing 
the  state  of  the  prisoner's  mind.     Where  the  moral  powers 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  295 

have  become  so  deranged  as  to  lead  to  criminal  acts,  with- 
out, however,  any  perceptible  impairment  of  the  intellect, 
time  only  is  necessary,  in  the  greater  proportion  of  cases,  to 
fmnish  indubitable  evidence  of  mental  derangement.  And 
whatever  may  be  the  result,  the  ends  of  justice  are  not 
defeated  by  waiting  a  few  months,  while  the  scruples  of  the 
over  humane  are  removed,  and  the  acquiescence  of  the  min- 
isters of  the  law  in  measures  calculated  to  establish  inno- 
cence rather  than  guilt,  gains  for  them  a  confidence  and 
respect  that  the  conviction  of  guilt  never  can.  Many  in- 
stances might  be  mentioned  where  the  accused,  whose  insan- 
ity was  doubtful  on  trial,  has,  during  the  confinement  subse- 
quent to  his  acquittal  on  a  criminal  prosecution,  become 
most  manifestly  insane.  Hadfield,  who  was  tried  for  shoot- 
ing at  the  king,  and  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity, 
spent  the  remainder  of  his  life  in  Bethlem  hospital,  and 
for  thirty  years  showed  scarcely  any  signs  of  mental  aliena- 
tion, except  once,  when  suddenly  and  without  any  known 
cause,  he  became  so  furious  that  they  were  obliged  to  chain 
him  in  his  room.  This  paroxysm  lasted  but  a  short  time, 
when  he  recovered  his  ordinary  state  of  health.^ 

§  298.  Another  reason  for  delay  is,  that  insanity  is  some- 
times so  completely  veiled  from  observation,  as  never  to  be 
suspected  even  by  the  most  intimate  associates  of  tlie  patient. 
An  instructive  case  is  related  by  Georget,  in  which  the  exist- 
ence of  insanity,  though  of  several  years'  duration,  was 
not  recognized  till  after  the  death  of  the  subject.  The  cir- 
cumstances were  briefly  these.  Bertet,  a  revenue  oflicer, 
exercised  the  duties  of  his  office  for  three  years,  in  the  manu- 
factory of  MM.  Ador  and  Bonnaire,  at  Vaugirard,  where  he 
was  only  noticed  for  his  unaccommodating  disposition, 
melancholy  temperament,  and  fondness  for  seclusion.  One 
day  w^hile  M.  Ador  was  conversing  with  some  of  the  work- 
men, he  was  requested  by  Bertet  to  affix  his  signature  to  cer- 
tain papers.  He  proceeded  to  his  room  for  this  purpose,  and 
while  in  the  act  of  writing,  was  shot  dead  by  Bertet,  who 

^  Billiard,  quoted  by  Georget  in  Nouv.  discuss,  med.  leg.  71. 


296  MEDICAL   JURISrRUDEXCE   OF   INSANITY. 

immediately  afterwards  blew  out  his  own  brains.  Among 
his  papers  were  found  several  addressed  to  the  advocate- 
general,  bearing  the  most  singular  titles,  such  as  my  last  re- 
flections, mij  last  sighs,  in  which  he  declared  that  he  had  been 
poisoned  several  years  before,  and  gave  a  minute  account  of 
the  numerous  remedies  he  had  ineffectually  used,  insisting  at 
the  same  time  that  his  head  was  not  turned,  that  he  acted 
deliberately,  and  giving  very  coherent  reasons  to  prove  it.  He 
announced  that  four  victims  were  required,  namely,  the  two 
heads  of  the  establishment,  a  woman  who  was  living  in  it, 
and  his  old  houseliceper,  and  that  in  case  he  should  be  con- 
tented with  one,  he  would  leave  to  justice  the  charge  of 
obtaining  the  others.  Some  of  these  papers  he  finishes  with 
saying,  "  To-day  my  pains  are  less  acute, —  I  feel  better, — 
my  vengeance  is  retarded,"  or  "  my  pains  are  renewed  — 
with  them  my  thoughts  of  vengeance."  Among  other  wild 
fancies,  he  made  a  description  of  the  funeral  monument  to 
be  raised  to  one  of  his  victims,  which  was  to  be  a  gibbet 
covered  with  figures  of  instruments  of  punishment.  He  also 
described  his  own  funeral  procession.  He  wished  the  four, 
corners  of  the  pall  to  be  carried  by  the  four  persons  above 
mentioned,  in  case  he  should  not  have  sacrificed  them  ;  that 
the  advocate-general  should  follow  the  cortege ;  and  that 
when  it  reached  the  cemetery,  the  latter  should  prepare  a 
large  ditch  in  which  they  should  first  cast  him,  J^ertet,  and 
then  the  four  pall-bearers.  In  another  paper,  he  said  he 
designed  for  each  of  his  victims  two  gilt  balls,  as  an  emblem 
of  their  ambition  and  thirst  of  gold,  and  some  pulverized 
cantharides,  as  an  image  of  the  torments  which  he  suffered. 
Bertet  had  never  shown  any  signs  of  mental  alienation  in 
his  official  letters  and  reports.  He  was  sometimes  abstracted 
and  loved  to  be  alone,  but  his  disposition,  in  this  respect, 
had  been  of  long  standing,  and  seemed  to  be  owing  to  the 
state  of  his  health,  of  which  he  was  constantly  complaining, 
though  judging  from  his  exterior,  he  seemed  to  be  well 
enough.  He  had  always  discharged  the  duties  of  his  office 
satisfactorily,  and,  by  his  own  solicitation,  had  just  before 
obtained  a  more  profitable  place.     Had  not  Bertet  recorded 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL  MANIA.  297 

his  insane  fancies,  but,  failing  in  his  suicidal  attempt,  had 
been  brought  to  trial  for  the  murder  of  M.  Ador,  the  plea  of 
insanity  would  have  fallen  on  the  most  incredulous  ears,  and 
he  would  have  paid  the  last  penalty  of  the  law.  In  a  state 
of  confinement  and  seclusion,  however,  nothing  but  time 
would  have  been  necessary  to  reveal  the  true  nature  of  his 
case. 

§  299.  Homicidal  monomania  presents  us  with  one  of 
those  remarkable  phenomena,  the  existence  of  which  men 
are  slow  to  believe,  long  after  the  evidence  in  its  favor  has 
accumulated  to  such  an  extent  as  to  render  incredulity  any 
thing  but  a  virtue.  The  facts  themselves  cannot  be  denied, 
and  the  various  methods  of  explaining  them  on  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  sound  understanding,  though  every  phase  of 
human  character  and  every  spring  of  human  action  has  been 
resorted  to  for  the  purpose,  are  little  calculated  to  diminish 
the  confidence  of  impartial  minds  in  the  correctness  of  the 
above  views.  Strongly  impressed  as  we  are  with  their  im- 
portance, we  may  have  devoted  more  attention  to  the  objec- 
tions that  have  been  urged  against  them,  than  they  really 
deserve  ;  we  shall,  therefore,  say  but  little  more  on  this  part 
of  the  subject.  Against  Georget's  proposition  relative  to  the 
homicide  committed  by  Henriette  Cornier,  that  "  an  act  so 
atrocious,  so  contrary  to  human  nature,  committed  without 
interest,  without  passion,  opposed  to  the  natural  character  of 
the  individual,  is  evidently  an  act  of  madness;"^  it  has  beeni 
seriously  objected  that  though  we  may  be  unable  to  discover 
motives,  yet  this  is  not  a  positive  proof  that  there  actually  are 
no  motives.  We  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  sometimes  the 
character  of  the  act  itself  furnishes  sufficient  evidence  of  its 
having  been  prompted  by  insanity,  even  when  the  closest 
investigation  of  the  bodily  and  mental  condition  of  the  party 
fails  to  detect  other  proofs  of  its  existence.  A  man  named 
Greensmith  (§  26),  was  tried  and  convicted  in  England  in 
1837,  for  the  murder  of  his  four  children.  It  appeared  in  evi- 
dence that  he  was  a  kind  father,  and  a  sober,  industrious  man ; 

*  Discussion  medico-legale  sur  la  Folle,  126. 


298  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

that  he  took  affectionate  leave  of  his  children  before  he  de- 
stroyed them,  and  again  before  he  finally  left  them  ;  that  he 
calmly  and  deliberately  strangled  them  one  after  the  other, 
and  evinced  neither  fear,  nor  repentance,  nor  mental  agitation. 
The  motive  he  assigned  for  the  act  was,  that  he  thought  it 
would  be  better  for  him  and  for  his  family  that  he  should 
destroy  his  children  and  be  executed  for  the  act,  than  let 
them  go  to  the  workhouse.  Stronger  evidence  of  insanity 
than  such  conduct  famishes,  could  not  be  had.  The  judge 
and  jury,  however,  thought  otherwise,  although  they  had, 
besides,  the  testimony  of  an  eminent  physician  of  a  lunatic 
asylum,  who  stated  his  belief,  as  the  result  of  his  observation 
of  the  accused,  that  he  was  laboring  under  insane  delusion, 
and  that  the  .act  was  the  direct  offspring  of  that  delusion. 
In  1848,  a  man  was  tried  in  England,  for  murder,  having, 
one  night,  cut  the  throats  of  his  wife  and  child,  and  attempted 
suicide.  When  questioned,  he  said  "  that  trouble,  dread  of 
poverty  and  destitution  had  made  him  do  it,  fearing  his  wife 
and  child  would  starve  when  he  was  dead."  This  was  the 
only  delasion  he  held,  and  it  was  hardly  that,  for  it  had  some 
foundation  in  fact.  A  physician  said  that  he  acted  under  an 
uncontrollable  impulse.^  Does  the  man,  who  like  Hadfield 
imagines  that  he  is  to  be  sacrificed  for  the  salvation  of  the 
world,  and  to  that  end  shoots  at  the  king,  or  he  who  murders 
his  neighbor  in  the  belief  that  his  victim  and  others  are  con- 
spiring against  his  life  (§  10),  evince  a  more  extensive  de- 
rangement of  the  mental  powers,  than  these  poor  creatures 
who  destroy  their  dear  offspring  in  the  imaginary  apprehen- 
sion of  coming  want?  It  seems  as  if  nothing  but  the  most 
slavish  and  puerile  regard  for  technicalities,  could  so  blind 
one  to  the  clearest  manifestation  of  truth  as  to  lead  him  to 
return  an  affirmative  to  this  question. 

§  300.  By  those  who  delight  not  in  metaphysical  subtle- 
ties, a  more  summary,  if  not  more  philosophical,  explanation 
of  homicidal  monomania  has  been  furnished  in  the  idea  that 
it  is  to  be  attributed  to  an  instinct  of  ferocity ;  to  unnatural 

1  Reg.  V.  Barton,  3  Cox,  C.  C.  275. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OP   MOKAL   MANIA.  299 

depravity  of  character;  to  a  radical  perversity.  That  such 
qualities  do  exist  as  the  too  common  result  of  a  defective  con- 
stitution, or  a  vicious  education,  is  proved  by  the  testimony 
of  every  day's  experience,  even  if  we  had  not  the  best  author- 
ity for  believing  that  the  heart  may  be  "  desperately  wicked." 
But  even  where  they  exist  to  the  fullest  extent,  the  actions 
to  which  they  prompt  have  always  some  immediate  motive, 
slight  as  it  may  be,  of  pleasure  sought,  or  pain  avoided ;  or  if 
they  can  claim  no  higher  title  than  that  of  instinct^  it  is  one 
of  no  sudden,  transitory  character,  but  a  constant  and  con- 
sistent portion  of  the  constitution.  It  is  an  anomalous  in- 
stinct that  manifests  itself  but  once  or  twice  in  a  person's 
life  ;  and  therefore,  we  cannot,  without  indulging  in  the  most 
unwarrantable  use  of  language,  apply  this  term  to  those  un- 
controllable, abnormal  influences  that  lead  to  acts  of  fury 
and  destruction.  "What  resemblance  can  we  detect  between 
the  Domitians  and  Neros  of  history,  and  the  Papavoines 
and  Corniers,  whose  terrible  acts  have  been  commemorated 
in  the  records  of  criminal  jurisprudence  ?  In  the  former,  this 
instinct  of  ferocity  appeared  in  their  earliest  youth  ;  it  im- 
parted a  zest  to  every  amusement,  and  excited  ingenuity  to 
contrive  new  means  for  heightening  the  agonies  of  the 
wretched  victims  of  their  displeasure.  In. the  latter,  the  char- 
acter was  mild  and  peaceable,  and  their  days  were  spent  in 
the  quiet  and  creditable  discharge  of  the  duties  belonging  to 
their  station,  till  a  cloud  of  melancholy  enveloped  their  minds, 
and  under  its  shadow  they  perpetrated  a  single  deed,  at  the 
very  thought  of  which  they  would  have  previously  shuddered 
with  horror.  In  short,  all  our  knowledge  of  human  nature, 
all  our  experience  of  the  past,  force  us  to  the  conclusion,  that 
"  the  presence  of  mental  alienation  should  be  admitted  in  him 
who  commits  a  homicide  without  positive  interest,  without 
criminal  motives,  and  without  a  reasonable  passion." 

§  301,  After  what  has  been  said  on  the  subject  of  homi- 
cidal monomania,  it  will  be  scarcely  necessary  to  enter  into 
particulars  relative  to  the  legal  consequences  of  the  other 
forms  of  partial  moral  mania.  Completely  annulling,  as  we 
believe  they  do,  all  moral  responsibility  for  acts  committed 


300  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

under  their  influence,  the  law  can  rightfully  inflict  no  pun- 
ishment on  their  unfortunate  subjects,  though  it  should  adopt 
every  measure  of  precaution  that  the  interests  of  society 
require.  To  punish  the  thief  and  the  incendiary  for  acts 
which  are  the  result  of  disease,  is  not  only  unjust,  but  it 
serves  to  aggravate  their  disorder,  and  to  prepare  them,  when 
their  term  of  punishment  has  closed,  for  renewing  their  depre- 
dations on  society  with  increased  perseverance.  The  proper 
course  to  pursue  with  this  class  of  offenders,  when  brought 
into  courts  of  justice,  is  to  place  them,  or  obtain  a  guaranty 
from  their  friends  that  they  shall  be  placed,  where  judi- 
cious medical  treatment  will  be  used  for  the  purpose  of 
restoring  their  moral  powers  to  a  sounder  condition,  and 
where  they  will  he  secluded  from  society  until  this  end  shall 
be  accomplished. 

§  302.  If  the  doctrines  here  laid  down  relative  to  moral 
insanity  and  its  legal  consequences  are  correct,  it  would 
seem  to  follow  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  they  should  exert 
their  legitimate  influence  on  judicial  decisions.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  contended,  —  and  that  too  by  some  who  do  not 
question  the  truth  of  these  doctrines,  —  that  they  ought  not  to 
have  this  practical  effect,  for  the  reason  that  insanity  would 
thereby  be  made  the  ground  of  defence  in  criminal  actions, 
to  a  most  pernicious  extent.  Stated  in  the  plainest  and 
strongest  terras,  the  objection  is,  that  if  these  doctrines 
should  be  recognized  in  our  courts  of  justice,  and  suffered  to 
influence  their  decisions,  almost  every  criminal  would  resort 
to  a  defence,  the  tendency  of  which  is  invariably  to  puzzle 
and  distract  the  minds  of  the  jury,  and  to  produce  the 
acquittal  of  many  a  wretch,  who  would  first  hear  the  men- 
tion of  his  own  derangement  from  the  lips  of  ingenious 
counsel.  Now,  even  if  we  were  disposed  to  accord  to  this 
objection  all  the  foundation  that  is  claimed  for  it,  it  would 
not  seem  to  warrant  the  inference  that  is  drawn  from  it. 
Are  we. to  take  from  the  maniac  the  defence  which  the  law 
of  nature  secures  to  him,  because  it  may  sometimes  be 
offered  by  those  who  use  it  as  a  means  of  deception  ?  Are 
the   innocent   to    be  made  to    suffer  for  the   devices    of  the 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    MORAL   MANIA.  301 

guilty?  To  avoid  this  cruel  injustice,  therefore,  without  at 
the  same  time  inflicting  a  positive  evil  on  society,  we  would 
deduce  from  this  objection  an  inference  of  a  totally  different 
kind.  It  is,  to  let  the  right  of  the  accused  party  to  make 
his  defence  be  cumbered  with  no  restrictions,  expressed  or 
implied  ;  to  let  the  plea  of  insanity,  if  he  choose  to  make  it, 
be  attentively  listened  to,  the  facts  urged  in  its  support 
closely  scrutinized,  the  accused  carefully  and  dispassionately 
examined,  and  his  character  and  history  investigated.  If 
this  duty  be  performed  as  it  should  be,  and  always  may  be, 
the  case  will  seldom  happen,  when  the  truth  will  not  be 
established  to  the  satisfaction  of  every  unprejudiced  mind. 
If  the  accused  be  really  insane,  we  have  the  satisfaction  of 
reflecting,  that  an  enlightened  investigation  of  his  case  has 
saved  an  innocent  person  from  an  ignominous  fate,  while 
on  the  other  hand,  if  he  be  simulating  insanity,  every  doubt 
will  be  dissipated  as  to  the  justice  of  his  sentence,  and  the 
conviction  will  be  strengthened  in  the  popular  mind,  that  the 
law  will  prevail  over  every  false  pretence,  and  expose  the 
guilty  even  in  their  most  secret  refuge.^ 

^  The  following  remark  of  Chief  Justice  Parker  of  N.  II.,  shows  that  this 
objection  is  not  confirmed  by  tlie  experience  of,  at  least,  one  practical  lawyer, 
the  value  of  whose  testimony  on  this,  or  any  other  point,  need  not  be  indica- 
ted by  any  comment  of  mine.  "  There  are,  undoubtedly,  instances  in  which 
this  kind  of  defence  is  attempted  from  the  mere  conviction  that  nothing  else 
can  avail,  —  cases  in  wdiich  the  advocate  forgets  the  high  duty  to  which  he  is 
called,  and  excites  a  prejudice  against  the  case  of  others,  by  attempting  to 
procure  the  escape  of  a  criminal  under  this  false  pretence ;  but  such  cases 
are  truly  rare,  and  usually  unsuccessful."  Charge  to  the  grand  jury  of  Mer- 
rimack county,  X.  H.,  1838,  quoted  in  20  American  Jurist,  457.  Dr.  Bell, 
the  Superintendent  of  the  McLean  Asylum,  Massachusetts,  states,  "  that  foi 
one  real  criminal  acquitted  on  the  score  of  insanity,  there  have  been  a  dozen 
maniacs  executed  for  their  criminal  acts."  Dr.  "Woodward,  Superintendent 
of  the  Massachusetts  Lunatic  Hospital,  says,  "  of  all  the  cases  that  have  come 
to  my  knowledge,  and  I  have  examined  the  subject  with  interest  for  many 
years,  I  have  known  but  a  single  instance  in  which  an  individual  arraigned 
for  murder,  and  found  not  guilty  by  reason  of  insanity,  has  not  afterwards 
shown  unequivocal  symptoms  of  insanity  in  the  jails  or  hospitals  where  he 
has  been  confined  ;  and  I  regret  to  say  that  quite  a  number  who  have  been, 
executed,  have  shown  as  clear  evidence  of  insanity  as  any  of  these." 

26 


302  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   IXSANITY. 

§  803.  The  doctrine  of  moral  insanity. has,  as  yet,  received 
no  countenance  from  British  courts,  whose  conservative  ten- 
dencies do  not  readily  yield  to  innovations  upon  established 
forms  and  precedents.  If,  but  a  few  years  ago,  one  of  the 
highest  law-officers  of  England  pronounced  the  "  systematic 
correctness  "  of  an  action,  to  be  a  proof  of  sanity  sufficient  to 
render  all  others  superfluous,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  idea 
of  moral  insanity  has  been  generally  considered  by  the  legal 
profession,  as  having  sprung  "from  the  teeming  brains  of 
medical  theorists.  In  the  fulness  of  this  spirit,  Mr.  Chitty 
declares,  that,  "  unless  a  jury  should  be  satisfied  that  the 
mental  fatuities  have  been  perverted^  or,  at  least,  the  faculties 
of  reason  and  judgment,  it  is  believed,  that  the  party  subject 
to  such  a  moral  insanity,  as  it  is  termed,  would  not  be  pro- 
tected from  criminal  punishment ;  "  ^  and  in  the  trial  of  Howi- 
son,  in  1832,  for  murder,  in  Scotland,  moral  insanity  which 
was  pleaded  in  defence,  was  declared  by  the  court  to  be  a 
"  groundless  theory."/^  In  Pveg-.  v.  Stokes  (1848),  Baron 
Rolfe  said:  "  It  is  true,  learned  speculators  in  their  writings, 
have  laid  it  down,  that  men,  with  a  consciousness  that  they 
were  doing  wrong,  were  irresistibly  impelled  to  commit  some 
unlawful  act.  But  who  enabled  them  to  dive  into  the 
human  heart,  and  see  the  real  motive  that  prompted  the 
commission  of  such  deeds  ?"^  In  Reg.  v.  Allnut  (1848),  the 
same  judge  said  :  "  The  witnesses  called  for  the  defence  de- 
scribed the  prisoner  as  acting  from  uncontrollable  impulse, 
.  .  .  but  he  must  say  that  it  was  his  opinion  that  such  evi- 
dence ought  to  be  scanned  by  juries  with  very  great  jealousy 
and  suspicion,  because  it  might  tend  to  perfect  justification 
of  every  crime  that  was  committed.  What  was  the  meaning 
of  not  being  able  to  resist  moral  influence?  Every  crime  was 
committed  under  an  influence  of  such  a  description,  and  the 
object  of  the  law  was  to  compel  persons  to  control  these 
influences ;  and  if  it  was  made  an  excuse  for  a  person  who 
had  committed  a  crime,  that  he  had  been  goaded  to  it  by 

^  Chitty,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  352. 
-  Sampson,  Homicidal  Insanity. 
2  3  Car.  &  Kir.  185. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  303 

some  impulse  which  medical  men  might  choose  to  say  he 
could  not  control,  he  must  observe  that  such  a  doctrine  would 
be  fraught  with  great  danger  to  society."  ^  So  too  in  Reg:  v. 
Barton  (1848),  Baron  Parke  spoke  of  the  doctrine  of  moral 
insanity  as  a  "dangerous  innovation  coming  in  with  the 
present  century,"  and  said,  in  reference  to  the  plea  of  an  irre- 
sistible impulse,  "something  more  than  this  is  necessary  to 
justify  an  acquittal  on  the  ground  of  insanity."  ^  In  Reg:  v. 
Pale  (1850),  Baron  Alderson  said  :  "  The  only  insanity  which 
excuses  a  man  'for  his  acts,  is  that  species  of  delusion  which 
conduced  to,  and  drove  him  to  commit  the  act  alleged  against 
him.  The  jury  ought  to  have  clear  proof  of  a  formed  disease 
of  the  mind,  a  disease  existing  before  the  act  was  committed, 
and  which  made  the  accused  incapable  of  knowing  at  the 
time  that  it  v?as  a  wrong  act  for  him  to  do.  The  law  does 
not  acknowledge  the  doctrine  of  an  uncontrollable  impulse, 
if  the  person  was  aware  it  was  a  wrong  act  he  was  about  to 
commit.  A  man  might  say  he  picked  a  pocket  from  some 
uncontrollable  impulse,  and  in  that  case,  the  law  would  have 
an  uncontrollable  impulse  to  punish  him  for  it."  ^  In  civil 
cases  too  the  result  has  been  the  same.  "  I  am  not  aware," 
says  Sir  Herbert  Jenner  Fust,  "  of  any  case  decided  in 
a  court  of  law,  where  moral  perversion  of  the  feelings 
unaccompanied  with  delusion,'  has  been  held  a  sufficient 
ground  to  invalidate  and  nullify  the  acts  of  one  so  affec- 
ted.""^ In  this  country,  of  late  years,  moral  insanity  has 
been  often  recognized  as  an  established  fact,  and  a  valid 
defence  in  criminal  cases.  In  Commonioealth  v.  Rogers, 
Chief  Justice  Shaw  of  Massachusetts,  said :  "  If  then  it  be 
proved,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury,  that  the  mind  of  the 
accused  v/as  in  a  diseased  and  unsound  state,  the  question 
will  be,  whether  the  disease  existed  to  so  high  a  degree,  that, 
for  the  time  being,  it  overwhelmed  the  reason,  conscience, 
and  judgment,  and  whether  the  prisoner,  in  committing  the 
homicide,  acted  from  an  irresistible,  uncontrollable  influence. 
If  so,  then  the  act    was  not  the   act    of  a  voluntary  agent, 

1  Taylor,  Med.  Jur.  645.  ^  3  Qq^,  C.  C.  275. 

3  Loudon  Times,  July  12,  1850.         *  Frere  v.  Peacock,  1  Eobertson,  448. 


304  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

but  the  involuntary  act  of  the  body,  without  the  con- 
currence of  a  mind  directinsr  it."  ^  The  law  as  here  laid 
down  has  been  extensively  adopted  in  subsequent  crimi- 
nal trials,  consequently  securing  the  impunity  of  those 
who  have  committed  criminal  acts  under  an  irresistible 
impulse.  In  1846,  Chief  Justice  Gibson,  of  Pennsylvania, 
said,  in  a  case  he  was  trying :  "  There  is  a  moral  or 
homicidal  insanity,  consisting  of  an  irresistible  inclination  to 
kill  or  to  commit  some  other  particular  offence.  There  may 
be  an  unseen  ligament  pressing  on  the  mind,  drawing  it  to 
consequences  which  it  sees  but  cannot  avoid,  and  placing  it 
under  a  coercion  which,  while  its  results  are  clearly  perceived, 
is  incapable  of  resistance.  The  doctrine  which  acknowledges 
this  mania  is  dangerous  in  its  relations,  and  can  be  recognized 
only  in  the  clearest  cases.  It  ought  to  be  shown  to  have 
been  habitual,  or  at  least  to  have  evinced  itself  in  more  than 
a  single  instance."  ^  In  an  earlier  case,  Chief  Justice  Lewis 
of  the  same  State,  said  :  "  Where  its  existence  is  fully  estab- 
lished, this  species  of  insanity  [moral]  relieves  from  account- 
ability to  human  laws."^  In  the  case  of  Kleim  (1846)  tried 
for  murder,  Mr.  Justice  Edmonds  said:  "  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  moral  as  well  as  the  intellectual  faculties  may 
be  so  disordered  by  the  disease,  as  to  deprive  the  mind  of  its 
controlling  and  directing  power." '^  A  similar  view  was  ex- 
pressed by  Mr.  Justice  Whiting,  in  Freemcui's  case  (1847).'^ 
On  the  contrary.  Chief  Justice  Hornblower,  of  New  Jersey, 
echoes  the  doctrine  of  the  English  courts.  To  receive  moral 
insanity  as  an  excuse  for  crime,  he  thinJis,  "would  inevitably 
lead  to  the  most  pernicious  consequences,  and  it  would  very 
soon  come  to  be  a  question  for  the  jury,  whether  the  enor- 
mity of  the  act  was  not,  in  itself,  sufficient  evidence  of  moral 
insanity ;  and  then,  the  more  horrible  the  act,  the  greater 
would  be  the  evidence  of  such  insanity."  ^ 


*  Trial  of  Abncr  Ropers.     By  Bij^elow  &  Bemis,  277. 

*  Wharton  &  Stille,  Unsoundness  of  Mind,  43. 

*  Idem,  44.  *  Am.  Jour.  Ins.  ii.  245. 
^  Trial  of  Freeman,  (pampli.). 

»  Stale  V.  Spencer,  1  Zabriskie,  196.     (1846.) 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  305 

§  304.  In  the  form  of  moral  insanity  characterized  by 
alternate  excitement  and  depression  (§  171),  the  patient  is 
strongly  disposed  to  buy  and  sell,  which  fact  joined  with 
equal  eagerness  on  the  part  of  others  to  take  advantage  of  it, 
frequently  makes  their  civil  transactions  the  subject  of  litiga- 
tion. In  these  cases  there  are  so  many  points  to  be  consid- 
ered, that  it  is  often  difficult  to  arrive  at  satisfactory  conclu- 
sions. It  is  to  be  settled,  —  and  perhaps  on  very  meagre  evi- 
dence,—  whether  the  transaction  occurred  during  the  lucid 
interval ;  or  if  it  occurred  during  the  period  either  of  excite- 
ment or  of  depression,  whether  the  mental  affection  were 
sufficiently  grave  to  obscure  the  perceptions  or  weaken  the 
judgment,  and  if  so,  whether  the  other  party  took  advantage 
of  this  infirmity  to  obtain  more  favorable  terms  than  he  oth- 
erwise would.  It  is  also  to  be  considered,  that  although  the 
contracts  of  these  persons  may  be  fair  enough  independently 
regarded,  yet  their  number  and  extent  may  be  so  far  beyond 
their  means,  as  to  prove  highly  inconvenient,  if  not  ruinous. 
The  following  account  of  a  suit  arising  out  of  one  of  this 
class  of  contracts,  will  give  a  better  idea  of  the  various  ques- 
tions which  they  open,  as  well  as  the  principles  of  law  appli- 
cable to  them,  than  any  general  discussion. 

§  305.  At  a  session  of  the  Supreme  judicial  Court  of 
Massachusetts,  at  Northampton,  August,  1848,  a  suit  was 
brought  by  the  guardian  of  Josiah  AUis,  against  Billings  and 
others,  for  the  purpose  of  annulling  a  contract  made  several 
years  previous,  whereby  the  plaintitT  conveyed  to  the  defend- 
ants his  interest  in  certain  mills,  on  the  ground  that  the 
former  was  then  insane  and  that  the  latter  were  guilty  of 
fraud.  It  appeared  in  evidence  that  Allis,  then  about  fifty 
years  old,  and  the  son  of  a  farmer,  was  attacked  in  1819  with 
mania,  under  the  form  of  high  though  not  furious  excitement. 
He  recovered,  apparently,  in  the  course  of  two  or  three 
months,,  but  every  year  since,  had  been  visited  by  a  similar 
attack  which  was  invariably  followed  by  a  period  of  depres- 
sion, and  this  by  a  period  of  apparent  restoration  to  his  nat- 
ural condition.  In  1822  he  married  his  first  wife  by  whom 
he  had  two  daughters  now  married.  In  1829  his  father  died, 
*  26* 


306  .    MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

leaving  him  executor  of  his  will  and  residuary  legatee  to 
nearly  all  his  property.  In  1833  his  wife  died.  In  March, 
1834,  he  made  a  contrac'  with  Bod  well,  the  husband  of  his 
only  sister,  whereby  the  latter  was  induced  to  move  upon 
AUis's  farm,  and  maintain  him  and  his  family.  At  the  end 
of  a  year  this  contract  was  dissolved  by  mutual  consent.  On 
March  21st,  1834,  he  made  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  the 
mills  which  it  was  the  object  of  this  suit  to  avoid.  For  his 
interest  in  the  property,  being  one  half,  he  received  ^4,000, 
and  a  release  from  certain  unsettled  claims  which,  he  sup- 
posed, might  amount  to  $500.  In  this  year  his  mother  died. 
In  March,  1835,  he  sold  his  homestead  for  $4,600,  with  the 
expectation  of  receiving  $500  more.  In  the  fall  of  the  next 
year  he  married  his  second  wife.  In  November,  1842,  his 
oldest  daughter,  and  the  next  year,  his  other  daughter,  were 
married.  In  1843  he  commenced  a  suit  against  the  pur- 
chaser of  his  homestead,  for  avoidance  of  the  contract.  He 
obtained  a  verdict,  bat  subsequent  law  proceedings  were  in- 
stituted, and  the  matter  was  still  pending.  In  the  latter  part 
of  1843,  he  was  placed  under  guardianship.  On  July  6th, 
1844,  he  was  sent  to  the  Worcester  lunatic  hospital,  where  he 
stayed  six  weeks. 

Bearing  these  incidents  and  dates  in  mind,  we  shall  more 
easily  understand  the  evidence  respecting  his  mental  condi- 
tion, every  particular  of  which  is  here  faithfully  given. 

§  306.  It  was  abundantly  proved  by  the  evidence,  that 
AUis  was  a  subject  of  periodical  insanity,  each  attack  being 
characterized  by  a  turn  of  excitement  and  depression,  an 
interval  intervening  between  the  attacks,  quite  free  from  both. 
They  occurred  every  year.  At  most  there  was  but  one  year 
in  which  their  occurrence  was  called  in  question.  It  appears 
that  the  excited  turns  usually  commenced  in  the  middle,  or 
latter  part  of  summer,  continuing  from  one  to  three  months. 
While  under  their  influence,  he  was  noisy,  boisterous,  and 
■talkative.  The  various  other  manifestations  of  this  condi- 
tion, as  related  by  the  witnesses,  were,  for  the  most  part, 
referred  to  particular  attacks,  and  were  probably  confined  to 
them.     In  this  manner,  it  was  stated,  that  he  would  drive 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL  MANIA.  307 

abont  rapidly  and  carelessly,  shouting  and  hallooing;  that  he 
indulged  in  wild  and  incoherent  expressions,  and  was  ob- 
served rambling  about  without  hat,  coat,  or  shoes.  At  differ- 
ent times,  too,  he  entertained  some  strange  fancies  which 
were  not  far  from  being  real  delusions.  He  professed  to  be 
able  to  walk  on  the  water;  to  catch  a  person's  breath  in  his 
teeth ;  to  have  command  of  angels ;  to  tame  a  ferocious 
woodchuck  by  looking  in  his  eye  ;  and  to  hold  up  through  a 
storm  a  whole  broadside  of  a  house  frame  which  they  were 
raising.  At  times  he  had  great  fears  of  thieves  and  devils, 
and  would  carry  about  a  double-barrelled  gun  to  protect  him- 
self. Once  he  spoke  of  these  devils  as  brushing  by  him  at 
an  evening  meeting.  At  another,  he  thought  a  fellow  boarder 
at  the  hotel  had  been  robbed  of  a  large  sum.  With  two  or 
three  exceptions,  the  excitement  was  never  so  high  as  to  re- 
quire his  confinement  to  the  house,  nor  did  it  always  prevent 
him  from  managing  his  affairs.  It  was  said  he  was  inclined 
to  make  purchases,  generally  of  fancy  articles  quite  unsuita- 
ble to  his  condition,  but  only  one  or  two  instances  were 
related  of  his  indulging  in  foolish  speculations,  and  those 
were  of  trifling  amount. 

§  307.  Depression  immediately  succeeded  the  excitement, 
and  continued  until  spring.  Once  it  was  spoken  of  as  dis- 
appearing in  March;  and  at  another  time,  in  April.  This 
also  seems  to  have  varied  in  severity.  At  one  time,  he  is 
described  as  being  still,  sitting  in  company  for  hours  without 
saying  a  word,  shy,  and  avoiding  his  friends.  In  many  of 
the  depressed  turns  he  was  filled  with  vague  fears  and  appre- 
hensions, thought  he  was  coming  to  want,  and  was  disposed 
to  suicide.  In  others,  he  was  able  to  attend  to  his  customary 
business. 

§  308.  His  daughters  testified  that  within  their  recollec- 
tion (then  respectively  twenty-five  and  twenty-three  years 
old),  he  had  never  been  otherwise  than  excited  or  depressed  ; 
yet  it  was  abundantly  shown  by  a  cloud  of  witnesses  who 
were  in  the  habit  of  seeing  him,  every  day  or  two,  for  many 
years,  that  there  were  well-marked  intervals  between  his 
attacks,  when   he  was  apparently  free  from  excitement  or 


308  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE .  OF   INSANITY. 

depression.     It  was  their  concurrent  testimony,  that  in  these 
intervals,  his  manners  were  natural  and  proper,  his  conduct 
and  conversation  correct,  and  nothing  in  either  to  arrest  the 
observation  of  others.     He  managed  the  farm,  both  before 
and  after  his  father's  death,  with  no  very  obvious  lack  of  pru- 
dence and  intelligence,  and  creditably  discharged  the  duties 
of  a  parent,  husband,  and  citizen.     Various  business  transac- 
tions of  his  at  one  time  or  another,  were  described  by  the 
witnesses  as  having  been  performed  with  at  least  ordinary 
discretion  and  sagacity  ;  and  those  who  had  these  dealings 
with  him  observed  nothing  strange  or  unusual  in  his  appear- 
ance.    He  hired  and  paid  his  workmen,  bought  and  sold  his 
cattle,  procured  the  necessary  supplies  of  food  and  clothing 
for  his  family,  placed  his  children  at  school  away  from  home, 
paid   the  bills  for   their   board    and   tuition,  married  twice, 
bought  and  sold  real  e^state,  lent  money,  received  payments, 
obtained   discounts   at   the  bank,  and   once   (in  1832),  was 
chosen  by  the  parish  as  its  agent  for  disposing  of  some  lands. 
In  all  these  transactions,  the  defendants  undertook  to  show, 
that  he  evinced  an  ordinary  share  of  shrewdness  and  intelli- 
gence;  and  in  regard  to  many  of  them,  certainly,  this  was 
the  fact.     Instances  were  mentioned  of  his  giving  too  much 
for  his  purchases,  and  of  buying  some  things  which  he  did 
not  need,  but  nearly,  if  not  quite  all,  these  transactions  oc- 
curred when  he  was  confessedly  in  his  excited  state.     One  of 
them,  which  occurred  in  the  spring  of  1842,  referred  to  the 
purchase  of  an  old   shop  for  a  needy  neighbor,  and  was  first 
related  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  convey  the  impression  that  it 
was  deeply  tinctured  with  folly.    The  testimony  of  the  neigh- 
bor himself,  however,  presented  the  matter  in  a  very  different 
light.     It  appeared  that  he  owned  a  lot  of  land,  very  near 
Allis's  house,  which  it  had  been  proposed  to  purchase  for  a 
burying-place  for  the  use  of  the  town.     AUis  being  loath  to 
have  a  burying-place  so  near  him,  suggested  to  the  witness, 
that  he  had  better  put  up  a  house  on  It.     "  I  replied,"  said 
the  latter,  "that  I  had  no  funds,  and  then  he  offered  to  assist 
me.     The  next  morning  he  came  and  proposed  to  buy  for  me 
a  certain  old  shop  near  by,  which   might  be  made  into  a 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF  MORAL   MANIA.  309 

house,  and  could  be  obtained,  he  thought,  for  $100."  He 
succeeded  in  getting  it  for  $90,  and  had  it  removed  to  the  lot 
in  question,  but  failed  to  supply  the  funds  necessary  for  con- 
verting it  into  a  house.  Thus  the  land  was  not  sold  for  a 
burying-place,  and  he  did  no  more  than  was  necessary  to 
defeat  the  project.  Many  of  the  witnesses  who  had  dealings 
with  him,  and  spoke  of  him  as  evincing  nothing  strange  or 
unusual  in  his  manner,  and  appearing  lik«e  other  men,  had 
seen  him  in  his  excited  and  depressed  states,  and  declared 
that  in  them,  he  appeared  very  differently.  Instances  of 
excitement  were  related,  which  apparently  occurred  while  in 
his  rational  or  lucid  intervals,  but  they  were  transitory,  and 
seemed  to  have  been  caused  by  sudden  provocations,  or  some 
other  special  causes.  In  this  connection  it  is  proper  to  state, 
that  following  the  custom  of  the  times,  he  frequently,  if  not 
excessively,  used  ardent  spirits;  and  it  was  testified  that 
drinking  always  excited  him. 

§  309.  The  evidence  respecting  Allis's  mental  condition 
about  the  time  of  the  transaction  in  question,  requires  par- 
ticular attention.  In  August,  1833,  he  went  on  a  pleasure 
excursion  to  Saratoga,  stayed  two  or  three  weeks,  and  came 
back  highly  excited.  In  September  he  bought  a  piece  of 
land  of  his  nephew;  he  attended  auctions,  and  was  disposed 
to  bid  off  every  thing  that  was  sold.  In  that  month  or  the 
next  he  went  abroad  to  purchase  cattle,  for  the  purpose  of 
fattening  them.  He  was  disposed,  says  a  witness,  to  give 
whatever  was  asked,  and  actually  did  pay  high  prices.  He 
said,  when  he  returned  home,  that  he  had  got  them  for  a 
song.  In  October,  his  wife  died;  she  was  sick  when  he  left 
home  to  buy  cattle,  and  he  told  a  young  mau  who  lived  with 
him,  that  if  she  died,  he  must  procure  a  coffin.  Soon  after, 
he  became  depressed  ;  was  troubled  at  finding  he  had  bought 
more  cattle  than  he  had  the  means  of  feeding,  and  solicited 
his  brother-in-law  to  help  him  out  of  his  troubles.  A  wit- 
ness who  took  some  of  the  cattle  to  keep  for  him,  said  that 
Allis  applied  to  him  and  made  the  bargain.  He  was  to  keep 
them  from  2oth  of  November  to  the  early-part  of  February, 
at  ^1.17  per  pair,  AUis  furnishing  grain,  and  witness  hay.    •'  He 


310  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OE   INSANITY. 

came  often,"  said  the  witness,  "  to  see  the  cattle  ;  talked  about 
them  as  other  men  do  ;  apjDeared,  in  all  respects,  like  other 
men.  Said  he  would  pay  when  he  got  returns,  and  did  pay 
in  the  course  of  two  or  three  weeks.  I  saw  nothins:  like  ex- 
citement  or  depression."  In  March,  1834,  he  conversed  with 
a  witness  about  the  mills;  said  they  were  not  profitable; 
that  there  was  always  something  to  be  done  on  them,  and 
that  he  thought  of  selling  them.  He  said  he  had  been  otlered 
$4,000  for  his  part,  and  asked  witness's  opinion  about  the 
price.  The  witness  observed  nothing  wild  or  incoherent  in 
his  manner;  he  was  as  usual  when  about  his  business.  In 
March,  if  not  before,  he  began  to  negotiate  the  arrangement 
with  his  brother-in-law,  referred  to  in  the  beginning  of  this 
notice,  which  ended  in  a  contract  whereby  the  latter  was  to 
receive  all  Allis's  real  estate  excepting  the  mills,  and  which 
was  valued  at  between  $8,000  and  $9,000,  maintaining  him 
and  his  daughters,  and  giving  the  latter  $2,000  each.  His 
reasons  for  this  step  were,  as  appears  from  the  evidence,  that 
by  the  death  of  his  wife,  he  was  left  with  two  young  children, 
and  an  aged  mother  sick ;  that  he  was  unable  to  get  any 
suitable  person  to  take  charge  of  his  family ;.  and  if  his 
brother-in-law  should  prove  a  gainer  by  the  arrangement,  it 
would  only  turn  a  portion  of  his  father's  property  into  his  sis- 
ter's family.  The  brother-in-law  went  in  March,  and  said  he 
thought  Allis  continued  depressed  until  the  first  of  April,  but 
soon  went  out  to  work  with  him,  and  appeared  to  be  in  his 
natural  condition  during  the  summer.  He  also  consulted 
with  his  brother  respecting  the  sale  of  the  mills;  told  him 
what  was  offered  and  his  reasons  for  selling. 

§  310.  The  evidence  respecting  the  character  of  the  act, 
inasmuch  as  it  will  affect  our  estimate  of  his  mental  capaci- 
ty, remains  to  be  considered.  He  felt  perplexed  by  his  busi- 
ness and  overburdened  with  cares.  His  brother,  with  whom 
he  often  spoke  of  his  intention  to  sell  the  mills,  told  him  it 
would  be  a  judicious  step  and  relieve  him  of  care.  Both  this 
witness  and  another  whom  he  consulted,  expressed  their  sat- 
isfaction "with  th(?  price.  The  fact  of  his  being  indebted 
to  the  defendants  to  the  amount  of  $500,  or  indeed  to  any 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OP  MORAL  MANIA.  311 

amount,  was  neither  proved  nor  disproved.  If  not  so  in- 
debted, then  he  received  at  the  rate  of  ^8,000  for  the  whole 
property ;  otherwise  at  the  rate  of  $9,000.  A  few  witnesses 
rated  the  mills  at  $10,000,  in  18S4 ;  one  at  $12,000.  A 
larger  number  fixed  their  value  at  $6,000;  at  this  sum,  they 
were  assessed  on  the  tax  book  of  the  town  that  year. 

§  311.  Dr.  Lee,  assistant  physician  of  the  lunatic  hospital 
at  Worcester,  testified  that  AUis  entered  that  institution  July 
6th,  1844;  that  he  was  highly  excited,  and  continued  so  four 
days ;  that  this  excitement,  then,  rather  rapidly  passed  into 
depression,  in  which  state  he  continued  so  long  as  he  re- 
mained, which  was  six  weeks.  His  opinion  upon  the  evi- 
dence was,  that  the  fact  of  periodical  insanity  was  estab- 
lished, but  not  that  of  occasional  sanity.  He  was  satisfied  of 
AUis's  insanity  in  the  spring  of  1834.  Dr.  Woodward,  late 
superintendent  of  the  hospital  at  Worcester,  coincided  with 
Dr.  Lee  in  the  opinion  that  Allis  had  no  lucid  intervals,  and 
must  have  been  insane  in  the  spring  of  1834.  Buying  and 
selling,  he  thought,  no  proof,  one  way  or  the  other,  because 
insane  men  are  capable  of  doing  certain  business.  He  admit- 
ted, however,  that,  if  Allis  on  his  return  from  the  hospital, 
had  talked  with  his  family  on  the  subject  of  his  will,  and  had 
set  down  coolly  and  deliberately  and  made  a  proper  will,  the 
presumption  would  have  been  in  its  favor.  The  author  testi- 
fied that  in  his  opinion  the  existence  of  lucid  intervals  was 
abundantly  proved ;  that  in  these  intervals  he  was  as  capable 
of  transacting  business  as  a  person  ever  is  in  a  lucid  interval, 
and  that  the  contract  in  question  was  made  in  one  of  them. 
It  should  be  stated  in  this  connection,  that  the  first  two 
medical  witnesses  had  heard  none  of  the  defendants'  wit- 
nesses, and  not  all  of  the  plaintiff's ;  while  the  latter  had 
heard  all  of  the  plaintiff's,  and  most  of  the  defendants'  wit- 
nesses. 

§  312.  The  charge  of  the  court  (Mr.  Justice  Dewey)  to  the 
jury,  contained  some  instructions  that  deserve  the  attention 
of  the  medical  jurist.  The  jury  were  told  that  the  precise 
point  of  inquiry  for  them  was  the  state  of  Allis's  mind  on 
the  21st  of  March,  1834,  and  that  his  previous  and  subse- 


312  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   IXSAXITT. 

qnent  states  were  only  important  as  elucidating  that  inquiry. 
It  was  also  stated  that  acts  done  in  a  lucid  interval  will  be 
sustained  by  the  law,  and  that  the  question  of  fraud  is  of  lit- 
tle weight,  except  as  connected  with  that  of  sanity  and  of  the 
consideration.  In  regard  to  the  burden  of  proof,  ihc  ordinary 
doctrine  was  given,  namely,  that. if  insanity  is  alleged,  it  must 
be  proved  ;  that  if  habitual  insanity  be  proved,  the  party  who 
contends  that  the  act  was  done  in  a  lucid  interval  must  prove 
it;  that  if  a  party  exhibits  only  temporary  ebullition  of  in- 
sanity, he  cannot  be  presumed  to  be  always  insane.  The  court 
also  instructed  the  jury  that  AUis  must  have  had  sufficient 
capacity  to  judge  of  the  character  and  value  of  the  property 
sold,  and  the  law  required  no  more.  On  the  point  of  affirma- 
tion the  court  said  that  the  contract  was  not  void,  but  merely 
voidable,  and  therefore  capable  of  ratification,  and  that, 
though  it  were  the  act  of  an  insane  man,  it  might  stand  if 
confirmed.  If  Allis,  therefore,  after  recovering  his  reason, 
having  in  his  recollection  and  knowledge  the  nature,  extent, 
and  time  of  the  contract,  and  all  the  circumstances  before 
his  mind;  having  recognized  the  sale  by  permitting  posses- 
sion on  the  part  of  the  defendants ;  having  received  instal- 
ments on  the  notes  given  for  the  purchase-money,  knowing  it 
to  be  the  consideration  of  the  sale  of  his  part  of  the  mills,  he 
would  be  bound  by  it. 

The  jury  returned  a  verdict  for  the  defendants,  and  thus 
the  contract  was  not  disturbed. 

§  313.  In  this  case  the  plaintiff  claimed  relief  on  the 
ground  of  his  own  insanity  and  the  fraud  of  the  otlier  party, 
and  the  defendants  undertook  to  prove  that  neither  allega- 
tion was  true.  Indeed,  the  whole  course  of  the  proceedings 
showed  that  neither  party  regarded  these  two  points  as  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  and  not  inseparably  involved  in  the 
question  of  the  merits  of  the  case.  The  plaintiff  disclaimed 
any  desire  to  avail  himself  of  his  insanity.  Whether  sane  or 
insane,  he  was  xvilling  the  contract  should  stand,  if  a  fair 
price  had  been  paid  for  the  property  ;  and  yet  the  burden  of 
his  testimony  had  reference  to  his  mental  condition.  The 
defendants,   on   the  other  hand,  while    they  endeavored    to 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  313 

establish  his  competency,  were  equally  careful  to  show  that 
they  had  paid  the  full  value  of  the  property.  It  was  well 
understood  that  the  stronger  the  proof  of  incompetency,  the 
easier  it  would  be  to  prove  the  fraud  ;  and  vice  versa. 

§  314.  It  was  not  denied  that  Allis  was  insane  a  portion 
of  every  year;  nor  was  it  denied,  except  by  his  daughters, 
that  for  a  portion  of  every  year,  he  showed  no  very  obvious 
manifestations  of  disease,  and  was,  apparently,  at  least,  in 
his  natural  condition  of  mind.  The  question  was  whether 
these  restorations  were  real,  and  not  apparent  merely ;  a 
complete  intermission  of  the  disease,  a  li(cid  interval,  as  it  is 
somewhat  technically  called,  or  only  a  transitory  remission 
in  the  severity  of  the  symptoms.  The  difference  of  opinion 
on  this  point  between  the  medical  witnesses,  may  be  ac- 
counted for,  perhaps,  in  the  fact,  that  they  formed  their 
judgment  upon  different  data.  Taking  the  evidence  of  both 
parties  together,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  stronger  proof 
than  it  furnished,  that  AUis's  periodical  restorations  fairly 
amounted  to  what  are  called  lucid  intervals.  The  states  of 
excitement  and  depression  were  scarcely  more  strongly  testi- 
fied to,  than  an  interval  whicli  was  marlvcd  by  neither.  Many 
of  the  same  persons  who  observed  him  in  the  former  states, 
also  observed  him  in  the  latter,  and  were  struck  by  the  con- 
trast they  exhibited.  If,  then,  for  months  together,  he  was 
neither  excited  nor  depressed,  and  entertained  no  delusions, 
wherein  was  he  insane?  When  we  consider,  too,  that  he 
resumed  his  customary  duties,  and  appeared  to  his  friends 
and  neighbors  to  be  like  himself,  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
we  have,  in  a  great  majority  of  cases,  more  satisfactory  proof 
of  recovery. 

§  315.  The  disbelief  of  two  of  the  experts  in  his  sanity, 
seemed  to  be  a  matter  of  inference,  rather  than  of  direct  proof. 
The  intervals  were  so  short  compared  with  the  duration  and 
frequency  of  the  attacks,  that  there  was  hardly  sufficient 
time,  they  thought,  for  the  mind  to  have  been  restored  to  a 
state  of  sanity.  If  by  sanity  they  meant  the  restoration  of 
the  mind  to  a  state  of  perfect  health,  such  as  those  enjoy 
who  have  never  been  insane,  no  one  would  be  disposed  to 

27 


314  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

disagree  with  them.  We  are  not  aware,  however,  that  the 
lucid  interval  as  understood  by  medical  authorities,  implies 
exactly  such  a  restoration  as  that.  Without  canvassing  the 
various  definitions  that  have  been  given  of  this  state,  it  is 
enough  that  they  agree  in  the  fact,  that  the  individual  clearly 
and  correctly  recognizes  his  true  conditions  and  relations,  all 
delusions  having  vanished,  and  the  affections  returned  to  their 
natural  current.  This  does  not  imply  that  he  has  recovered 
the  original  vigor  of  his  mind  and  his  capacity  for  transact- 
ing unusual  or  important  business,  with  his  original  prompti- 
tude and  correctness.  Indeed,  a  degree  of  restoration  like  this, 
is  possessed  by  few  patients  who  are  discharged  from  our  hos- 
pitals as  recovered.  To  prove  the  occurrence  of  a  lucid  inter- 
val, it  seems  hardly  reasonable  to  require  evidence  of  a  degree 
of  capacity  which  can  only  be  predicated  of  a  mind  that,  for 
years,  has  enjoyed  complete  exemption  from  disease.  Dr. 
Woodward  declared,  as  has  already  been  observed,  that 
buying  and  selling,  even  with  a  certain  degree  of  shrewdness, 
was  no  proof  of  sanity,  as  such  transactions  are  often  per- 
formed by  the  inmates  of  asylums.  The  fact  thus  broadly 
stated,  is  undoubtedly  true,  and  we  do  not  recollect  any  par- 
ticular transaction  of  Allis  which  might  not  be  performed  by 
some  unequivocally  insane  persons.  But  the  question  of 
sanity  or  competence  cannot  be  settled  by  reference  to  a  sin- 
gle act,  —  except  perhaps  as  regards  that  particular  act.  A 
broader  view  of  the  individual  is  necessary  for  this  purpose. 
If  he  buys  and  sells  for  months  together ;  if  he  manages  his 
affairs  with  prudence  ;  if  no  delusions  possess  his  mind;  if  to 
his  friends  and  neighbors  he  seems  to  have  regained  his  natu- 
ral character ;  if,  in  short,  the  indications  of  sanity  appear  in 
his  general  habit  and  not  merely  in  a  particular  act,  he  must 
be  regarded  as  sane.  It  is  because  the  very  reverse  of  this  is 
true,  that  the  inmate  of  the  asylum  is  deemed  to  be  insane, 
though  he  may  occasionally  do  a  very  shrewd  thing.  He  is, 
perhaps,  the  prey  of  delusions,  or  his  affections  are  grossly 
perverted,  or  his  shattered  understanding  needs  the  constant 
support  and  guidance  of  sounder  minds.  To  meet  every 
instance  of  shrewd  transaction  by  the  assertion  that  many 


LEGAL   COXSEQUEXCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  315 

persons  of  unquestioned  insanity  do  the  same  things,  can 
only  jDroduce  a  confusion  of  ideas.  There  is  another  fact  of 
the  deepest  significance  in  this  connection.  Year  after  year 
he  had  been  seen  by  his  father,  under  whose  roof  he  lived, 
stricken  down  by  annual  attacks  of  insanity.  And  yet  by 
this  father  who  knew  his  mental  infirmities  better  than  any 
one  else,  he  was  made  the  executor  of  his  will,  and  residuary 
legatee  of  the  burden  of  his  estate,  amounting  to  nearly 
$50,000.  What  stronger  evidence  could  we  have,  that  for  a 
large  part  of  every  year,  he  enjoyed  his  ordinary  health  and 
competence?  Besides,  are  his  two  marriages  to  be  regarded 
as  having  no  bearing  on  the  question  of  his  mental  condi- 
tion ?  Had  he  no  lucid  intervals  when  they  were  con- 
tracted ? 

§  316.  The  admission  that  Allis  had  lucid  intervals,  does 
not  necessarily  settle  the  question  of  his  sanity  or  compe- 
tence. True,  the  general  doctrine  of  the  law,  whatever  may 
be  its  practice,  is,  that  in  the  lucid  interval  the  individual  is 
fully  himself  again,  and  restored  to  all  his  privileges  and 
responsibilities.  This  implies  that  the  mind  is  restored  to  a 
degree  of  integrity  which  the  present  state  of  our  pathologi- 
cal knowledge  on  the  subject  fails  to  establish.  For  common 
purposes  and  ordinary  occasions,  it  may  be  abundantly  ade- 
quate, but  the  weakness  and  irritability  which  are  induced 
by  numerous  and  frequent  attacks,  unfit  it  for  extraordinary 
efforts.  So  long  as  the  individual  confines  himself  to  the 
beaten  track  of  his  customary  thoughts  and  pursuits,  he 
shows  no  want  of  capacity  ;  but  let  him  embark  in  new  un- 
dertakings, assume  responsibilities  of  unusual  magnitude,  or 
be  subjected  to  provocations  peculiarly  calculated  to  try  his 
power  of  self-control,  and  his  mind  is  very  liable  to  be  led 
astray.  He  may  rightly  appreciate  the  value  of  his  property 
and  manage  it  very  judiciously,  and  yet  be  far  more  easily 
overreached  by  dishonest  men,  than  if  he  had  never  been 
insane.  To  regard  all  persons  in  a  lucid  interval  as  either 
completely  responsible,  or  completely  irresponsible,  for  their 
civil  or  criminal  acts,  would  be  manifestly  unjust.  A  better 
rule  would  be  to-  permit  them  the  exercise  of  all  legal  rights, 


316  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

and  protect  them  from  the  fraudulent  practices  of  those  who 
would  take  advantage  of  their  infirmity. 

§  317.  Admitting  the  general  fact  that  Allis  had  lucid 
intervals,  the  next  question  was  whether  the  period  when  the 
contract  for  the  sale  of  the  property  was  made,  was  embraced 
in  one  of  them.  By  two  witnesses  he  was  described  as 
being  depressed  as  late  as  April,  when  he  began  to  manifest 
his  natural  condition.  Allis's  case  was  not  of  that  kind  in 
which  the  transitions  are  very  rapid  and  abrupt,  —  a  single 
day  or  night  dividing  the  different  states  from  each  other. 
The  change  was  slower,  and  it  was  impossible  to  fix  upon  a 
particular  day  as  that  on  which  the  depression  completely 
passed  away,  and  the  individual  resumed  his  natural  charac- 
ter. If  the  plaintiff  were  lying  in  the  deepest  shadow  of 
despondency,  as  he  undoubtedly  had  been  at  times,  then  of 
course,  no  one  would  contend  that  he  was  in  a  lucid  interval. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  cloud  had  fairly  rolled  away  from 
his  understanding,  though  his  animal  spirits  had  not  quite 
risen  to  their  natural  buoyancy,  it  certainly  does  admit  of  a 
question  whether  he  may  not  be  correctly  said,  for  any  prac- 
tical purpose,  to  have  been  in  a  lucid  interval. 

§  318.  It  remains,  then,  to  be  ascertained  whether,  on  the 
21st  of  March,  1834,  he  was  suffering  under  a  degree  of  de- 
pression sufficiently  severe  to  exert  a  controlling  influence 
over  his  views  and  calculations.  On  this  point,  the  testimony 
of  the  man  who  kept  his  cattle  for  him,  and  of  the  other 
witnesses  with  whom  he  conversed  respecting  his  projected 
sale  of  the  mills,  is  conclusive.  They  saw  nothing  in  him 
like  excitement  or  depression,  and  thought  his  manifestations 
were  natural.  The  only  controlling  influence  which  this  de- 
pression could  exert  over  the  contract,  was  supposed  to  arise 
from  the  feeling  of  poverty  by  which  it  was  accompanied. 
Two  witnesses  testified  that  during  the  winter  he  felt  poor, 
but  no  particulars  respecting  the  feeling  were  given,  and  it 
did  not  appear  whether  it  continued  into  March.  Even 
admitting  that  it  did.  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  it 
affected  his  estimates  of  the  value  of  property  ;  nor  do  we 
see  why  it  should  have  induced  him  to  sell  at  a  less  price 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   MORAL   MANIA.  817 

than  he  otherwise  would.  Presnraptively  it  would  seem  as 
if  the  poorer  he  felt,  the  more  he  would  endeavor  to  get.  It 
is  difficult,  however,  to  see  any  connection  at  all  between  this 
feeling  and  the  sale  of  the  mills.*  Converting  his  mills  into 
promissory  notes  would  make  him  no  richer,  nor  remove  in 
any  degree  the  feeling  of  povej'ty.  Considering,  therefore, 
that  he  was  admitted  by  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  to  have 
come  out  of  his  depressed  state  by  the  first  of  April;  that 
other  witnesses  saw  nothing  unnatural  in  his  appearance 
weeks  previously;  and  that  this  morbid  feeling,  if  it  existed 
at  all,  must  have  been  very  slight,  the  lucid  interval  may  be 
fairly  said  to  have  embraced  the  21st  of  March. 

§  319.  Another  and  a  conclusive  proof  that  the  contract 
was  made  in  a  lucid  interval,  is  to  be  found  in  the  various 
affirmations,  as  the  lawyers  call  them,  by  which  it  was  recog- 
nized. Year  after  year,  until  1841,  he  continued  to.  receive 
the  annual  interest  and  instalments  upon  his  notes,  in  the 
month  of  June ;  and  neither  then,  nor  at  any  other  time  dur- 
ing those  seven  years,  did  he  complain  that  he  had  made  the 
contract  when  he  was  not  aware  exactly  of  what  he  was 
doing;  or  that  the  defendants  had  taken  advantage  of  his 
morbid  feeling  of  poverty,  to  obtain  the  property  at  an  in- 
adequate price.  The  effect  of  this  fact  can  be  avoided 
only  by  denying  that  he  'enjoyed  a  single  lucid  moment 
subsequent  to  March,  1834,  and  this  would  hardly  be 
thought  of. 

§  320.  None  of  these  facts  are  necessarily  incompatible 
with  fraud  on  the  part  of  the  defendants,  because  it  is  safe  to 
presume  that  in  the  lucid  interval,  the  mind  is  deprived  of 
some  of  its  original  vigor,  and  in  consequence  thereof,  the 
individual  may  be  made  the  dupe  of  dishonest  and  design- 
ing men.  Acts  performed  in  this  state,  therefore,  should  be 
viewed  with  the  utmost  jealousy,  and  much  less  evidence  of 
fraud  should  be  necessary  to  annul  them,  than  if  the  mental 
soundness  had  never  been  called  in  question.  Leaving  out 
of  view  the  amount  of  AUis's  indebtedness  to  the  defend- 
ants, in  regard  to  which,  however,  there  was  no  direct  evi- 
dence at  all,  the  contract  was  singularly  clear  from  suspicious 

27* 


318  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

circumstances.  Allis  was  desirous  of  selling  the  mills,  be- 
cause he  regarded  them  as  a  source  of  trouble  and  vexation. 
Had  his  mind  been  in  a  perfectly  healthy  condition,  they 
probably  would  not  have  been  regarded  in  this  light,  but  the 
fact  was  no  less  real,  nor  did  it  furnish  a  less  rational  motive 
for  the  transaction.  It  certajnly  was  not  a  very  strange  thing 
that  a  person  who  was  in  a  state  of  excitement  or  depression 
a  considerable  portion  of  every  year,  should  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  his  interests  would  be  promoted  by  having  this 
property  in  some  other  shape.  His  brother-in-law,  who  was 
probably  more  capable  than  any  one  else  of  advising  him, 
thought  it  a  judicious  step.  Under  difTerent  circumstances, 
it  might  have  been  otherwise.  Had  his  health  been  good,  or 
had  he  been  under  guardianship,  the  mill  property  might 
have  been  rendered  more  profitable,  than  its  valae  invested 
in  any  other  way.  Here  the  case  was  very  different  — 
sufficiently  so  to  account  for  the  different  course  which  Allis 
pursued. 

§  o21.  There  was  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the  contract 
that  required  an  extraordinary  mental  effort.  He  had  always 
been  acquainted  with  the  mills;  they  were  partly  owned  by 
himself,  as  they  had  been  by  his  father  before  him ;  with 
their  expenses  and  earnings  he  w^as  perfectly  familiar ;  the 
condition  of  the  buildings  was*  obvious ;  mills  had  been 
bought  and  sold  in  the  vicinity,  and  thus  he  was  furnished 
with  an  additional  means  of  comparison  for  judging  of  the 
value  of  his  own ;  in  short,  it  was  a  species  of  property  with 
the  value  and  nature  of  which  he  must  have  been  perfectly 
well  acquainted.  Neither  was  the  idea  of  selling  them  a 
sudden  one.  He  had  contemplated  the  sale  for  some  time 
previous,  mentioned  his  intentions  to  his  friends,  and  deliber- 
ately executed  the  contract  for  the  transfer  of  the  property. 
On  the  part  of  the  defendants,  so  far  as  the  evidence  indi- 
cated, the  transaction  was  an  open  and  an  honest  one.  The 
alternative  before  them  was,  either  to  allow  a  stranger  to 
come  into  the  joint  ownership,  or  to  purchase  Allis's  half 
themselves.  It  seems  that  the  price  they  offered  was  an 
average  of  the  different  estimates  of  the  value  of  the  prop- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   MORAL  MAXIA.  319 

erty  made  fourteen  years  afterwards.  The  negotiation  was 
not  done  in  a  corner.  Allis  took  ample  time  to  consider  the 
matter,  conversed  with  and  received  the  advice  of  his  friends 
on  the  subject,  deliberately  consummated  the  bargain,  and  for 
seven  years  continued  to  affirm  it  by  receiving  the  annual 
payments  on  the  notes. 


CHAPTER     IX. 


DEMENTIA. 


§  322.  Tnis  form  of  insanity  is  attended  by  a  general 
enfeeblement  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  faculties  which 
were  originally  sound  and  well-developed,  in  consequence  of 
age  or  disease,  and  is  characterized  by  forgetfulness  of  the 
past,  indifTerejice  to  the  present  and  future,  and  a  certain 
childishness  of  disposition.  The  apparent  similarity  of  this  ' 
state  to  that  of  imbecility  or  idiocy,  renders  it  necessary  that 
they  should  be  accurately  distinguished ;  for  nothing  could 
be  more  improper  or  unjust,  than  to  view  them  merely  as 
different  shades  of  the  same  mental  condition.  Idiocy  and 
the  higher. degrees  of  imbecility  are  congenital  or  nearly  so, 
and  consist  in  a  destitution  of  powers  that  were  never  pos- 
sessed. Little  or  nothing  is  remembered,  because  little  or 
nothing  has  left  any  impression  upon  the  mind,  and  no 
advance  is  made  in  knowledge,  because  the  faculties  neces- 
sary for  obtaining  it  have  never  existed.  The  proprieties  and 
decencies  of  life  are  unobserved,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
their  moral  relations  have  never  been  discerned,  and  their  in- 
difference to  the  most  pressing  wants  is  to  be  attributed  to 
the  absence  of  the  most  common  instincts  of  our  nature. 
The  idiot  is  restless,  uneasy,  and  inattentive,  because  the 
faculties  that  direct  the  attention,  and  draw  from  its  applica- 
tion valuable  results,  have  been  utterly  denied.  In  idiocy 
and  imbecility  the  manners  and  conversation  strongly  resem- 
ble those  of  childhood  ;  in  dementia  they  never  lose  the  im- 
press of  manhood,  however  disjointed  and  absurd  they  may 
be.     The  former  appear  at  an  early  age  of  life  ;   the  latter 


DEMENTIA.  321  ^ 

never  takes  place  till  after  the  age  of  puberty,  except  oc- 
casionally as  a  sequel  of  wounds  or  diseases  of  the  head, 
and  generally  increases  with  time,  from  the  slightest  possible 
impairment  of  mental  energy  to  the  most  complete  fatuity. 
In  dementia  the  past  is  forgotten,  or  but  indistinctly  and  un- 
connectedly  brought  up  to  the  mind  ;  the  attention  wanders 
from  one  thing  to  another ;  the  affairs  of  the  present  possess 
no  interest ;  and  the  moral  and  social  affections  are  inac- 
tive, because  the  faculties,  in  consequence  of  pathological 
changes  in  the  brain,  have  fallen  into  a  state  of  inertia  that 
prevents  their  ordinary  manifestations.  The  whole  condition 
betrays  the  existence,  not  of  physical  imperfection,  but  of 
physical  weakness  (many  of  the  bodily  functions  also  fre- 
quently being  enfeebled),  and  consequently  it  may  sometimes 
be  cured,  or  temporarily  relieved.  "When  once  firmly  seated, 
it  is  not  incompatible  with  length  of  years;  and  after  death, 
we  may  find,  on  examination,  lesions  of  structure,  or  diminu- 
tions of  size,  which  are  accidental,  the  result  of  diseased 
action,  and  not  original' malconforma^ions.  The  above  com- 
parison of  mental  deficiency  with  dementia  shows,  that  they 
depend  on  two  very  diflferent  conditions  of  the  brain,  and 
consequently  must  display  very  different  moral  and  intellect- 
ual manifestations ;  from  which  we  are  warranted  in  infer- 
ring that  in  regard  to  their  medico-legal  relations,  they  cannot 
properly  be  placed  on  the  same  ground. 

§  323.  Dementia  is  distinguished  from  general  mania, 
the  only  other  affection  with  which  it  is  .liable  to  be  con- 
founded, by  characters  that  cannot  mislead  the  least  practised 
observer.  The  latter  arises  from  an  exaltation  of  vital 
power,  from  a  morbid  excess  of  activity,  by  which  the  cere- 
bral functions  are  not  only  changed  from  their  healthy  con- 
dition, but  are  performed  with  unusual  force  and  rapidity. 
The  maniac  is  irrational  from  an  inability  to  discern  the 
ordinary  characters  and  relations  of  things,  amid  the  mass  of 
ideas  that  crowd  upon  his  mind  in  mingled  confusion ;  while 
in  dementia,  the  reasoning  faculty  is  impaired  by  a  loss  of  its 
original  strength,  whereby  it  not  only  mistakes  the  nature  of 
things,  but  is  unable,  from  want  of  power,  to  rise  to  the  con- 


322  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

templation  of  general  truths.  The  reasoning  of  the  maniac 
does  not  so  much  fail  in  the  force  and  logic  of  its  arguments, 
as  in  the  incorrectness  of  its  assumptions ;  but  in  dementia 
the  attempt  to  reason  is  prev^ented  by  the  paucity  of  ideas, 
and  that  feebleness  of  the  perceptive  powers,  in  consequence 
of  which  they  do  not  faithfully  represent  the  impressions 
received  from  without.  In  mania,  when  the  memory  fails,  it 
is  because  new  ideas  have  crowded  into  the  mind,  and  are 
mingled  up  and  confounded  with  the  past ;  in  dementia  the 
same  effect  is  produced  by  an  obliteration  of  past  impressions 
as  soon  as  they  are  made,  from  a  want  of  sufficient  power  to 
retain  them.  In  the  former,  the  mental  operations  are  char- 
acterized by  hurry  and  confusjon  ;  in  the  latter,  by  extreme 
slowness  and  frequent  apparent  suspension  of  the  thinking 
process.  In  the  former,  tlie  habits  and  affections  undergo  a 
great  change,  the  conduct  becoming  strange  and  inconsistent 
from  the  beginning,  and  the  persons  and  things  that  once 
pleased  and,  interested,  viewed  with  indifference  or  aversion. 
In  the  latter,  the  moral  habits  and  natural  feelings,  so  far  as 
they  are  manifested  at  all,  lose  none  of  their  ordinary  char- 
acter. The  temper  may  be  more  irritable,  but  the  moral 
disposition  evinces  none  of  that  perversity  which  characterizes 
mania. 

§  324.  In  dementia  the  mind  is  susceptible  of  only  feeble 
and  transitory  impressions,  and  manifests  but  little  reflection 
even  upon  these.  They  come  and  go  without  leaving  any 
trace  of  their  presence  behind  them.  The  attention  is  inca- 
pable of  more  than  a  momentary  effort,  one  idea  succeeding 
another  with  but  little  connection  or  coherence.  The  mind 
has  lost  the  power  of  comparison,  and  abstract  ideas  are 
utterly  beyond  its  grasp.  The  memory  is  peculiarly  weak, 
events  the  most  recent  and  most  nearly  connected  with  the 
individual  being  rapidly  forgotten.  The  language  of  the 
demented  is  not  only  incoherent,  but  thoy  are  much  inclined 
to  repeat  insulated  words  and  phrases  without  the  slightest 
meaning.  "  It  seems,"  says  Esquirol,  "  as  if  they  were  list- 
ening to  imaginary  tales  which  they  repeat  in  obedience  to 
an  involuntary  or   automatic  impulse  excited  by  their   old 


DEMENTIA.  323 

habits  or  fortuitous  associations  with  actual  impressions."^ 
The  mind  is  often  occupied  by  hallucinations  which  con- 
tinue a  longer  or  shorter  time,  and  disappear  to  be  succeeded 
by  others.  The  useful  or  ornamental  arts  which  they  may 
have  practised  with  skill  and  followed  with  ardor,  and  the 
various  other  employments  of  life,  seem  to  be  utterly  forgot- 
ten as  if  they  had  never  been  thought  of.  Their  time  is  spent 
either  in  moving  about  with  restless  activity,  or  passing  days, 
weeks,  or  months,  in  the  same  spot,  in  utter  vacuity  of  thought 
or  purpose  ;  in  pouring  forth  an  incessant  flow  of  words  at 
the  top  of  their  voice,  or  uttering  low,  muttering  sounds,  con- 
sisting of  scarcely  articulate  words  and  broken  phrases ;  in 
singing,  crying,  or  laughing. 

§  325.  Though  often  irascible  and  self-willed,  their  anger 
is  momentary,  and  thus  they  readily  yield  to  the  direction  of 
others.  The  moral  powers,  in  fact,  seem  to  be  possessed  of 
too  little  energy  to  maintain  resolution,  or  cherish  the  pas- 
sions. Their  feebleness  of  purpose  and  passive  obedience  to 
the  will  of  others,  strikingly  contrast  with  the  pertinacity  and 
savage  fury  often  evinced  by  the  maniac.  With  the  remem- 
brance of  their  friends  and  former  employments,  there  also 
disappears  all  trace  of  the  social  and  domestic  affections. 
All  interest  in  the  concerns  of  others  is  lost ;  and  family, 
friends,  and  relations  are  viewed  with  the  indifference  of  per- 
fect strangers,  and  nothing  is  able  to  awaken  an  emotion  of 
pleasure  or  pain. 

§  326.  The  derangement  of  the  intellectual  powers  is 
sometimes  indicated  by  remarkable  changes  of  the  counte- 
nance. The  skin  is  pale,  dry,  and  wrinkled ;  the  eyes  sunken, 
dull,  and  moistened  with  tears;  the  pupils  dilated;  the  look 
uncertain  and  wandering;  the  cheeks  hollow  and  emaciated  ; 
and  the  whole  face  destitute  of  expression,  and  indicative  of 
decay.  The  organic  functions  suffer  but  little;  the  appetite 
for  food  is  so  great  that  the  patient  seems  to  be  constantly 
eating,  and  the  quantity  consumed  is  enormous.     Affections 


*  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  220. 


324  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  the  nervous  system,  however,  particularly   paralysis,   are 
not  unfrequent  complications  of  dementia. 

§  327.  The  above  description  is  applicable  to  dementia 
only  when  fully  developed  and  before  it  has  passed  into  the 
state  of  fatuity  in  which  it  often  terminates.  This  form  of 
insanity  appears  under  two  different  degrees  of  severity,  which 
are  designated  as  acute  and  chronic.  The  former  is  a  sequel 
of  temporary  errors  of  regimen,  of  fevers,  hemorrhages, 
metastases,  suppression  of  customary  evacuations,  and  the 
debilitating  treatment  of  mania.  It  differs  from  the  latter 
in  being  more  rapid  in  its  progress,  and  in  its  successive 
stages  not  being  so  well  distinguished  from  one  another. 
It  is  readily  cured  by  regimen,  exercise,  bathing,  tonics,  anti- 
spasmodics, or  simply  by  removing  the  exciting  cause.  It 
sometimes  terminates  in  an  explosion  of  acute  mania,  which 
then  becomes  critical. 

§  328.  Chronic  dementia  is  a  sequel  of  mania  (of  which 
it  is  the  usual  termination)  when  life  continues  long  enough, 
of  apoplexy,  epilepsy,  masturbation,  and  drunkenness ;  or  it 
may  occur  idiopathically,  and  then  it  usually  accompajpies 
old  age.  This  form  of  the  disorder,  or  senile  dementia,  is  so 
often  the  subject  of  medico-legal  inquiries,  especially  in  con- 
nection with  wills,  that  it  deserves  particular  attention. 
Senile  dementia,  it  must  be  recollected,  is  something  more 
than  that  mere  loss  of  mental  power  which  results  from  the 
natural  decay  of  the  faculties ;  it  is  attended  with  those 
pathological  changes  also  which  are  essential  to  the  produc- 
tion of  insanity.  The  mind  is  not  only  feeble,  but  it  is  de- 
ranged. AVere  it  not  so,  every  old  man  would  labor  under  a 
certain  degree  of  dementia.  The  first  symptom  which  indi- 
cates the  approach  of  this  affection,  is  generally  an  impair- 
ment of  the  memory  of  recent  occurrences.  The  events  of 
early  life  have  lost  none  of  their  distinctness,  while  recent 
impressions  are  feebly  made,  and  in  a  short  time  mostly  for- 
gotten. While  the  visits  of  his  friends"  are  forgotten  beyond 
the  day  or  week  they  are  made,  the  patient  may  talk  of  their 
former  interviews,  and  relate  the  most  trivial  details  concern- 
ing them.     From  this  weakness  of  memory  seems  to  arise, 


DEMENTIA.  .  325 

oftentimes,  the  first  appearance  of  tnental  alienation.  The 
patient  forgetting  the  intermediate  ideas,  the  connection  be- 
tween those  he  does  remember,  and  that  order  and  filiation 
of  them  necessary  to  sound  reasoning,  are  destroyed  ;  and 
hence  those  gaps  in  his  ideas,  and  those  inconsistencies  of 
conduct  which  convey  the  impression  of  mental  derange- 
ment. Coincident  with  the  failure  of  the  memory,  or  very 
shortly  afterwards,  there  is  a  diminution  of  the  ordinary 
ability  of  recognizing  external  objects,  which  arises  not  so 
much  from  weakness  of  the  organs  of  sensation,  as  of  the 
organs  of  perception  within.  That  is,  the  impressions  of 
sound,  light,  touch,  etc.,  are  well  enough  received,  but  the 
qualities  of  form,  size,  weight,  color,  etc.,  are  imperfectly  dis- 
cerned. Objects  not  very  different  are  mistaken  for  one 
another,  from  an  inability  to  perceive  at  the  first  sight  the 
qualities  that  distinguish  them,  though  the  individual  may 
recognize  his  mistake  when  it  is  pointed  out  to  him. 

§  329.  Thus  far  there  is  nothing  that  can  properly  be 
called  mental  derangement ;  the  pathological  changes  in  the 
brain  have  only  occasioned  a  diminution  of  the  natural  power 
and  activity  of  the  mind.  The  first  symptom  indicative  of 
derangement  (and  it  is  the  next  which  is  observed),  is  a  degree 
of  incoherence  in  the  ideas,  like  that  of  dreams.  It  may  not 
appear  for  days  or  weeks  together,  or  only  on  certain  occa- 
sions. The  above  symptoms  increase  in  intensity  more  or 
less  rapidly  till  complete  dementia  is  produced,  when  all  the 
moral  and  intellectual  powers  are  "involved  in  this  state  of 
decay  and  derangement.  The  memory  of  recent  impressions 
fades  away  as  fast  as  they  are  formed,  and  the  past  is  be- 
held with  considerable  indistinctness  and  confusion,  though 
events  and  acquaintances  of  early  life  are  not  yet  forgotten. 
The  patient  is  often  at  a  loss  to  know  where  he  is,  or  thinks 
himself  at  home  when  in  another  house,  and  wonders  why 
he  is  not  engaged  in  his  usual  occupations.  Places,  times, 
and  circumstances  are  forgottorr,  or  incorrectly  remembered. 
His  friends  are  not  easily  distinguished ;  morning,  noon, 
and  evening,  yesterday  and  to-morrow  are  being  constantly 
blended  together;  and  he  will  get  up  in  the  night,  mistake 

28 


326  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  light  of  candles  for  that  of  day,  and  persist  in  calling  it 
morning.  Objects  the  most  dissimilar  are  mistaken  for  one 
another,  and  consequently  his  notions  are  often  the  most 
grotesque  and  absurd.  The  intellect  gradually  becomes 
incapable  of  discerning  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect,  and 
of  comparing  ideas  together;  in  short,  any  thing  like  an  effort 
of  reflection  is  beyond  its  powers.  The  person  is  unable  to 
follow  the  conversation,  unless  it  be  of  the  simplest  ideas, 
and  particularly  addressed  to  him. 

§  330.  Although  such  is  the  ordinary  course  of  senile 
dementia,  it  sometimes  begins  with  a  general  nervous  excite- 
ment, accompanied  by  an  excitement  of  some  particular 
function  which  is  exerted  with  a  new  and  unaccustomed 
energy  that  deceives  the  old  man  and  imposes  on  his  friends. 
Thus,  some  are  irritated  by  the  slightest  circumstances,  and 
are  very  active  and  ready  to  undertake  any  thing.  Others 
experience  venereal  desires  that  have  been  long  since  ex- 
tinguished, exciting  them  to  conduct  directly  contrary  to  their 
ordinary  habits.  Others  who  had  previously  been  temperate 
and  sober,  manifest  an  appetite  for  high-seasoned  dishes  and 
intoxicating  drinks.  These  symptoms  of  excitement,  how- 
ever, are  soon  succeeded  by  those  of  dementia,  and  the 
transition  is  sometimes  quite  sudden,  especially  when 
the  patient  is  restrained  from  gratifying  his  unreasonable 
desires. 

§  331.  The  same  decay  which  the  bodily  powers  exhibit 
as  they  proceed  to  their  natural  termination  in  death,  is 
always  participated  by  the  mental ;  but  it  sometimes  hap- 
pens that  the  latter  are  irretrievably  affected  long  before  the 
former  have  shown  any  symptoms  of  faltering  in  their  course. 
The  causes  of  this  inversion  of  the  natural  order  of  decay, 
so  far  as  they  are  external,  are  to  be  found  probably  in  the 
great  irregularity  of  exercise,  both  of  kind  and  duration,  to 
which  the  brain  is  subjected  by  the  habits  and  wants  of  a 
highly  civilized  condition,  whereby  its  healthy  elasticity  and 
vigor  are  so  impaired,  that  it  needs  only  the  first  touch  of 
decay  to  lose  forever  the  nicely  adjusted  balance  of  its  facul- 
ties.    The  transition  from  the  greatest  mental  exertion  to  the 


DEMENTIA. 


327 


most  tedious  inactivity,  from  the  various  phases  of  excite- 
ment to  the  irksome  sameness  of  ennui,  from  the  stimulus 
afforded  by  the  performance  of  a  thousand  duties,  and  the 
glow  that  is  constantly  kindled  by  the  hopes  of  the  future,  to 
the  monotony  too  often  occasioned  by  the  loss  of  business, 
friends,  and  the  cares  of  long-accustomed  pursuits,  is  of  such 
frequent  occurrence,  that  every  thing  like  regular  and  proper 
exercise  which  is  as  indispensable  to  the  health  of  the  brain 
as  it  is  to  that  of  every  other  organ,  is  but  imperfectly  prac- 
tised by  a  large  proportion  of  men. 

§  o32.  In  the  later  periods  of  life,  —  and  particularly  if 
the  constitution  be  weakened  by  sickness  or  dissipation, — 
any  exertion  of  the  mind  far  beyond  its  power  to  sustain,  is 
liable  to  be  rapidly  followed  by  a  state  of  dementia.  The 
same  effect  is  produced  when  after  many  years  of  unremit- 
ting attention  to  certain  pursuits,  the  mind  is  suddenly  de- 
prived of  the  objects  on  which  it  rested,  and  thrown  upon 
itself  to  furnish  the  means  of  excitement  in  the  declining 
years  of  life,  when  novelty  presents  no  allurements,  and  the 
circle  of  earthly  prospects  is  being  constantly  narrowed. 
Take  an  individual  from  the  stir  and  bustle  of  a  city  resi- 
dence ;  from  the  unceasing  strife  of  competition  in  the  pur- 
suit of  wealth  or  honor;  throw  down  the  goal  on  which  for 
years  his  eye  has  rested,  though  ever  receding  from  his  grasp; 
place  him  in  the  country,  at  a  distance  from  familiar  faces 
and  scenes  ;  and  unless  his  mind  be  informed  with  various 
knowledge,  or  warmed  by  an  interest  in  the  moral  concerns 
of  his  fellow  men  around  him,  it  will  sink  into  that  state  of 
inactivity  so  favorable  for  the  operation  of  the  predisposing 
causes  of  this  disease. 

§  333.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  old  age  is  subject  to 
no  other  kind  of  insanity  than  that  of  dementia,  for  mania, 
even  of  the  severest  description,  is  not  uncommon  at  this 
period,  and  the  importance  of  distinguishing  between  them, 
in  a  legal  point  of  view,  must  be  immediately  obvious.  Not 
only  may  the  mind  remain  competent  to  the  discharge  of 
some  of  the  civil  duties  of  life,  in  mania,  but  there  is  always 
a  prospect  of  its  restoration  to  health.     The   characteristic 


328  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

symptoms, 'as  well  as  the  exciting  causes  that  we  have  de- 
scribed above,  if  carefully  observed,  will  generally  prevent  us 
from  committing  the  serious  mistake  of  confounding  them 
together,  as  is  too  often  done,  with  scarcely  a  thought  of  the 
impropriety  of  the  practice. 


CHAPTER    X. 

LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DEMENTLA.. 

§  334.  I}s  its  last  stages,  dementia  does  not  differ,  of  course, 
in  respect  to  its  legal  relations,  from  general  intellectual 
mania.  It  is  only  while  the  mind  is  in  its  transition-state,  if 
we  may  use  the  expression,  passing  from  its  sound  and 
natural  condition  to  the  enfeeblement  and  total  extinction  of 
its  reflective  powers  —  and  the  entire  change  may  occupy 
months  and  years  in  its  progress  —  that  its  legal  capacity  is 
ever  called  in  question.  The  successive  steps  of  this  disorder 
are  so  gradual  and  oftentimes  affect  the  powers  so  unequally, 
that  it  is  not  strange  that  so  much  diversity  of  opinion 
should  arise  respecting  the  capacity  of  the  mind  which  is  the 
subject  of  it,  or  that  groundless  suspicion  of  improper  influ- 
ence should  be  so  frequently  excited.  It  must  be  considered, 
too,  as  a  circumstance  calculated  to  favor  this  effect,  that 
the  judgment  is  debarred  from  forming  an  unbiased  decision, 
by  suggestions  of  interest  or  jealousy  which  lead  it  to  see 
lapses  of  the  mind  that  would  otherwise  have  appeared  to  be 
nothing  more  than  that  natural  loss  of  energy,  suffered  by 
the  mind  as  it  "draws  near  to  its  eternal  home."  Most 
people,  too,  are  so  little  accustomed  to  observe  and  analyze 
the  mental  phenomena,  and  so  little  acquainted  with  the 
physiological  laws  that  govern  their  manifestations,  that  cir- 
cumstances are  often  adduced  as  indications  of  unequivocal 
insanity,  wdiich  only  evince  some  normal  peculiarities  of  the 
senile  understanding.  They  need  only  to  be  put  on  the  pro- 
per bias,  to  confound  the  natural  decay  of  the  mental  facul- 
ties with  that  derangement  that  depends  exclusively  on  patho- 
logical affections ;  so  strongly  do  they  resemble  each  other  to 

28* 


330  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  superficial  observer.  By  how  many  would  Bichat's 
beautiful  picture  of  the  closing  scenes  of  old  age,  be  mistaken 
to  represent  the  defaced  and  shattered  temple  that  has  been 
prostrated  by  the  touch  of  disease.  "  Seated  near  the  fire 
and  concentrated  within  himself,  a  stranger  to  every  thing 
without  him,  he  passes  his  days  there,  deprived  of  desire,  of 
passion,  and  sensation  ;  speaking  little,  because  he  is  deter- 
mined by  nothing  to  break  his  silence,  yet  happy  in  feeling 
that  he  still  exists,  when  almost  every  other  sentiment  is 
gone."  ^  Far  greater,  then,  must  be  the  necessity  of  caution 
in  distinguishing  between  such  degrees  of  capacity  as  exist 
in  the  early  and  those  of  the  later  stages  of  dementia,  and 
where,  too,  the  causes  of  error  are  so  much  more  numerous. 
The  deafness  that  generally  accompanies  the  early  stages, 
disables  the  individual  from  participating  in  or  listening  to 
the  conversation  of  those  around  him,  and  thus  gives  to  his 
countenance  an  expression  of  dulness  and  stupidity  that 
might  easily  mislead  one  not  particularly  acquainted  with 
him,  while  in  fact  he  needs  only  to  be  properly  addressed,  to 
display  a  mind  that  has  not  yet  ceased  to  think  with  some 
degree  of  accuracy  and  vigor.  The  latter  fact,  however,  will 
be  known  only  to  his  intimate  friends,  while  the  former  is 
conveyed  to  the  mass  of  common  observers  who  are  always 
ready  to  decide  upon  a  person's  mental  capacity,  from  an 
occasional  glimpse  of  his  manner,  or  a  few  remarks  on  the 
most  ordinary  topics. 

§  335.  A  judge  is  seldom  required  to  decide  questions  of 
more  delicacy, —  questions  that  demand  such  nice  and  cau- 
tious balancing  of  evidence,  such  penetration  into  motives 
and  biases,  such  a  profound  knowledge  of  the  mental  mani- 
festations as  aflfected  by  disease,  —  than  those  of  mental 
capacity  in  old  age,  where  the  mind  is  confessedly  laboring 
under  some  kind  or  degree  of  impairment.  The  standard 
by  which  witnesses'  opinions  are  formed  in  such  cases  is  so 
different,  and  the  pertinacity  with  which  each  one  clings  to 
his  own  conclusions,  —  in  proportion  generally  to  his  igno- 

^  Sur  la  Vie  et  le  Mort,  pt.  1 ,  c.  x. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DEMENTIA.  331 

ranee  of  the  subject,  —  is  so  strong,  that  nothing  but  a  great 
display  of  the  above-mentioned  qualities  will  enable  the 
judge  to  joerform  his  duty  with  credit  to  himself,  and  satis- 
faction to  others.  Unless  he  can  state  the  grounds  of  his 
opinions,  they  are  no  better  than  surmises,  and  he  fails  of 
accomplishing  one  of  the  most  desirable  objects  of  the  law  — 
that  of  establishing  and  confirming  the  popular  confidence  in 
its  decisions.  Difficult  as  this  duty  is,  it  will  be  very  much 
lightened  by  attending  to  some  of  those  points  which  can 
always  be  ascertained,  and  which  have  an  important  bearing 
on  the  question  at  issue. 

§  336.  Though  some  of  the  perceptive  powers  may  pre- 
serve their  wonted  activity  through  the  whole  of  the  disease; 
yet  it  is  in  these  that  the  disorder  is  first  manifested,  and  that 
long  before  the  higher  powers  of  the  understanding  have 
materially  suffered.  The  memory  of  persons,  things,  and 
dates,  and  especially  of  recent  impressions,  iB  exceedingly 
treacherous,  and  so  striking  is  this  impairment  to  those 
unaccustomed  to  look  beneath  the  surface  of  appearances, 
that  when  they  find  they  are  not  recognized,  though  once 
well  enough  knowni ;  that  past  events  and  the  actors  engaged 
in  them  are  either  forgotten,  or  singularly  entangled  and  con- 
fused; and  that  a  certain  listlessness  and  absence  of  mind 
take  the  place  of  former  animation  and  attentiveness;  they 
summarily  conclude  that  for  all  business  purposes,  the  patient 
is  utterly  incapacitated.  The  impressions  produced  by  a 
single  short  interview  have  no  chance  of  being  corrected  by 
subsequent  opportunities,  or  by  more  philosophical  observa- 
tions, and  the  final  opinion  is  adopted  and  authoritatively 
propounded,  that  the  individual  in  question  did  not  possess 
legal  capacity.  If  he  take  no  part  in  the  conversation,  and 
appear  scarcely  to  know  what  is  passing  around  him,  we  are 
not  to  draw  unfavorable  conclusions  relative  to  his  mental 
condition,  until  we  ascertain,  if  possible,  that  there  are  no 
peculiar  reasons  why  he  should  remain  silent  and  alone,  and 
that  he  is  no  longer  capable  of  pursuing  a  train  of  thought 
of  some  length  and  complexity.  If  he  have  forgotten  the 
names  and  circumstances  of  those  once  familiar,  but  whom 


332  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF  INSANITY. 

he  has  not  been  in  the  habit  of  seeing  recently,  it  does  not 
follow  that  he  has  also  forgotten  those  whose  relations  to 
him  have  kept  them  within  the  sphere  of  his  daily  observa- 
tion, and  made  them  the  objects  of  his  thoughts.  An  old 
servant  or  tenant  whose  countenance  may  not  have  been 
seen  for  weeks  or  month-;,  is  not  to  be  compared  in  this  re- 
spect, with  the  near  relative  who  is  frequently  in  his  com- 
pany, and  always  regarded  with  feelings  of  interest  and 
affection.  However  certain  it  may  be  that  he  has  lost  all 
sense  of  the  ordinary  proprieties  of  life,  it  needs  further  evi- 
dence to  prove  that  the  persons  and  interests,  which  have 
been  always  nearest  to  his  heart  and  connected  with  the 
great  purposes  of  liis  life,  have  utterly  faded  from  his  mind. 
The  evidence  of  tliose,  therefore,  who  are  qualified  both  by 
their  habits  of  intimacy  with  the  person  whose  mental  capac- 
ity is  in  question,  and  by  their  intelligence  and  education, 
to  appreciate  the  changes  his  mind  may  have  undergone,  is 
far  more  to  be  relied  on  than  that  of  people  of  a  different 
description,  who  make  up  their  opinion  hastily  from  a  few 
casual  and  perhaps  trivial  circumstances.  The  great  point 
to  be  determined  is,  not  whether  he  was  apt  to  forget  the 
names  of  people  in  whom  he  felt  no  particular  interest,  nor 
the  dates  of  events  which  concerned  him  little,  but  whether 
in  conversat'on  about  his  affairs,  his  friends  and  relatives, 
he  evinced  sufficient  knowledge  of  both,  to  be  able  to  dis- 
pose of  the  former  with  a  sound  and  untrammelled  judgment. 
It  is  a  fact  that  many  of  those  old  men  who  appear  so  stupid, 
and  who  astonish  the  stranger  by  the  singularities  of  their 
conduct,  need  only  to  have  their  attention  fairly  fixed  on 
their  property,  their  business,  or  their  family,  to  understand 
them  perfectly  well,  and  to  display  their  sagacity  in  the  re- 
marks they  make.  In  the  case  of  Kindleside  v.  Harrison,^ 
which  we  shall  briefly  notice,  in  illustration  of  these  remarks, 
the  reader  may  obtain  a  better  idea  than  can  otherwise  be 
conveyed,  of  the  kind  of  evidence  generally  produced  in  cases 
of  senile  dementia,  and  derive  instruction  and  high  intellect- 

1  2  Phillimore,  449. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DEMENTIA.  333 

ual  gratification  from  the  clearness  and  ability  with  which 
it  is  sifted  and  stamped  with  its  proper  value,  in  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court,  Sir  John  NichoU. 

§  337.  The  points  contested  in  this  case  were  four  codicils 
to  the  will  of  an  old  gentleman,  on  the  ground  that  at  the 
time  of  making  them,  he  was  incapable,  by  reason  of  mental 
decay,  of  understanding  their  nature  and  effect.  It  was  tes- 
tified by  some  of  the  servants  of  his  brother,  who  lived  at  a 
little  distance  from  him,  and  by  those  of  the  lady  with  whom 
he,  the  deceased,  resided,  that  during  the  two  or  three  years 
within  which  the  codicils  were  made,  he  frequently  did  not 
know  people  with  whom  he  had  previously  been  well  ac- 
quainted, without  being  told  who  they  were ;  that  he  would 
go  about  the  house  and  garden  looking  around,  and  appear- 
ing not  to  know  what  he  was  about.  On  one  occasion,  he 
not  only  did  not  recognize  a  certain  person,  but  could  not  be 
made  to  understand  who  he  was,  and  it  was  testified  by  a 
very  different  kind  of  witness,  that  the  deceased  asked  him 
how  old  was  witness's  father  (though  he  had  been  dead  six- 
teen years  and  had  been  his  partner  in  business),  and  soon 
after,  he  inquired  of  the  witness  after  his  health,  as  if  he 
were  addressing  another  person.  Several  other  similar  lapses 
of  memory  and  various  appearances  of  childishness  in  his 
conduct,  were  also  revealed  by  the  evidence,  amply  suffi- 
cient, no  doubt,  to  induce  superficial  observers  to  believe 
that  he  was  mentally  incapacitated  from  disposing  of  prop- 
erty. It  appeared,  however,  that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  giv- 
ing, in  favor  of  his  brother's  butler,  drafts  accurately  signed 
and  filled  up  ;  that  at  Christmas  time,  he  gave  the  servants 
Christmas  boxes  and  the  usual  amount  of  money,  and  en- 
tered the  sums  in  his  account  book;  that  he  received  a 
farmer's  bills  for  corn  and  paid  them  with  drafts  on  his  banker 
which  he  wrote  himself,  going  through  the  whole  business 
correctly,  and  that  he  docketed  the  bills  and  receipts  on  the 
back  with  the  name  of  the  person  to  whom  paid,  and  the 
amount  of  the  bill,  making  corresponding  entries  also  in  his 
private  account  book;  that  he  signed  twenty  drafts,  at  least, 
one  morning  for  payment  of  his  brother's  debts,  without  in- 


334  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

struction  or  assistance,  subscribing  his  own  name  as  executor 
of  his  brother;  that  he  would  detect  errors  in  the  casting  up 
of  other  people's  accounts;  that  he  discharged  his  physician's 
bills  correctly  ;  and,  in  short,  that  he  managed  his  affairs,  and 
that  prudently  and  correctly,  to  the  last.  It  was  also  testified 
that  it  was  his  practice  to  read  aloud  to  the  family  the  psalms 
and  lessons  of  the  day  ;  that  he  was  fond  of  a  little  fun,  and 
played  at  whist  remarkably  well.  That  a  person  might  have 
done  all  this  and  yet  been  unsound  in  mind,  is  certainly  not 
impossible;  but  it  was  far  beyond  the  power  of  a  mind  so 
broken  up  by  old  age  and  the  invasion  of  disease,  as  to  be 
incapable  of  altering  testamentary  dispositions  previously 
made.  This  consideration,  and  the  fact  that  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  famished  abundant  reasons  for  the  altera- 
tion, induced  the  court  to  decide  in  favor  of  the  capacity  of 
the  testator. 

§  338.  In  this  country,  where  such  cases  are  decided  by 
juries  who  are  not  responsible  for  their  decisions,  we  some- 
times meet  with  extraordinary  verdicts.  The  case  of  Dennet 
and  ivife  v.  Doiv,  Executor,  recently  decided  in  Maine,  after 
a  protracted  litigation,  is  calculated  to  excite  serious  reflec- 
tions in  the  minds  of  all  who  are  accustomed  to  regard  the 
testamentary  act  as  too  sacred  to  be  disturbed  by  any  other 
than  the  clearest  evidence  of  incompetency.  It  appears  that 
Stephen  Neal,  who  died  in  December,  1836,  aged  seventy- 
four  years,  left  a  will,  dateji  29th  of  October,  1835,  in  which 
his  nephew  John  Neal,  was  made  residaary  legatee  to  nearly 
the  whole  of  his  property.  From  the  decree  of  the  probate 
judge  approving  this  will,  an  appeal  was  entered  by  the  nat- 
ural heirs  (the  daughter  of  the  testator  and  her  husband),  and 
tried  before  the  supreme  court  in  November,  1838 ;  and 
again,  in  consequence  of  a  successful  application  for  a  new 
trial,  in  December,  1840,  the  verdict  being,  in  each  trial, 
against  the  will,  on  the  ground  of  insanity.  Before  noticing 
tlie  evidence  relative  to  his  mental  condition,  it  will  be  better 
to  mention  some  acts  in  which  the  testator  was  a  party  con- 
cerned. April  15th,  1834,  he  was  placed  under  guardianship, 
as  being  non  cotupos,  but  the  application  which  was  made  by 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DEMENTIA.  335 

some  prominent  members  of  the  Society  of  Friends,  to  which 
he  aUo  belonged,  was  accompanied  by  a  written  request 
from  him  that  the  measure  might  be  taken,  and  no  inquiry 
was  made  into  his  mental  condition.  The  guardian  having 
tajven  him  home  to  his  own  house,  and  observed  him  closely 
for  several  months,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  not 
unsound,  and  on  his  setting  forth  the  facts,  the  letters  of 
guardianship  were  revoked,  September,  1834.     In  November, 

1834,  he  conveyed  to  the  appellants  divers  stocks  and  por- 
tions of  real  estate,  amounting  to  about  one  half  of  his  whole 
property.  In  December,  1834,  he  made  a  will  which  was 
found  after  his  death  uncancelled,  in  which  he  constituted 
the  Society  of  Friends  in  Portland  residuary  legatee  of  nearly 
all  his  remaining  property.  In  July,  1835,  the  Friends,  by 
their  committee,  applied  to  have  him  placed  under  guardian- 
ship on  the  ground  of  his  being  non  compns  mentis.  This 
application  having  been  dismissed  in  October,  1835,  it  was 
immediately    renewed,  and    again    dismissed    December  2d, 

1835.  On  the  29th  of  October,  1835,  he  made  the  will  in 
dispute,  agreeing  essentially  with  the  other  just  mentioned, 
excepting  the  clause  respecting  the  residuary  legatee,  in  which 
John  Neal  is  substituted  for  the  Society  of  Friends.  In 
February,  1S36,  his  last  illness  commenced;  he  was  placed 
under  guardianship  upon  application  of  the  Friends,  25th  of 
April,  1836,  and  died  in  December  of  the  same  year. 

§  339.  As  the  evidence  touching  the  mental  condition  of 
the  testator,  was  unusually  multifarious,  rambling,  and  inap- 
propriate, we  must  confine  ourselves  to  those  facts  which 
have  any  real  connection  with  this  point.^  In  favor  of  his 
mental  capacity,  it  was  testified  by  the  person  who  drew  up 

'  For  these  I  am  indebted  to  the  notes  of  the  Courts  (Mr.  Justice  Shep- 
ley  on  the  first  trial,  and  Chief  Justice  Weston,  on  the  last),  ■which  were 
politely  submitted  to  my  inspection  by  those  gentlemen.  As  the  evidence 
at  the  two  trials  was  essentially  the  same,  except  that  some  additional  facts 
came  out  at  the  last,  I  have  made  no  distinction  between  it,  only  using  those 
notes  in  which  it  is  most  fully  reported.  As  the  verdicts  were  alike,  there 
seems  to  be  no  impropriety  in  this  course.  I  have  given  every  fact  which 
had  any  bearing  on  the  state  of  the  testator's  mind. 


336  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  will,  that  he  did  it  from  a  draft  originally  in  testator's 
handwriting;  that  they  had  considerable  conversation  about 
the  items;  and  that  he  had  no  doubt  of  his  entire  compe- 
tency. One  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  who  was  also  a 
neighbor  and  in  the  habit  of  doing  business  with  him,  had  no 
doubt  of  his  competency.  While  under  the  first  guardianship 
and  during  the  year  1835,  he  made  bargains  and  contracts  of 
various  kinds,  such  as  for  sale  of  land,  for  board,  for  rent 
with  his  tenants,  for  services,  etc.,  all  of  which  appeared  to  be 
shrewd  and  well-considered.  The  woman  with  whom  he 
boarded  a  few  weeks,  immediately  after  the  first  guardian- 
ship was  discharged,  testified  that  he  used  to  purchase  for  the 
table,  he  keeping  an  account  and  she  also ;  and  that  when 
they  settled,  she  found  him  exact  to  a  cent,  and  very  close. 
The  accounts  with  his  tenants  were  entered  in  a  little 
memorandum-book,  addition  and  subtraction  made,  credits 
given,  etc.     After  making  a  contract  for  board  in  November, 

1834,  by  which  he  was  to  provide  the  fuel,  he  struck  out  the 
word  firewood,  and  inserted  "  coal,  to  be  delivered  at  the 
wharf,"  in  order  to  save  the  charge  of  truckage.     In  July, 

1835,  when  land  speculations  were  rife,  he  refused  an  offer  of 
two  thousand  six  hundred  dollars,  and  half  profits,  for  a  lot 
of  land,  preferring  two  thousand  eight  hundred  dollars,  part 
in  cash,  and  the  balance  secured  by  mortgage.  It  appears, 
too,  that  the  purchaser,  having  soon  after  sold  the  land  for 
five  thousand  dollars,  induced  the  testator  to  change  the 
papers,  and  receive  from  the  last  purchaser  notes  amounting 
to  three  thpusand  five  hundred  dollars,  secured  by  a  mortgage 
on  the  land.  He  showed  uncommon  watchfulness  about 
security,  insisting  upon  the  purchaser's  wife  signing  a  relin- 
quishment of  dower  in  the  mortgage,  until  satisfied  by  legal 
inquiry  that  it  was  not  necessary.  He  insisted,  too,  upon 
having  the  deed  carried  down  at  night  and  recorded,  lest  pos- 
sibly an  attachment  might  be  slipped  in,  as  he  had  known 
such  a  case.  On  being  assured  of  the  purchaser's  solvency, 
he  gave  up  the  point,  and  waited  until  the  next  morning. 
Hiring  a  man  to  dig  his  potatoes  by  the  bushel  in  October, 
1834,  and  finding  that  he  made  more  than  day's  wages,  he 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DEMENTIA.  337 

insisted  on  changing  the  bargain  and  paying  him  by  the  day. 
Another  witness  who  had  known  him  for  fifty  years,  met  him 
one  day  while  under  the  first  guardianship,  and  the  testator 
began  to  converse  about  the  value  of  stocks  and  the  compara- 
tive value  of  bank  and  insurance  stocks,  observing  that  he 
owned  both,  and  thought  the  former  safer,  though  the  latter 
might  be  more  profitable.  Neither  then  nor  afterwards,  for 
he  was  in  the  habit  of  meeting  testator  frequently  at  his 
son's  house,  did  he  observe  any  thing  to  lead  him  to  sus- 
pect that  the  testator  was  unsound  or  incompetent.  One 
of  his  nieces  often  saw  him  during  the  summers  of  1833,  '34, 
and  '35.  At  one  time  he  fenced  their  land-lots  which  were  con- 
tiguous ;  bought  boards,  used  her  old  posts  to  save  expense, 
and  kept  the  accounts.  He  also  bought  trees,  gave  her  some, 
and  directed  her  how  to  plant  them.  An  architect  conversed 
with  him  several  times  in  1835  about  some  houses  he  was 
building  for  his  nephew,  and  showed  him  plans  with  which  he 
was  pleased,  though  he  criticized  them,  and  suggested  some 
sensible  alterations  in  the  manner  of  laying  the  stone.  In 
the  autumn  of  1834,  he  bargained  with  a  witness  for  some 
stones  to  be  used  in  making  a  cellar  drain ;  and  conversed 
very  sensibly  on  the  different  kinds  and  qualities  of  stone 
and  the  manner  of  splitting  them.  About  this  time  he  con- 
versed with  considerable  acuteness  respecting  a  young  child's 
memory.  The  child  knew  its  aunt,  he  said,  not  because  he 
remembered  her  countenance,  but  because  she  resembled  his 
mother ;  and  when  it  was  objected  that  the  resemblance  was 
not  very  strong,  he  replied  that  the  child  might  perceive  it 
though  an  adult  might  not,  and  that  probably  the  resem- 
blance was  in  the  sound  of  their  voices,  rather  than  their 
features.  This  child  died  in  September,  1835,  and  for  some 
time  afterwards,  he  frequently  spoke  of  it,  and  with  feelings 
of  affection.  It  appears  that  until  his  last  sickness,  he 
always  immediately  recognized  his  friends  and  acquaint- 
ances, and  manifested  an  interest  in  their  welfare. 

§  340.  To  show  that  the  will  was  a  rational  act,  as  well 
as  rationally  done,  a  memorandum-book  was  produced,  con- 
taining, in  the  handwriting  of  the  first  guardian,  a  schedule 

29 


838  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  the  property  he  had  conveyed  to  his  children,  and  beneath 
it,  in  his  own  hand,  and  subscribed  with  his  name,  he  ex- 
pressed the  design  not  to  give  them  any  thing  more,  saying, 
"  he  had  amply  provided  them  with  the  means  of  a  comfort- 
able subsistence,  provided  that  they  exercise  proper  industry 
and  economy  ;  and  without  these  all  my  property  could  not 
suffice  them,  which,  therefore,  I  have  thought  proper  to  dis- 
pose of  in  another  manner."  He  expressed  the  same  views 
in  conversation  with  different  witnesses.  It  also  appeared 
that  he  was  not  on  good  terms  with  his  children,  from  whom 
he  had  received,  or  at  least  thought  he  had  received,  much 
unkind  treatment.  As  reasons  for  altering  his  testamentary 
dispositions,  we  have  the  two  attempts  of  the  Friends  to 
place  him  under  guardianship,  which,  of  course,  were  as 
little  calculated  to  secure  his  regard  for  them,  as  the  treat- 
ment of  his  children  was  to  increase  his  affection  for  them. 
It  also  appeared  in  evidence  that  the  Society  had  "  dealt  with 
his  wife,"  and  turned  her  out  of  meeting,  on  the  representa- 
tions of  his  own  daughter. 

§  341.  On  the  other  hand,  in  proof  of  his  incompetency, 
it  was  testified  by  one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  that  he 
"  did  not  think  him  of  sound  mind,"  though  he  could  give  no 
other  reason  for  his  opinion  than  "  the  appearance  of  the 
man."  He  could  state  no  facts  nor  conversation  evincing 
unsoundness  of  mind,  though  before  and  after  the  execution 
of  the  will,  the  testator  was  in  the  habit  of  buying  groceries 
at  his  shop.  He  also  admitted  that  the  testator  "  always 
appeared  to  know  what  he  was  about."  The  remaining  sub- 
scribing witness  "did  not  consider  him  so  sound  as  it  was 
desirable  he  should  be  in  such  an  important  transaction," 
though  he  admitted  that  "  he  was  pretty  close  in  making  a 
bargain,  and  was  a  saving,  prudent  man  in  his  calculations." 
He  told  stories  and  conversed  correctly  on  old  affairs,  but  on 
recent  transactions,  was  not  so  connected.  This  witness 
also  mentioned  some  other  facts  indicative,  in  his  opinion,  of 
mental  unsoundness,  which  will  be  presently  noticed.  In 
July,  1835,  he  offered  to  the  city  treasurer,  in  payment  of 
his  taxes,  a  scrap  of  paper,  apparently  a  bill  of  purchases, 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OP   DEMENTIA.  339 

and  insisted  that  it  was  as  good  as  money,  and  would  be 
taken  at  the  bank.  But  it  appeared  that  he  had  received  a 
check  upon  a  bank,  but  his  sight  being  poor,  and  his  specta- 
cles missing,  he  had  mistaken  for  it  something  of  no  impor- 
tance. One  evening  he  entered  a  house  next  his  own  and  sat 
down,  but  he  discovered  the  mistake  himself  the  moment  he 
heard  a  strange  voice.  Once  when  the  meeting  for  worship 
was  over,  and  the  business  meeting  had  begun,  he  asked,  in 
a  loud  whisper,  an  old  friend  of  his  who  dealt  in  wool,  what 
he  gave  for  wool  then.  On  being  answered  that  he  should 
wait  till  after  meeting  before  talking  on  such  subjects,  he 
nodded  assent  and  was  silent.  Several  times  he  went  out  of 
his  house  without  his  hat,  and  in  one  or  two  instances,  he 
inquired  the  way  to  a  house  or  street  with  which  he  had 
been  previously  well  acquainted,  and  then  started  off'  in  an 
opposite  direction.  Some  of  the  entries  in  the  memoran- 
dum-book were  repeated,  but  they  were  all  correct  to  a  cent. 
Once,  in  1833,  after  paying  the  balance  of  an  account,  he 
entirely  forgot  it  in  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  and  when 
reminded  of  it,  said,  I  am  forgetful ;  and  in  1835,  he  would 
ask  the  same  question  several  times  in  succession,  without 
beins  aware  that  it  had  been  asked  and  answered.  Once  he 
undertook  to  write  a  deed  (a  business  he  was  accustomed 
to),  boggled  over,  and  finally  gave  it  up.  Then  he  took 
another  blank,  got  confused,  and  the  witness  had  to  write  it 
himself.  In  1834,  when  the  witness  carried  to  him  money  to 
pay  a  note,  he  had  forgotten  the  note  entirely,  was  unable  to 
find  it,  and  requested  the  witness  to  write  a  receipt  for  him  to 
sign.  The  money  he  undertook  to  count,  but  merely  tum- 
bled it  over,  and  laid  it  down,  when  the  witness  counted  it 
over  to  him,  bill  by  bill.  On  purchasing  things  at  the  shops, 
he  would  take  his  change  without  counting  it.  It  was  testi- 
fied that  when  at  table  he  required  his  food  to  be  cut  up  for 
him ;  that  he  would  attempt  to  spread  cheese  on  his  bread, 
mistaking  it  for  butter ;  would  pour  his  tea  into  a  cup-plate 
instead  of  a  saucer;  and  put  his  sugar  into  the  plate.  A 
stray  cow  coming  into  the  yard,  he  said  it  was  one  he  had 
lately  bought.     Asked  a  witness  if   his    mother's  shed  was 


340  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

much  injured  in  the  storm,  alluding  to  his  aunt's  shed,  which 
had  been  blown  down.  He  spoke  of  having  some  chairs 
and  tables  in  a  town  at  some  distance,  and  wanted  the  wit- 
ness to  ask  the  stage-driver  to  bring  them  down,  as  he  might, 
a  part  at  a  time.  One  witness  testified  that  in  the  autumn 
of  ]  835,  after  the  execution  of  the  will,  he  rode  out  with  him 
at  a  little  distance  from  town  ;  that  he  seemed  lost  —  did  not 
know  where  he  was,  even  when  he  got  to  his  son's  tanyard  ; 
that  he  wovild  rave  about  his  children  and  their  ill-treatment 
of  him,  and  then  go  to  see  them  and  be  cheerful  with  them, 
make  no  complaints,  and  come  away  happy.  He  admitted, 
however,  that  they  drove  around  by  an  unusual  road,  and 
that  on  returning,  while  yet  at  a  little  distance  from  town, 
testator  asked  where  they  were,  when  he  replied,  pointing 
over  the  bridge  to  Dennet's  tanyard,  "  Don't  thee  know  that 
place  ?  That  is  Oliver's  tanyard."  He  spoke  of  certain 
property  as  his,  after  he  had  sold  it.  A  female  witness,  who 
lived  in  the  same  house  with  him  in  the  autumn  of  1835, 
said  that  he  could  not  dress  himself  unassisted  ;  that  she  had 
seen  him  try  to  put  on  his  wife's  stays ;  that  he  used  to 
bring  bits  of  paper  and  ask  her  to  sew  them  together,  calling 
it  dividing  his  property  ;  that  he  talked  of  being  buried  at 
the  head  of  his  bed ;  that  he  called  patching  windows,  tailor- 
ing; and  that  he  made  up  a  fire  on  the  floor  and  filled  the 
room  with  smoke.  It  appeared,  however,  that  being  large, 
clumsy,  and  wearing  a  loose  wrapper,  he  was  sometimes 
embarrassed  in  putting  on  his  pantaloons;  that  his  wife's 
stays  were  in  fact  a  flannel  waist  much  resembling  the  flan- 
nel waistcoat  he  always  wore  ;  that  the  bits  of  paper  he  had 
sewed  together  were,  on  one  occasion  at  least,  vouchers  of 
his  guardian's  accounts^which  he  had  stitched  through  and 
through,  in  order  to  preserve  them ;  that  he  had  strips  of 
paper  sewed  together  and  used  for  a  measure  ;  that  the 
hearth  was  very  large,  and  one  leg  of  one  andiron  stood  off 
the  hearth  on  the  floor.  There  was  evidence  of  a  want  of 
cleanliness,  and  neglect  of  the  decencies  of  life,  indicative  of 
mental  unsoundness.  He  was  seen  in  the  street  with  the 
flap  of  his  pantaloons  wholly  or  'partly  down,  aud  he  some- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DEMENTIA.  341 

times  disregarded  the  calls  of  nature,  or  attended  to  them  in 
improper  places.  It  was  testified,  however,  in  explanation 
of  these  facts,  that  his  hands  being  swollen  and  clumsy,  and 
the  button-holes  of  his  pantaloons  much  worn,  he  had  some 
difficulty  in  buttoning  and  in  keeping  them  buttoned ;  that 
the.uncleanliness  was  not  habitual,  but  limited  to  occasions 
when  he  was  suffering  from  diarrhoea,  and  that  other  in- 
stances of  impropriety,  which  had  been  alleged,  occurred  dur- 
ing his  last  illness,  when  his  mental  unsoundness  was  admit- 
ted by  the  other  party.  It  also  appeared  that  he  was  some- 
what intemperate  in  the  use  of  spirituous  liquors. 

§  342.  No  one,  at  all  acquainted  with  the  habits  of  old 
age  and  wnth  the  effect  of  senile  dementia  on  the  mind,  can 
entertain  a  doubt  of  the  testator's  competency  to  make  his 
will.  True,  he  was  more  forgetful  of  the  present  than  of  the 
past;  he  frequently  forgot  what  he  had  just  before  said  or 
done  ;  and  he  sometimes  disregarded  the  common  observances 
of  life.  All  this,  however,  may  be  said  of  multitudes  of  old 
men  whose  competency  for  any  business  is  never  questioned 
by  those  who  know  them  best.  However  weak  may  have 
been  the  mind  of  this  old  man,  he  still  was  acquainted  with 
the  value  of  property,  especially  of  his  own  ;  he  recognized 
his  relatives  and  friends;  was  always  aware  of  the  exact 
nature  of  their  relations  towards  him,  and  of  their  respective 
claims  on  his  bounty  ;  he  still  was  capable  of  feeling  the 
sting  of  filial  ingratitude,  and  of  being  actuated  by  motives 
of  ordinary  prudence  and  discretion.  If  his  mind  were  not 
sufficiently  vigorous  to  engage  in  contracts  and  speculations 
of  large  magnitude,  it  was  none  the  less  able  to  bequeathe  his 
property,  the  kind  and  amount  of  which  he  perfectly  under- 
stood, to  relatives  and  friends  whom  he  still  recognized  and 
loved.  The  will  was  a  rational  act,  rationally  done,  and  there 
was  not  a  tittle  of  evidence  to  show  that  the  testator  was 
under  improper  influences. 

§  343.  The  court,  at  each  trial,  refrained  from  any  com- 
ments on  the  evidence  relating  to  the  testator's  mental  con- 
dition, and  the  jury  were  left  to  their  own  unenlightened  and 
unassisted  deliberations.     There  were  peculiar  reasons,  per- 

29* 


342  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

haps,  for  taking  this  course,  in  the  present  case,  but  we  may- 
be allowed  to  question  its  propriety  as  a  general  rule  of  prac- 
tice. In  cases  like  these,  which  are  characterized  by  the 
abundance  and  discrepancy  of  the  evidence,  it  needs  a  cool, 
tenacious,  and  intelligent  mind  to  recapitulate  this  evidence ; 
to  sift,  to  analyze,  weigh,  and  finally  stamp  it  with  its  proper 
value.  The  jury,  it  is  true,  are  sole  judges  of  the  facts,  and 
if  the  question  here  were,  whether  certain  facts  offered  in 
evidence  were  true  or  false,  not  a  remark  might  be  required 
of  the  court.  But  since  they  have  to  do  with  a  very  different 
question,  that  is,  whether  these  facts  w^arrant  certain  infer- 
ences relative  to  mental  capacity,  they  are  unable  to  answer 
it  correctly,  we  apprehend,  without  the  light  that  is  derived 
from  superior  penetration  and  attainments.  The  knowledge 
necessary  for  this  purpose  is  of  a  technical  kind,  which  a  jury 
cannot  be  expected  to  possess,  and  the  very  abundance  of  the 
evidence  is  calculated  to  fill  their  minds  with  uncertainty  and 
confusion.  If  they  can  hear  the  opinions  of  experts  —  of 
persons  who  have  given  especial  attention  to  this  branch  of 
knowledge  —  respecting  the  precise  value  of  all  these  facts 
considered  in  relation  to  the  point  they  are  designed  to 
establish,  then  indeed  they  would  be  in  a  condition  to  form 
conclusions  of  their  own.  But  since  this  is  not  always 
practicable,^  are  they  to  be  left  to  float  about  on  a  sea  of 
conjecture,  without  star  or  compass  to  guide  their  course  ? 
Must  a  jury,  not  one  of  whom,  perhaps,  ever  observed  a  case 
of  insanity,  or  even  studied  the  operations  of  the  sane  mind, 
take  upon  themselves  to  say  that  certain  facts  do,  or  do  not 


'  Nothing  can  more  strongly  illustrate  the  necessity  of  some  such  measure 
as  we  have  suggested  (§  4G),  than  a  fact  that  occui'red  in  this  case.  The  ap- 
pellees were  desirous  that  the  evidence  relating  to  the  testator's  mental  con- 
dition, should  be  heard  by  some  one  particularly  acquainted  with  the  subject 
of  insanity,  who  might  tcstifj-,  on  the  strength  of  such  knowledge,  whether 
the  evidence  showed  him  to  have  been  incapable  of  making  a  valid  will.  The 
attendance  of  such  a  witness  could  not  be  obtained,  for  one  of  the  gentlemen 
api^lied  to  —  and  they  were  the  nearest  —  resided  at  a  distance  of  120,  and 
another  of  250  miles.  Had  it  been  otherwise,  Ave  might  not  have  seen  the 
most  sacred  of  legal  acts  annulled  on  the  most  trivial  grounds. 


LEGAL   CONSEQTJEXCES   OF  DEMENTIA.  343 

prove  the  presence  of  testamentary  capacity  ;  in  other  words, 
to  decide  upon  professional  questions  of  acknowledged  diffi- 
culty ?  The  really  intelligent  and  conscientious  juror,  dis- 
tracted by  an  appalling  mass  of  evidence,  much  of  which  is 
irrelevant  and  contradictory,  which  he  may  try  in  vain  to 
unravel  and  arrange,  and  puzzled  by  questions  he  never  con- 
sidered before,  will  and  ought  to  look  to  the  court  for  assist- 
ance. 

§  344.  The  principle  laid  down  by  the  court,  at  the  first 
trial,  that  a  disposing-  mind  means  "  so  much  m^ind  and  mem- 
ory as  would  enable  him  to  transact  common  business  with 
that  intelligence  which  belongs  to  the  weakest  class  of  sound 
minds,"  may  be  theoretically  correct,  but  it  seems  to  be  of 
too  abstract  a  nature  to  be  practically  applied  by  jurors.  To 
compare  one  mind  with  another  of  different  calibre,  is  a  task 
for  which  they  are  altogether  unfitted  by  their  previous  tastes, 
habits,  and  studies.  Justice  merely  requires  that  the  strength 
of  the  mind  should  be  equal  to  the  purpose  to  which  it  is 
applied.  If  this  simple  principle  be  distinctly  presented  to 
the  minds  of  the  jury,  there  are  few  so  dull  as  to  be  unable  to 
give  it  a  practical  application.  It  is  not  only  reasonable,  but 
it  has  the  merit  of  having  been  repeatedly  recognized  in 
courts  of  law,  until  it  has  now  obtained  all  the  force  of  estab- 
lished authority.  "  He  may  not  have  sufficient  strength  of 
memory  and  vigor  of  intellect,  to  make  and  to  digest  all  the 
parts  of  a  contract,  and  yet  be  competent  to  direct  the  distri- 
bution of  his  property  by  will."  ^  "A  man  may  be  capable 
of  making  a  will,  and  yet  incapable  of  making  a  contract,  or 
to  manage  his  estate."  ^ 

§  345.  We  are  to  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  testamentary 
dispositions  generally  imply  an   exercise  of  memory.    ■  The 

^  Stevens  and  wife  v.  Vancleve,  4  Wasli.  C.  C.  R.  262. 

^  Harrison  v.  Roivan,  3  Wasli.  C.  C.  R.  580.  Nowhere  has  the  subject  of 
testamentary  capacity  been  treated  with  so  much  good  sense  and  regard  to 
scientific  truth,  as  in  the  charges  of  the  court  from  which  the  above  quota- 
tions are  made.  With  the  progress  of  sound  views  on  this  subject,  the  cor- 
rectness of  the  principles  there  laid  down  will  only  be  the  more  firmly 
established. 


344  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDEXCE   OF   INSANITY. 

mind  must  be  able  to  bring  up  before  it  scenes  and  persons 
connected  with  the  past  as  well  as  the  present,  for  without 
such  ability,  persons  may  be  overlooked  who  would  other- 
wise have  held  a  prominent  place  in  the  act,  and  transactions 
forgotten  which  might  naturally  be  supposed  to  have  an 
effect  upon  its  dispositions.  A  will  which  makes  no  men- 
tion of  relatives  who  had  a  natural  claim  on  the  bounty  of 
the  testator,  and  in  regard  to  whom,  he  apparently  enter- 
tained only  the  kindest  feelings,  creates  a  suspicion  that  his 
memory  was  at  fault,  and  unless  the  fact  is  satisfactorily 
explained,  a  strong  presumption  is  raised  against  the  validity 
of  the  will.  Many  old  men  who  have  begun  to  lose  their 
faculties,  have  a  passion  for  making  wills,  and  so  far  as  the 
form  is  concerned,  they  are  able  to  do  it  correctly,  but  they 
are  often  governed  by  the  whim  of  the  moment  rather  than 
any  definite  views  of  the  claims  which  others  may  have  upon 
them,  and  not  having  them  brought  to  their  notice  by  any 
one  else,  they  are  liable  to  overlook  them  unintentionally. 


'^ 


CHAPTER     XI. 


FEBRILE     DELIRIUM. 


§  346.  Cerebral  affection,  of  some  kind  or  other,  we  have 
considered  as  essential  to  the  existence  of  insanity  —  as 
constituting  in  fact  the  whole  disease ;  but  there  is  another 
form  of  mental  derangement  of  very  common  occurrence,  in 
which  the  cerebral  affection  is  only  an  accidental  sym}3tom 
of  severe  disease  in  the  brain  or  some  other  organ.  The 
functions  of  the  brain  are  disturbed  in  each,  but  they  differ 
so  widely  in  their  causes,  progress,  and  termination,  that 
the  propriety  of  distinguishing  them  from  each  other  for 
medico-legal,  as  well  as  therapeutical  purposes,  is  universally 
recognized.  Few  diseases  terminate  in  death  without  pre- 
senting at  soixie  period  or  other  of  their  progress,. but  more 
particularly  towards  their  close,  more  or  less  disturbance  of 
the  mental  faculties ;  organic  diseases  of  the  brain,  especially 
acute  inflammation  of  its  membranes  and  its  periphery,  are 
generally  accom.panied  with  delirium;  and  it  is  sometimes  a 
symptom  of  acute  disease  in  other  organs,  in  consequence  of 
the  cerebral  irritation  which  they  sympathetically  produce. 
It  is  seldom  entirely  absent  in  fevers  of  any  severity,  and  is 
readily  determined  by  inflammations  of  the  mucous  and 
serous  membranes,  particularly  of  the  alimentary  canal.  In 
inflammation  of  the  lungs,  liver,  spleen,  and  kidneys,  it_ap- 
pears  only  towards  the  last  period  of  the  disease  when  it  is 
approaching  a  fatal  termination.  :  Surgical  operations,  too, 
that  prove  fatal,  are  ordinarily  attended  at  last  with  delirium. 
In  chronic  diseases,  such  as  cancer,  dropsy,  consumption,  the 
mind  is  seldom  impaired,  except  that  occasionally,  during  the 
final  struggle,  it  wanders  over  the  mingled  and  broken  images 


346  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

of  the  past.  Delirium  is  also  produced  by  intoxicating  agents, 
when  it  simulates  mania  more  perfectly  than  when  it  arises 
from  other  causes;  but  this  form  of  the  affection  will  be  dis- 
/  cussed  in  a  different  place. 
j i  §  347,  Delirium  sometimes  occurs  suddenly,  but  generally* 
if  comes  on  gradually,  and  is  preceded  by  premonitory  symp- 
toms, such  as  pain  or  throbbing  in  the  head,  heat  of  the 
scalp,  and  flushing  of  the  cheeks.  Its  first  appearance  is 
manifested  by  a  propensity  of  the  patient  to  talk  during 
sleep,  and  a  momentary  forgetfulness  of  his  situation  and  of 
things  about  him,  on  waking  from  it.  After  being  fully 
aroused,  however,  and  his  senses  collected,  the  mind  is  com- 
paratively clear  and  tranquil,  till  the  next  slumber,  when  the 
same  scene  is  repeated.  Gradually,  the  mental  disorder 
becomes  more  intense,  and  the  intervals  between  its  returns 
of  shorter  duration,  until  they  are  scarcely,  or  not  at  all 
perceptible.  The  patient  lies  on  his  back,  his  eyes,  if  open, 
presenting  a  dull  and  listless  look,  and  is  almost  constantly 
talking  to  himself  in  a  low,  muttering  tone.  Regardless  of 
persons  or  things  around  him,  and  scarcely  capable  of  recog- 
nizing them  when  aroused  by  his  attendants,  his  mind  retires 
within  itself  to  dwell  upon  the  scenes  and  events  of  the  past, 
which  glide  before  it  in  wild  and  disorderly  array,  while  the 
tongue  feebly  records  the  varying  impressions,  in  the  form  of 
disjointed,  incoherent  discourse,  or  of  senseless  rhapsody.  In 
the  delirium  which  occurs  towards  the  end  of  chronic  diseases, 
the  discourse  is  often  more  coherent  and  continuous,  though 
the  mind  is  no  less  absorbed  in  its  own  reveries.  As  the  dis- 
order advances,  the  voice  becomes  more  indistinct,  the  fingers 
are  constantly  picking  at  the  bed-clothes,  the  evacuations  are 
passed  insensibly,  and  the  patient  is  incapable  of  being 
aroused  to  any  further  effort  of  attention.  In  some  cases, 
delirium  is  attended  with  a  greater  degree  of  nervous  and 
vascular  excitement  which  more  or  less  modifies  the  above- 
mentioned  symptoms.  The  eyes  are  open,  dry,  and  blood- 
shot, intently  gazing  into  vacancy,  as  if  fixed  on  some  object 
which  is  really  present  to  the  mind  of  the  patient;  the  skin 
is  hotter  and  drier;  and  he  is  more  restless  and  intractable. 


FEBRILE   DELIRIUM.  347 

He  talks  more  loudly,  occasionally  breaking  out  into  cries 
and   vociferations,   and  tosses   about  in  bed,   frequently  en- 
deavoring to  get  up,  though  without  any  particular  object  iri//!!. 
\view.  v>^ 

§  348.  While  delirium  thus  shuts  out  all  ideas  and  images 
connected  with  the  present,  it  sometimes  revives  the  impres- 
sions of  the  past,  which  had  seemed  long  before  to  have 
been  consigned  to  utter  oblivion,  in  a  manner  unknown  in  a 
state  of  health.  A  case  once  occurred  in  St.  Thomas's  hos- 
pital, of  a  patient  who,  when  he  began  to  rally,  after  a  con- 
siderable injury  of  the  head,  spoke  a  language  that  nobody 
could  understand,  but  which  was,  at  last,  ascertained  to  be 
Wdsh.  It  appeared  that  he  was  a  Welshman,  and  had 
been  from  his  native  country  about  thirty  years,  during  which 
period  he  had  entirely  forgotten  his  native  tongae,  and 
acquired  the  English  language.  But  when  he  recovered 
from  the  accident,  he  had  forgotten  the  language  he  had 
been  so  long  and  recently  in  the  habit  of  speaking,  and 
acquired  that  wdiich  he  had  originally  learned  and  lost.^  Dr. 
Rush  mentions,  among  many  other  similar  instances,  that 
the  old  Swedes  of  Philadelphia,  when  on  their  death-beds, 
would  always  pray  in  their  native  tongue,  though  they  had 
not  spoken  it  for  fifty  or  sixty  years,  and  had  probably  for- 
got-ten  it  before  they  were  sick.^ 

§  349.  When  delirium,  or  more  properly  speaking,  the  dis- 
ease on  which  it  depends,  proves  fatal,  it  usually  passes  into 
coma.  Occasionally,  however,  it  disappears  some  days  or 
hours  before  death,  and  leaves- the  mind  in  possession  of  its 
natural  soundness.  Though  enfeebled  by  disease,  and  there- 
fore incapable  of  much  exertion  of  his  faculties,  the  patient 
is  rational  and  intelligent,  recognizes  perfectly  well  his  rela- 
tions to  others,  and  on  familiar  subjects,  can  arrange  his  ideas 
without  dictation  or  guidance.  \ . 

J-        §  350.    So  closely  does  delirium   resemble    mania  to  the  \\^ 
/   casual  observer,  and  so  important  is  it  that  they  should  be      ^ 


^  Tapper's  Inquiry  into  Gall's  System,  35. 
2  On  Diseases  of  the  Mind,  282. 


348  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

distinguished  from  each  other,  that  it  may  be  well  to  indicate 
some  of  the  most  common  and  prominent  featm'es  of  each. 
In  mania,  the  patient  recognizes  persons  and  things,  and  is 
perfectly  conscious  of  and  remembers  what  is  passing  around 
him.  In  delirium,  he  can  seldom  distinguish  one  person  or 
thing  from  another,  and,  as  if  fully  occupied  with  the  images 
that  crowd  upon  his  memory,  gives  no  attention  to  those 
that  are  jiresented  from  without.  In  delirium,  there  is  an 
entire  abolition  of  the  reasoning  power;  there  is  no  attempt 
at  reasoning  at  all ;  the  ideas  are  all  and  equally  insane;  no 
single  train  of  thought  escapes  the  morbid  influence,  nor 
does  a  single  operation  of  the  mind  reveal  a  glimpse  of  its 
natural  vigor  and  acuteness.  Inmania,  however  false  *and 
absurd  the  ideas  may  be,  we  are  never  at  a  loss  to  discover 
patches  of  coherence,  and  some  semblance  of  logical  se- 
quence in  the  discourse.  Thejjatient  still  reasons,  though 
he  reasons  incorrectly.  In  mania,  tlfe  muscular  power  is  not 
perceptibly  diminished,  and  the  individual  moves  about  with 
his  ordinary  ability.  Delirium  is  invariably  attended  with 
great  muscular  debility;  the  patient  is  confined  to  his  bed, 
and  is  capable  of  only  a  momentary  effort  of  exertion.  In 
mania,  sensation  is  not  necessarily  impaired,  and  in  most 
instances,  the  maniac  sees,  hears,  and  feels  with  all  his 
natural  acuteness.  In  delirium,  sensation  is  greatly  im- 
paired, and  this  avenue  to  the  understanding  seems  to  be 
entirely  closed.  In  mania,  many  of  the  bodily  functions  are 
undisturbed,  and^Uie  appearance  of  the  patient  might  not,  at 
first  sight,  convey  the  impression  of  disease.  In  delirium, 
every  function  suffers,  and  the  whole  aspect  of  the  patient  is 
indicative  of  disease.  Mania  exists  alone  and  independent 
of^any  other  disorder,  while  delirium  is  only  an  unessential 
symptom  of  some  other  disease.  Being  a  symptom  only, 
the  latter  maintains  certain  relations  with  the  disease  on 
which  it  depends ;  it  is  relieved  when  that  is  relieved,  and  is 
aggravated  when  that  increases  in  severity.  Mania,  tlrough 
it  undoubtedly  tends  to  shorten  life,  is  not  immediately 
dangerous,  whereas  the  disease  on  which  delirium  de- 
pends, speedily  terminates  ia  death,  or  restoration  to  health. 


\ 


FEBRILE   DELIRIUM.  349 

Mania  seldom  occurs  till  after  the  age  of  puberty ;  delirium 
attacks  all  periods  alike,  from  early  childhood  to  extreme  old 
age.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  the  above  dis- 
tinctive features  are  not  always  present.  A  form  of  mania 
is  occasionally  seen,  in  which  the  mental  aberrations  and 
some  of  the  physical  symptoms  are  remarkably  like  those  of 
delirium.  y 

30 


CHAPTER    XII. 

LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    DELIRIUM.  N. 

;^  ^. 

§  351.;  Testamentary  dispositions  made  during  the  inter- 
vals of  febrile  delirium,  are  often  contested  on  the  ground  of 
incapacity,  especially  where  there  is  any  suspicion,  real  or 
pretended,  of  improper  influence  on  the  testator's  mind. 
These  cases  are  sometimes  very  embarrassing,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  come  to  a  conclusion  upon  the  direct  evidence 
respecting  the  state  of  mind  ;  nothing  more  can  be  attained 
than  an  approximation  to  correctness,  by  a  careful  investiga- 
tion of  the  attending  circumstances^'  When  the  delirium  • 
accompanies  only  the  daily  exacerbations  of  the  fever,  and 
disappears  with  them,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  mind's 
being  in  a  suitable  condition,  during  the  intervals,  for  devis- 
ing property,  but  not  for  transacting  other  business  of  im- 
portance. |riie  existence  of  delirium  at  any  period  of  a 
disease  will  be  sufficient  to  throw  suspicion  on  any  contracts 
entered  into  during  such  disease;  and  unless  it  can  be  showrn 
that  the  delirium  was  but  an  occasional  symptom,  and  of 
short  duration  when  it  occurred,  and  that  the  mind  of  the 
patient  at  other  times  was  perfectly  calm  and  rational,  their 
validity  is  liable  to  be  destroyed.  When  these  two  conditions 
are  reversed,  that  of  delirium  being  the  habitual,  and  the 
lucid  intervals  the  occasional  state,  the  mind  ma//  have  suffi- 
cient capacity  to  make  a  will;  but,  certainly,  no  other  civil 
act  which  it  might  perform  ought  to  be  held  valid,  for  the 
same -reason  that  the  acts  of  imbeciles  are  avoided.  Georget, 
however,  dtres  not  hesitate  to  express  his  belief,  that  under 
these  circumstances,  the  reason  is  not  so  restored  that  the 
patient  can  be  declared  capable  even  of  making  a  will,  and 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DELIRIUM.  351 

we  readily  admit  that  it  is  often  questionable  whether  the 
mind  is  sufficiently  steady  and  collected  to  comprehend  the 
relations  of  property,  or  appreciate  the  claims  of  kindred 
and  friends.  A  case  related  by  Dr.  Woodward,  the  superin- 
tendent of  the  Lunatic  Asylum  at  Worcester,  while  giving 
his  evidence  in  court  on  one  occasion,  strongly  confirms  the 
correctness  of  Georget's  views.  A  legal  gentleman,  in  the  ~=s 
course  of  an  acute  pneumonic  affection,  began  to  have  slight  f^  } 
delirium  on  waking  in  the  mornliig,  but  it  was  observed  at 
no  other  time.  About  this  time  he  remarked  to  his  physi- 
cians that  if  they  considered  him  in  danger,  he  wished  to 
know  it,  as  he  was  desirous  of  altering  his  will,  which  he  had 
previously  made.  Though  not  considering  him  to  be  in 
much  danger,  they  approved  of  the  plan,  and  the  alteration 
was  made.  A  few  months  after  his  recovery,  he  accidentally 
met  with  the  will  among  his  papers,  but  had  no  recollection 
of  having  made  it,  and  \yas  much  surprised  and  dissatisfied 
with  its  dis^sitions,  for  they  did  great  injustice  to  two  of  his 
sons.  Still  we  would  not  make  the  disqualification  univer- 
sal, for  cases  not  unfrequently  happen  in  which,  after  days  of 
constant  delirium,  reason  for  a  while  resumes  her  dominion 
and  the  patient  converses  with  his  accustomed  fluency  and 
wisdom,  describing  his  feelings,  giving  directions  to  his  fam- 
ily, and  alluding  to  the  past  with  a  clearness  and  accuracy 
that  leave  no  doubt  on  the  minds  of  those  around  him,  of 
his  perfect  sanity.  A  safer  practice  probably  would  be,  to  be 
governed  in  our  decision  of  this  point  by  the  circumstances 
that  attend  the  making  of  the  will,  the  previous  intentions  of 
the  testator,  and  the  nature  of  his  disease.^  T  /\ 

§  352.  The  law  requires  that  in  this  aflfection,  as  in  mania, 
the  occurrence  of  lucid  intervals  should  be  proved  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt,  but  as  delirium  is  merely  an  adventitious 
symptom,  and    not,  like   mania,  the    habitual    state    of   the 


^  It  must  be  recollected  that  the  question  is,  not  whether  the  mind  pos- 
sesses its  ordinary  soundness  and  vigor,  for  we  know  it  is  always  enfeebled, 
but  whether  it  retains  what  may  be  called  a  testamentary  capacity.     See 


^ 


^^3^/j^    J^y-   b^      ::. 


352  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

patient,  it  will  be  satisfied  with  much  less  proof  in  the  for- 
mer than  in  the  latter  affection.  Sir  John  Nicholl  has  very 
justly  observed,  that  "  in  cases  of  permanent,  proper  insanity, 
the  proof  of  a  lucid  interval  is  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty, 
and  for  this  among  other  reasons,  namely ;  that  the  patient 
so  affected  is  not  unfrequently  rational  to  all  outivard  appear- 
ance, without  any  real  abatement  of  his  malady ;  so  that  in 
truth  and  substance,  he  is  just  as  insane  in  his  apparently 
rational,  as  he  is  in  his  visible  raving  fits.  But  the  apparently 
rational  intervals  of  persons  merely  delirious,  for  the  most 
part,  are  really  such.  Delirium  is  a  fluctuating  state  of 
mind,  created  by  temporary  excitement;  in  the  absence  of 
which,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  appearance  of  the  patient, 
the  patient  is,  most  commonly,  really  sane.  Hence,  as  also 
indeed,  from  their  greater  presumed  frequency  in  most  in- 
stances in  cases  of  delirium,  the  probabilities,  a  priori,  in 
favor  of  a  lucid  interval,  are  infinitely  stronger  in  a  case  of 
delirium,  than  in  one  of  permanent  proper  insanity;  and  the 
difficulty  of  proving  a  lucid  interval  is  less,  in  the  same  exact 
proportion,  in  the  former,  than  it  is  in  the  latter  case,  and  has 
always  been  so  held  by  this  court."  ^ 

§  353.  In  the  case  frt)m  which  the  above  passage  is 
taken,  the  testatrix,  a  widow  lady,  died  of  some  acute  dis- 
ease after  an  illness  of  about  ten  days,  during  the  two  or 
three  last  of  which  she  was  more  or  less  delirious.  Her  will 
was  made  on  the  evening  of  the  day  preceding  her  death, 
and  its  validity  was  opposed  on  the  ground  that  she  did  not 
possess  a  testamentary  capacity  at  the  time  of  its  execution. 
The  evidence  of  the  two  consulting  physicians  who  visited 
her  about  four  o'clock,  which  was  but  a  few  hours  prior  to 
the  execution  of  the  will,  was  decidedly  unfavorable  to  her 
testamentary  capacity.    One  considered  it  "  doubtful  whether 


'  Brofjden  v.  Broion,  2  Addams,  441.  If  the  reader  is  desirous  of  extend- 
ing his  knowledge  of  this  subject,  he  will  be  well  rewarded  for  a  careful 
perusal  of  this  and  the  following  cases,  in  which  the  luminous  expositions  of 
Sir  John  Nicholl  cannot  fail  to  please  and  convince.  Evans  v.  Knight,  1 
Addams,  229  ;  Lemann  v.  Bonsall,  ibid,  383. 


LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF   DELIRIUM.  353 

she  was  capable  of  making  a  will  or  not;  his  opinion  rather 
was  that  she  was  not."  He  saw  her  once  or  twice  after- 
wards, when  she  was  "  quite  delirious  and  clearly  incapable." 
The  other  physicians  who  saw  her  at  four  o'clock,  conceived 
her  "  quite  incapable  of  any  complicated  act ;  undoubtedly  of 
any  thing  that  required  fixed  attention,  or  any  exercise  of 
mental  faculty."  The  attending  physician,  however,  attrib- 
uted the  delirium  to  the  paroxysms  of  severe  pain  suffered 
by  the  deceased,  it  being  scarcely  perceptible  when  these 
were  absent,  and  believed  that  in  the  intervals  she  had 
perfect  capacity.  It  appeared,  too,  that  the  will,  which  had 
been  prepared  from  instructions  just  before  received  from 
her,  was  read  over  to  the  deceased,  placed  before  her  while 
she  was  sitting  up  in  bed,  and  subscribed  by  her  in  the  usual 
form  with  a  dash  below.  The  validity  of  the  will  was 
established. 

§354.  In  another  case,  the  testator  who 'died  on  Friday, 
the  24th  of  April,  of  an  attack  of  pneumonia,  during  the  lat- 
ter stages  of  which  he  had  considerable  delirium,  made  his 
testamentary  dispositions  on  the  21st.  One  of  the  physicians 
deposed  that  when  he  saw  the  deceased  on  the  21st,  "  he  was 
not  in  a  state  of  sound  mind,  memory,  and  understanding,  or 
capable  of  doing  any  act  requiring  the  exercise  of  thought^ 
judgment,  and  reflection."  Another,  who  saw  him  for  the 
first  and  only  time  on  the  23d,  thought  it  w^as  extremely 
"improbable  that  the  deceased  should  have  been  free  from 
wandering  and  mental  affection,  on  a  day  so  shortly  before 
he  saw  him,  as  the  21st."  It  appeared,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  he  gave  instructions  for  a  will  without  any  suggestions 
whatever  from  the  solicitor  who  reduced  them  to  writing, 
and  that  after  they  were  read  to  him,  he  approved  and  sub- 
scribed them.  It  was  also  deposed  by  other  witnesses,  that 
when  the  solicitor  came,  and  while  giving  him  instructions, 
he  appeared  rational  and  conducted  with  propriety.  The 
court  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  deceased's  testamentary 
capacity.! 

*  Evans  v.  Knight  and  Moore,  1  Addams,  229. 

30* 


354  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

§  355.  In  cases  where  the  validity  of  testamentary  dis- 
positions is  impugned  on  the  ground  of  mental  incapacity 
produced  by  delirium,  or  indeed  by  any  other  disorder,  it  is 
the  practice  of  the  English  ecclesiastical  courts,  not  to  con- 
fine their  attention  exclusively  to  the  evidence  directly  relat- 
ing to  the  mental  condition  of  the  testator,  but  to  consider 
all  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  testamentary  act ; 
for  the  object  is  not  so  much  to  settle  the  question  of  sound- 
ness and  unsoundness  in  general,  as  it  is  in  reference  to  that 
particular  act.  This  principle  is  —  and  it  is  one  that  is  well- 
grounded  in  the  common  experience  of  men  —  that  a  person 
may  be  capable  of  testamentary  acts,  while  technically  and 
really  unsound,  and  incapable  of  doing  other  acts  requiring 
much  reflection  and  deliberation.  This  principle  is  particu- 
larly applicable  in  cases  of  delirium  where  the  transitions 
from  a  state  of  senseless  raving  to  that  in  which  the  mind  is 
calm,  perfectly  rational,  and  conscious  of  its  condition,  are 
very  rapid,  and  where  in  the  lucid  interval,  the  mind,  though 
weak,  is  clear  and  unclouded  by  any  of  those  peculiar  views 
or  notions  which  often  characterize  the  lucid  intervals  in 
mania.  Accordingly,]the  testamentary  capacity  is  to  be  de- 
termined, in  a  great  measure,  by  the  nature  of  the  act  itself. 
If  it  be  agreeable  to  instructions  or  declarations  previously 
expressed,  when  unquestionably  sound  in  mind  ;  if  it  be  con- 
sonant to  the  general  tenor  of  his  affections ;  if  it  be  consist- 
ent and  coherent,  one  part  with  another ;  and  if  it  have  been 
obtained  by  the  exercise  of  no  improper  influence  ;  it  will  be 
established,  even  though  the  medical  evidence  may  throw 
strong  doubts  on  the  capacity  of  the  testator.  On  the  con- 
trary, when  these  conditions  are  absent,  or  are  replaced  by 
others  of  an  opposite  description,  it  will  as  generally  be  an- 
nulled, however  plain,  and  positive  may  be  the  evidence  in 
favor  of  his  capacity^ 

*  In  illustration  of  these  remarks,  the  reader  is  referred  to  Cook  v.  Goiide 
and  Bennett.,  1  Hagfrard,  577;  King  and  Thiraks  v..  Farley,  ibid.  502; 
Waters  v.  Ilowlett,  3  Haggard,  790  ;  Bird  v.  Bird,  2  Haggard,  142  ;  Martin 
V.  Wotton,  1  Lee,  130;  Bitdexton,  hy  her  guardian,  v.  Clarl\  2  Lee,  229; 
Marsh  v.  Tyrrel,  2  Haggard,  84  ;  Iloby  v.  Jlohy,  1  Haggard,  14G. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DELIRIUM.  355     , 

r-  .  NV 

^/  §  356.  /  In  some  affections  of  the  head,  and  they  may  be 
/primary  or  sympathetic,  the  patient  lies  in  a  comatose  state 
from  which  he^linay  be  aroused,  when  he  will  recognize  per- 
sons, and  answer  questions  correctly  respecting  his  feelings, 
but  drop  asleep  again  as  soon  as  they  cease  to  excite  him. 
That  the  mind  is  much  embarrassed,  certainly,  cannot  be 
doubted,  and  it  is  well  known  that  when  the  patient  recovers, 
he  has,  ordinarily,  very  little  idea  of  what  passed  at  those 
times;  indeed,  he  is  generally  unconscious  of  every  thing  he 
either  said  or  did.  It  would  be  a  bold  'assertion  to  say  that 
the  mind,  under  these  circumstances,  is  legally  capable  of 
making  testamentary  dispositions,  and  they  ought,  therefore, 
to  receive  no  favor  from  courtsj  In  cases  of  injury  to  the 
head,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  the  patient  —  after  rallying 
from  its  immediate  effect  —  to  answer  questions  rationally,  to 
appear  collected  and  intelligent,  in  short  to  have  fully  re- 
covered his  senses,  though  he  may  subsequently  declare  that 
he  is  utterly  unconscious  of  what  were  his  acts,  thoughts,  or 
feelings  at  that  time.  Few,  even  among  medical  men,  who 
observe  a  person  under  such  circumstances,  would  have  any 
hesitation  in  expressing  their  belief  in  his  testamentary  ca- 
pacity, though  the  event  would  show  that  they  had  labored 
under  a  serious  error. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

APOPLEXY    AND     PARALYSIS    WITH    THEIR     LEGAL     CONSEQUENCES. 

§  357.  With  little  or  no  preliminary  disorder,  a  person 
suddenly  falls  down,  with  loss  of  sensation  and  the  power  of 
motion.  He  lies  totally  unconscious  of  persons  or  things;  he 
breathes  slowly  and  laboriously;  and,  wath  the  exception 
sometimes  of  a  little  convulsive  action  in  some  part  of  the 
body,  he  remains  perfectly  quiescent.  This  state  of  things 
continues  for  a  period  varying  from  a  few  mirmtes  to  a  few 
days,  when  it  terminates,  either  in  death  or  a  more  or  less 
complete  restoration  of  the  ordinary  condition.  This  is  an 
attack  of  apoplexy.  Again,  a  person  is  stricken  with  a  loss 
of  the  power  of  motion,  either  in  a  very  limited  series  of 
muscles,  like  those  of  the  eye  or  tongue,  or  in  those  of  the 
whole  or  a  large  part  of  the  body.  Sensation  —  except  that 
of  feeling  —  and  consciousness  are  not  perceptibly  atfected. 
This  is  an  attack  of  paralysis.  Tlie  pathological  conditions 
in  which  these  two  diseases  originate,  are,  unquestionably, 
very  nearly  allied,  insomuch  that  the  latter  has  been  often  de- 
scribed as  only  a  minor  degree  of  the  former.  It  is  certain 
that  all  the  phenomena  of  paralysis  often  occur  as  a  sequel 
of  apoplexy. 

§  358.  Restoration,  after  an  attack  of  apoplexy,  as  just 
stated,  is  more  or  less  complete.  The  person  may  come  to 
himself,  and  be,  to  all  appearance,  entirely  himself  again;  or 
he  may  exhibit  some  lesion  of  motion,  sensation,  or  intellect, 
which  may  gradually  or  never  disappear.  The  lesion  of 
motion  may  affect  the  muscles  that  belong  to  the  vocal 
organs,  so  that  the  speech  is  thick,  and  difficult,  if  not  en- 
tirely suppressed;  it  may  affect  the  muscles  of  a  single  limb, 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   APOPLEXY   AND   PARALYSIS.      357 

the  arm  or  leg,  rendering  them  powerless  ;  it  may  affect  all 
the  voluntary  muscles  on  one  side  of  the  median  line  of  the 
body,  or  those  of  the  lower  extremities  only,  the  upper  remain- 
ing unchanged,  and  vice  versa.  In  the  affected  parts,  sensa- 
tion is  generally  blunted.  The  patient  may  also  exhibit  some 
impairment  of  intellect,  varying  from  a  little  defect  of  mem- 
ory to  entire  abolition  of  the  mental  faculties.  After  a  while 
all  these  various  impairments  may  disappear,  apparently. 
The  cripple  regains  the  use  of  his  limbs ;  the  organs  of  speech 
readily  utter  the  thoughts;  and  the  mind  resumes  its  cus- 
tomary activity  and  strength. 

§  359.  These  affections  originate  in  some  pathological  con- 
dition of  the  brain.  Thus  far  there  can  be  no  doubt,  but 
beyond  this  our  knowledge  is  very  imperfect.  After  death 
from  apoplexy,  we  may  find  extravasations  of  blood  or  serum 
in  the  brain,  or  we  may  find  in  it  scarcely  any  deviations 
from  the  normal  state,  —  certainly  none  that  could  be  re- 
garded as  an  adequate  cause  of  the  fatal  result.  After  death 
from  paralysis  of  some  duration,  the  brain  usually  exhibits 
well-marked  lesions  of  some  kind  or  other,  but  without  any 
uniformity  of  character  whatever.  Two  cases  apparently 
similar  during  life,  present  nothing  in  common,  in  the  patho- 
logical condition  of  the  brain,  as  apparent  to  the  senses. 
The  reason  is,  no  doubt,  that  the  essential  pathological 
change  common  to  both,  is  of  too  subtle  a  nature  to  be 
revealed  by  the  ordinary  methods,  while  the  lesions  actually 
presented  are  subsequent  results,  controlled  by  causes  other 
than  those  which  determine  the  character  of  the  disorder. 

§  360.  Paralytics  often  make  wills  or  contracts  which  be- 
come the  subject  of  litigation,  their  validity  being  contested 
on  the  ground  of  mental  incompetence.  It  is  a  matter  of 
much'  importance  therefore,  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view, 
to  understand  how  the  mind  is  affected  in  paralytic  affec- 
tions. Of  course,  we  are  obliged,  in  regard  to  these  as  well 
as  other  affections,  when  required  to  decide  upon  the  mental 
capacity,  to  be  governed  by  those  general  principles  univer- 
sally applicable,  rather  than  by  any  characters  peculiar  to  the 
diseases  in  question.     The  latter,  however,  often  throw,  much 


358  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

light  upon  the  points  at  issue,  and  ought  not  to  be  neglected 
in  this  class  of  investigations. 

§  361.  It  is  sometimes  asserted  that  attacks  of  apoplexy 
and  of  paralysis  are  invariably  followed  by  more  or  less  of 
permanent  mental  impairment.  It  has  also  been  recently 
maintained  that  in  a  large  class  of  paralytic  cases,  and  those 
of  apparently  the  severest  description,  mental  impairment  is 
the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.^  Neither  of  these  extreme 
views  expresses  exactly  the  truth,  —  as  it  is  maintained  with 
little  diversity  of  opinion,  by  writers  and  observers  of  the 
highest  authority,  —  that,  while  a  case  of  paralysis  occasion- 
ally occurs  in  which  no  mental  impairment  can  be  detected 
by  any  practicable  test,  it  is  more  or  less  obvious,  in  by  far 
the  greater  number  of  cases.  The  most  common  manifesta- 
tion of  this  impairment  is  a  diminution  of  intellectual  power. 
The  patient  may  seem  to  be  in  perfect  possession  of  his 
senses,  so  long  as  his  mind  is  occupied  with  matters  of 
trivial  importance,  while  quite  incapable  of  those  higher  efforts 
which  were  easy  enough  before  the  attack.  He  is  incapable 
of  any  prolonged  exercise  of  thought;  he  is  unable  to  dis- 
cern unusual  or  complicated  relations  with  his  ordinary 
quickness,  if  he  does  at  all ;  he  more  readily  defers  to  the 
judgment  of  others,  and  is  willing  to  follow  where  once  he 
was  accustomed  to  lead.'  This,  it  will  be  observed,  is  a  kind 
of  impairment  which  would  be  discerned  only  by  those  well 
acquainted  with  his  mental  characteristics,  and  maintaining 
habits  of  intimacy  with  him  after  the  attack.  The  casual 
observer  sees  no  impairment,  siiaiply  because  it  is  not  ob- 
truded upon  his  notice,  and  he  has  not  the  opportunities 
that  would  enable  him  to  detect  it,  and  thus  he  misleads 
himself  and  others  into  the  belief  that  it  does  not  actually 
exist. 

§  362.  There  is  often,  as  a  sequel  of  paralysis,  a  grade  of 
general   intellectual    enfeeblement,    obvious    enough    to    the 

*  "To  what  degree  are  the  intellectual  faculties  afTected  in  cases  of 
Apoplexy  and  Hemiplegia  ?  "  By  B.  McCready,  M.  D.  New  York  Journal 
of  Medicine,  September,  1857.     • 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF  APOPLEXY   AND   PARALYSIS.      359 

casual  observer.  The  patient  may  observe  the  common  for- 
malities of  life,  but  his  demeanor,  his  discourse,  his  occupa- 
tions, all  betray  the  fact  that  the  original  power  of  the  mind 
is  broken,  its  perceptions  dimmed,  and  its  grasp  feeble  and 
uncertain.  The  only  special  intellectual  impairment  ever 
occurring  in  cases  of  this  kind,  is  the  complete  or  partial  loss 
of  speech  that  sometimes  follows  apoplectic  attacks.  This 
affection  has  been  already  described  (§  161),  and  here  I  need 
only  indicate  its  bearings  upon  the  question  of  mental  ca- 
pacity. It  is  supposed  to  proceed  sometimes,  entirely  from 
a  loss  of  the  power  of  articulation,  the  intellect  being 
untouched.  This  is,  certainly,  a  hasty  generalization,  be- 
cause the  power  of  testing  the  intellect  of  a  person  more  or 
less  unable  to  speak,  must  be  exceedingly  limited.  The  same 
objection  lies  against  the  other  generalization,  that  the  intel- 
lect may  be  untouched  sometimes,  in  the  far  larger  class  of 
cases  where  it  is  admitted  that  the  defect  in  question  depends 
upon  the  loss  of  the  memory  of  words.  On  this  point,  we 
can  scarcely  say  more  than  that,  under  the  circumstances,  our 
limited  means  of  information,  sometimes  enables  us  to  see  no 
appreciable  defect  of  the  reasoning  powers.  Of  course,  the 
more  complete  the  loss  of  the  power  of  language,  the  more 
difficult  will  it  be  to  establish  any  conclusions  relative  to  the 
mental  condition.  Where  the  patient  is  unable  to  articulate 
'a  word,  and  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  write,  it  is  quite  im- 
possible to  conceive  of  any  tests  that  would  place  the  fact 
of  the  mental  integrity  beyond  a  doubt.  The  opposite  con- 
clusion can  be  far  more  easily  settled. 

§  363.  When  a  person  loses  the  power  of  language,  in  the 
way  here  indicated,  he  will  endeavor  to  supply  the  defect, 
according  as  his  understanding  is  unaffected  by  the  stroke. 
For  this  purpose  he  will  resort  to  signs,  writing,  and  the 
making  of  words  by  means  of  block  letters,  or  the  letters  of 
a  printed  page.  If  the  right  hand  is  paralyzed,  he  will  use 
his  left,  until  by  perseverance  he  has  acquired  considerable 
facility  of  writing.  In  cases,  happily  rare,  where  the  defect 
extends  both  to  written  and  spoken  language,  and  the 
thoughts  can  be  expressed  by  pantomime  only,  the  manner 


360  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

in  which  this  is  used  will  furnish  some  clew  to  the  mental 
capacity.  If  highly  expressive,  it  is  a  proof,  no  doubt,  that 
the  understanding  retains  some  degree  of  strength  and  activ- 
ity, but  it  can  never,  by  any  possibility,  place  beyond  a  doubt, 
the  complete  exemption  of  the  intellect  from  the  effects  of 
disease.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  patient  never  resorts  to 
signs,  or  to  a  very  few,  and  shows  no  improvement  in  the  use 
of  them,  the  conclusion  is  irresistible  that  the  mind  is  in  a 
state  of  dementia.  In  cases  where  the  hearing  is  unaffected, 
and  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  the  patient  understands 
both  spoken  and  written  language,  while  he  makes  but  little 
or  no  attempt  to  communicate  his  thoughts  by  letters,  we 
cannot  avoid  the  conviction  that,  for  all  rational  purposes,  the 
mind  is  gone. 

§  364.  Valuable  indications  respecting  the  mental  condi- 
tion in  this  class  of  cases,  may  be  derived  from  the  manners 
and  habits  of  the  patient.  To  the  practised  observer  there 
will  always  be  discerned  a  wide  difference  in  this  respect, 
between  one  who  has  lost  his  mind  with  his  power  of  speech, 
and  another  who  with  his  loss  of  speech,  retains  his  mind  in 
its  original  integrity.  This  is  a  matter  which  hardly  admits 
of  definition  or  description,  and  therefore,  the  reliance  which 
is  deservedly  placed  upon  it,  can  scarcely  be  appreciated  by 
any  but  those  who  have  observed  the  phenomena  of  dementia 
on  a  large  scale.  One  of  them  may  be  referred  to  here  as* 
particularly  worthy  of  attention,  because  it  would  be  a  con- 
clusive test  in  cases  that  might  otherwise  be  doubtful.  In  the 
graver  forms  of  dementia,  the  patient  occasionally  neglects  to 
obey  the  calls  of  nature  in  a  suitable  manner,  although  a 
vigilant  attendant  will  generally  obviate  this  disagreeable 
incident  by  observing  the  symptoms  of  uneasiness,  and  lead- 
ing him,  in  season,  to  the  place  of  relief.  By  one  of  the 
medical  gentlemen  whose  opinion  was  obtained  in  a  cele- 
brated will-case  lately  adjudicated  in  a  neighboring  State, 
this  symptom  was  confidently  relied  on  as  a  conclusive  proof 
of  dementia.  It  could  not  have  arisen,  in  the  case  in  ques- 
tion, he  thought,  from  paralysis  of  the  sphincter  muscles, 
because,  in  the  first  place,  the  paralytic  difficulty  was  hemi- 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   APOPLEXY   AND    PARALYSIS.      361 

plegia,  not  paraplegia,  in  which  the  influence  of  the  will  over 
these  muscles  is  suspended  ;  and  in. the  second  place,  such  an 
affection  would  necessarily  give  rise  to  unseasonable  evacua- 
tions, habitually,  not  occasionally.  Neither  could  it  have  pro- 
ceeded from  morbid  irritability  of  the  rectum  or  bladder,  for 
such  an  affection  would  have  led  to  unusual  frequency  of  the 
evacuations,  —  a  fact  which  did  not  appear  in  the  evidence. 
It  would  also  have  been  accompanied  by  other  indications  of 
disease  that  would  have  forced  themselves  upon  the  notice  of 
the  medical  attendant,  and  required  some  measures  of  relief. 
The  only  other  possible  cause  of  this  disregard  of  the  prompt- 
ings of  nature,  is  dementia,  —  that  mental  condition  in  which 
the  individual  is  too  careless  of  propriety,  too  indolent  or  too 
irresolute  to  act  properly  upon  the  impressions  which  he  per- 
ceives. He  is  aware  of  what  is  coming,  he  fumbles  about 
his  pantaloons,  looks  towards  the  customary  place  of  relief, 
or  eats  with  redoubled  quickness  if  he  happens  to  be  at  his 
meal,  but  if  his  attendant  is  out  of  the  way,  or  fails  to  recog- 
nize these  premonitory  signs,  he  readily  ceases  to  trouble 
himself  about  the  matter,  and  lets  things  take  their  course.^ 
Who,  much  conversant  with  the  insane,  will  fail  to  be  im- 
pressed with  the  correctness  of  this  diagnosis? 

§  365.  In  testing  the  capacity  of  one  deprived  of  the  use 
of  speech  by  cerebral  lesions,  we  must  guard  against  the 
common  error,  not  unfrequently  made,  even  by  cultivated  and 
intelligent  men,  with  confounding  incidents  expressive  of 
only  the  most  common  wants  and  affections  of  our  nature 
with  such  as  imply  some  effort  of  the  reflective  powers.  A 
large  portion  of  our  movements  —  those  connected  with  the 
simple  routine  of  life  —  become  automatic  and  are  performed 
without  much  exercise  of  mind.  The  ability  to  comprehend 
questions  relative  to  trivial  matters  of  fact,  to  execute  mes- 
sages, even  to  play  games  of  skill,  indicate  but  little  mind, 
and  yet  it  is  just  this  kind  of  intelligence  which  is  often  sup- 
posed to  prove  the  complete  integrity  of  the  mind.  Another 
common  mistake,  in  testing  the  mental  powers  of  paralytics, 

1  Dr.  L.  V.  Bell,  Opinion  in  the  Parish  WiU  Case,  iv.  484. 

31 


362  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  whatever  class,  is  that  of  concluding  that,  because  the 
patient  comprehends  the.  terms  of  a  proposition,  he  necessa- 
rily comprehends  the  merits  of  the  case  which  it  involves.  A 
man  may  be  very  \vell  aware  that  he  owns  a  certain  estate, 
and  that  some  one  is  ready  to  buy  at  a  certain  price,  and  yet 
be  quite  incompetent  to  decide  whether  or  not,  under  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  this  price  would  be  a  fair  one.  In 
making  his  will,  he  might  be  aware  of  the  existence  of  all 
his  relatives,  and  recognize  their  natural  claims  upon  his 
bounty,  while  incompetent  to  distribute  that  bounty  upon 
any  principles  of  equity  and  fairness.  Surely,  something 
more  is  necessary  in  such  things  than  the  mere  comprehen- 
sion of  language,  and  yet  large  amounts  of  property  have 
been  disposed  of  to  one  and  another  upon  a  principle  of  dis- 
crimination calculated  to  excite  suspicion,  where  it  is  doubt- 
ful if  the  testator,  himself  deprived  of  the  power  of  speech, 
understood  even  the  language  in  which  these  dispositions 
were  suggested  by  others. 

§  366.  Neither  are  we  too  hastily  to  conclude  that  expres- 
sions of  assent  or  dissent  imply  a  correct  understanding  of 
the  merits  or  the  terms  of  a  proposition.  By  persons  of  shat- 
tered intellect,  such  expressions  are  often  used  automatically, 
and  are  utterly  unreliable  unless  carefully  tested  by  varying  the 
form  of  the  question.  A  paralytic  recently  under  my  observa- 
tion, would  converse,  for  a  few  moments,  intelligently  and 
pertinently;  he  had  the  air  and  demeanor  of  a  gentleman, 
and  he  observed  tolerably  well  the  little  proprieties  of  life. 
As  far  as  the  train  of  thought  was  mechanical,  so  to  speak, 
he  got  on  pretty  well ;  but  the  moment  any  effort  was  needed, 
he  utterly  failed.  He  would  assent  to  any  proposition,  or 
dissent  from  it,  according  to  the  form  in  which  it  was  put. 
For  instance:  "Major"  (he  had  held  a  commission  in  the 
French  army,  under  Louis  Philippe),  "  you  were  in  the  battle 
of  Waterloo,  I  believe  ? "  "  O,  yes,  I  was  there."  "  In 
Jerome's  division,  in  the  assault  on  Hougoumont."  "  Yes, 
I  was  with  Jerome."  "  But  how  could  that  be.  Major  ?  The 
battle  of  Waterloo  was  fought  before  you  were  born.  You 
could  not  have  been  there."     "  O,  no,  I  was  not  there." 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   APOPLEXY   AND   PARALYSIS.      363 

§  367.  The  temper  and  disposition  often  suffer,  in  common 
with  the  intellect,  in  consequence  of  paralytic  attacks.  The 
patient  becomes  irritable  and  peevish,  not  easily  pleased,  and 
impatient  of  salutary  restriction.  He  loses  his  self-posses- 
sion, and  the  least  emotion  is  accompanied  by  immoderate 
weeping  or  laughter.  Dependent  apon  others  for  assistance 
and  comfort,  a  little  adroitness  readily  subjects  him  to  their 
will,  and  makes  him  execute  their  purposes. 

§  368.  The  effect  of  time  on  the  immediate  consequences 
of  apoplexy  and  paralysis  —  the  loss  of  speech,  of  the  use  of 
the  limbs,  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  vigor  —  is  various. 
They  may  remain  unchanged  for  months  or  years,  until 
increased  by  another  attack;  they  may  completely  or  partially 
disappear,  either  under  the  restorative  influences  of  the  con- 
stitution, or  perseverance  in  the  use  of  appropriate  means. 
This  kind  of  improvement  is  a  fact  of  much  medico-legal 
importance,  and  indicates  the  necessity  of  a  careful  discrim- 
ination of  its  different  stages.^ 

^  The  Reports  abound  with  cases  in  which  the  patient  and  his  acts  were 
subjected  to  judicial  examination,  among  which,  as  particularly  worthy  of 
attention,  are  Clark  v.  Fisher,  1  Paige,  171 ;  King  and  Thwaits  v.  Farley, 
1  Haggard,  502 ;  Marsh  v.  Tyrrel,  2  Haggard,  84 ;  Croft  v.  Day,  1  Curteis, 
782.  Never,  however,  have  the  phenomena  of  apoplexy  and  paralysis, 
whether  in  their  medical  or  psychological  relations,  and  the  acts  of  the 
patient,  been  more  thoroughly  investigated,  or  with  a  larger  comprehension 
of  all  the  usual  questions  which  such  a  proceeding  raises,  than  they  were  in 
a  case  lately  (1857)  adjudicated  in  the  city  of  New  York,  and  printed, 
though  not  published,  in  4  vols,  entitled  the  "  Parish  Will  case." 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

DURATION    AND    CURABILITY    OF    INSANITY. 

§  369.  With  the  exception  of  that  kind  of  dementia  that 
occurs  at  other  periods  of  life  than  that  of  old  age,  mania  is 
the  only  form  of  insanity  that  admits  of  a<^ure;  and  though 
its  duration  is  various,  the  probability  of  this  event  is  almost 
entirely  destroyed  within  a  comparatively  short  space  of 
time.  This  is  abundantly  evident  from  the  statistics  of 
madness  that  have  been  published  from  time  to  time  by  the 
heads  of  various  lunatic  establishments.  Esquirol  concludes, 
on  data  furnished  by  the  returns  of  the  principal  French  and 
English  hospitals,  that  the  absolute  number  of  recoveries 
from  madness  is  about  one  in  three;  and  also  that  the  num- 
ber of  recoveries  varies  in  different  establishments,  from  one 
in  four,  to  one  in  two  or  two  and  a  half  of  the  whole  number 
of  persons  affected.  Prichard  regards  this  computation  of 
recoveries  as  much  below  what  really  takes  place  under 
favorable  circumstances,  and  the  reports  of  American  hospi- 
tals confirm  the  correctness  of  his  opinion.  Such,  however, 
is  the  imperfection  of  statistics  on  this  subject,  that  we  can 
speak  with  but  little  confidence  respecting  the  proportion  of 
recoveries.  We  only  know  that  in  cases  subjected  to 
judicious  treatment  soon  after  the  attack,  recovery  takes 
place  in  the  proportion  of  six  or  eight  to  ten ;  while  in  those 
which  have  continued  a  couple  of  years,  there  is  little  pros- 
pect of  recovery.  Pinel,  in  a  memoir  presented  to  the  Insti- 
tute in  1800,  was  led  to  conclude  from  a  selection  of  cases 
expressly  chosen  for  this  purpose,  that  a  greater  number  of 
recoveries  takes  place  in  the  first  month  than  in  any  succeed- 
ing one,  and  that  the  mean  time  of  the  duration  of  the  dis 


DURATION   AND    CURABILITY   OF   INSANITY.  365 

ease  when  cured,  is  between  five  and  six  months.  Esquirol, 
however,  gives  a  table  of  recoveries  at  the  Salpetriere  during 
ten  years,  which  shows  a  little  longer  term  to  insanity.  Out 
of  two  thousand  and  five  patients,  twelve  hundred  and 
twenty-three  were  cured,  namely,  six  hundred  and  four  dur- 
ing the  first  year;  four  hundred  and  ninety-seven  in  the 
second  ;  eighty-six  in  the  third ;  and  forty-one  in  the  seven 
succeeding  years  ;  from  which  it  appears  that  eleven  twelfths 
of  the  number  of  cures  is  obtained  within  the  first  two  years  ; 
that  the  mean  duration  of  cases  cured  is  a  little  short  of  one 
year ;  and  that  after  the  third  year,  the  probability  of  a  cure 
is  scarcely  more  than  one  in  thirty.  M.  Desportes  states, 
from  observations  made  at  the  Bicetre  and  Salpetriere,  that 
of  the  whole  number  of  recoveries  in  1822,  1823,  and  1824, 
seven  hundred  and  forty-six  took  place  in  the  first  year,  and 
one  hundred  and  eighteen  only  from  the  second  to  the  seventh 
year.^ 

§  370.  Recovery  from  insanity  generally  takes  place  gradu- 
ally, though  occasionally  the  disease  may  suddenly  disappear, 
especially  on  the  occurrence  of  certain  moral  or  physical 
impressions.  Pinel  relates  the  case  of  a  literary  gentleman 
who,  in  a  paroxysm  of  suicidal  mania  resolved  to  go  and 
jump  into  the  river.  On  arriving  at  the  bridge,  he  was  at- 
tacked by  robbers,  against  whom  he  defended  himself  vigor- 
ously, beat  them  off,  forgot  the  purpose  of  his  excursion,  and 
returned  home  cured.  Dr.  Rush  relates  that  one  of  his 
patients,  for  whom  he  had  recommended  gentle  exercise  on 
horseback,  was  suddenly  cured  in  consequence  of  the  fright 
experienced  from  her  horse  running  away  in  one  of  her  excur- 
sions. He  was  stopped  by  a  gate,  and  when  her  attendants 
came  up  they  found  her  entirely  restored  to  reason.  Several 
other  cases  of  recovery  are  related,  produced  by  a  similar 
cause.  Esquirol  speaks  of  having  cured  a  girl  at  once,  by 
the  terror  she  experienced  at  the  sight  of  the  actual  cautery 
which  he  was  about  to  apply.  He  also  mentions  the  case  of 
a  girl  who,  after  being  insane  ten  years,  suddenly  ran  to  her 

^  Esquirol,  Des  mal.  ment.  i.  94. 

31* 


366  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

mother's  bed,  exclaiming,  as  she  embraced  her,  "  Mother, 
mother,  I  am  well."  She  had  become  insane  in  consequence 
of  a  suppression  of  the  menses  which  at  last  made  their  ap- 
pearance on  the  evening  preceding  her  cure.  Prichard  states 
that  several  instances  of  sudden  cure  from  the  same  cause, 
have  occurred  in  some  of  the  English  hospitals.  Insanity- 
has  been  sometimes  cured  by  an  attack  of  fever.  A  number 
of  maniacs  were  once  cured,  in  the  Pennsylvania  hospital, 
by  a  malignant  fever  which  appeared  in  that  establishment. 
Direct  appeals  to  the  reasoning  power  have  sometimes  been 
followed  by  immediate  recovery.  Pinel  relates  the  case  of  a 
watchmaker  who  became  deranged,  and  believed  that  he  had 
been  guillotined,  and  that  in  consequence  of  the  mixing  of 
the  heads  of  other  victims,  his  own  had  been  replaced  by 
another.  When  the  miracle  of  St.  Denis  was  mentioned, 
who  carried  his  head  under  his  arm  and  kissed  it  as  he  went, 
he  contended  for  the  possibility  of  the  fact,  by  appealing  to 
his  own  case,  when  one  of  his  companions  burst  into  a  loud 
laugh,  saying,  "  What  a  fool  you  are  ;  how  could  St.  Denis 
kiss  his  own  head  ?  was  it  with  his  heel  ?  "  The  absurdity 
of  the  idea  struck  his  mind,  and  he  never  after  spoke  of  the 
misplacement.  Dr.  Cox  speaks  of  a  patient  who  believed 
that  he  was  the  Holy.  Ghost.  Another  asked  him,  "  Are  there 
two  Holy  Ghosts  ?  how  can  you  be  the  Holy  Ghost  and  I  be 
so  too  ?  "  He  appeared  surprised,  and  after  pausing  awhile 
said,  "  But  are  you  the  Holy  Ghost  ?  "  and  when  the  other 
replied,  "  Did  you  not  know  that  I  was  ?  "  he  answered,  "  I 
did  not  know  it  before;  then  I  cannot  be  the  Holy  Ghost." ^ 
It  is  probable  that  in  nearly  if  not  quite  all  these  cases  of 
sudden  recovery  by  means  of  mental  impressions,  the  disease 
was  declining,  and  that  its  termination  was  hastened  only  by 
these  impressions. 

§  371.  Partial  intellectual  mania  is  said  to  be  cured  with 
much  more  difficulty  than  general  mania,  and  the  latter  is 
more  easily  cured  when  the  sequel  of  some  violent  cause, 
than  when  it  has  come  on  gradually  from  some  steadily  con- 
tinued influence.      Among  the   circumstances   favorable    to 

^  Spurzheim  on  Insanity,  294. 


DURATION  AND    CURABILITY   OF   INSANITY.  367 

recovery  may  be  mentioned  a  constitution  not  greatly  de- 
bilitated by  excesses  of  any  kind,  good  moral  and  intellectual 
education,  the  absence  of  hereditary  predisposition,  and  an 
early  medical  treatment. 

§  372.  The  above  facts  and  considerations  will  furnish  the 
data,  on  which  the  physician  is  to  form  an  opinion  relative 
to  the  duration  and  curability  of  any  given  case  of  insanity. 
While  in  very  many  cases  incurability  is  almost  certain, 
and  there  can  be  no  hesitation  in  certifying  the  same,  there 
are  none  in  regard  to  which  we  can  predict  a  certain  re- 
covery. The  utmost  we  can  say  in  the  most  favorable  cases 
is,  that  the  patient  will  probably  recover,  and  the  physician 
cannot  be  too  cautious  how  he  commits  his  own  reputation 
and  the  interests  and  happiness  of  others,  by  the  expression 
of  hasty  and  positive  opinions.^  Idiocy,  imbecility,  and  senile 
dementia  admit  neither  of  cure  nor  amelioration,  and  when 
mania  is  of  more  than  two  years'  standing,  and  especially 
if  other  circumstances  are  not  favorable,  it  may  be  safely 
said  there  is  but  little  hope  of  cure,  but  never  that  the  case 
is  beyond  all  hope.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  persons, 
after  years  of  insanity,  have  sometimes  recovered  their  reason 
shortly  before  death. 

§  373.  An  important  feature  of  insanity  in  a  medico-legal 
point  of  view,  is  its  tendency  to  relapse  during  convalescence, 
and  to  recurrence  after  being  perfectly  cured.  The  general 
rule  is,  that  a  brain  which  has  once  been  the  seat  of  the 
maniacal  action  is  far  more  liable  to  its  recurrence,  than  one 
which  has  not.  Many  recover  the  full  strength  and  activity 
of  their  mental  faculties,  but  the  majority,  Prichard  thinks, 
are  curable  only  to  a  certain  extent.  "  They  remain,"  says 
Esquirol,  "  in  such  a  state  of  susceptibility  that  the  slightest 
causes  give  rise   to  relapses,  and  they  only  preserve  their 


^  K  proof  be  required  of  the  propriety  of  this  warning,  the  reader  will  find 
a  memorable  one,  in  Wraxhall's  (Posthumous  Memoirs)  lively  description  of 
the  contradictory  statements  and  dogmatic  assertions  into  which  the  medical 
attendants  of  George  III.  were  betrayed  by  pai'ty  zeal,  and  which  resulted  in 
the  confusion  and  disgrace  of  some  respectable  physicians. 


368  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

sanity  by  continuing  to  live  in  a  house  where  no  mental 
agitation  or  inquietude,  no  unfortunate  contingency  is  likely 
to  fall  to  their  lot,  and  throw  them  back  to  their  former 
state.  There  are  other  individuals  whose  faculties  have  sus- 
tained such  a  shock,  that  they  are  never  capable  of  returning 
to  the  sphere  which  they  have  held  in  society.  They  are  per- 
fectly rational,  but  have  not  sufficient  mental  capacity  to 
become  again  military  officers,  to  conduct  commercial  affairs, 
or  to  fulfil  the  duties  belonging  to  their  appointments."  ^ 
The  proportion  of  cases  in  which  insanity  is  recurrent,  is 
estimated  by  writers  at  from  one  tenth  to  one  sixth  ;  Esqui- 
rol  estimates  it  at  one  twentieth.  In  those  cases  where  the 
mind  on  recovery  regains  its  usual  capability,  this  disposition 
to  recurrence  is  by  no  means  so  strong,  as  when  it  is  left  in 
a  weak  and  irritable  state,  and  it  diminishes  with  the  length 
of  the  interval  after  the  recovery.  This  feature  of  insanity 
should  ever  be  borne  in  mind  by  the  physician,  when  required 
to  give  his  opinion  on  the  propriety  of  removing  the  interdic- 
tion of  an  insane  person  who  is  apparently  restored  to  health. 
He  should  seriously  consider  the  risk  the  patient  runs,  by 
entering  again  on  the  busy  scenes  of  life,  and  enduring  the 
anxiety  and  excitement  attendant  on  the  management  of 
his  affairs,  of  renewing  that  cerebral  irritation  which  the  quiet 
and  repose  of  seclusion  have  temporarily  subdued.  In 
criminal  cases  also,  it  should  lead  to  a  thorough  and  can- 
did investigation  of  the  plea  of  insanity  urged  in  defence  of 
those  who  have  previously  suffered  from  it,  and  it  should 
be  satisfactorily  settled  whether  or  not  the  circumstances 
attending  the  criminal  act  were  likely  to  reproduce  that 
pathological  condition  on  which  insanity  depends.  If  it 
should  prove  that  they  were  of  that  nature,  and  that  the 
individual  had  but  recently  recovered  from  an  attack  of 
insanity,  then  it  would  indicate  a  confidence  that  springs  from 
some  other  source  than  a  just  appreciation  of  the  phenomenon 
of  insanity  under  consideration,  to  presume,  nevertheless,  the 
continuance  of  mental  soundness  and,  consequently,  of  moral 
responsibility. 

*  Des  maladies  mentales,  i.  96. 


DURATION   AND    CURABILITY    OF   INSANITY.  369 

§  374.  We  are  also  to  bear  in  mind,  that  a  considerable 
number  recover  only  to  a  certain  point.  They  recover  so  far 
as  to  be  free  from  all  delusions,  to  maintain  unremitting  self- 
control,  and  transact  their  customary  business  correctly  and 
shrewdly,  but  never  regain  confidence  in  those  who  favored 
their  confinement  or  restraint,  though  their  part  in  it  was 
prompted  by  kindness  and  managed  discreetly  and  consider- 
ately. This  state  of  feeling  varies  from  tacit  distrust  and 
aversion  to  a  deep  malignity  that  leads  to  violence  and 
litigation.  Having  regained  all  their  natural  shrewdness, 
they  have  no  difficulty  in  enlisting  the  sympathies  of  those 
—  and  they  constitute  the  greater  part  of  mankind  —  who 
are  ever  ready  to  yield  their  faith  to  any  statement  that  is 
uttered  with  a  certain  plausibiUty  of  manner.  Whether 
actuated  b^  a  kind  of  pride  that  refuses  to  acknowledge  that 
they  have  been  the  subjects  of  so  humbling  an  infirmity  as 
insanity,  or  an  obscurity  in  their  recollections  of  the  past,  that 
leads  them  to  mingle  the  real  and  imaginary,  and  confound 
the  scenes  with  the  cause  of  their  suflf'ering,  they  persist  in 
referring  the  mental  tortures  they  endured,  to  the  measures 
that  were  meant  for  their  mitigation,  and  attributing  their 
various  discomforts  to  the  cruelty  or  neglect  of  others,  rather 
than  to  the  disordered  condition  of  their  own  minds.  Even 
when  they  fail  to  convince  the  world  that  they  were  never 
insane, -^  for  of  this  fact  there  may  have  been  too  many 
witnesses, — they  often  leave  the  impression  that  they  have 
been  unjustly,  if  not  cruelly  dealt  with.^ 

§  375.    It   has   been    already  remarked    that    in    most  in- 


'  A  memorable  case  of  this  description  —  memorable  for  the  success  which 
followed  the  representations  of  the  patient,  and  the  utter  groundlessness  of 
the  charges  which  he  brought  —  occurred  in  Philadelphia  in  1849.  A  man 
named  Hinchman  who  was  placed  in  the  Friends'  Asylum  for  the  insane  in 
Frankford,  because,  as  the  evidence  showed  beyond  a  doubt,  he  was  vio- 
lently and  dangerously  insane,  brought  an  action  of  conspiracy  against  every 
individual  the  least  concerned  in  the  measure,  —  his  mother,  sister,  cousins, 
the  sheriff,  a  passing  traveller,  the  physicians  of  the  asylum  and  the  physi- 
cian who  signed  the  certificate,  and  others,  —  and  he  succeeded  in  obtaining 
heavy  damages. 


370  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

stances,  recovery  takes  place  gradually,  and  is  completed  only 
after  a  period,  more  or  less  long,  of  convalescence.  Nothing, 
therefore,  can  be  more  chimerical  than  the  idea  of  fixing  on 
any  precise  moment  when  all  disease  has  departed  and 
perfect  health  is  established  ;  and  yet  this  is  what  we  are 
called  upon  to  do  when  required  to  determine,  as  we  some- 
times are  in  criminal  cases,  at  what  time  the  accused  began  to 
be  responsible.  To  contend  that  a  convalescent  maniac  may 
be  irresponsible  one  day  and  responsible  the  next,  would  be  no 
less  absurd  than  to  say  to  one  recovering  from  inflammation 
of  the  lungs,  that,  as  he  valued  his  life,  he  must  not  leave  his 
room  to-day,  though  to-morrow  he  might  safely  expose  him- 
self to  the  severest  inclemency  of  the  weather  ;  and  to  believe 
that  the  former  is  perfectly  sound,  because  laboring  under 
no  hallucination  and  attacked  by  no  fits  of  fury,  would  be  as 
erroneous,  as  to  consider  the  respiratory  functions  of  the 
latter  sound  and  vigorous,  because  we  hear  no  cough  and  see 
no  difficulty  of  breathing.  The  time  that  has  elapsed  since 
the  unequivocal  insanity  of  the  accused,  is  therefore  an  im- 
portant element  in  the  determijnation  of  his  mental  sound- 
ness. Just  as  exposure  to  bad  weather,  a  week  after  an 
attack  of  inflammation  of  lungs  had  begun  to  subside,  would 
be  more  likely  to  reproduce  the  disease,  than  it  would  a 
month  afterwards ;  so  the  longer  the  time  since  an  attack  of 
insanity  has  been  apparently  cured,  the  less  likely  is  the  cere- 
bral irritation  to  be  renewed  by  sudden  provocations  or  other 
causes  that  tend  to  produce  it.  Ample  time  must  be  allowed 
to  cover  the  period  of  convalescence,  and  if  it  be  difficult  to 
fix  upon  the  exact  duration  of  this  state,  so  much  greater 
the  necessity  of  caution  in  determining  the  responsibility  of 
the  accused.  Here  it  is  often  a  merit  to  doubt,  and  justice 
requires  that  the  accused  should  have  the  benefit  of  our 
doubts. 


CHAPTER    XV. 


LUCID   INTERVALS. 


§  376.  It  is  well  known  that  many  diseases  —  especially 
of  the  class  called  nervous  —  observe  a  law  of  periodicity 
which  is  not  uncommon  in  the  actions  of  the  animal  econo- 
my. One  effect  of  this  curious  law  consists  in  an  intermis- 
sion of  the  outward  manifestations  of  the  disease,  so  com- 
plete as  to  bear  the  appearance  of  a  perfect  cure,  and  this,  in 
the  present  state  of  our  knowledge,  is  all  that  we  can,  with 
certainty,  say  of  it.  As  to  the  change  that  takes  place  in 
the  organic  condition  of  the  part  affected,  during  the  inter- 
mission, we  can  at  best  hazard  nothing  more  than  a  rude 
conjecture.  We  have  no  warrant  for  believing  that  the 
pathological  affection  itself  entirely  disappears  with  the 
symptoms  that  arise  from  it,  and  perhaps  never  shall  have, 
until  we  are  able  to  explain  why,  after  such  disappearance, 
the  tendency  of  the  disease  to  return  at  certain  intervals 
should  still  remain  ;  or,  in  other  words,  wherein  the  final, 
perfect  cure  differs  from  the  temporary  intermission.  But  in 
view  of  the  established  fact  that  organic  disease  often  exists 
without  producing  its  ordinary  symptoms,  or  revealing  itself 
by  any  appreciable  signs,  it  seems  the  more  probable  suppo- 
sition, that  the  pathological  condition  of  the  affected  organs 
does  not  disappear  entirely  during  the  intermission,  but  con- 
tinues with  perhaps  a  modified  intensity. 

§  377.  The  slightest  examination  will  convince  us,  that 
in  the  most  complete  intermission  of  any  disease  that  affects 
the  whole  system  to  some  extent,  the  patient  is  far  from 
enjoying  sound  health,  or  free  from  every  indication  of 
morbid  action.     A  greater  contrast  in  the  matter  of  health, 


372  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

can  scarcely  be  presented  in  the  same  individual,  than 
that  between  the  paroxysm  and  the  intermission  of  a 
quotidian  fever ;  yet  none  will  say,  after  the  former  has 
passed  off,  and  the  patient,  is  longer  shaking  with  cold  " 
nor  parched  with  heat,  is  able  to  arise  and  give  some  at- 
tention to  his  duties,  that  he  is  entirely  well.  Better,  no 
doubt,  he  is ;  but  his  mind  is  weak,  his  stomach  declines 
its  once  favorite  food,  a  little  exertion  overcomes  him,  a  cer- 
tain malaise  not  easily  described,  pervades  his  whole  system, 
and  which,  though  not  excessively  painful,  is  something  very 
different  from  the  buoyant  sensation  of  health.  We  are 
therefore  bound  to  believe,  that  the  disease  still  exists,  though 
its  external  aspect  has  changed.  And  here  it  may  be  as 
well  to  remark,  that  we  must  not  be  led  by  an  abuse  of 
language  to  attribute  that  to  the  disease  —  to  the  pathologi- 
cal condition  —  which  belongs  only  to  one  of  its  symptoms. 
When  the  epileptic,  a  few  days  after  one  of  his  frightful  con- 
vulsions, appears  to  have  regained  his  customary  health,  no 
intelligent  physician  imagines  that  the  proximate  cause  of 
this  disturbance  has  vanished  with  the  fit,  leaving  the  organ 
it  affected  as  sound  as  ever.  The  fit  itself  which  is  a  mere 
symptom,  is  indeed  of  periodical-  occurrence,  but  the  patho- 
logical condition  on  which  it  depends,  continues,  slowly  and 
surely  though  imperceptibly,  to  undermine  the  powers  of  the 
constitution.  The  general  expression  of  all  our  knowledge 
on  the  subject  of  the  intermission  of  diseases  is,  then,  that 
certain  pathological  conditions  give  rise,  among  other  phe- 
nomena, to  some  that  disappear  for  a  time,  only  to  recur 
after  an  interval  of  more  or  less  duration. 

§  378.  That  insanity,  or  rather  mania,  is  one  of  the  dis- 
eases that  are  subject  in  some  respects,  to  this  law  of  pe- 
riodicity, is  universally  admitted ;  but  to  what  extent  the  law 
operates,  is  a  point  on  which  there  is  much  diversity  of 
opinion.  There  are  few  cases  in  which  we  may  not  observe 
various  periods  in  their  course,  when  the  severity  of  the 
symptoms  is  greatly  alleviated ;  when  calmness  takes  the 
place  of  fury,  and  a  quiet  and  sober  demeanor  succeeds  to 
noisy  and  restless  agitation  ;  when  reason,  driven  from  her 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  373 

throne,  seems  to  be  retracing  her  steps  and  struggling  for  her 
lost  dominion.  In  all  this,  however,  there  is  nothing  differ- 
ent from  what  occurs  in  many,  if  not  the  greater  proportion 
of  chronic  diseases.  In  mania,  but  in  no  other  form  of  in- 
sanity, this  abatement  of  the  severity  of  the  symptoms  may 
amount  to  a  complete  intermission,  when  the  patient  is  con- 
scious of  his  true  condition,  converses  rationally,  and  admits 
his  having  been  insane.  But,  that  the  intermissions  of  mania 
are  ever  so  complete  that  the  mind  is  restored  to  its  original 
integrity,  or  so  sudden  as  to  justify  the  statement  of  Baron 
Rolfe,  that  "such  is  the  nature  of  the  mind  that  it  might  be 
one  minute  sane,  and  another  minute  insane,"  ^  would  seem 
scarcely  probable,  from  the  fact,  that  the  very  seat  of  the 
pathological  changes  is  the  material  organ  on  which  the 
manifestations  of  the  mental  phenomena  depend.  For  if  the 
mind  be  rendered  as  sound  as  before  the  attack,  it  necessa- 
sarily  follows  that  the  brain  is  equally  restored,  since  in 
point  of  health  they  stand  to  each  other  in  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect.  But  as  there  is  no  proof  that  such  is 
the  case,  and  as  the  supposition  is  not  supported  by  what 
we  know  of  pathological  actions,  we  have  no  right,  at  pres- 
ent, to  conclude  that  the  physical  condition  on  which  mania 
depends  is  entirely  removed  during  the  intermission.  We 
are  thus  led  to  scrutinize  a  little  more  closely  these  peri- 
odical restorations  of  the  insane  mind,  or  lucid  intervals,  as 
they  are  Called,  in  order  to  ascertain  if  possible,  what  is  the 
actual  state  of  the  mind  at  these  times.  But  before  doing 
this,  it  will  be  proper  to  show  what  is  understood  in  law  by 
lucid  intervals,  as  explained  by  eminent  legal  authorities. 

§  379.  D'Aguesseau,  in  his  pleading  in  the  case  of  the 
Abbe  d' Orleans,  says,  "It  must  not  be  a  superficial  tran- 
quillity, a  shadow  of  repose,  but  on  the  contrary  a  profound 
tranquillity,  a  real  repose  ;  it  must  be,  not  a  mere  ray  of 
reason,  which  only  makes  its  absence  more  apparent  when  it 
is  gone,  —  not  a  flash  of  lightning,  which  pierces  through  the 
darkness  only  to  render  it  more  gloomy  and  dismal,  —  not 

1  Reg.  V.  Layton,  6  Cox,  C.  C  149. 

32 


374  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

a  glimmering  which  joins  the  night  to  the  day;  but  a  per- 
fect light,  a  lively  and  continued  lustre,  a  full  and  entire  day 
interposed  between  the  two  separate  nights  of  the  fury 
which  precedes  and  follows  it;  and,  to  use  another  image, 
it  is  not  a  deceitful  and  faithless  stillness  which  follows  or 
forebodes  a  storm,  but  a  sure  and  steadfast  tranquillity  for  a 
time,  a  real  calm,  a  perfect  serenity ;  in  fine,  without  look- 
ing for  so  many  metaphors  to  represent  our  idea,  it  must  be 
not  a  mere  diminution,  a  remission  of  the  complaint,  but  a 
kind  of  temporary  cure,  an  intermission  so  clearly  marked, 
as  in  every  respect  to  resemble  the  restoration  of  health."  ^ 

§  380.  Many  years  after.  Lord  Thurlow,  in  the  court  of 
chancery,  thus  stated  his  views  of  the  condition  of  mind 
necessary  to  constitute  a  lucid  interval.  "  By  a  perfect  inter- 
val, I  do  not  mean  a  cooler  moment,  an  abatement  of  pain 
or  violence,  or  of  a  higher  state  of  torture,  —  a  mind  relieved 
from  excessive  pressure ;  but  an  interval  in  which  the  mind, 
having  thrown  off  the  disease,  had  recovered  its  general 
habit."  2 

§  381.  Here,  then,  is  the  lucid  interval  as  clearly  and  mi- 
nutely described,  as  a  profusion  of  words  and  metaphors 
could  do  it,  and  as  such  it  was  believed  by  these  authorities, 
no  doubt,  to  have  a  real  existence.  In  the  early  periods  of 
the  English  law,  the  doctrine  of  lucid  intervals  was  univer- 
sally admitted,  and  they  seem  to  have  been  considered  not 
a  rare,  but  a  very  common  phenomenon  of  mental  derange- 
ment. Indeed,  judging  from  the  frequent  mention  made  of 
them  in  all  discussions  on  the  subject,  and  from  the  fact  that 
idiocy  and  lunacy  —  which  latter  was  considered,  as  its 
name  would  lead  us  to  suspect,  to  be  of  an  intermittent 
, nature  —  constituted,  for  a  long  time,  the  only  division  of 
mental  diseases,  it  will  not,  perhaps,  be  too  strong  an  expres- 
sion to  say,  that  they  were  viewed  as  an  essential  feature  of 
mania.  This,  however,  was  in  the  infancy  of  medical  sci- 
ence, before  the  phenomena  of  mania  —  which,  until  recently, 

'  Potbier  on  Obligations,  by  Evans,  Appendix,  579. 

^  Attorney-General  v.  Parnther,  8  Brown's  Ch.  Cases,  234. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  375 

has  always  been  less  understood  than  other  diseases  —  were 
thoroughly  and  accurately  observed,  and  the  men  whose 
ideas  we  have  just  quoted  had  no  practical  acquaintance 
with  the  disorder  whose  phases  they  so  vividly  described. 
Before  adopting  their  views,  then,  it  will  be  proper  to  inquire 
how  far  they  are  supported  by  the  investigations  of  modern 
medical  science. 

§  382.  While  the  doctrine  of  lucid  intervals,  as  explained 
by  the  language  above  quoted,  is  upheld  by  scarcely  a  single 
eminent  name  in  the  medical  profession,  we  find  that  their 
existence  is  either  denied  altogether,  or  they  are  regarded  as 
being  only  a  remission,  instead  of  an  intermission  of  the  dis- 
ease; an  abatement  of  the  severity  of  the  symptoms,  not 
a  temporary  cure.  Mr.  Haslam,  who  is  no  mean  authority 
on  any  question  connected  with  insanity,  emphatically  de- 
clares, that,  "  as  a  constant  observer  of  this  disease  for  more 
than  twenty-five  years,  I  cannot  affirm  that  the  lunatics,  with 
whom  I  have  had  daily  intercourse,  have  manifested  alterna- 
tions of  insanity  and  reason.  They  may  at  intervals  become 
more  tranquil,  and  less  disposed  to  obtrude  their  distempered 
fancies  into  notice.  For  a  time  their  minds  may  be  less 
active,  and  the  succession  of  their  thoughts  consequently 
more  deliberate  ;  they  may  endeavor  to  effect  some  desirable 
purpose,  and  artfully  conceal  their  real  opinions,  but  they 
have  not  abandoned,  nor  renounced  their  distempered  no- 
tions. It  is  as  unnecessary  to  repeat  that  a  few  coherent 
sentences  do  not  constitute  the  sanity  of  the  intellect;  as 
that  the  sounding  of  one  or  two  notes  of  a  keyed  instrument 
could  ascertain  it  to  be  in  tune."  ^ 

§  383.  Strong  as  this  testimony  is,  and  true,  no  doubt, 
as  the  result  of  an  individual's  experience,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  others,  whose  opportunities  have  not  been  less 
than  Mr.  Haslam's,  have  distinctly  recognized  the  existence 
of  intervals,  when  the  patient  not  only  becomes  more  tran- 
quil and  reserved,  but  is  conscious  of  having  been  mad,  and 
perceives  the  folly  of  the  delusions  that  have  engrossed  his 

^  Medical  Jurisprudeiice,  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  224. 


376  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

thoughts.  But  SO  far  are  they  from  attributing  to  the  mind, 
during  their  occurrence,  that  degree  of  soundness  which  is 
contended  for  in  the  passages  above  quoted,  that  they  have 
taken  great  care  to  inculcate  a  very  different  doctrine.  "  The 
mania,"  says  Fodere,  "  which  is  accompanied  by  fury,  is  very 
often  periodical;  that  is,  as  if  granting  an  occasional  truce 
to  the  patient,  it  appears  only  at  certain  epochs,  between 
which  he  enjoys  all  his  reason,  and  seems  to  conduct  and 
judge  in  all  respects  like  other  men,  if  we  except  in  regard  to 
certain  ideas  the  thought  of  which  may  at  any  time  occasion 
a  fresh  paroxysm."  ^ 

§  384.  Georget,  while  he  speaks  of  lucid  intervals  "  as 
returns  to  reason,"  is  careful  to  add,  that,  "  in  this  state, 
patients  frequently  experience  some  degree  of  malaise^  some 
disturbance  of  their  ideas,  and  weakness  of  mind,  which 
prevents  them  from  fixing  their  attention,  for  any  length  of 
time,  on  a  particular  subject;  from  engaging  in  reading, 
writing,  or  attending  to  their  affairs."  ^ 

§  385.  "  There  are  few  cases  of  mania  or  melancholy," 
says  Dr.  Reid,  "  where  the  light  of  reason  does  not  now  and 
then  shine  out  between  the  clouds.  In  fevers  of  the  mind 
as  well  as  those  of  the  body,  there  occur  frequent  intermis- 
sions. But  the  mere  interruption  of  a  disorder  is  not  to  be 
mistaken  for  its  cure,  or  its  ultimate  conclusion.  Little  stress 
ought  to  be  laid  upon  those  occasional  and  uncertain  disen- 
tanglements  of  intellect,  in  which  the  patient  is  for  a  time 
only,  extricated  from  the  labyrinth  of  his  morbid  hallucina- 
tions. Madmen  may  show,  at  starts,  more  sense  than  ordi- 
nary men."  ^ 

§  386.  Dr.  Combe,  in  one  of  the  most  philosophical 
treatises  on  Insanity,  which  the  present  century  has  pro- 
duced, expresses  similar  views  in  the  most  explicit  and 
forcible  language.  "  But  however  calm  and  rational  the 
patient  may  appear  to  be,  during  the  lucid  intervals,  as  they 


'  De  Medecine  Legale,  i.  205,  §  140. 

*  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  46. 

'  Essays  on  Hypochondriacal  and  other  Nervous  Affections  :  21st  Essay. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  377 

are  called,  and  while  enjoying  the  quietude  of  domestic 
society,  or  the  limited  range  of  a  well-regulated  asylum,  it 
must  never  be  supposed,  that  he  is  in  as  perfect  possession 
of  his  senses,  as  if  he,  had  never  been  ill.  In  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances and  under  ordinary  excitement,  his  perceptions 
may  be  accurate,  and  his  judgment  perfectly  sound ;  but  a 
degree  of  irritability  of  brain  remains  behind,  which  renders 
him  unable  to  withstand  any  unusual  emotion,  any  sudden 
provocation,  or  any  unexpected  and  pressing  emergency. 
Were  not  this  the  case,  it  is  manifest  that  he  would  not  be 
more  liable  to  a  fresh  paroxysm,  than  if  he  had  never  been 
attacked.  And  the  opposite  is  notoriously  the  fact ;  for 
relapses  are  always  to  be  dreaded,  not  only  after  a  lucid 
interval,  but  even  after  perfect  recovery.  And  it  is  but  just 
as  well  as  proper  to  keep  this  in  mind,  as  it  has  too  often 
happened,  that  the  lunatic  has  been  visited  with  the  heaviest 
responsibility,  for  acts  committed  during  such  an  interval, 
which,  previous  to  the  first  attack  of  the  disease,  he  would 
have  shrunk  from  with  horror."  ^ 

§  387.  With  the  views  of  these  distinguished  observers 
before  us,  what  are  we  to  think  of  the  doctrine,  that  in  the 
lucid  intervals  the  mind  is  restored  to  its  natural  strength 
and  soundness;  that  it  is  capable  of  as  great  intellectual 
exertions,  and  of  holding  as  tight  a  rein  over  the  passions ; 
that  it  is  as  able  to  resist  foreign  influence  and  to  act  on  its 
own  determination,  with  its.  ordinary  prudence  and  forecast ; 
that  "  having  thrown  off  the  disease,  it  has  recovered  its 
general  habit,"  or  that  it  has  undergone  a  "  temporary  cure  "  ? 
Sounder  pathology  was  never  written,  than  is  contained  in 
the  extract  from  Dr.  Combe,  and  no  physician,  who  has  been 
much  conversant  with  the  insane,  will  be  disposed  to  ques- 
tion its  correctness.  Fodere  goes  a  step  further  and  hazards 
a  theory  which  is  plausible,  at  least,  to  explain  the  pathologi- 
cal causes  that  produce  this  alternation  of  paroxysms  and 
lucid  intervals.  The  former  state,  he  considers,  is  attended 
by  an  excessive  plethora  of  the  blood-vessels  of  the  brain, 

^  Observations  on  Mental  Derangement,  241. 
32* 


378  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

and  the  latter  by  a  relaxed,  atonic  condition  of  these  vessels, 
which  is  an  effect  of  their  previous  forcible  distension.  In 
this  condition  they  are  liable  to  be  suddenly  engorged  by 
exciting  causes,  such  as  intemperance  in  eating  or  drinking, 
anger,  violent  exercise,  insolation,  etc.;  or  in  consequence  of 
a  certain  predisposition  of  constitution.^  Indeed,  it  is  well 
known,  that  the  return  of  the  paroxysms  is  often  retarded  by 
regulated  diet,  bleeding,  quiet,  seclusion,  kind  treatment,  and 
the  absence  of  the  above-named  stimuli.  It  is  thus  shown, 
conclusively,  that  in  every  lucid  interval,  there  remains  some 
unsoundness  of  the  material  organ  of  the  mind,  which  may 
be  designated  generally  as  a  morbid  irritability,  which,  on 
the.  application  of  the  slightest  exciting  cause,  may  produce 
an  outbreak  of  mania  in  all  its  original  severity. 

§  388.  The  principle  of  law,  which  holds  the  civil  respon- 
sibilities of  the  insane  to  be  unimpaired  during  the  lucid 
interval,  we  are  willing  to  admit,  is  generally  correct.  It 
should  be  the  duty  of  courts,  however,  to  view  their  acts 
done  at  such  times,  with  the  most  watchful  jealousy,  because 
their  minds,  though  left  free  from  all  delusion,  are  neverthe- 
less weak  and  irritable,  and  they  may  be  easily  induced  by 
the  arts  of  unprincipled  men,  to  enter  into  transactions,  the 
folly  of  which  would  have  been  obvious  enough  to  them  be- 
fore they  began  to  be  insane.  Although  inclined  to  believe 
that  the  restoration  of  the  mind  during  the  lucid  interval  is 
far  from  being  so  perfect,  as  it  .is  represented  by  the  legal 
authorities  above  quoted,  yet  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say,  that 
the  proof  of  its  occurrence  should  be  as  strong  as  they  re- 
quire it.  D' Aguesseau,  in  continuation  of  the  remarks  above 
quoted,  declares,  that,  "  as  it  is  impossible  to  judge  in  a 
moment  of  the  quality  of  an  interval,  it  is  requisite  that  there 
should  be  a  sufficient  length  of  time  for  giving  a  perfect 
assurance  of  the  temporary  recstablishment  of  reason,  which 
it  is  not  possible  to  define  in  general,  and  which  depends 
upon  the  different  kinds  of  fury,  but  it  is  certain  there  must 
be  a  time  and  a  considerable  time."     Lord  Thurlow,  also,  on 

»  De  MtJdicine  Legale,  i.  208,  §  140. 


LUCID    INTERVALS.  379 

the  same  occasion  which  elicited  his  views  of  the  nature  of 
the  lucid  interval,  says,  that  "  the  evidence  in  support  of  the 
allegation  of  a  lucid  interval,  after  derangement  at  any  period 
has  been  established,  should  be  as  strong  and  demonstrative 
of  such  fact,  as  where  the  object  of  the  proof  is  to  establish 
derangement.^  The  evidence  in  such  a  casej  applying  to 
stated  intervals,  ought  to  go  to  the  state  and  habit  of  the 
person,  and  not  to  the  accidental  interview  of  an  individual, 


^  It  appears  from  a  note  in  1  Beck's  Med.  Juris.  586,  that  Lord  Eldon 
dissented  from  tliis  proposition,  and  thus  stated  his  objections  to  it  to  Lord 
Thurlow  himself.  "  I  have  seen  you  exercising  the  duties  of  Lord  Chan- 
cellor with  ample  sufficiency  of  mind  and  understanding,  and  with  the 
greatest  ability.  Now  if  Providence  should  afflict  you  with  a  fever,  which 
should  have  the  efi«ct  of  taking  away  that  sanity  of  mind  for  a  considerable 
time  (for  it  does  not  signify  whether  it  is  the  disease  insanity,  or  a  fever  that 
makes  you  insane),  would  any  one  say,  that  it  required  such  very  strong 
evidence  to  show  that  your  mind  was  restored  to  the  power  of  performing 
such  an  act  as  making  a  will,  —  an  act,  to  the  performance  of  which  a  per- 
son of  ordinary  intelligence  is  competent  ?  "  We  are  not  informed  how 
this  objection  struck  Lord  Thurlow,  but  we  trust  that  no  reader  of  the 
present  work  will  be  at  a  loss  to  perceive  its  weakness  for  a  moment.  It 
does  signify  every  thing,  whether  it  is  the  disease  insanity  or  a  fever  that 
makes  one  insane,  for  the  delirium  of  fever  is  but  a  casual  symptom  of  that 
disease,  and,  together  with  the  pathological  condition  that  gave  rise  to  it,  is 
presumed  to  disappear  with  the  main  disorder  on  which  it  depends.  This 
is  the  ordinary  course  of  nature.  On  the  contrary,  mental  alienation  is  the 
essential,  the  pathognomic,  and,  oftentimes,  the  only  clearly  discernible 
symptom  of  mania,  and  its  disappearance  furnishes  the  only  intimation  per- 
haps that  we  have  of  the  cure  of  this  disease.  Thus  ourmeans  of  deciding 
this  point  being  so  small,  we  are  necessarily  led  to  require  stronger  evidence 
of  their  certainty,  than  of  the  restoration  of  the  mind  in  fever,  because  the 
latter  is  confirmed  by  a  multitude  of  symptoms.  Recovery  from  an'  attack 
of  fever  is  a  phenomenon,  that  any  one  can  see,  but  not  such  is  recovery 
from  an  attack  of  mania;  because,  though  the  insane  delusions  or  conduct 
by  which  it  was  manifested  may  disappear,  it  remains  to  be  determined  in 
every  case,  whether  they  are  not  purposely  concealed  from  observation,  or 
proper  opportunity  has  been  offered  to  the  patient  to  bring  them  forward. 
Just  as  the  existence  of  mania  requires  stronger  proof  than  that  of  the  de- 
lirium of  fever,  so  does  recovery  from  the  former  require  stronger  proof 
than  recovery  from  the  latter. 

The  views  expressed  in  this  note  were  subsequently  maintained  by  Mr. 
Justice  Dewey,  in  Hix  v.  WhUtemore,  4  Metcalf,  545. 


380  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

or  to  the  degree  of  self-possession  in  any  particular  act."  It 
may  be  well  to  inquire  how  far  these  views  are  sustained  by 
subsequent  decisions. 

§  389.  In  law  and  equity  courts  there  seems  to  have  been 
little  disposition,  in  civil  cases,  to  question  their  correctness.^ 
In  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  however,  there  has  occurred  some 
discrepancy  of  opinion,  both  as  to  the  exact  nature  of  the 
lucid  interval,  and  the  kind  of  proof  required  to  establish  its 
existence.  In  a  commendable  respect  for  the  sacred  charac- 
ter of  testamentary  acts,  they  have  assumed  considerable 
latitude,  and,  no  doubt,  very  properly,  in  their  construction  of 
lucid  intervals;  but  occasionally  they  have  gone  further  than 
even  the  truths  of  pathology  will  warrant. 

§  390.  In  Cartivri^ht  v.  Cartwrig-ht,'^  the  deceased,  a  single 
woman,  made  her  will  on  the  14th  of  August,  1775,  which 
will  was  contested  on  the  ground  of  the  insanity  of  the  tes- 
tator. "  It  was  proved  in  general,"  says  the  court,  "  that  her 
habit  and  condition  of  body,  and  her  manner,  for  several 
months  before  the  date  of  the  will,  was  that  of  a  person 
afflicted  with  many  of  the  worst  symptoms  of  that  dreadful 
disease,  and  continued  so  certainly  after  making  the  will." 
It  appears  from  the  evidence,  that  for  some  time  previous  to 
the  date  of  the  will,  she  was  very  importunate  for  the  use  of 
pen,  ink,  and  paper,  which,  however,  were  withheld  from  her 
by  the  direction  of  her  physician.  Dr.  Battle,  who  was  emi- 
nent for  his  knowledge  and  treatment  of  mental  disorders. 
Her  importunity  continuing,  he  at  length  consented,  in  order 
to  quiet  and  pacify  her,  that  she  might  have  them,  observing 
that  it  did  not  signify  what  she  might  write,  as  she  was  not 
fit  to  make  a  proper  use  of  pen,  ink,  and  paper.  These  being 
carried  to  her,  her  hands,  which  had  been  constantly  tied, 
were  loosed,  and  she  sat  down  to  a  bureau  to  write.  Her 
attendants,  who  were  watching  her  outside  the  door,  saw  her 
write  on  several  pieces  of  paper  in  succession,  which  she 
tore  up  and  threw  into  the  grate,  walking  up  and  down  the 

*  See  Hall  v.  Wairen,  9  Vesey ;  exparte  Holyland,  11  Vesey. 
»  1  Phillimore,  90. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  381 

room  in  a  wild  and  ferocious  manner,  and  muttering  to  her- 
self. After  one  or  two  hours  spent  in  this  manner,  she  finally 
succeeded  in  writing  a  will  that  suited  her,  though  it  occu- 
pied but  a  few  lines.  Such  are  the  facts  that  have  any  bear- 
ing on  the  point  at  issue.  It  was  decided  by  the  court,  Sir 
William  Wynne,  that  she  had  a  lucid  interval  while  making 
the  will,  the  validity  of  which  was  consequently  established. 
The  grounds  of  this  decision  were,  that  the  will  made  a 
natural  and  consistent  distribution  of  her  property,  and,  in 
short,  that  it  was  "a  rational  act  rationally  done  ; "  hence  it 
was  to  be  inferred,  that  her  mind  was  visited  by  a  lucid  inter- 
val, at  the  moment  of  making  it.  "  For,"  says  the  court,  "  I 
think  the  strongest  and  best  proof,  that  can  arise  as  to  a  lucid 
interval,  is  that  which  arises  from  the  act  itself;  that  I  look 
upon  as  the  thing  to  be  first  examined,  and  if  it  can  be 
proved  and  established,  that  it  is  a  rational  act  rationally 
done,  the  whole  case  is  proved."  It  seems  to  have  occurred 
to  the  court,  that  some  catenation  must  be  made  out  between 
such  an  act  and  a  lucid  interval ;  and  it  being  in  evidence, 
that,  at  times,  she  would  converse  rationally,  we  have  the 
following  deductions  therefrom.  "  If  she  could  converse  ra- 
tionally, that  is  a  lucid  interval ;  and  that  she  did  so  and  had 
lucid  intervals,  I  think  is  completely  established."  The  fact 
is,  that  the  court,  throughout  its  whole  judgment,  confounded 
testamentary  capacity  with  a  lucid  interval,  without  once 
seeming  to  be  aware  that  though  the  will  might  be  a  rational 
act,  and,  therefore,  perhaps  valid,  it  by  no  means  followed, 
that  a  lucid  interval  had  taken  place.  What  it  considered  as 
such  here  scarcely  amounted  to  the  kind  of  remission  de- 
scribed by  Mr.  Haslam  (§  328),  for  not  a  single  fact  appears 
in  the  evidence,  from  which  we  can  infer  any  alteration  what- 
ever in  the  state  of  her  disease.  True,  the  court  thought  that 
her  reason  had  returned,  because,  though  released  from  the 
confinement  of  a  strait  waistcoat,  and  trusted  with  a  candle, 
she  did  no  mischief  and  did  not  abuse  her  liberty;  but  such 
things  would  have  little  weight  with  medical  men,  especially 
at  the  present  day.     Nothing,  indeed,  can  be  more  chimeri- 


382  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

cal,  because  so  utterly  contradicted  by  all  that  we  know  of 
insanity,  than  this  idea  of  a  lucid  interval  of  a  few  minutes' 
duration  suddenly  interposed  amid  years  of  mania,  and  as 
suddenly  disappearing.^  The  point  particularly  insisted  upon 
by  the  judge  is,  that  she  would  sometimes  converse  rationally, 
as  indeed  most  insane  people  do.  "  If,"  he  says,  "  she  had 
particular  subjects  or  topics  in  her  mind,  and  at  such  times 
would  converse  rationally  upon  them,  and  when  those  topics 
were  out  of  her  mind  would  fly  into  outrages  of  frenzy  and 
extravagance,  does  that  all  show  that  at  the  former  time  she 
was  deprived  of  rational  capacity  ?  "  He  does  not  seem  to 
be  aware,  that  madmen  are  every  day  doing  rational  acts, 
and  that  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  wills  should  sometimes 
be  found  among  the  number. 

§  391.  We  have  no  fault  to  find  with  the  principle  of  law 
which  makes  these  wills  valid,  but  we  would  have  the  ground 
on  which  such  validity  is  established,  distinctly  understood 
to  be  the  character  of  the  act,  not  the  condition  of  the  tes- 
tator's mind ;  and  if,  in  the  above  case,  the  court  had  been 
contented  with  proving  the  will  to  be  a  rational  act,  and 
thence  inferring  testamentary  capacity,  there  would  have 
been  nothing  to  complain  of  It  is  important  that  on  sub- 
jects like  medical  jurisprudence,  language  should  be  used 
with  strict  adherence  to  its  original  and  proper  signification  ; 
and  therefore  when  a  lucid  interval  is  defined  by  competent 
authority  to  be  a  "  temporary  cure "  of  the  disease,  a  re- 
covery of  the  mind's  general  habit,  the  occurrence  of  which 
must  be  proved  by  the  "  state  and  habit,"  of  the  person, 
observed  during  a  sufficient  length  of  time,  we  have  to  com- 
plain,-that  the  term  is  applied  by  others  to  a  mere  remission 


^  Its  consetjuences  seem  to  render  it  as  pernicious  as  it  is  absurd.  In  the 
trial  of  Hadfield  for  shooting  at  the  king,  Lord  Kenyon,  after  admitting 
that  he  Avas  insane  both  before  and  after  the  act,  and  that  it  was  improbable 
he  had  recovered  his  senses  in  the  interim,  declared,  that  "  were  they  to  run 
into  nicety,  proof  might  be  demanded  of  his  insanity,  at  the  precise  moment 
when  the  act  was  committed  !"  as  if  such  proof  were  not  utterly  beyond  the 
reach  of  human  means. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  383 

in  the  violence  of  the  symptoms,  which  lasts  but  a  few  min- 
utes, and  is  proved  by  a  single  coherent  act. 

§  392.  The  construction  here  put  upon  the  lucid  interval, 
not  only  conflicts  with  the  opinions  of  the  eminent  authori- 
ties we  have  quoted,  but  has  not  been  countenanced  by  sub- 
sequent decisions  even  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts.  In  a 
recent  case,  where  the  testamentary  acts  of  an  insane  per- 
son were  propounded  by  the  executors  who  endeavored 
to  prove  the  occurrence  of  a  lucid  interval  at  the  time  of 
their  execution,  the  court.  Sir  John  Nicholl,  decided  that 
the  proof  was  not  sufficient,  though  it  was  unquestionably 
stronger  than  in  the  case  of  Cartivright  v.  Cartivright. 
The  surgeon  of  the  testator  who  saw  him  once  within 
the  period  —  a  little  more  than  ten  months  —  that  included 
the  two  wills  in  question,  and  commenced  a  frequent  at- 
tendance on  him  between  two  and  three  months  afterwards, 
deposed,  that  on  none  of  these  occasions  did  he  exhibit 
any  symptoms  of  insanity,  but  "  conducted  himself,  and 
talked  and  discoursed  in  a  rational  manner,  and  was  in 
the  full  possession  of  his  mental  faculties."  The  solicitor 
who  took  the  instructions  for  the  last  will,  considered  him  of 
sound  mind,  and  deposed  that  neither  of  the  witnesses 
treated  him  as  a  person  of  diseased  intellect  or  of  unsound 
mind.  In  the  testamentary  dispositions  themselves,  there 
was  nothing  to  negative  the  idea  of  the  most  perfect  sound- 
ness of  mind.  In  view  of  the  fact,  however,  that  the  testa- 
tor was  so  deranged  that  he  was  attended  by  a  keeper  from 
a  lunatic  asylum,  till  within  a  few  months  of  the  date  of  the 
first  will,  and  frequently  manifested  absurd  delusions  during 
the  period  including  both  wills,  the  above  proof  was  not  con- 
sidered as  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  reasoning  upon  the 
general  principles  of  insanity.  "  It  is  clear,"  said  the  court, 
"  that  persons  essentially  insane  may  be  calm,  may  do  acts, 
hold  conversations,  and  even  pass  in  general  society  as  per- 
fectly sane.  It  often  requires  close  examination  by  persons 
skilled  in  the  disorder,  to  discover  and  ascertain  whether  or 
not  the  mental  derangement  is  removed,  and  the  mind  again 
become  perfectly    sound.     When    there    is  calmness,  when 


384  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

there  is  rationality  on  ordinary  subjects,  those  who  see  the 

party  usually  conclude  that  his  recovery  is  perfect 

Where  there  is  not  actual  recovery,  and  a  return  to  the 
management  of  himself  and  his  concerns  by  the  unfortunate 
individual,  the  proof  of  a  lucid  interval  is  extremely  diffi- 
cult." ^  Whatever  confidence  the  civil  law  may  repose  in  the 
evidence  furnished  by  the  character  of  the  testamentary  act 
touching  the  mental  condition  of  the  testator,  it  is  distinctly 
enough  inculcated  in  the  above  quotations,  that  such  evi- 
dence is  not  necessarily  to  prevail  over  that  which  is  drawn 
from  his  daily  walk  and  conversation.  When,  however, 
sanity  is  confessedly  doubtful  merely,  then  "  the  agent  is  to 
be  inferred  rational,  from  the  character  broadly  taken  of  his 
act."  ^ 

§  393.  It  has  been  admitted,  that,  with  certain  reserva- 
tions, the  civil  responsibilities  of  the  insane  are  unimpaired 
during  the  lucid  interval,  because  the  mind  is  sufficiently 
restored  to  enable  the  individual  to  act  with  tolerable  discre- 
tion in  his  civil  relations.  In  respect  to  crime,  however,  the 
matter  is  altogether  different,  for  reasons  that  will  not  be 
without  their  force,  we  trust,  to  those  who  have  attentively 
considered  the  preceding  remarks.  These  reasons  are,  that 
the  crimes  which  are  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in  a 
lucid  interval  are  generally  the  result  of  the  momentary 
excitement  produced  by  sudden  provocations ;  that  these 
provocations  put  an  end  to  the  temporary  cure,  by  immedi- 
ately reproducing  that  pathological  condition  of  the  brain 
called  irritation,  and  that  this  irritation  is  the  essential  cause 


^  Groom  and  Thomas  v.  Thomas  and  Thomas,  2  Hagg.  433.  In  White 
V.  Driver,  1  riiillimore,  84,  however,  a  lucid  interval  was  held  to  be  estab- 
lished, on  much  less  proof  than  was  offered  in  the  above  case,  though  far 
more,  certainly,  than  was  admitted  in  Carhvright  v.  Cartwright.  In  a  more 
recent  case,  Chambers  v.  The  Queen's  Proctor,  2  Curteis,  415,  the  court 
as  if  following  the  principle  laid  down  in  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,  estab- 
lished the  will  of  a  man  Avho  was  admitted  to  have  entertained  insane  delu- 
sions during  the  three  days  immediately  preceding  its  execution,  and  tO' 
have  committed  suicide  the  next  day  after. 

^  Scruhy  and  Finch  v.  Fordham,  1  Addams,  74. 


LUCID   INTERVALS.  385 

of  mental  derangement  which  absolves  from  all  the  legal 
consequences  of  crime.  The  conclasion  is,  therefore,  that 
we  ought  never  perhaps  to  convict  for  a  crime  committed  dur- 
ing the  lucid  interval,  because  there  is  every  probability,  that 
the  individual  was  under  the  influence  of  that  cerebral  irrita- 
tion which  makes  a  man  insane.  The  difference  between  a 
person  in  the  lucid  interval  and  one  who  has  never  been 
insane,  on  which  we  particularly  insist,  is,  that  while  in  the 
latter,  provocations  stimulate  the  passions  to  the  highest  degree 
of  which  they  are  capable  in  a  state  of  health,  though  still 
more  or  less  under  his  control,  they  produce  in  the  former  a 
pathological  change  which  deprives  him  of  every  thing  like 
moral  liberty.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  do  more  than 
barely  state  these  views,  since  their  correctness  seems  to  have 
been  universally  recognized  in  practice,  not  a  single  case  hav- 
ing occurred,  so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  where  a  person 
has  been  convicted  of  crime  committed  during  a  lucid 
interval.  Burdened  as  the  criminal  law  is  with  false  princi- 
ples on  the  subject  of  insanity,  the  time  has  gone  by  when 
juries  will  return  a  verdict  of  guilty  against  one  who  is 
admitted  to  have  been  insane,  shortly  before  and  after  the 
criminal  act  with  which  he  is  charged.^ 

§  394.  We  should  be  careful  not  to  confound  the  period 
intervening  between  the  perfect  cure  of  one  attack  of  insanity 
and  the  occurrence  of  another  attack,  with  a  lucid  interval. 

^  We  have  been  so  long  accustomed  to  the  severity  that  characterizes  the 
spirit  of  the  English  criminal  law,  that  we  look  with  no  little  jealousy  on  any 
attempt  to  circumscribe  the  range  of  its  operation.  In  Germany,  however, 
where  no  such  influence  is  felt,  more  humane  and  scientific  views  on  the 
subject  of  responsibihty  during  the  lucid  Interval  have  found  distinguished 
supporters.  "  The  state  of  the  mind  during  the  lucid  Interval  Is  such,"  says 
Dr.  Friedreich,  "  that  a  circumstance  which  would  have  passed  unnoticed  at 
any  other  time,  here  excites  the  Individual  to  violent,  Illegal  acts."  "Who 
can  positively  decide  whether  the  criminal  act  really  happened  during  a  lucid 
Interval,  or  was  the  result  of  a  paroxysm  prematurely  provoked  by  some 
internal  or  external  cause  of  excitement  (for  during  the  lucid  interval,  the 
susceptibility  to  excitement  is  greatly  Increased),  and  which  paroxysm  might 
not  have  occurred  at  all  without  such  provocation."  —  Ueber  Zurechnung  im 
lucido  intervallo,  Neues  Archio  des  Criminalrechls,  xiv.  268. 

33 


386  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

The  renewal  of  the  disease  does  not  prove  that  it  never  has 
been  cured,  for  in  this  respect,  insanity  follows  the  same 
pathological  laws  as  gout,  rheumatism,  colic,  or  any  other 
disease.  True,  persons  who  have  experienced  repeated  attacks 
of  insanity,  generally  labor  under  a  certain  irritability  of  the 
nervous  system,  which  should  lead  us  to  be  cautious  in  form- 
ing opinions  relative  to  their  moral  liberty  under  particular 
circumstances.  Whether  the  absence  of  the  disease  arise 
from  a  lucid  interval,  or  a  complete  cure,  the  occurrence  of 
certain  exciting  causes  equally  exposes  the  patient  to  a 
renewed  attack  of  the  disease  in  all  its  original  severity. 
Whenever,  therefore,  the  criminal  acts  of  one  subject  to 
repeated  acts  of  insanity,  are  called  in  question,  and  it 
appears  that  the  accused  was  under  the  influence  of  violent 
or  harassing  moral  emotions,  such  as  anger,  grief,  or  sense 
of  responsibility ;  or  of  certain  physiological  conditions,  such 
as  menstruation,  lactation,  or  the  repulsion  of  other  diseases  ; 
or  exposed  to  the  noxious  influence  of  certain  physical 
agents,  such  as  insolation,  deprivation  of  sleep,  or  blows  on 
the  head,  we  are  justified  in  considering  him  as  not  having 
been  morally  free  at  the  time  when  the  act  was  committed. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  appear  to  have  been  no  causes  of 
this  kind  in  operation,  and  the  usual  signs  of  insanity  were 
not  present,  and  especially  if  the  act  obviously  serves  some 
interest  of  the  accused,  we  can  hardly  avoid  the  conclusion, 
that  he  is  responsible  for  his  criminal  acts. 


CHAPTER     XVI. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY. 


§  395.  The  supposed  insurmountable  difficulty  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  feigned  and  real  insanity  has  conduced, 
probably  more  than  all  other  causes  together,  to  bind  the 
legal  profession  to  the  most  rigid  construction  and  applica- 
tion of  the  common  law  relative  to  this  disease,  and  is  always 
put  forward  in  objection  to  the  more  humane  doctrines  that 
have  been  inculcated  in  the  present  work.  That  some  diffi- 
culty has  been  experienced,  and  given  rise  to  much  per- 
plexity and  mistake,  cannot  be  denied ;  but  it  is  to  be 
considered,  whether  it  has  not  arisen,  less  from  the  obscurity 
of  the  subject,  than  from  the  imperfect  means  that  have  been 
generally  applied  to  its  elucidation.  The  opinions  of  phy- 
sicians, which  are  ordinarily  taken  in  doubtful  cases,  have 
been  received  with  a  deference  that  was  warranted  more  by 
general  professional  reputation,  than  by  superior  knowledge 
of  this  particular  disease.  The  treatment  of  insanity  is  now 
so  much  confined  to  the  beads  of  extensive  establishments 
in  which  its  subjects  are  congregated,  that  opportunities  for 
studying  it  are  comparatively  limited  in  ordinary  practice,  so 
that  a  physician  may  be  justly  celebrated  in  the  knowledge 
and  treatment  of  other  diseases,  and  at  the  same  time  be 
poorly  qualified  to  decide  upon  questions  relative  to  insanity, 
especially  when  every  effort  is  made  to  perplex  and  mys- 
tify his  mind.  This  truth  cannot  be  disguised,  and  though 
physicians  are  frequently  unwilling  to  believe  it,  and  are  dis- 
posed to  act  on  the  popular  notion  that  all  medical  subjects 
are  equally  familiar  to  them,  this  is  no  reason  why  courts  and 
jiiries   should   ever  forget   it.      Nothing,  indeed,   requires  a 


388  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

severer  exercise  of  a  physician's  knowledge  and  tact,  than  a 
case  of  simulated  insanity ;  but  the  same  might  be  said  with 
quite  as  much  truth,  of  other  diseases  that  men  have  been 
lei  to  feign,  but  which,  nevertheless,  are  every  day  investi- 
gated and  understood. 

§  396.  The  workings  of  an  insane  mind  —  such  as  attract 
the  popular  notice  —  are  apparently  so  confused  and  dis- 
cordant, so  wild  and  unnatural,  as  to  have  given  rise  to  the 
notion  as  prevalent  as  it  is  unfounded,  that  insanity  may  be 
easily  imitated.  The  method  that  is  in  madness,  the  con- 
stant and  consistent  reference  to  the  predominant  idea,  which 
the  practised  observer  detects  amid  the  greatest  irregularity 
of  conduct  and  language,  is  one  of  those  essential  features  in 
certain  forms  of  the  disease,  which  is  generally  overlooked, 
or  at  least  very  unsuccessfully  imitated.  Those  who  have 
been  longest  acquainted  with  the  manners  of  the  insane, 
and  whose  practical  acquaintance  with  the  disease  furnishes 
the  most  satisfactory  guaranty  of  the  correctness  of  their 
opinions,  assure  us  that  insanity  is  not  easily  feigned,  and 
consequently  that  no  attempt  at  imposition  can  long  escape 
the  efforts  of  one  properly  qualified  to  expose  it.  Georget 
does  not  believe,  "  that  a  person  who  has  not  made  the 
insane  a  subject  of  study,  can  simulate  madness  so  as  to 
deceive  a  physician  well  acquainted  with  the  disease."  ^  Mr. 
Haslam  declares,  that,  "  to  sustain  the  character  of  a  parox- 
ysm of  active  insanity,  would  require  a  continuity  of  exertion 
beyond  the  power  of  a  sane  person."  ^  Dr.  Conolly  affirms, 
"  that  he  can  hardly  imagine  a  case  which  would  be  proof 
against  an  efficient  system  of  observation."  ^  Another 
writer,  while  admitting  that  attempts  to  deceive  are  some- 
times successful,  on  accovmt  of  the  imperfect  knowledge  of 
the  operations  of  the  mind  in  health  and  disease  possessed 
by  medical  men  in  general,  observes,  however,  that  when 
we  consider  the  "  very  peculiar  complex  phenomena  which 


*  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  60. 

*  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  322. 

*  Inquiry  concerning  the  Indications  of  Insanity,  467. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  389 

characterize  true  madness,  and  reflect  on  the  general  igno- 
rance of  those  who  attempt  to  imitate  them,  we  have  no 
right  to  expect  such  a  finished  picture  as  could  impose  on 
persons  well  acquainted  with  the  real  disease."  ^  With  such 
authority  before  us,  to  urge  as  an  objection  against  the  free 
admission  of  insanity  in  excuse  for  crime,  the  extreme  diffi- 
culty of  detecting  attempts  to  feign  it,  can  no  longer  be  any 
thing  more  than  the  plea  of  ignorance  or  indolence.  The 
only  effect  such  difficulty  should  have  on  the  minds  of  those 
who  are  to  form  their  opinions  by  the  evidence  they  hear, 
should  be  to  impress  them  with  a  stronger  sense  of  the 
necessity  of  an  intimate,  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity 
on  the  part  of  the  medical  witness,  and  convince  them  that 
without  this  qualification,  the  testimony  of  the  physician  is 
but  little  better  than  that  of  any  one  else.  We  shall  nov^ 
notice  those  features  of  insanity  the  knowledge  of  which, 
either  from  their  not  being  generally  obvious,  or  not  easily 
simulated,  will  enable  us  to  distinguish  the  reality  from  the 
imitation  ;  and  as  general  mania  is  oftener  chosen  than  any 
other  form  of  mental  derangement,  for  the  purpose  of  decep- 
tion, we  shall  begin  with  that. 

§  397.  The  grand  fault  committed  by  impostors  is,  that  in 
their  anxiety  to  produce  an  imitation  that  shall  deceive,  they 
overdo  the  character  they  assume,  and  present  nothing  but  a 
clumsy  caricature.  The  representations  of  mania  put  forth 
in  the  works  of  novelists  and  poets,  with  a  few  such  admira- 
ble exceptions  as  the  Lear  and  Hamlet  of  Shakspeare,  are, 
of  all  their  attempts  to  copy  nature,  the  least  like  their 
model.  If,  then,  men  of  education,  who  may  have  had  some 
opportunities  for  observing  the  disease,  have  after  all  so 
imperfect  a  picture  of  its  phenomena  in  their  mind,  what 
success  could  be  expected  from  the  attempts  of  persons  who, 
for  the  most  part,  assume  their  task  upon  the  spur  of  the 
occasion  with  little  preparation,  and  who  have  derived  all 
their  ideas  of  madness  from  a  casual  visit  to  an  insane  hos» 
pital,   or   from   observing   the   manoeuvres   of   some   roving 

^  Cyclopaedia  of  Practical  Medicine:  Article,  Feigned  Diseases,  146. 

33* 


390  MEDICAJj  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

maniac  ?  With  such,  insanity  is  but  another  name  for  wild- 
ness,  fury,  and  unlimited  irregularity,  and  consequently  under 
the  thin  disguise  they  assume,  there  can  readily  be  detected 
a  constant  effort  to  impress  on  the  beholder  the  conviction 
they  are  anxious  to  produce,  by  the  mere  force  of  noise  and 
disorder.  The  really  insane,  except  in  the  acute  stage  of  the 
disease,  are,  generally  speaking,  not  readily  recognized  as 
such  by  a  stranger,  and  they  retain  so  much  of  the  rational 
as  to  require  an  effort  to  detect  the  impairment  of  their  facul- 
ties. In  feigned  cases,  all  this  is  very  different ;  the  person  is 
determined  that  his  4ei'angement  shall  not  be  overlooked  for 
want  of  numerous  and  obvious  manifestations  of  its  exist- 
ence. Under  this  impression,  the  impostor  is  constantly 
guilty  of  some  word  or  act  grossly  inconsistent  with  real 
insanity,  and  affording  an  easy  clew  to  the  truth  of  the  case. 

§  398.  Generally,  after  the  acute  stage  has  passed  off,  a 
maniac  has  no  difficulty  in  remembering  his  friends  and 
acquaintances,  the  places  he  has  been  accustomed  to  fre- 
quent, names,  dates,  and  events,  and  the  occurrences  of  his 
life.  The  ordinary  relations  of  things  are,  with  some  excep- 
tions, as  easily  and  clearly  perceived  as  ever,  and  his  discrim- 
ination of  character  seems  to  be  marked  by  his  usual  shrewd- 
ness. His  replies  to  questions,  though  they  may  sometimes 
indicate  delusion  or  extravagant  notions,  generally  have 
some  relation  to  the  subject,  and  show  that  it  has  occupied 
his  attention.  Now  a  person  simulating  mania  will  fre- 
quently deny  all  knowledge  of  men  or  things,  with  whom  he 
has  always  been  familiar,  especially  whenever  he  imagines 
that  such  ignorance,  if  believed,  may  be  considered  as  a 
proof  of  his  innocence.  The  very  names,  dates,  and  trans- 
actions, with  which  he  has  been  most  lately  and  intimately 
conversant,  he  will,  for  the  same  reason,  refuse  to  remember, 
while  the  real  madman  will  seldom,  if  ever,  forget  them,  in 
whatever  shapes  they  may  appear  to  his  mind,  or  with  what- 
ever.delusions  they  may  be  connected.  His  distorted  percep- 
tions may  transform  his  humble  dwelling  into  a  princely  cas- 
tle, and  the  people  about  him  into  generals  and  courtiers 
ready  to  execute  his  slightest  orders  ;  but  he  will  never  deny 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  391 

that  he  has  an  abode,  nor  forget  the  existence  or  names  of 
those  whose  station  and  duties  he  has  so  entirely  mistaken. 
Grant  his  premises,  and  oftentimes  nothing  can  be  urged* 
against  the  conclusions  of  the  madman's  reasoning ;  but  in 
simulated  madness,  the  common  error  is  to  imagine  that 
nothing  must  be  remembered  correctly,  and  that  the  more 
inconsistent  and  absurd  the  discourse,  the  better  is  the  at- 
tempt at  deception  sustained.  In  simulated  madness  there 
is  also  a,  certain  hesitation  and  appearance  of  premeditation 
in  the  succession  of  ideas,  however  incoherent,  very  different 
from  the  abruptness  and  rapidity  with  which  in  real  madness 
the  train  of  thought  is  changed.  This,  of  itself,  is  sufficient, 
in  the  majority  of  cases,  to  reveal  the  deception  to  the  prac- 
tised observer  of  insanity.  In  simulated  mania,  the  impos- 
tor, when  requested  to  repeat  his  disordered  ideas,  will  gen- 
erally do  it  correctly,  as  if  anxious  that  none  of  his  ravings 
should  escape  attention,  or  be  forgotten  ;  while  the  genuine 
patient  will  be  apt  to  wander  from  the  track,  or  introduce 
ideas  that  had  not  presented  themselves  before.  The  follow- 
ing case,  which  we  find  in  one  of  Georget's  works,  will 
furnish  an  appropriate  illustration  of  the  foregoing  remarks, 
and  give  an  insight  into  the  devices  of  imposture,  to  be 
obtained  only  from  examples. 

§  399.  "  Jean-Pierre,  aged  forty-three  years,  formerly  a 
notary,  was  brought  before  the  court  of  assizes  of  Paris,  on 
the  21st  February,  1824,  accused  of  crimes  and  misconduct, 
in  which  cunning  and  bad  faith  had  been  prominently  con- 
spicuous. He  had  already  been  condemned  for  forgery ;  and 
was  now  accused  of  forgery,  swindling,  and  incendiarism. 
When  examined  after  his  arrest,  he  answered  with  precision 
every  question  that  was  put  to  him.  But  about  a  month 
after,  he  would  no  longer  explain  himself,  talked  incohe- 
rently, and  finally  gave  way  to  acts  of  fury,  breaking  and 
destroying  every  thing  that  came  in  his  way,  and  throwing 
the  furniture  out  of  the  window.  At  the  suggestion  of  the 
medical  men  who  were  called  to  examine  him,  Jean-Pierre 
was  sent  to  the  Bicetre,  to  be  more  closely  observed.  There 
he  became  acquainted  with  another  pretended  lunatic,  ac- 


392  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

cused  also  of  forgery  and  swindling,  and  retained  in  that 
house  for  the  same  purpose,  —  that  of  being  observed  by  the 
physicians.  One  night  a  violent  fire  broke  out  at  the  Bicetre, 
in  three  different  places  at  once,  in  one  of  the  buildings  occu- 
pied by  the  insane,  which  circumstance  led  to  the  suspicion 
that  the  fire  was  the  effect  of  malice.  The  next  day  it  was 
discovered  that  the  two  supposed  madmen  had  disappeared. 
Jean-Pierre  hid  himself  in  Paris  in  a  house  where  his  wife 
was  employed,  and  where  he  was  again  arrested.  Im- 
mediately on  his  escape  from  the  Bicetre,  he  wrote  a  very 
sensible  letter  to  one  of  his  friends;  but  scarcely  had  he  been 
taken  when  he  again  assumed  the  character  of  a  madman. 
From  the  indictment,  it  appears  that  the  person  who  ran 
away  at  the  same  time  with  Jean-Pierre,  confessed  that 
they  had  formed  the  plan  of  escaping  in  company,  and  that 
they  had  profited  by  the  occurrence  of  the  fire  to  put  it  into 
execution.  He  also  said  that  Jean-Pierre  had  made  him 
swear  to  reveal  nothing ;  and  he  seems  to  have  told  as  a 
secret  to  one  of  the  officers  of  La  Force,  that  the  fire  was 
the  work  of  Jean-Pierre. 

"  All  the  witnesses,  who  had  had  any  transactions  with, 
or  known  any  thing  of  the  accused  before  his  arrest,  deposed 
that  he  always  seemed  to  them  rational  enough,  and  even 
very  intelligent  in  business.  One  of  the  prisoners  in  La 
Force,  who  occasionally  met  and  talked  with  Jean-Pierre, 
declared  that  his  conversation  was  often  very  incoherent, 
and  that  in  some  of  the  phases  of  the  moon,  his  mind  was 
much  excited.  But  these  observations  were  made  after  the 
arrest  of  the  accused.  '  It  was  his  conduct  at  the  trial,  how- 
ever, which,  more  than  any  thing  else,  proved  that  the  mad- 
ness of  Jeari-Pierre  was  only  assumed ;  for  there  is,  perhaps, 
not  one  of  his  answers  that  would  have  been  given  by  a 
madman.     The  following  are  a  few  of  them. 

"  Q.  How  old  are  you  ?  —  A.  Twenty-six  years  [he  was 
forty-three]. 

"Q.  Have  you  ever  had  any  business  with  Messrs.  Pel- 
lene  and  Desgranges  [two  of  his  dupes]  ? — A.  I  don't  know 
them. 


SIMULATED  INSANITY.  393 

"Q.  Do  you  acknowledge  the  pretended  notarial  deed 
which  you  gave  this  witness? — A.  I  do  not  understand 
this. 

"  Q.  You  have  acknowledged  this  deed  before  the  commis- 
sary of  police  ?  —  A.    It  is  possible. 

"Q.  Why,  the  day  of  your  arrest,  did  you  tear  up  the  bill 
for  three  thousand  eight  hundred  francs  ?  —  A.  I  don't  recol- 
lect. 

"Q.  You  stated  in  your  previous  examinations,  that  it 
was  because  the  bill  had  been  paid.  —  A.    It  is  possible. 

"  As  to  many  other  of  his  own  depositions  the  accused 
answered,  in  like  manner,  that  he  did  not  recollect  any  thing 
about  them. 

"  Q.  Do  you  know  this  witness  [the  portress  of  the  house 
he  lived  in]  ?  —  A.    I  don't  know  that  woman. 

"Q.  Can  you  point  out  any  person  who  was  confined  in 
La  Force  with  you,  and  who  can  give  any  account  of  your 
then  state  of  mind  ?  —  A.    I  don't  understand  this. 

"Q.  You  made  your  escape  from  the  Bicetre?  —  A.  Were 
you  there  ? 

"  Q.  At  what  hour  did  you  escape  ?  —  A.  At  one  o'clock- 
—  three  o'clock. 

"Q.  What  road  did  you  take?  — A  That  of  Meux  en 
Brie.     [He  took  that  of  Normandy.] 

"Q.  Can  you  tell  us  who  set  the  Bicetre  on  fire?  —  A.  I 
do  not  know  what  you  mean. 

"  Q.  You  wrote  a  letter  to  Captain  Froyoff  the  day  after 
your  escape  from  the  Bicetre  ?  —  A.  I  did  not  write  that 
letter.     [It  was  his  own  handwriting.] 

"  When  charged  with  setting  fire  to  the  Bicetre,  Jean- 
Pierre  uttered  the  most  horrid  imprecations,  and  incessantly 
interrupted  his  counsel  and  '  the  advocate-general  in  their 
pleadings,  with  contradictions,  ridiculous  remarks,  and 
curses."  ^ 

§  400.  In  commenting  on  this  case,  Georget  observes, 
that  "  among  those  madmen  who  have  not  entirely  lost  their 

^  Archives  general  de  Med.  viii.  182. 


394  MEDICAI«\JURISPRUDENCE   OF  IXSANITY. 

senses,  —  and  JeanrPierre  is  not  one  of  this  kind,  —  probably 
not  one  will  be  found  who  would  mistake  the  persons  with 
whom  he  has  been  connected,  who  would  not  understand 
what  a  notarial  act  is,  who  would  have  forgotten  his  actions, 
who  would  not  know  what  was  meant  when  a  memorable 
event  was  recalled  to  him,  and  who  would  make  such  sin- 
gular answers  as  ihose  we  have  quoted.  The  latter  appear 
as  so  many  contradictions  to  those  who  are  accustomed  to 
observe  the  insane.  When  people  have  completely  lost  their 
reason,  they  either  do  not  reply  to  questions  at  all,  or  branch 
off'  to  subjects  that  have  no  relation  to  the  questions  address- 
ed to  them.  I  have  seen  patients  whose  understanding  was 
reduced  to  a  few  isolated  sensations,  and  who  recognized 
their  parents  and  friends,  and  called  them  by  name.  Some,  it 
is  true,  can  recognize  nobody,  but  they  certainly  would :  not 
have  returned  ^11  the  answers  above  mentioned,  a/nd  their 
mental  disorder  would  have  been  otherwise  characterized."  ^ 

§  401.  The  change  that  takes  place  in  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  the  insane,  in  their  affections  and  desires,  furnishes  -an 
excellent  test  of  the  genuineness  of  any  particular  case,  inas- 
much as  this  fact  hai'dly  enters  into  the  popular  notions  of 
this  disease.  Perhaps  no  character  of  mania,  general  or 
partial,  is  more  common  than  that  inversion  of  feeling,  which 
is  manifested  in  reference  to  every  person  or  thing  that 
comes  within  the  circle  of  the  domestic  and  friendly  relations. 
The  feelings  of  the  parent,  child,  and  spouse,  seem  to  be 
completely  eradicated,  while  family  loses  its,  ties,  home  its 
endearments,  and  friends  their  kind  and  soothing  influence. 
Suspicion  takes  the  place  of  confiding  trust;  jealousy,  of 
love;  and  fierce  and  hostile  demeanor,  of  grace  and  suavity 
of  manner.  As  the  severity  of  the  disease  abates,  the  cur- 
rent of  the  affections  begins  to  resume  its  ordinary  direction, 
and  no  indication  of  improvement  is  more  to  be  relied  on, 
than  manifestations  of  regard  for  those  to  whom  they  are 
bound  by  ties  of  intimacy  or  relationship.  The  impostor  is 
seldom  aware  of  these  facts,  and; generally  evinces  no  settled 

^  Bes  Maladies  Meutales,  61. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  395 

diminution  of  his  attachment  to  his  family  or  friends.  He 
does  not  scruple  to  show  his  ordinary  fondness  for  his  chil- 
dren or  parents,  or  if  he  happens  to  be  aware  of  the  trait  of 
insanity  here  described,  and  has  suppressed  all  such  displays, 
the  first  menace  of  injury  to  these  objects  of  his  regard,  is 
sufficient  to  tear  away  his  disguise,  and  disclose  the  rational 
and  affectionate  man.  In  the  conspiracies  and  hostile  plans 
that  constantly  perplex  the  madman's  brain,  his  intimate 
friends  bear  the  most  prominent  part,  while  the  impostor 
always  pitches  upon  those  as  the  disturbers  of  his  peace, 
with  whom  he  has  had  some  previous  disagreement,  or  at 
least,  no  particular  intimacy. 

§  402.  In  real,  general  mania  there  is  usually  more  or  less 
insensibility  to  the  ordinary^roprieties  and  decencies  of  life, 
insomuch  that  sometimes  those  who  were  formerly  noted  for 
the  purity  of  their  manners,  freely  indulge  in  obscene  lan- 
guage and  filthy  practices.  Indeed,  it  seldom  happens  that 
in  general  mania  the  patient  preserves  the  natural  propriety 
of  his  conversation  and  manners ;  and  this  departure  from 
the  ordinary  character  will  go  far  to  distinguish  the  real  from 
the  simulated  disease. 

§  403.  If,  as  we  have  endeavored  to  prove  elsewhere? 
mania  arises  from  cerebral  disorder,  we  might  reasonably 
expect  to  find  it  giving  rise  to  physical  disturbances  of  more 
or  less  moment,  and,  accordingly,  in  most  cases,  it  actually  is 
manifested  by  various  pathological  symptoms  which  no 
device  of  imposture  can  ever  imitate.  To  say  nothing  of 
the  wildness  of  the  eye,  and  a  certain  strangeness  of  expres- 
sion, as  easily  recognized  when  once  impressed  on  the  mind, 
as  it  is  difficult  to  describe,  there  is  some  degree  of  febrile 
action  which  it  requires  no  very  labored  examination  to 
discover.  The  pulse  will  generally  be  found  more  frequent 
than  in  health,  and  when  this  increased  frequency  is  observed 
in  doubtful  cases,  it  will  furnish  a  strong  collateral  proof  of  the 
genuineness  of  the  mental  disorder.  In  the  case  of  a  crimi- 
nal condemned  to  be  executed  who  was  suspected  of  feign- 
ing madness,  the  opinion  of  the  late  Dr.  Rush  was  requested, 
and  when  that  critical  observer  of  disease  found  the  pulse 


396  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

twenty  beats  more  frequent  than  in  the  natural  state,  he 
decided,  chiefly  on  the  strength  of  this  fact,  that  the  prisoner 
was  really  insane,^  and  such  he  finally  proved  to  be  beyond  a 
doubt.  Of  course,  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that  whenever 
the  pulse  remains  at  the  natural  standard,  the  plea  of  mad- 
ness is  fictitious,  nor  vice  versa ;  it  is  mentioned  merely  as  a 
valuable  means  in  connection  with  others,  of  arriving  at 
correct  conclusions  in  doubtful  cases. 

§  404.  Sleeplessness,  which  is  so  common  in  mania,  is 
another  of  those  symptoms,  the  presence  of  which  may 
furnish  conclusive  proof  of  real  insanity,  and  though  its 
absence  would  hardly  warrant  the  contrary  conclusion,  it 
would  certainly  produce  strong  suspicions,  and  thus  give 
additional  weight  to  less  prominent  symptoms.  In  real 
mania,  the  patient  will  be  days  and  even  a  week  without 
sleep,  while  the  simulator,  if  aware  of  this  feature  of  the 
disease,  will  be  observed,  when  faithfully  watched,  not  to 
protract  his  sleeplessness  to  any  thing  like  the  period  which  it 
commonly  remains  in  the  real  disease.  In  fact,  in  spite  of 
all  his  efforts,  sound  sleep  will  invariably  overtake  him  before 
the  second  or  third  day.  Impostors  almost  always  attempt 
to  imitate  the  nocturnal  restlessness  and  disorder  of  maniacs, 
but  the  imitation  is  as  different  from  the  reality,  as  the 
occasional  disturbance  by  sound  slumbers  can  make  it,  —  a 
difference  which  it  would  require  but  little  watching  to 
establish. 

§  405.  Perhaps  there  is  nothing  which  of  itself  furnishes 
a  better  test  in  doubtful  cases,  than  the  manner  of  their  inva- 
sion. Weil-marked,  real  mania  seldom  occurs  suddenly,  but 
is  preceded,  as  has  been  elsewhere  noticed,  by  a  course  of 
preliminary  symptoms  which  occupy  a  period  of  more  or 
less  duration,  and  which,  though  they  do  not  always  suggest 
to  the  beholder  the  suspicion  of  derangement,  will,  when  the 
disease  has  become  indubitably  established,  be  recollected  as 
having  appeared  strange  and  unaccountable.  In  simulated 
insanity,  on  the  contrary,  the  invasion  is  as  sudden  as  is  most 

^  Introductory  Lectures,  369. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  397 

frequently  the  occasion  tjiat  leads  to  it.  The  simulator  being 
unaware  of  the  progressive  nature  of  the  invasion,  suddenly, 
in  the  midst  of  health,  startles  his  attendants  by  an  outbreak 
of  the  most  extravagantly  wild  and  furious  conduct,  while  the 
minutest  inquiries  will  fail  to  establish  the  previous  existence 
of  any,  precursory  symptoms.  No  instance  of  strange,  or 
eccentric  conduct  or  language,  not  the  slightest  departure 
from  the  individual's  natural  thoughts  and  affections,  or 
manner  of  manifesting  them,  nor  any  indications  of  bodily 
derangement,  will  have  been  observed  by  those  who  were 
about  his.  person.  When,  therefore,  the  disease  has  come 
on  in  this  manner,  it  may  be  safely  concluded,  if  there  be 
any  the  least  ground  of  suspicion,  that  the  case  is  one  of 
simulation. 

§  406.  When  other  tests  fail,  the  habits  and  constitutional 
peculiarities  of  the  individual  may  sometimes  furnish  us  with 
valuable  information.  If,  for  instance,  the  person  have  in- 
dulged in  intemperate  drinking,  the  occurrence  of  mejital 
derangement  would  be  no  unnatural  sequel  to  the  sudden 
abstinence  from  intoxicating  drinks  to  which  prisoners  are 
generally  subjected.  If  insanity  have  been  a  disease  of  his 
family,  more  especially  if  it  have  been  manifested  in  former 
periods  of  his  life,  when  there  existed  no  motive  for  decep- 
tion, there  must  be  additional  evidence  strong  enough  to 
counterbalance  the  presumption  drawn  from  this  fact,  to 
induce  the  belief  that  the  case  is  one  of  simulation.  When, 
too,  the  person  is  well  known  to  possess  an  irritable,  ner- 
vous temperament,  inordinately  excited  by  moral  or  physical 
causes,  this  fact  will  very  justly  raise  a  bias  in  his  favor,  and 
lead  us  to  require  so  much  additional  weight  in  the  proofs  of 
deception  ;  and  its  force  will  be  strengthened  by  the  consid- 
eration, that  the  circumstances  in  which  he  has  been  recently 
placed,  are  of  the  very  kind  most  calculated  to  produce  the 
effect  to  which  he  is  thus  predisposed. 

§  407.  In  real  mania  there  is  usually  an  extreme  irrita- 
bility of  temper  which  makes  the  person  impatient  of  the 
least  contradiction,  and  is  constantly  breaking  out  into 
furious  gusts  of  passion,  as  sudden  as  the  apparent  causes 

34 


398  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

are  inadequate  to  account  for  therai  This  feature  of  mania 
is  not  easily  imitated,  and  nothing  less  than  long  personal 
observation  of  the  insane,  joined  with  no  inconsiderable 
powers  of  mimicry,  would  enable  the  simulator  to  arrive  at 
even  an  approximation  to  the  reality.  When,  therefore,  the 
pretended  madman  maintains  his  temper  under  various  little 
annoyances  and  contradictions,  or  only  displays  a  clumsily- 
enacted  passion,  it  may  be  pretty  safely  concluded  that  he  is 
feigning  the  disease. 

§  408.  Generally,  persons  feigning  mania,  lack  the  bold, 
unflinching  look  of  real  maniacs;  they  never  look  the  physi- 
cian steadily  in  the  face,  nor  allow  him  to  fix  their  eye;  and 
on  being  accused,  their  change  of  countenance  plainly  be- 
trays that  they  are  conscious  of  the  nature  of  the  charge. 
Dr.  Hennen  speaks  of  an  instance  where  a  person  feigning 
madness,  confessed  that  he  could  not  support  the  inquiring 
glance  of  the  physician  who  examined  him.^ 

§.  409.  It  is  a  well  known  fact  that  in  real  insanity,  the 
system  becomes  singularly  insensible  to  the  power  of  certain 
medicines  —  particularly  emetics,  drastic  purgatives,  and 
opium.  A  dose  of  the  last  article,  which  would  not  procure 
a  moment's  sleep  to  a  real  maniac,  would  completely  over- 
power the  simulator,  and  in  doubtful  cases  the  result  of  this 
experiment  should  be  entitled  to  considerable  weight.  The 
same  may  also  be  said  of  experiments  on  the  effect  of  other 
narcotics. 

§  410.  Partial  insanity,  in  consequence  of  the  superior 
difficulty  of  the  attempt,  is  much  less  frequently  simulated, 
and  with  a  much  smaller  degree  of  success,  than  the  general 
form  of  the  disease.  Those  who  undertake  it  "  are  defi- 
cient," says  Haslam,  "in  j,he  presiding  principle,  the  ruling 
delusion,  the  unfounded  aversions,  and  causeless  attachments 
which  characterize  insanity,  —  they  are  unable  to  mimic  the 
solemn  dignity  of  characteristic  madness,  nor  recur  to  those 
associations  which  mark  this  disorder;  and  they  will  want 
the  peculiarity  of  look  which  so  strongly  impresses  an  expe- 

*  Principles  of  Military  Surgery,  364. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  399 

rienced  observer."  ^  The  mental  and  physical  peculiarities  of 
partial  mania  are  of  a  kind  that  do  not  obtrude  themselves 
on  the  observation,  and  instead  of  loudly  proclaiming  the 
presence  of  a  crazed  condition,  and  soliciting  the  attention  of 
the  beholder,  some  investigation  is  required  before  they  are 
discovered.  All  this  is  contrary  to  the  purposes  of  the  simu- 
lator, which  require  that  an  immediate  and  powerful  impres- 
sion should  be  made  on  those  in  whose  charge  he  is  placed. 
If,  however,  in  consequence  of  ignorance  or  presumption, 
these  difficulties  are  unknown  or  under-estimated,  and  the 
task  of  simulating  partial  madness  is  assumed,  we  have  only 
to  bear  in  mind  the  characteristic  features  of  the  affection,  to 
detect  the  counterfeit  almost  at  a  glance.  In  real  mono- 
mania the  patient  seldom  troubles  himself  to  make  the  sub- 
ject of  his  delusion  square  with  other  notions  with  which  it 
has  more  or  less  relation,  and  the  spectator  wonders  that  he 
can  possibly  help  observing  the  inconsistency  of  his  ideas, 
and  that  when  pointed  out  to  him,  he  should  seem  to  be  in- 
different to  or  unaware  of  this  fact.  In  the  simulator,  on  the 
contrary,  the  experienced  physician  will  detect  an  unceasing 
endeavor  to  soften  down  the  palpable  absurdity  of  his  delu- 
sions, or  reconcile  them  with  correct  and  rational  notions. 
This  too  obvious  anxiety  to  produce  an  impression,  strongly 
contrasts  with  the  reserve  and  indifference  of  the  real  disor- 
der, and  will,  of  itself,  furnish  almost  conclusive  proof  of  sim- 
ulation. In  partial  mania,  the  subject  of  the  delusion,  though 
it  may  frequently  change,  completely  occupies  the  mind  for  a 
longer  or  shorter  period,  and  the  patient's  discourse,  when 
he  wanders,  will  always  have  some  relation  to  it.  When 
this  form  of  the  disease  is  simulated,  the  delusions  are  not 
only  frequently  changing,  but  when  questioned  concerning 
them,  the  person  is  more  likely  than  not  to  shape  his  answer 
without  any  reference  to  the  subject,  and  embrace  the  oppor- 
tunity to  introduce  a  new  insane  idea.  Nothing  irritates  a 
monomaniac  more  than  to  be  called  insane.  He  stoutly 
repels  the  idea,  and  maintains  the  reality  and  correctness  of 

^  Medical  Jurisprudence  as  it  relates  to  Insanity,  323. 


400  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

his  delusions.  The  simulator,  on  the  contrary,  will  be  but 
little  inclined  to  discourage  a  belief  which  it  is  his  great 
object  to  produce.  "  A  real  monomaniac,"  says  Marc,  "  is 
strongly  prejudiced  in  favor  of  his  opinions,  the  slightest 
contradiction  excites  his  temper,  while  the  simulator  readily 
overlooks  this  essential  point  in  his  part,  if  the  contradiction 
be  skilfully  managed.  The  taciturnity  peculiar  to  the  real 
subject  of  monomania,  frequently  leaves  simulators  at  fault, 
since  the  complaints  of  the  latter,  when  sure  of  being  seen 
or  heard,  and  their  repugnance  at  dwelling  in  solitude,  are 
not  met  with,  or  at  least,  not  in  the  same  degree,  in  the 
others."  ^  In  addition  to  these  characteristics  of  this  form 
of  mental  derangement,  it  may  be  remarked  that  many  of 
the  peculiarities  diagnostic  of  general  mania,  are  often  so  of 
partial  mania,  such  as  sleeplessness,  insensibility  to  opium, 
and  irritability  of  temper.  According  to  Marc,  monomania 
that  is  not  characterized  by  sad,  or  at  least  serious  ideas,  has 
seldom,  if  ever,  led  to  criminal  acts. 

§  411.  Idiocy  and  imbecility  are  sometimes  simulated,  and 
the  imitation  would  be  very  likely  to  deceive  those  not  prac- 
tically acquainted  with  these  mental  affections;  but  the 
history  of  the  individual  and  his  physical  constitution  furnish 
such  conclusive  proof  of  the  imposture,  that  the  attempt  is 
less  successful  than  when  the  other  forms  of  insanity  are 
selected  for  simulation.  In  genuine  cases,  if  the  affection 
be  congenital,  the  history  of  the  patient  or  form  of  the  head 
will  establish  this  fact.  If  it  have  occurred  at  an  after  period 
of  life,  the  circumstances  that  have  occasioned  it  may  be 
learned  from  the  acquaintances  of  the  patient.  If  the  form 
of  the  head  present  nothing  abnormal,  if  is  to  be  supposed 
that  the  mental  deficiency,  if  there  be  any  "in  reality,  is  of 
the  acquired  kind,  so  that  if  the  person  pretends  to  have  been 
from  birth  in  his  present  condition,  this  of  itself  would  be 
presumptive  proof  of  imposition.  If,  however,  he  is  capable 
of  referring  his  mental  deficiency  to  the  influence  of  any  par- 
ticular adventitious  causes,  the  practitioner  can  determine  for 

^  Diet.  Med.  Sci.  Article,  Alieaes. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  401 

himself,  in  a  certain  measure,  how  far  these  alleged  causes 
could  have  contributed  to  produce  the  condition  in  question. 
If  they  appear  to  be  plainly  and  palpably  inadequate,  he  has 
a  right  to  conclude  that  the  person  is  acting  the  part  of  an 
impostor.  It  sometimes  happens  that  the  simulator  has  had 
frequent  opportunities  of  observing  the  manners  of  an  idiot 
or  imbecile,  and,  possessing  some  powers  of  mimicry,  is  able 
to  give  a  pretty  faithful  copy  of  the  example  he  has  studied. 
But  there  is  a  stupid,  vacant  cast  of  countenance  in  these 
affections,  which  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible  to  imitate 
well  enough  to  deceive  one  much  conversant  with  this  class 
of  beings.  Full  as  difficult  is  it  to  imitate  the  unfixed,  un- 
certain, expressionless  look,  and  the  frequently  and  abruptly 
fluctuating  train  of  their  ideas.  Zacchias  offers  as  a  test  of 
idiocy,  the  pusillanimous  and  submissive  character  of  its 
subjects,  but  it  is  now  well  known  that  most  idiots  are  lia- 
ble, on  provocation,  to  gusts  of  furious,  brutal  passion,  as 
transient  as  they  are  sudden.  Imbecility  presents  such  a 
diversity  of  mental  deficiency  both  in  kind  and  degree,  that 
the  simulation  of  it  will  baffle  the  scrutiny  of  the  observer, 
who  is  not  prepared  for  his  task  by  a  considerable  acquaint- 
ance with  the  phenomena  of  tlie  imbecile  mind.  In  the  first 
degree  of  real  imbecility  there  is  a  singular  mixture  of  stupid- 
ity and  shrewdness,  in  the  fraudulent  imitation  of  which  the 
vigilant  observer  may  discover  proofs  of  simulation.  He 
will  find  that  on  points  directly  involving  the  interest  of  the 
simulator,  the  latter  will  display  the  full  endowment  of  the 
shrewdness  compatible  with  this  condition,  while  he  reserves 
his  stupidity  for  occasions  where  his  own  interests  are  not 
particularly  concerned.  In  replying  to  the  questions  put  to 
him,  he  will  be  careful,  amid  all  his  display  of  imbecility,  to 
say  nothing  likely  to  favor  a  belief  of  his  guilt  in  the  matter 
which  has  led  him  to  assume  the  part  of  an  impostor.  What 
he  says  is  intended  to  leave  an  impression  favorable  to  his, 
innocence,  and  this  effect  he  will  endeavor  to  produce  as  far 
as  he  dares.  When,  therefore,  the  person  replies  to  inquiries 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  criminate  himself,  it  may  be  pretty 
safely  concluded  that  the  imbecility  is  genuine ;  and  though 

34* 


402  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  converse  of  this  rule  may  not  be  equally  true,  yet  if  the 
whole  tenor  of  his  replies  has  an  exculpatory  turn,  strong 
ground  of  suspicion  at  least  is  afforded,  that  all  is  not  right. 
Imbecility  in  the  first  degree  will  seldom  be  counterfeited, 
however,  from  the  simple  fact,  that  the  real  affection  seldom 
annuls  the  criminal  responsibilities  of  those  who  are  ac- 
knowledged to  be  its  subjects. 

§  412.  Senile  dementia  may  be  simulated  by  aged  per- 
sons, but  is  so  imperfectly  known  as  a  distinct  form  of 
insatiity,  that  its  peculiar  features  would  probably  be  mingled 
with  those  of  general  and  partial  mania,  and  thus  lead  to  an 
easy  detection.  If  the  physician  will  steadily  bear  in  mind 
that  senile  dementia  is  essentially  characterized  by  deficiency 
of  mental  excitement,  he  will  not  be  long  in  arriving  at  the 
truth  in  doubtful  cases,  for  the  simulator  will  inevitably 
indulge  in  hallucinations,  and  perform  physical  movements 
indicative  of  excessive  mental  excitement.  The  principal 
points  that  distinguish  this  affection  from  mania  may  be 
briefly  recapitulated.  In  senile  dementia,  the  delusions  are 
based  on  some  previous  event  of  life,  and  though  irrational, 
are  not  always  absurd.  The  memory  decays,  first,  relative 
to  recent  events,  and  finally,  to  every  thing  it  had  previously 
stored  up.  The  senses  lose  their  acuteness ;  the  power  of 
recognizing  persons,  places,  and  things,  fails  at  last,  and  has 
gone  forever  ;  and  one  looks  in  vain  for  the  least  exertion  of 
thought.  The  whole  conduct  and  language  are  indicative  of 
complete  childishness ;  and  in  this  second  childhood,  the 
necessity  of  vigilance  to  prevent  the  miserable  patient  from 
injuring  himself  or  others,  is  no  less  imperative  than  in  the 
first.  In  mania,  the  delusions  are  generally  absurd  as  well 
as  irrational;  the  memory  manifests  no  decay,  except  perhaps 
on  subjects  that  relate  to  the  predominant  idea  ;  the  strength 
and  accuracy  of  the  senses  are  unimpaired;  persons  and 
things  are  as  readily  recognized  as  ever;  and  occasionally 
the  mind  flashes  forth  with  more  than  its  usual  power  and 
vividness.  At  times  the  character  assumes  its  natural  manli- 
ness and  dignity,  and  the  individual  conducts  with  a  pro- 
priety and  discretion  scarcely  to  be  distinguished  from  those 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  403 

of  perfect  soundness  of  mind.  Bearing  in  mind  these  char- 
acteristic differences  which  are  so  little  known  to  any  but 
medical  men,  we  cannot  be  easily  deceived  by  the  best-man- 
aged attempt  at  simulating  senile  dementia. 

§  413.    It  has  been  already  stated  (§  328),  that  the  other 
forms  of  dementia  are  usually  the  sequel  of  mania,  or  other 
disorders  of  the  nervous  system.     It  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
that  the  previous  disorder  is  sometimes  so  mild,  so  obscure, 
and  so  short  in   its  duration,  as  to    be  entirely  overlooked. 
When  this    is    the   case,    the    dementia    that   supervenes    is 
viewed  with  suspicion,  and,  unless  sufficient  time  is  allowed 
for  its   development,  it  may  frequently  be  mistaken  for  the 
effect  of  simulation.     The  following  case  looks  like  one  of 
this   kind,  though   nothing   but  further  observation  and  per- 
haps more  information  respecting  his  previous  history,  could 
place  its  true  nature   beyond  the  reach  of  doubt.     "  I  was, 
a  few  years  ago,  requested  to  see  a  man  confined  in  gaol 
for  the   crime  of  cutting  off  his  wife's  head.     This  man  had 
made  no  attempt  to  deny  the  deed,  or  to  escape  the  conse- 
quences.     For  some  time  after  he  was  taken  to  prison,  his 
conduct  was  quiet,  and  on  common  subjects  he  would  talk 
in  a  common  way  with  his  fellow-prisoners.     When  he  was 
asked  about  the  murder,  and  reminded  that  he  would  cer- 
tainly be  hanged  for  it,  he  always  said  he  did  not  know  that 
he  had  done  any  harm.     After  being  confined  five   or   six 
weeks,  he  occasionally  showed  a  disposition  to  be  violent ; 
and,  on  one  occasion,  put  a  handkerchief  round  his  neck  as 
if  he  intended  to    hang   himself.     Subsequently  he  became 
taciturn,  and  his  demeanor  changed  to  that  of  an  imbecile 
person,   which  it  was  at  the  time  of  my  seeing  him.     He 
wore  a  woollen  cap,  which  he  had  taken  from  one  of  the 
other  prisoners,  and  carried  a  piece  of  wood  about  with  him, 
which  he  represented,   by  signs,  to   be   his   sword ;   for   he 
would  not  speak,  nor  answer  any  questions ;  only  breaking 
silence  now  and  then  by  repeating  the  word  '  cabbage,'  with- 
out any  kind  of  meaning.     He  had  buttons  and  other  com- 
mon trinkets  tied  round  his  wrist ;  and  he  had  made  a  great 
many  attempts  to  walk  out  of  the  hospital  of  the  prison,  in 


40-4  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

which  he  was  lodged.  When  a  watch  or  any  shining  sub- 
stance was  shown  to  him,  he  would  assume  an  idiotic  smile, 
and  begin  to  dance."  ^ 

§  414.  The  narrator  of  this  case  suspected  that  the  man 
"  was  playing  a  part,"  though  he  admits  that  "  the  nature 
of  his  crime,  and  his  conduct  after  committing  it,  went  far 
to  support  the  idea  of  his  insanity,  and  that  his  insanity 
might  have  been  coming  on  some  time  before  the  murder." 
He  remarks,  as  one  ground  of  His  suspicions,  that  "  the 
mixed  character  of  his  mental  disorder,  and  the  rapid  super- 
vention of  idiocy  [dementia]  on  a  quiet  form  of  insanity,  in 
a  man  of  thirty-five,  seemed  to  be  unusual  circumstances." 
Such  circumstances  are  certainly  not  very  common,  but 
nevertheless,  they  have  been  observed.  Esquirol  recognizes 
a  form  of  dementia  which  is  complicated  more  or  less 
with  monomania,  and  distinctly  alternating  with  it.  He 
remarks  of  a  patient  whose  case  he  relates,  that  "  though 
apparently  insensible  to  whatever  was  passing  around  him, 
he  still  was  not  entirely  deprived  of  intelligence,  and  he  had 
great  strength  of  will."  ^  The  case  of  Pechot,  adjudicated 
in  France  within  three  or  four  years,  was  a  striking  instance 
of  the  rapid  supervention  of  dementia  on  a  quiet  form  of 
insanity,  though  the  patient  was  older,  it  is  true,  than  Dr. 
Conolly's.  Between  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the 
murder  in  April,  for  which  he  was  indicted,  and  that  of 
his  trial  in  the  following  November,  he  was  frequently  ob- 
served and  examined  by  a  medical  commission  appointed 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  exact  condition  of  his 
mind.  During  the  early  part  of  this  period,  he  merely  ap- 
peared to  be  deeply  dejected,  and  the  commission  reported 
that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  say  that  his  understanding 
was  nowise  impaired.  At  the  time  of  the  trial,  however, 
dementia  was  plainly  visible,  and  then  one  of  the  commission 
stated,  that  during  the  first  examination,  Pechot  was  un- 
doubtedly in  a  state  of  profound  melancholy,  of  which  the 


*  Conolly,  Indications  of  Insanity,  455. 

*  Des  Maladies  Men.  ii.  228. 


SIMULATED   IXSAXITT.  405 

present  dementia  was  the  natural  sequel.  It  also  appeared 
from  the  evidence,  that  for  some  time  previous  to  the  mur- 
der, his  mind  was  considerably  disordered.^  The  other  cir- 
cumstances which  raised  the  suspicion  of  simulation  in  the 
above  case,  were,  that  though  he  would  not  answer  ques- 
tions, he  heard  and  understood  them, —  that  "although  he 
never  looked  directly  at  any  one,  he  was,  in  reality,  very 
watchful  of  their  movements,  even  when  distant  from  him," 
—  and  that  "  he  always  made  a  sudden  run  toward  the  door 
when  anybody  opened  it  to  go  out."  In  regard  to  the  last 
circumstance,  we  can  only  say,  that  it  is  often  seen  in  every 
form  of  insanity ;  and  as  it  regards  the  others,  it  may  be 
sufficient  to  observe,  that  the  committee,  in  speaking  of  Pe- 
chot's  condition  a  few  days  after  the  murder,  stated  that  he 
was  very  reluctant  to  answer  questions,  and  that  "  his  eye 
was  constantly  on  the  watch,  the  slightest  noise,  the  least 
gesture  instantly  attracting  his  attention." 

§  415.  Homicidal  insanity,  when  the  fact  of  its  existence 
shall  be  generally  recognized,  will,  undoubtedly,  be  often 
falsely  pleaded  in  excuse  for  crime,  and  the  task  imposed  on 
the  physician  in  such  cases,  will  be  sometimes  a  difficult  and 
a  delicate  one.  The  characteristic  and  distinctive  features  of 
this  affection  have  been  elsewhere  stated  (§  257),  and  it  is  to 
a  knowledge  of  them  we  are  to  look  for  the  means  of  detect- 
ing its  counterfeits ;  and  though  our  investigation  may  occa- 
sionally result  only  in  doubt  and  uncertainty,  yet,  generally, 
when  rightly  conducted,  it  will  lead  us  to  the  truth. 

§  416.  Insanity,  characterized  by  hysteric  symptoms,  was* 
simulated  not  long  since  in  the  McLean  Asylum,  Massa- 
chusetts, and,  considering  the  youth  of  the  subject,  the  appar- 
ent want  of  motive,  and  the  severity  of  the  symptoms,  it  was 
somewhat  curious.  The  lad,  thirteen  years  old,  had  fallen  on 
his  head  about  two  years  and  a  half  previous  to  admission, 
and  ever  since  that  period,  had  exhibited  some  anomalous 
symptoms  of  disease,  which  had  been  referred  by  his  physi- 

^  Annales  d'Hygiene,  No.  35.  The  article  is  condensed  in  22  American 
Jurist,  27. 


406  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

cians  to  derangement  of  the  digestive  organs.  For  the  few 
last  months  the  symptoms  were  more  severe  and  decided. 
He  refused  food  for  long  jDcriods,  had  spasms,  laid  with  his 
eyes  fixed  and  legs  drawn  up,  would  hold  his  breath  and 
strike.  On  admission  to  the  asylum,  he  presented  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  sickly,  emaciated  boy  under  puberty,  unable  to 
stand,  exhausted  by  suffering,  breathing  quick,  and  pass- 
ing his  evacuations  in  bed.  Every  few  minutes  he  had  a 
frightful  spasm,  commencing  with  a  convulsive  shaking  of 
the  head,  pawing  of  the  hands,  and  turned-up  eyes.  Soon 
his  hands  would  vibrate  against  his  sides  and  chest;  his 
countenance  would  be  dreadfully  distorted,  and  then  would 
commence  a  horrid  scream  that  might  be  heard  over  the 
whole  premises.  In  this  condition,  with  occasional  remis- 
sions, and  the  addition,  at  one  time,  of  diarrhoea,  he  remained 
for  about  a  month,  when  the  imposture  which  had  been  sus- 
pected, was  detected.  Being  watched  through  a  hole  in  a 
blanket  hung  before  his  window,  he  was  observed  to  jump 
up  and  stride  about  his  room  as  actively  as  anybody,  but  at 
the  slightest  noise,  resuming  his  old  position,  screaming  and 
groaning.  Dr.  Bell  finally  burst  in  upon  him  before  he 
could  regain  his  bed,  chided  him  for  his  deceit,  and  bade  him 
walk  into  the  hall.  "  The  spell  is  broken,"  says  the  record, 
"  the  feeble  knees  are  made  strong,  the  convulsed  and  dis- 
torted visage  is  calm  and  smooth,  and  the  young  deceiver 
goes  forth  erect,  clothed,  and  in  his  right  mind." 

§  417.  Besides  a  knowledge  of  the  symptoms  of  insanity, 
which  will  enable  the  physician  to  detect  its  simulation, 
his  own  ingenuity  may  often  co'ntrive  some  plan  for  outwit- 
ting the  pretender,  and  entrapping  him  in  his  own  toils.  To 
perform  the  part  of  an  insane  person,  carrying  through  its 
numerous  and  complicated  phases,  requires  an  endowment 
of  the  imitative  powers,  seldom  bestowed  on  any,  least  of  all, 
on  those  who  would  have  occasion  to  use  it  for  such  pur- 
poses, so  that  the  measure  of  ingenuity  by  which  it  is  main- 
tained, is  scarcely  ever  a  match  for  the  devices  which  a 
shrewd  and  vigilant  physician  has  always  at  hand.  In  the 
case  of  a  girl  feigning  mania,  Fodere  informed  the  keeper,  in 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  407 

her  presence,  that  if  she  were  not  better  the  next  day,  he 
should  ajDply  a  hot  iron  between  her  shoulders.  This  im- 
mediately produced  a  decided  amendment.  There  is  related 
the  case  of  a  sailor,  whose  simulated  madness  was  mani- 
fested by  a  vehement  desire  to  throw  himself  overboard, 
which,  after  being  prevented  for  some  time,  he  was  at  last 
permitted  to  do ;  immediately  on  reaching  the  water,  how- 
ever, he  swam  vigorously  and  called  loudly  for  a  boat.^  A 
device  frequently  resorted  to,  is  to  mention  in  the  hearing  of 
the  person  some  symptom  of  madness  which  is  easily  imi- 
tated, as  not  being  present;  at  a  subsequent  examination,  if 
the  disease  is  feigned,  this  symptom  will  certainly  be  ob- 
served, whether  it  is  or  is  not  a  symptom  of  madness.  In  some 
cases,  it  would  be  perfectly  proper  to  adopt  the  suggestion  of 
Marc,  to  intoxicate  him  slightly,  when,  if  he  be  playing  a  part, 
he  will  be  likely  to  forget  it,  and  appear  in  his  real  colors. 
In  the  English  naval  and  military  service,  where  the  medical 
officer  is  often  called  on  to  deal  with  feigned  insanity,  pun- 
ishment was  once  much  resorted  to,^  on  the  principle,  proba- 
bly, that  if  the  affection  be  counterfeited,  it  will  be  more 
efficacious  than  any  thing  else  in  restoring  the  impostor  to 
his  right  mind;  and  if  real,  it  will  do  good  by  acting  as  a 
powerful  derivative.  If  the  latter  part  of  the  alternative  were 
true,  nothing  certainly  could  be  more  proper  than  sound 
flagellation ;  but  if  any  thing,  more  surely  than  another,  will 
push  a  case  of  mental  derangement  beyond  the  reach  of 
curative  means,  it  is  corporal  punishment.  The  misery  thus 
produced  is  poorly  compensated  by  the  detection  of  a  few 
cases  of  imposture.  In  the  following  case,  however,  where 
something  like  this  kind  of  treatment  was  used,  it  would 
undoubtedly  have  been  very  proper  had  the  disorder  actually 
existed ;  and  as  it  may  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  practitioner  in 
similar  instances,  a  brief  notice  of  it  may  not  be  out  of  place 
in  this  connection. 

§  418.   Jean  Gerard,  a  bold  villain,  murdered  a  woman  at 

\  Cyclop.  Pract.  Med.,  Article,  Feigned  Diseases.  "  Idem. 


408  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

Lyons  in  1829.  Immediately  after  being  arrested,  he  ceased 
to  speak  altogether,  and  appeared  to  be  in  a  state  of  fatuity. 
He  laid  nearly  motionless  in  his  bed,  and  when  food  was 
brought,  his  attendants  raised  him  up,  and  it  was  given  to 
him  in  that  position.  His  hearing  also  seemed  to  be  atfected. 
The  physicians  who  were  directed  to  examine  him,  concluded 
that  if  this  were  actually  what  it  appeared  to  be,  a  paralysis 
of  the  nerves  of  the  tongue  and  ear,  the  actual  cautery 
applied  to  the  soles  of  the  feet,  would  be  a  proper  remedy. 
It  being  used,  however,  for  several  days,  without  any  suc- 
cess, it  was  agreed  to  apply  it  to  the  neck.  For  two  days 
no  effect  was  produced;  but  on  the  third,  while  prepara- 
tions were  making  for  its  application,  Gerard  evinced  some 
signs  of  repugnance  to  it,  and  after  some  urging,  he  spoke, 
declaring  his  innocence  of  the  crime  of  which  he  was  charged. 
His  simulation  was  thus  exposed.^ 

§  419.  When  required  to  examine  and  report  upon  cases 
of  suspected  simulation,  the  medical  man  cannot  be  too  cau- 
tious in  arriving  at  his  final  decision.  The  judgment  is  not 
to  be  determined  by  any  single  symptom,  however 'striking, 
but  every  pathological  indication,  every  possible  motive  to 
action,  in  short,  the  whole  moral,  intellectual,  and  physical 
history  of  the  individual  should  be  faithfully  studied, 
before  we  venture  to  make  up  our  final  opinion.  Espec- 
ially should  we  try  to  ascertain  from  the  acquaintances  of 
the  individual,  whether  he  has  evinced  mimic  powers  to 
any  extent,  and  has  ever  had  an  opportunity  to  observe 
the  manners  and  discourse  of  the  insane.  The  mimic 
power  necessary  to  produce  a  clever  imitation  of  insan- 
ity of  any  kind,  can  hardly  be  supposed  to  have  laid  all 
his  life  unexercised  and  unknown,  and  still  less  could  it  be 
supposed  that  this  power  might  be  so  great  as  to  render 
any  personal  observation  of  the  disease  unnecessary.  In  the 
class  of  persons  most  likely  to  simulate  insanity,  are  many 
whose  experience  in   poor  houses,  jails,  and  penitentiaries, 

^  Annales  d'Hyglene,  ii.  392. 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  409 

have  furnished  them  with  examples  of  mental  disease,  which 
they  are  able  to  reproduce,  more  or  less  successfully,  when 
the  occasion  requires.  These  cases  are  among  the  most  diffi- 
cult to  detect,  because,  even  a  clumsy  imitation  of  a  real 
thing  is  more  fitted  to  deceive,  than  any  acting  not  founded 
on  actual  experience.  In  the  following  case,  it  is  very  proba- 
ble that  the  man  was  acting  from  life  rather  than  any  theo- 
retical notions  of  insanity.  "John  Jakes  was  convicted  at 
the  Devon  Eastern  Sessions,  1856,  of  pocket-picking.  Pre- 
vious convictions  having  been  proved,  he  was  sentenced  to 
four  years'  penal  servitude.  On  hearing  the  sentence,  he  fell 
down  in  the  dock,  as  if  in  a  fit  of  apoplexy.  When  removed 
to  the  jail,  he  was  found  to  be  hemiplegic  and  apparently 
mindless.  He,  however,  did  some  things  which  did  not  be- 
long to  dementia  following  apoplexy ;  for  instance,  he  w^as 
designedly  filthy,  and  even  ate  his  own  excrements.  His 
insanity  was  certified  by  the  surgeon  of  the  jail,  and  by  a 
second  medical  man,  and  he  was  removed  to  an  asylum. 
Notwithstanding  the  medical  certificates  of  his  insanity,  the 
convicting  magistrates,  who  knew  his  character  as  a  burglar, 
and  a  criminal  of  great  ability,  thought  he  was  feigning. 
Warned  by  their  caution,  I  examined  the  man  carefully. 
He  had  all  the  symptoms  of  hemiplegia:  the  toe  dragged  in 
walking,  the  uncertain  grasp  of  the  hand,  a  slight  drawing  of 
the  features,  the  tongue  thrust  to  the  paralyzed  side  —  all 
these  symptoms  were  present  in  a  manner  so  true  to  nature, 
that,  if  they  were  feigned,  the  representation  was  a  consum- 
mate piece  of  acting  founded  upon  accurate  observation.  In 
the  asylum  the  patient  was  not  dirty;  he  ^vas  tranquil  and 
apparently  demented  ;  he  had  to  be  fed,  to  be  dressed,  and  to 
be  undressed,  to  be  led  from  place  to  place ;  he  could  not  be 
made  to  speak ;  he  slept  well.  On  the  night  of  the  17th  of 
August,  1856,  he  effected  his  escape  from  the  asylum,  in  a 
manner  which  convinced  the  magistrates  that  their  opinion 
of  his  simulation  was  just,  and  that  he  had  succeeded  in 
deceiving  some  four  or  five  medical  men.  He  converted  the 
handle  of  a  tin  cup  into  a  false  key,  wherewith  he  unlocked 
a  window-guard ;  through  the  window  he  escaped  by  night 

35 


410  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

into  the  garden,  from  thence  he  clambered  over  a  door,  eight 
feet  high,  and  afterwards,  over  a  wall  of  the  same  height. 
He  got  clear  away,  probably  joined  his  old  associates,  and  has 
never  been  heard  of  since."  ^  It  can  scarcely  be  questioned 
that  all  this  was,  as  Dr.  Bucknill  supposes,  "a  consummate 
piece  of  acting,  founded  upon  accurate  observation."  A  per- 
son really  so  demented  as  to  be  fed,  dressed,  and  undressed 
by  others,  would  obviously  be  incapable  of  making  a  key  out 
of  a  tin  cup,  not  to  speak  of  clambering  over  a  door  eight 
feet  high.  I  doubt  if  any  simulator  would  think  of  eating 
his  own  excrements,  who  had  not  seen  or  heard  of  this  trait 
in  some  insane  person,  because  it  forms  no  part  of  the  popu- 
lar notions  of  insanity.  Dr.  Bell  has  informed  me,  that  in  a 
case  of  suspected  simulation  of  raving  mania,  which  he  was 
requested  to  examine,  in  the  Massachusetts  state  prison,  he 
found  that  the  person  had  had  the  opportunity  of  observing 
pretty  closely  a  raving  maniac,  —  a  fact  which  explained 
some  embarrassing  traits  in  the  case. 

§  420.  Ample  time  for  the  investigation  should  be  de- 
manded, and  unless  it  be  granted,  the  physician  would  be 
justified  in  declining  altogether  the  duty  assigned  him.  Op- 
portunities must  be  provided  of  observing  the  simulator,  when, 
thinking  himself  not  watched,  he  throws  off  the  guise  he  has 
assumed  (which  he  will  do  at  such  times),  and  returns  to  his 
own  proper  character.  The  physician  should  never  forget, 
however,  the  extreme  perseverance  and  vigilance  with  which 
'these  people  manage  their  impositions,  and  not  be  too  easily 
induced  to  regard  them  favorably  in  consequence  of  the 
results  which  such  opportunities  may  sometimes  furnish ;  for 
they  will  often  suppose  they  are  watched  at  times  when  they 
have  no  means  of  knowing  whether  they  are  so  or  not. 
Foderfi  speaks  of  a  girl,  undoubtedly  a  simulator,  who  com- 
mitted every  kind  of  indecency  in  her  cell ;  and  another  case 
is  related  of  some  French  prisoners  of  war,  who  carried 
"their  simulation  to  so  exquisite  a  height,  as  to  eat  their  own 
excrement,  even  when  shut  up  in  their  cells,  suspecting  that 

*  Bucknill  &  Tuke,  on  Insanity,  334. 


SIMULATED    INSANITY.  411 

they  might  be  overlooked."  ^  In  suspected  cases,  therefore, 
the  persons  should  be  strictly,  and  as  far  as  possible,  secretly 
watched,  in  order  that  in  their  moments  of  forgetfulness  or  a 
sense  of  security,  they  may  be  seen  laying  aside  their  false 
colors,  and  suddenly  assuming  their  natural  manners.  That 
this  will  happen  sooner  or  later  in  every  case,  there  cannot  be 
a  doubt,  for  the  mind  will  instinctively  seek  relief  from  the 
painful  exertion  and  sense  of  restraint,  rendered  necessary  by 
an  elaborate  attempt  at  deception,  by  throwing  off"  the  dis- 
guise that  has  been  adopted,  and  again  returning  to  its 
natural  condition.  Again  we  caution  the  practitioner  not 
to  be  in  haste  to  form  his  opinion,  but  to  wait  long  and  pa- 
tiently, for  opportunities  that  may  shed  new  light  on  the  diffi- 
culties before  him. 

§  421.  The  importance  of  the  last  suggestion  is  strongly 
exemplified  in  the  following  case,  related  by  Professor  Mon- 
teggia,  and  translated  from  the  Italian  by  Marc.  We  have 
taken  the  liberty  to  abridge  somewhat  the  original  narrative. 
In  1792,  a  criminal  who  was  confined  in  the  prison  of  St. 
Ange,  in  the  province  of  Lodi,  became  insane  soon  after 
hearing  that  he  had  been  betrayed  by  his  accomplices.  The 
physicians  of  the  place,  who  were  required  to  examine  him, 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  feigning  madness,  though 
they  did  not  express  strong  confidence  in  their  opinion. 
From  their  report,  his  disorder  seems  to  have  been  of  rather 
a  quiet  form.  To  any  question  whatever,  he  merely  uttered 
the  words,  book,  priest,  croicn,  crucifix.  Sometimes  he 
seemed,  by  the  motions  of  his  mouth  and  tongue,  desirous  of 
replying  to  questions,  but  finally  repeated,  with  a  smile,  the 
usual  words.  Their  reasons  for  considering  him  to  be  feign- 
ing, were,  that  the  disease  appeared  suddenly,  without  any 
premonition,  and  was  accompanied  by  irregular  symptoms, 
sometimes  appearing  to  be  a  melancholy,  attended  by  wan- 
dering, sometimes  a  cheerful  mania,  and  sometimes  a  com- 
plete dementia.  It  appears  that  he  was  noisy  at  night  and 
quiet  by  day ;   that   he  scattered   his   food  about ;   that   he 

'  Cyclop.  Pract.  Med.,  Article,  Feigned  Diseases, 


412  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

never  sighed ;  and  that  he  never  fixed  his  eye  on  any  partic- 
ular object.  The  physicians,  in  speaking  to  one  another  in 
his  hearing,  of  these  four  circumstances,  observed,  for  the 
purpose  of  entrapping  him,  that  if  just  the  contrary  had  hap- 
pened, they  must  necessarily  have  concluded  that  he  was 
insane.  It  was  soon  after  observed  that  he  was  quiet  at 
night,  no  longer  scattered  his  food,  and  did  sigh.  He  seemed 
reluctant  to  have  his  pulse  felt,  for  whenever  this  was  done, 
he  would  keep  his  arm  and  fingers  constantly  in  motion, 
though  before  perfectly  at  rest.  The  physicians  also  said  in 
his  presence,  that  his  disorder  would  certainly  be  improved 
by  a  blister  to  the  neck.  At  this  time  he  was  mute,  but 
shortly  after  the  application,  he  began  to  repeat  the  old 
words,  hook,  crown,  etc. 

§  422.  In  July,  1793,  he  was  ordered  by  the  court  to  be 
transferred  to  the  prison  at  Milan,  and  Prof.  M.  was  requested 
to  examine  him  and  ascertain  his  mental  condition.  At  ttiis 
time  he  appeared  to  be  in  a  demented,  imbecile  state,  and 
there  was  a  kind  of  oddity  and  apparent  affectation  in  his 
manners,  which  at  first  strongly  favored  the  suspicion  of 
simulation.  Though  attentive  to  what  was  passing  around 
him,  he  seemed  to  shrink  from  observation,  and  averted  his 
eye  the  moment  it  met  that  of  another.  When  called,  he 
certainly  heard  the  voice,  and  would  start  to  go  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  sound,  but  instead  of  advancing  directly,  he 
would  wander  about  the  room.  He  never  spoke  ;  the  only 
sound  he  uttered  was  a  kind  of  whistle,  like  that  made  by 
the  wind  blowing  through  a  keyhole.  He  was  singularly 
fond  of  bright  and  beautiful  objects,  viewing  and  touching 
them  with  an  air  of  great  interest.  He  collected  various 
trifles  of  which  he  was  quite  fond.  He  never  was  com- 
pletely quiet,  but  was  constantly  in  motion,  or  making  some 
gesture.  He  was  never  observed  to  sleep  ;  while  in  bed,  he 
was  continually  moving  his  legs,  or  some  other  part  of  his 
body,  or  playing  with  a  rag  which  he  would  put  upon  his 
eyes  or  mouth,  or  twine  around  his  fingers.  He  loved  to  put 
it  over  the  eyes  or  mouth  of  others,  and  then  retiring  a  few 
steps,  would  look  at  them  with  a  smiling  air,  and  utter  a 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  413 

sound  expressive  of  gratification.  He  would  frequently 
caress  those  about  hinn,  and  pinch  their  cheeks  in  a  friendly 
manner.  He  could  neither  dress  nor  undress  himself  alone; 
being  used  to  eat  out  of  crockery  plates,  he  would  refuse 
food  brought  to  him  in  any  other  kind  of  ware.  He  would 
sometimes  hide  his  bread  in  his  bed,  and  think  no  more  of  it. 
He  never  seemed  to  desire,  nor  to  seek  for  food,  though  he  ate 
with  avidity  when  he  was  hungry.  Sometimes,  instead  of 
eating  his  soup  out  of  the  plate,  he  would  turn  it  out  on  the 
floor,  and  then  take  it  up  with  a  spoon.  He  was  much  an- 
noyed if  made  to  remain  long  in  any  one  place.  "When 
they  brought  towards  him  a  mirror,  he  would  spit  at  it, 
refuse  to  look  at  it,  and  be  made  quite  angry  if  they  persist- 
ed in  putting  it  under  his  eyes.  "When  teased  in  this  man- 
ner, he  exerted  extraordinary  strength.  When  pinched,  he 
appeared  not  to  feel  it,  and  he  was  seen  to  take  up  live  coals 
in  his  hands,  without  showing  any  sign  of  pain.  When  his 
attention  was  directed  to  figures  on  the  wall,  made  by  candle- 
light, he  would  run  as  if  to  catch  them  in  his  hands,  and 
express  his  disappointment  by  beating  his  head  with  his  fist. 
He  would  never  drink  wine,  but  the  moment  he  tasted  it,  he 
would  spit  it* out  with  a  strong  expression  of  displeasure. 

§  423.  Though  inclined  to  believe,  from  the  examination 
so  far,  that  the  disorder  was  real  and  not  feigned,  yet  consid- 
ering the  suspicions  of  the  physicians  of  St.  Ange,  some  de- 
cisive test  seemed  to  be  required  that  would  unmask  the 
simulation,  if  it  existed,  beyond  all  doubt.  Wine  being  out 
of  the  question,  six  grains  of  opium  was  given  him  in  his 
soup,  but  it  produced  no  effect  whatever.  A  few  days  after- 
wards he  again  took  six  grains  of  opium,  in  the  morning,  and 
this  producing  no  effect  at  the  end  of  six  hours,  six  more 
grains,  from  a  different  parcel,  was  given  him.  In  the  evening 
he  appeared  as  usual.  A  cracker  was  fired  near  him  while 
his  eye  was  turned  in  another  direction,  to  see  if  the  unex- 
pected explosion  would  surprise  him  at  all ;  but  it  did  not, 
nor  did  another  that  was  exploded  under  his  shirt.  He  passed 
the  night  as  usual,  without  sleep.  No  change  was  observed 
in  him  the  next  morning,  but  in  the  evening,  he  appeared  a 

35* 


414  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

little  uneasy  and  looked  towards  the  windows,  as  if  frightened. 
He  went  to  bed,  and  about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he 
raised  himself  up,  heaved  some  deep  sighs,  and  at  last  cried 
out,  "  My  God,  I  am  dying."  The  physician  who  was  im- 
mediately summoned,  found  him  quiet  and  talking  rationally, 
without  any  sign  of  madness.  He  said,  upon  inquiry,  that 
he  had  no  idea  of  what  had  taken  place;  he  believed,  or 
seemed  to  believe,  that  he  was  still  in  the  prison  of  St.  Ange; 
and  demanded  a  confessor  and  an  officer  of  justice,  that  he 
might  be  judicially  interrogated.  He  added,  that  there  had 
seemed  to  be  persons  at  the  windows,  who  told  him  that 
they  had  given  him  poisoned  soup  in  order  to  kill  him.  He 
complained  of  nausea,  though  his  pulse  was  natural,  and  his 
countenance  calm  and  unaltered.  The  next  day  he  ate  well, 
and  continued  to  conduct  well  and  appear  perfectly  rational 
as  long  as  he  remained  in  the  prison,  after  which  he  was  lost 
sight  of.  The  narrator  of  the  case  concludes  that  the  crimi- 
nal was  really  insane,  and  that  he  was  suddenly  cured  by 
the  opium  ;  because  if  he  had  been  feigning,  and  were  finally 
induced  to  throw  off  the  mask  from  the  fear  of  actually 
dying  from  the  effects  of  opium,  it  is  not  very  clear  why  the 
first  dose  had  no  effect. 

§  424.  Marc,  in  commenting  on  the  above  case,  observes, 
"  that  the  reasons  which  induced  the  physicians  of  St.  Ange 
to  suspect  simulation,  may  be  easily  disposed  of.  Their 
opinion  is  founded,  first,  on  the  irregularity  of  the  signs  of 
madness;  but  this  fact  appears  to  me  by  no  means  to  have 
been  established.  I  see  in  this  patient,  so  far  as  the  imper- 
fect description  enables  me  to  judge,  a  maniac  laboring  under 
a  cheerful  form  of  mania,  characterized  by  restlessness  and 
nocturnal  noise,  followed  by  a  remission  with  depression  and 
true  dementia.  Such  a  complication,  however,  is  frequently 
observed  in  maniacs.  The  circumstance  of  the  patient's 
being  noisy  at  night,  and  quiet  by  day,  is  rather  in  favor  of 
the  reality  of  the  derangement  than  otherwise.  Is  it  proba- 
ble, indeed,  that  a  simulator  would  choose  the  time  when  the 
imperious  want  of  sleep  is  most  strongly  felt,  to  feign  an 
attack  of  mania  which  he  could  just  as  well  feign  during  the 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  415 

day,  and  sleep,  at  least,  a  portion  of  the  night?  Besides, 
those  who  lived  with  the  prisoner,  and  even  the  keepers  of 
the  prison  of  Milan,  declared  that  he  had  never  been  seen  to 
sleep,  and  during  the  day,  was  so  restless  as  to  be  constantly 
changing  his  position.  It  seems  to  rae  impossible  for  a 
simulator  to  pert'ist  in  this  manner,  and,  therefore,  I  believe 
that  such  a  complete  and  long-continued  absence  of  sleep  is 
alone  sufficient  to  prove  the  reality  of  the  mental  perturba- 
tion." The  sudden  invasion  of  the  insanity,  he  does  not 
regard  as  a  proof  of  simulation,  because  this  fact,  though 
rare,  is  not  without  examples.  The  oddities  of  demeanor 
also,  are  characteristic  of  dementia,  and  could  not  be  coun- 
terfeited for  any  length  of  time.  But  the  effect  of  opium 
was  enough  to  destroy  any  remaining  suspicion  of  simula- 
tion. If  he  had  been  siiriulating,  there  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  a  sufficient  reason  for  ceasing  when  he  did.  The 
return  of  reason  was  preceded  by  a  hallucination  of  the 
sense  of  hearing ;  but  it  is  not  probable,  says  Marc,  that  an 
Italian  bandit  could  have  been  so  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  mental  disease,  as  to  have  thought  of  using  such  a 
stratagem. 

§  425.  A  remarkably  embarrassing  case  has  been  published 
by  Dr.  Parchappe,  physician  of  the  asylum  at  Rouen,  who 
was  directed  by  the  court  to  investigate  the  mental  condition 
of  the  prisoner,  and  who,  for  that  purpose,  was  allowed,  as 
is  the  custom  in  France,  to  examine  the  evidence  given  at 
the  preliminary  irial.  From  ti  is  it  appears,  that  on  the  8th 
of  April,  1845,  a  man  named  Lambert  was  bitten  in  the 
hand  by  a  dog  that  was  generally  considered  to  be  mad. 
The  same  day  the  wound  was  cauterized  with  the  actual 
cautery.  The  next  day  he  started  for  Nibas  to  find  some  one 
who  could  cure  him,  but  stopped  at  Eu  and  consulted  a 
lawyer  from  whom  he  got  a  secret  remedy  for  hydrophobia. 
On  the  11th  he  returned  home,  having  been,  during  all  this 
period,  very  anxious  and  abstracted,  saying  that  he  was  lost. 
About  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  13th,  he 
was  heard  howling  in  his  room.  The  persons  who  went  to 
him  found  him  calm.     He  told  them  that  he  had  perspired 


416  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  trembled;  that  this  was  the  first  paroxysm  of  hydro- 
phobia ;  that  he  must  go  directly  to  Nibas  to  get  cured,  as 
he  might  be  then,  but  that  after  the  third  paroxysm,  there 
could  be  no  help  for  him.  That  day  he  went  again  to  Eu, 
but  the  lawyer  declined  giving  him  a  remedy,  and  told  him 
he  was  more  likely  to  be  crazy  than  hydrophobic.  The 
following  night  he  did  not  go  to  bed,  because,  as  he  said,  if 
he  should  lie  down,  a  paroxysm  would  come  on.  On  the 
14th,  about  five  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he  came  into  the 
house  [he  slept  over  the  stables],  for  the  purpose  of  getting  a 
purse  of  money,  to  carry  into  the  fields.  He  sought  for 
money  in  every  direction,  and  then  displayed  it  on  the 
kitchen  table,  singing,  laughing,  and  dancing.  He  committed 
these  extravagances  till  noontime,  when  his  mistress  ordered 
him  to  go  to  work,  which  he  refused  to  do.  She  then  told 
him  that,  since  he  would  not  work,  he  might  quit  her  service. 
He  replied  that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  be  quiet  that 
afternoon.  He  did  not  dine,  but  for  two  or  three  hours  kept 
repeating  that  he  had  money,  but  it  was  a  great  misfortune, 
because  he  had  stolen  it  from  Dorothy,  an  old  servant  of  the 
family,  and  would  have  his  throat  cut  for  it.  In  the  morning 
he  had  had  an  altercation  with  his  mistress  because  she  had 
refused  him  the  use  of  a  horse,  and  called  her  an  old  tiger. 
About  half-past  two  he  had  collected  some  money,  and  by 
way  of  preventing  him  from  carrying  it  away,  his  mistress 
struck  him  with  a  little  walking-stick.  Lambert  wrested  the 
stick  from  her,  threw  her  upon  the  floor,  and  then  went  to 
the  kitchen,  saying :  "  This  is  not  the  thing ;  I  want  the 
hatchet;  I  must  kill  her."  With  this  weapon  he  returned  to 
her  room,  and,  having  frightened  away  h^r  maid,  killed  her 
by  repeated  blows  on  the  head.  In  about  ten  minutes  he 
went  into  the  street,  with  the  hatchet  on  his  shoulder,  pursu- 
ing every  one  who  came  in  sight,  and  crying  out,  "  long  live 
the  king,  my  fortune  is  made."  He  overtook  a  woman,  and 
killed  her  with  two  strokes  of  the  hatchet.  On  approaching 
another  person,  he  said,  "  fear  not,  I  do  not  mean  to  kill 
you ;  "  but  he  raised  the  hatchet  as  if  to  strike  him.  Pres- 
ently, he  was  shot  down  and  secured,  but  a  quarter  of  an 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  417 

hour  after,  he  begged  to  be  released,  because  he  had  eight 
more  to  kill.  A  witness  told  him  he  deserved  to  be  shot, 
when  he  replied,  "  shoot."  He  appeared  calm,  and  spoke  in 
his  ordinary  tone.  On  his  way  to  prison,  he  uttered  cries, 
and  tried  to  get  away.  lie  said  to  a  witness,  "  that  if 
he  died  without  killing  him,  he  should  not  die  content." 
"  Why,"  he  said,  "should  he  regret  having  killed  his  mistress? 
if  he  had  taken  her  money,  it  was  only  to  give  it  away  in 
charity,  which  she  never  would  do  herself."  Here,  too,  he 
cried,  "long  live  the  king;  Jesus,  my  God;  my  fortune  is 
made."  At  nine  o'clock  he  arrived  at  the  prison,  where  he 
tried  to  kick  one  of  the  witnesses.  Here  he  soon  became 
taciturn  and  abstracted,  and  refused  food.  Shortly  after,  he 
slept.  On  the  15th  he  was  abstracted  and  dull,  and  seemed 
to  be  surprised  when  told  of  the  cause  of  his  arrest  and  of 
his  wounds.  He  cursed  any  one  who  would  harm  so  good  a 
mistress  as  his.  When  examined  by  the  magistrate,  he  pro- 
fessed not  to  know  that  he  had  been  wounded,  nor  where  he 
was,  and  denied  having  killed  his  mistress.  "  A^hen  was  it?" 
said  he  ;  "I  have  not  killed  her.  If  I  did,  I  was  mad.  Why 
should  I  have  killed  her?  People  do  not  kill  without  a 
motive."  He  denied  having  killed  the  other  woman.  "  If  I 
did,"  said  he,  "  I  do  not  remember  it."  On  the  18th,  he 
recognized  the  hatchet,  but  denied  all  knowledge  of  the  mur- 
ders. He  recollected  nothing  since  Sunday.  From  the  14th 
of  April  to  the  6th  of  June,  the  physician  who  visited  him 
every  day,  was  unable  to  discover  a  single  symptom  of 
mental  disorder,  or  of  hydrophobia.  The  prisoner  constantly 
declared  that  he  had  no  recollection  of  the  murders  imputed 
to  him.  On  the  6th  of  August,  he  was  visited  by  Dr.  Par- 
chappe,  who  found  him  with  every  appearance  of  good 
health,  except  that  he  walked  with  a  little  difficulty  and  had 
a  sad  expression  of  countenance.  He  denied  all  knowledge 
of- the  murders,  and  of  other  events  subsequent  to  Sunday, 
as  before  stated.  He  was  conscious  of  his  situation,  and 
shed  tears.  On  the  12th  of  August,  he  was  visited  again, 
with  the  same  result. 

§  426.   In  regard  to  Lambert's  mental  condition,  it  is  ob- 


418  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

vious  that  he  was  either  insane  or  feigning  insanity ;  and  if 
insane,  he  must  have  been  laboring  eitlier  under  hydrophobia, 
or  ordinary  mania.  The  motiveless  character  of  the  acts,  the 
circumstances  of  atrocity  .by  which  they  were  marked,  and 
the  previous  good  reputation  of  the  prisoner,  are  at  variance 
with  the  supposition  qf  intentional  crime,  in  which  fact 
alone  could  be  found  any  motive  for  his  feigning  insanity. 
We  are,  therefore,  led  to  the  conclusion  that  he  must  have 
been  laboring  under  some  form  of  mental  disorder,  —  either 
hydrophobia  or  mania.  Although,  from  the  time  he  was 
bitten,  until  the  murder,  he  was  evidently  suffering  with 
strong  apprehensions  of  hydrophobia,  yet,  as  Dr.  Parchappe 
well  observes,  he  exhibited  at  no  time,  a  single  diagnostic 
symptom  of  that  disease.  His  mental  disorder  must  have 
been  a  form  of  acute  mania  of  which  his  excessive  appre- 
hensions of  the  consequences  of  the  bite,  were  a  powerfully 
exciting  cause.  To  this  idea,  which  obtained  complete  pos- 
session of  his  mind,  may  be  attributed  the  howling  on  Sun- 
day, —  the  fact  which  furnishes  the  strongest  suspicion  of 
simulation.  It  is  more  likely  to  have  arisen  in  this  manner, 
than  to  have  been  put  forth  as  the  only  symptom  of  an  affec- 
tion which  is  marked  by  so  many  and  such  well-known 
traits.  By  some,  the  very  brief  duration  of  the  attack  may 
be  regarded  as  a  sufficient  objection  to  this  hypothesis.  This 
is  certainly  an  unusual  feature  of  mania,  yet  its  occurrence 
has  been  too  often  witnessed  to  be  considered  as  problem- 
atical (§  136).  Dr.  Parchappe  is  most  embarrassed  by  the 
complete  unconsciousness  of  Lambert  for  a  period  of  forty- 
eight  hours,  a  fact  which  he  conceives  to  be  entirely  unsup- 
ported by  our  knowledge  of  the  disease.  "  In  mania  and  the 
kindred  forms  of  mental  disorder  unaccompanied  by  fever," 
he  says,  "  the  memory  is  preserved  during  the  disease.  .  .  . 
After  the  return  of  reason,  the  insane  remember  all  they 
have  said  and  done  and  thought."  He  concludes,  therefore, 
that,  although  the  prisoner  had  actually  suffered  an  attack  of 
mania,  he  simulated  this  unconsciousness  when  he  came  to 
himself,  in  order  the  better  to  escape  responsibility  for  his 
acts.     Without  disputing  this  hypothesis,  which  may  possi- 


SIMULATED   INSANITY.  419 

bly  be  correct,  we  are  not  quite  satisfied  of  the  necessity  of 
resorting  to  it  at  all,  for  our  own  observations  do  not  lead  us 
to  agree  with  Dr.  Parchappe,  as  to  the  matter  of  fact.  We 
think  we  have  occasionally  met  with  cases  not  marked  by 
any  febrile  movement,  in  which,  after  recovery,  a  certain 
period  was  a  complete  blank  in  the  mind.^ 

^  Anuales  med.  psyco.  vili.  228. 


CHAPTER    XVII. 


CONCEALED    INSANITY. 


§  427.  It  sometimes  happens,  that  when  maniacs  have 
learned  what  notions  of  theirs  are  accounted  insane  by  oth- 
ers, and  have  understanding  enough  left  to  appreciate  the 
legal  consequences  of  their  mental  condition,  they  endeavor 
to  conceal  it,  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  those  consequences. 
If  the  address  and  ingenuity  which  they  then  manifest 
have  occasionally  succeeded  in  baffling  the  scrutiny  of  the 
most  practised  experts,  it  is  not  strange  that  common  ob- 
servers should  have  been  frequently  deceived,  and  that  some 
of  the  medical  profession  even,  with  a  knowledge  of  this 
•fact  before  their  eyes,  should  have  been  outwitted  by  their 
manoeuvres.  When  it  is  considered  that  the  insanity  of 
many  consists  in  a  few  insane  notions  which  do  not,  to 
appearance,  affect  their  general  conduct  and  conversation, 
the  difficulty  of  concealing  it,  by  professing  to  have  re- 
nounced their  belief  in  these  notions,  is  perhaps  not  greater 
than  that  which  attends  the  accomplishment  of  most  of  their 
designs.  Their  task,  too,  is  materially  lessened,  it  is  to  be 
recollected,  by  the  prevalent  error,  that  madness  is  insepara- 
ble from  boisterous  behavior  and  complete  disorder  of  the 
ideas.  At  the  commencement  of  the  French  Revolution, 
when  the  mob  broke  into  the  lunatic  hospitals,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  liberating  those  among  their  inmates  whom  they  sup- 
posed to  be  unjustly  confined,  one  man  recounted  his  wrongs 
so  clearly  and  connectedly,  that  he  was  deemed  at  once  to 
be  a  victim  of  oppression,  and  ordered  to  be  released.  The 
use  he  made  of  his  liberty  soon  convinced  these  enlightened 
champions  of  their  race,  that  those  who  put  him  in  confine- 


CONCEALED  INSANITY.  421 

ment,  had,  what  they  themselves  had  not,  some  reason  for 
their  measures.^  Lord  Eldon  once  related,  that  after  repeated 
conferences  and  much  conversation  with  a  lunatic,  he  was 
persuaded  of  the  soundness  of  his  understanding,  and  pre- 
va'iled  on  Lord  Thurlow  to  supersede  the  commission.  The 
lunatic,  calling  immediately  afterwards  on  his  counsel  to 
thank  him  for  his  exertions,  convinced  him  in  five  minutes, 
that  the  worst  thing  he  could  have  done  for  his  client,  was  to 
get  rid  of  the  commission.^  Li  another  place  (§  22)  will  be 
found  a  case  which  well  illustrates  the  adroitness  and  per- 
severance, with  which  maniacs  will  sometimes  conceal  their 
mental  derangement. 

§  428.  In  England  and  in  this  country,  the  choice  of  the 
means  for  proving  the  existence  of  insanity  when  concealed, 
is  left  to  individual  sagacity.  This,  no  doubt  is  sufficient, 
where  great  practical  acquaintance  with  insanity  readily  sug- 
gests the  course  best  adapted  to  each  particular  case ;  but 
the  great  majority  of  medical  men  will  feel  the  need  of  some 
system  or  order  of  proceeding,  that  will  simplify  their  in- 
quiries, and  render  them  more  efficient.  The  French  arrange 
their  means  into  three  general  divisions  or  classes,  which  are 
made  use  of,  each  in  succession,  when  the  preceding  class 
has  failed  of  its  object.  They  are  called  the  interrogatory, 
the  continued  observation,  and  the  inquest,  and  as  no  better 
arrangement  has  ever  been  offered,  it  may  be  well  to  describe 
it;  and  it  may  be  added  in  passing,  that  it  would  materially 
conduce  to  our  success  in  inquiries  of  this  kind,  if  they  were 
always  pursued  in  the  course  here  indicated. 

§429.  Interrogatory. —  The  interrogatory  embraces  only 
those  means  of  information,  which  are  applicable  in  a  per- 
sonal interview  with  the  patient.  After  learning  generally 
his  moral  and  intellectual  character,  his  education  and  habits 
of  living,  the  duration  and  nature  of  his  mental  delusion  (if 
they  can  be  ascertained  from  his  acquaintances),  and  the 
state  of  his  relations  to  others,  and  after  observing  the  expres- 

^  Pinel,  Sur  Alienation  mentale,  159. 
^  Ex  parte  Holyland,  11  Vesey,  11. 
36 


422  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

sion  of  his  countenance,  his  demeanor  and  general  appear- 
ance, we  may  proceed  to  a  direct  examination  of  his  case. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  necessary  to  lull  his  suspicions  and 
remove  his  distrust,  as  far  as  possible,  by  a  free  and  courteous 
deportment,  and  an  air  of  kindness  and  unaffected  interest  in 
his  welfare.  He  should  then  be  engaged  in  conversation, 
which  should  lead  him  by  easy  and  imperceptible  transitions 
to  the  particular  subject  on  which  it  is  alleged  his  mind  is 
deranged;  and  the  manner  in  which  he  treats  it  should  be 
carefully  observed,  for  if  he  be  really  insane  on  that  point,  he 
will  probably  avow  it ;  while  if  he  is  not  so,  he  will  take  the 
opportunity  to  declare  his  disbelief  in  the  notions  imputed  to 
him,  and  bring  forward  various  considerations  to  support  the 
truth  of  his  assertions.  He  should  be  led  to  speak  of  his  rela- 
tives and  friends,  especially  if  they  have  taken  any  part  in 
provoking  his  interdiction,  or  otherwise  interfered  in  his 
affairs,  and  here  he  will  need  all  his  self-control  to  restrain 
himself  from  the  angry  and  revengeful  feelings  which  he  en- 
tertains towards  them.  When  confined  in  hospitals  or  other 
lunatic  establishments,  we  should  not  fail  to  ask  how  they 
like  their  situation,  and  what  they  think  of  their  companions; 
for  Georget  observes,  that  many,  even  of  those  the  least  de- 
ranged, are  such  poor  observers,  or  have  so  little  penetration, 
that  they  are  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  their  abode,  and  the 
character  of  those  around  them.  When  the  mental  disorder 
is  that  of  imbecility  or  dementia,  we  must  not  confine  our 
questions  to  the  simple  topics  of  their  present  condition  or 
feelings,  for  they  may  be  able  to  answer  them  clearly  and 
rationally,  though  subjects  requiring  a  little  more  reflection  or 
exertion  of  memory,  may  be  far  beyond  their  comprehension. 
It  not  unfrequently  happens  that  the  mental  deficiency  affects 
the  faculties  of  the  mind  unequally,  degrading  some  to  the 
scale  of  idiocy,  and  leaving  others  in  a  state  of  tolerable 
strength  and  development.  When,  therefore,  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  is  in  question,  whether  for  interdiction  or  any  other 
purpose,  we  must  not  fail  to  test  the  soundness  of  all  the  fac- 
ulties, by  inquiries  relative  to  the  objects  with  which  they  are 
respectively  concerned,  since,  if  satisfied  with  a  partial  ex- 


CONCEALED  INSANITY.  423 

amination,  we  may  grossly  deceive  ourselves  and  injure  the 
interests  of  others.  True,  this  requires  a  knowledge  of  the 
mental  constitution  not  possessed  by  every  one  charged 
with  this  kind  of  investigation;  but  the  deficiency,  common 
as  it  is,  proves  nothing  against  the  importance  of  this  knowl- 
edge. 

§  430.     The    importance    of    the    above    suggestions    is 

strikingly  shown    by  the    case  of  a   young  man,  B , 

noticed  by  Dr.  Abercombie,^  and  Dr.  Combe,^  which  occa- 
sioned much  trouble  and  litigation  to  the  parties  concerned. 
This  person  was  educated  for  the  church,  and  had  made 
such  proficiency  in  the  study  of  Latin  and  Greek,  that,  for 
several  years,  he  acted  as  a  tutor  in  these  languages.  He 
also  displayed  great  keenness  and  adroitness  in  driving  a 
bargain.  When,  however,  his  mind  was  directed  to  those 
studies  and  topics  which  require  the  exercise  of  the  higher 
powers  of  the  intellect,  he  was  found  so  deficient  that  he 
utterly  failed  in  his  second  examination  before  the  presby- 
tery, in  which  his  reasoning  powers  were  tasked,  though 
the  first,  which  was  in  the  languages,  he  passed  successfully 
and  creditably.  It  was  found,  too,  that  he  was  incapable  of 
comprehending  the  relations  of  business,  or  even  performing 
the  ordinary  duties  of  life.  Accordingly,  it  appeared  in  the 
course  of  the  law-proceedings,  that  those  witnesses  who  knew 
him  only  as  a  linguist  or  a  purchaser,  did  not  hesitate  to 
pronounce  him  a  capable,  clever  man  ;  while  those  who  had 
business  transactions  with  him  that  called  his  reflective 
powers  into  action,  had  no  doubt  whatever  of  his  imbecility. 

§  431.  There  are  few  points  in  regard  to  which  the  medi- 
cal jurist  will  find  it  more  important  to  possess  correct 
notions,  than  the  value  of  the  interrogatory  as  a  means  of 
establishing  the  existence  of  insanity.  In  the  English  courts 
of  chancery,  it  has  been  common,  especially  of  late  years,  to 
appoint  a  committee  of  physicians  to  examine  the  party 
whose  mental  condition  is  supposed  to  require  the  interference 
of  the  court,  and  thus  their  report,  deciding  as  it  virtually 

*  On  the  Intellectual  Powers,  276.        =*  On  Mental  Derangement,  244. 


424  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

does,  questions  of  liberty  and  property,  becomes  an  instru- 
ment of  much  good  or  much  harm.  It  is  a  curious  and  a  mor- 
tifying fact,  that,  not  unfrequently,  different  committees  have ' 
thus  examined  the  same  individual,  and  arrived  at  opposite 
results.  If  they  had  been  composed  of  persons  selected 
rather  on  account  of  professional  eminence  generally,  than 
for  their  knowledge  of  insanity,  unanimity  of  opinion  could 
hardly  have  been  expected ;  but  in  fact  we  always  observe 
among  them  the  names  of  men  whose  lives  have  been  devot- 
ed to  this  special  department  of  the  profession.^  Of  course, 
an  honest  difference  of  opinion  occasionally,  is  no  matter  of 
surprise  ;  but  when  it  becomes  so  common  as  it  has  of  late 
years,  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  prevalent 
mistake  touching  the  precise  value  of  the  method  employed 
for  obtaining  the  requisite  object. 

§  432.  There  are  many  cases,  unquestionably,  where  the 
insanity  of  the  party  would  be  clearly  exposed  by  means 
of  the  interrogatory ;  but  this  is  not  equally  true  in  respect 
to  sanity.  In  a  large  proportion  of  the  cases  which  re- 
quire such  investigation,  the  interrogatory  must  prove  utterly 
incompetent  for  this  purpose.  If  the  patient  entertain  delu- 
sions, he  may  have  learned  enough  of  the  consequences  of 
avowing  them,  to  keep  them  to  himself  in  the  presence  of 
those  who,  he  well  knows,  have  approached  him  for  the  very 
purpose  of  drawing  them  out  and  turning  them  to  his  detri- 
ment.    If,  too,  the  examiners   possess   no  clew  to  his  delu- 

'  In  the  celebrated  case  of  Dyce  Sombre  (London  Morning  Post,  Feb.  26, 
1849  and  seq.)  which  was  in  the  court  of  chancery  from  1842  to  1849,  acom- 
mittee  of  French  physicians,  not  entirely  unknown  to  fame,  reported  that  the 
party  was  of  sound  mind.  Shortly  after,  a  committee  of  two  English  phy- 
sicians reported  that  he  was  unsound,  and  incapable  of  managing  his  estate. 
Two  or  three  years  after,  the  same  committee,  with  the  addition  of  two 
others,  examined  him  again  and  found  no  change  in  his  mental  condition. 
Two  months  after,  another  English  committee  of  six  physicians,  examined 
him,  and  reported  in  the  strongest  terms  that  he  was  of  sound  mind,  and  ca- 
pable of  managing  his  property.  In  the  case  of  Mrs.  Cummings  (Times,  Jan. 
8,  1852  and  seq.)  there  was  the  same  lamentable  difference  between  the 
conclusions  to  which  two  medical  committees  arrived,  —  both  bearing  the 
names  of  men  eminent  for  their  knowledge  of  insanity. 


CONCEALED  INSANITY.  425 

sions,  they  have  no  means  of  provoking  him  to  utter  them, 
and  hence  he  passes  for  being  sound  simply  because  the 
chord  which  is  out  of  tune,  has  not  been  touched.  Another 
and  a  more  common  reason  why  the  interrogatory  should 
fail,  is,  that  the  patient's  unsoundness  may  not  manifest  itself 
in  delusions,  but  in  gross  improprieties  of  behavior,  in  fool- 
ish and  absurd  transactions,  and  the  extravagance  of  all  his 
anticipations.  Conversation  furnishes  no  occasion  for  the 
display  of  his  mental  disorder ;  but  let  him  go  into  the  world, 
the  master  of  his  own  movements,  heeding  no  will  but  his 
own,  and  every  day  would  furnish  additional  evidence  of  his 
incapacity  to  manage  himself  or  his  affairs.  Any  one  who 
visits  a  hospital  for  the  insane,  may  find,  at  every  turn,  some 
patient  who  converses  intelligently  and  discreetly,  and  neither 
in  discourse  nor  behavior,  displays  a  single  trace  of  insanity. 
Whoever  has  not  met  with  such  cases,  can  have  had  but  little 
practical  acquaintance  with  the  insane.  A  woman  once  came 
under  our  care  who  was  reported  to  have  had  several  previous 
attacks,  but  beyond  this  the  history  of  the  case  happened  to 
be  exceedingly  imperfect.  For  three  months  her  whole  dis- 
course and  demeanor  were  without  fault  or  blemish.  She 
was  calm  and  quiet  in  her  ways,  affable  and  intelligent,  and 
exerted  a  healthy  influence  upon  those  around  her.  In  regard 
to  her  own  case,  she  complained  that  she  should  be  banished 
from  society,  and  especially  from  that  of  a  young  and  beloved 
daughter  who  was  thus  cast  upon  the  mercy  of  strangers,  and 
for  no  other  reason,  as  she  said,  but  the  superior  force  of  a 
tyrannical  husband.  She  then  would  launch  into  long  and 
circumstantial  accounts  of  the  sufferings  she  had  experi- 
enced, by  poverty,  sickness,  and  every  species  of  privation, 
in  consequence  of  his  habitual  intemperance.  He  finally 
crowned  his  iniquities  two  or  three  years  before,  she  said,  by 
shutting  her  up  in  a  hospital  for  the  insane.  Now  all  this 
might  or  might  not  have  been  true.  We  had  no  means  of 
deciding.  But  when  she  added  as  a  great  secret,  not  to  be 
told  to  all,  that  he  employed  a  man  to  go  to  the  hospital, 
every  day,  and  beat  her  soundly  with  a  stick,  there  was  cer- 
tainly strong  reason  to  suspect  a  delusion.     Towards  the  end 

36* 


426  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

of  the  above-named  period,  she  became  agitated  and  irritable, 
and  finally  raved.  In  this  condition  she  continued  about  six 
months,  when  she  began  to  improve  quite  rapidly,  and  in  the 
course  of  a  month  or  two,  went  home,  entirely  restored,  v^ith 
her  husband  whose  conduct,  she  then  admitted,  had  always 
been  most  exemplary.  Had  this  woman  been  submitted  to 
the  examination  of  a  committee  of  physicians,  they  would 
unquestionably  have  reported  her  as  being  of  sound  mind  and 
an  unsuitable  subject  for  confinement. 

§  433.  When  delusions  or  other  indications  of  insanity, 
of  equivalent  value,  have  been  detected  by  competent  ob- 
servers, we  cannot  understand  why  their  existence  should  be 
denied  by  other  observers,  merely  because  they  have  failed 
to  detect  them.  To  prove  a  negative  under  any  circum- 
stances, is  no  easy  matter,  but  to  prove  it  in  the  face  of  an 
affirmative,  requires  a  course  of  protracted  and. varied  observa- 
tion, aided  by  strong  professional  sagacity,  very  different 
from  the  hasty  examinations  we  usually  witness.  Espec- 
ially should  we  be  cautious  in  cases  of  moral  insanity, 
where  the  very  incidents  which,  viewed  precisely  as  they 
occurred,  furnish  indubitable  proofs  of  disease,  may  be  so 
easily  represented  by  a  little  false  coloring,  in  a  totally  differ- 
ent light.  Had  this  caution  been  duly  observed,  the  world 
would  probably  have  been  spared  some  of  those  disagreements 
which  are  little  calculated  to  advance  its  confidence  in  medi- 
cal opinions. 

§  434.  Continued  observation.  —  A  systematic  course  of 
observations  continued  for  some  time,  may  establish  the 
fact  of  insanity  in  doubtful  cases,  after  several  personal  in- 
terviews have  completely  failed.  Opportunities,  therefore, 
should  be  demanded  for  visiting  the  patient  freely  and  fre- 
quently ;  for  watching  him  at  times  when  he  supposes  him- 
self unobserved;  and  for  exercising  a  general  surveillance 
over  his  conduct  and  conversation.  Those  about  him  should 
be  enjoined  to  watch  his  movements,  and  he  should  often, 
but  cautiously,  be  led  to  speak  of  the  motives  of  those  who 
are  anxious  to  prove  his  insanity.  It  often  happens,  too,  that 
those  who  are  most  successful  in  concealing  every  indication 


CONCEALED  INSANITY.  427 

of  disordered  mind,  in  their  conversation,  will  betray  them- 
selves the  moment  they  commit  their  thoughts  to  paper. 
They  should  be  induced,  therefore,  to  write  letters  to  their 
friends,  describing  their  present  situation,  and  to  prepare 
statements  of  their  wrongs  and  grievances,  and  thus  we  may 
be  readily  furnished  with  instances  of  incoherence  and  folly, 
which  the  patient  had  self-command  enough  to  withhold, 
when  put  on  his  guard  by  questions  which  he  knows  wxll 
enough  are  designed  to  entrap  him.  "  The  rapid  transitions 
and  odd  unions  of  discordant  subjects,  the  relations  of  things 
which  have  not  happened,  and  could  not  have  happened,  are 
in  many  cases  very  remarkable ;  and  a  forgetfulness  of  com- 
mon modes  of  spelling,  or  of  the  arrangement  of  letters  of 
words  well-knowii,  will  be  evinced  by  maniacs  who  have  been 
well  educated,  and  who  would  commit  no  such-  mistakes  but 
for  their  malady."  ^ 

§435.  Inquest.  —  When  the  above  means  fail,  our  inqui- 
ries must  take  a  wider  range,  and  be  directed  to  the  previous 
history  of  the  patient,  as  inade  known  to  us  by  the  testimony 
of  friends  and  relatives,  and  those  who  have  been  connected 
with  him  in  business,  or  had  any  other  good  opportunity  of 
becoming  acquainted  with  his  mental  condition.  "  The 
Inquest,''^  says  Georget,  "  consists  in  collecting  information 
respecting  the  patient's  condition  before  and  after  the  pre- 
sumed disease,  and  the  causes  suspected  to  have  impaired 
his  mind.  For  this  purpose  we  consult  his  writings,  and 
recur  to  the  testimony  of  those  who  have  been  about  him 
and  conversed  with  him ;  who  have  been  able  to  observe 
him  closely  and  to  witness  his  insane  actions  and  irrational 
discourse.  We  should  be  particularly  careful,  however,  to 
require  of  witnesses  facts  rather  than  opinions.^  We  should 
ascertain  if  insanity  be  a  disease  of  the  family;  if  he  have 
already  evinced  a  degree  of  singularity  in  his  moral  and 
intellectual  character,  or  exaltation  of  any  kind ;  if  he  have 
been  exposed  to  the  influence  of  powerful  causes,  such  as 

^  ConoUy,  Indications  of  Insanity,  469. 
'  See  Haihorne  v.  King,  8  Mass.  371. 


428  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

chagrins,  severe  and  repeated  crosses,  reverses  of  fortune, 
etc. ;  if,  without  any  real  motive,  he  has  manifested  any 
change  of  his  habits,  tastes,  or  affections ;  in  short,  we  should 
inquire  into  all  those  circumstances  which  so  frequently  pre- 
cede the  development  of  the  disease."  ^  We  are  to  look  into 
his  business  transactions,  his  management  of  family  affairs, 
his  conduct  in  the  domestic  and  social  relations,  and  the  part 
he  has  taken  in  public  scenes  and  duties.  His  letters  and 
written  communications  should  be  closely  scrutinized,  espec- 
ially those  that  have  any  reference  to  the  state  of  his  health, 
or  to  the  legal  measures  that  have  been  taken  against  him,  for 
here  we  may  meet  with  incoherent  and  foolish  ideas,  that  we 
have  found  nowhere  else.  In  short,  no  source  of  information 
likely  to  enlighten  us  on  the  subject  of  the  patient's  mental 
condition,  should  be  suffered  to  go  unexplored.  If  the  means 
thus  indicated  are  faithfully  used  —  if  the  whole  life  of  the 
individual  have  passed  in  review  before  us,  and  after  all,  we 
are  unable  to  prove  the  patient's  insanity  beyond  a  doubt, 
we  are  bound  to  conclude  that  his  mind  is  sound,  or  at  least, 
that  he  is  not  a  proper  subject  for  legal  interference.  This 
conclusion  will  be  no  less  proper,  even  though  we  still  enter- 
tain some  doubt  of  his  mental  soundness,  for  if  he  have  suffi- 
cient self-control  and  penetration  to  enable  him  to  conceal 
his  mental  impairments  and  conduct  himself  rationally,  but 
little  harm  will  probably  arise  from  leaving  him  at  present  to 
his  own  discretion. 

*  Des  Maladies  Men  tales,  57. 


CHAPTER    XVIII. 

EPILEPSY   AND   ITS   LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES. 

§  436.  Epilepsy  is  a  nervous  disease  characterized  by  par- 
oxysms of  insensibility,  unconsciousness,  and  convulsions. 
These  vary  in  severity,  from  that  of  a  simple  vertigo,  con- 
tinuing for  a  few  seconds  and  scarcely  discernible  by  others, 
to  that  of  a  most  distressful  convulsive  fit  enduring  from  five 
minutes  to  some  hours.  They  may  recur  twice  or  thrice  a  day 
for  several  days  together,  or  once  a  week,  month,  or  year. 
They  sometimes  occur  without  warning,  but,  as  often  perhaps, 
they  are  preceded  by  symptoms  indicative  of  disturbance  of 
the  nervous  functions  ;  such  as,  giddiness,  pain  of  the  head, 
drowsiness,  frightful  dreams,  hallucinations  of  sight  or  of 
hearing,  vigilance,  irritability  of  temper.  So  distressing  is 
the  condition  of  many  epileptics,  says  Esquirol,  previous  to 
the  paroxysm,  that  they  endeavor  to  hasten  its  access,  and 
for  this  purpose  resort  to  spirituous  drinks.  The  cessation  of 
the  paroxysm  is  followed  by  somnolence,  pain  in  the  head, 
and  a  sense  of  weakness.  The  recurrence  of  the  fits  is 
determined  by  whatever  disturbs  the  general  health,  more 
especially  by  derangements  of  those  organs  in  which  the 
series  of  morbid  phenomena  takes  its  origin.  Anger,  fright, 
or  any  strong  moral  emotion  is  very  liable  to  produce  a 
paroxysm.  A  soldier,  in  mounting  a  breach,  was  frightened 
into  a  fit  of  epilepsy  by  the  bursting  of  a  bomb-shell  near 
him.  He  was  soon  cured,  but  at  sight  of  the  place,  twenty 
years  afterwards,  he  was  thrown  into  a  fit.^ 

§  437.    Epilepsy  seldom  continues  for  any  length  of  time 


»  Esq«irol,  Des  Malad.  Ment.  i.  297. 


430  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

without  destroying  the  natural  soundness  of  the  mind,  ren- 
dering the  patient  listless  and  forgetful,  indisposed  and  un- 
able to  think  for  himself,  yielding  without  any  will  of  his 
own  to  every  outward  influence,  and  finally  sinking  into 
hopeless  fatuity,  or  becoming  incurably  maniacal.  Esquirol 
states  that  of  three  hundred  and  thirty-nine  epileptics  in  the 
Salpetriere,  twelve  were  monomaniacs ;  sixty-four  were  ma- 
niacal, of  whom  thirty-four  were  furious ;  one  hundred  and 
forty-five  were  imbecile  or  demented,  of  whom  one  hundred 
and  twenty-nine  were  so  only  immediately  after  the  fit;  eight 
were  idiotic ;  fifty  were  habitually  rational,  but  with  loss  of 
memory,  exaltation  of  the  ideas,  sometimes  a  temporary 
delirium  and  a  tendency  to  dementia;  sixty  had  no  derange- 
ment of  intellect,  but  were  very  irritable,  irascible,  obstinate, 
capricious,  and  eccentric.^ 

§  438.  From  this  statement  it  appears,  that  of  the  one 
hundred  and  forty-five  imbecile  or  demented  epileptics,  all 
but  sixteen  were  so  only  immediately  after  the  fit,  and  that 
this  was  also  the  case  with  three  of  the  thirty-four  who  were 
furious.  This  is  a  fact  of  no  little  importance  in  a  medico- 
legal point  of  view,  and  should  never  be  lost  sight  of  in 
judicial  investigations  of  the  mental  condition  of  epileptics. 
The  maniacal  fury  of  these  patients  is  of  the  wildest  and 
blindest  kind  which  nothing  can  tame,  the  individual  acting 
automatically,  as  it  were,  and  in  a  state  of  unconsciousness. 
It  may  continue  for  minutes,  hours,  or  days.  The  dementia 
which  is  the  form  of  mental  derangement  to  which  epileptics 
are  most  liable  after  the  fit,  is  characterized  by  intellectual 
stupor  and  moral  depression,  in  which,  however,  they  have 
sufficient  energy,  under  some  circumstances,  to  commit  acts 
of  violence,  of  which  they  retain  only  an  imperfect  recollec- 
tion when  they  recover.  Another  direct,  though  temporary 
effect  of  the  epileptic  fit,  is  to  leave  the  mind  in  a  morbidly 
irritable  condition,  in  which  the  slightest  provocation  will 
derange  it  entirely.  Sometimes  this  irritability  is  accom- 
panied   by  a   sense   of  anxiety,  distrust,  jealousy,  and  un- 

'  Ibid.  i.  284. 


EPILEPSY  AND   ITS   LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES.  431 

founded  fear,  and  sometimes  by  great  activity  of  the  lower 
propensities. 

§439.  The  mental  disturbance  generally  follows  the  fit 
immediately,  but  in  many  cases  it  precedes  the  fit  and  heralds 
its  approach.  And  this  latter  fact  is  irrespective  of  the  form 
of  the  disturbance,  which  may  be  fury,  excitement,  confusion 
of  ideas,  or  stupidity.  The  ordinary  succession  of  events, 
however,  is  not  unfrequently  changed.  The  mental  disorder 
which  usually  succeeds  the  fit,  may  occasionally  precede  it, 
in  the  same  individual ;  generally  proportioned  to  the  vio- 
lence of  the  physical  symptoms,  but  occasionally  most  severe 
when  these  symptoms  have  been  least  violent;  and  two  suc- 
cessive fits  may  be  attended,  one  by  excessive  mental  disor-- 
der,  and  the  other,  by  scarcely  any.  An  interval  of  months 
or  even  years,  may  be  followed  by  fits  in  rapid  succession  ; 
and  an  exact  regularity  of  period  in  the  occurrence  of  the 
attacks  may  be  replaced  by  no  regularity  at  all. 

§  .440.  To  determine  exactly  the  mental  condition  of  an 
epileptic  at  the  moment  of  his  committing  a  criminal  act,  in 
whom  the  disease  has  not  produced  habitual  insanity,  is 
often  a  difficult  task.  It  may  have  taken  place  in  the* 
absence  of  any  observer,  in  a  fit  of  fury  that  rapidly  passed 
away,  and  which,  perhaps,  may  not  have  followed  any  pre- 
vious paroxysm ;  or  the  accused,  though  subject  to  the  dis- 
ease, may  not  have  recently  suffered  an  attack,  and  may  have 
appeared  perfectly  rational  to  those  around  him.  The  sus- 
picion that  the  accused  was  deprived  of  his  moral  liberty 
when  committing  the  criminal  act,  would  be  strengthened,  if 
the  paroxysms  had  been  recently  frequent  and  severe  ;  if  one 
had  shortly  preceded  or  succeeded  the  act;  if  he  had  been 
habitually  subject  to  mental  irritability,  or  other  symptoms  of 
nervous  disorder ;  and  by  those  circumstances  generally 
which  would  lead  to  the  same  conclusion,  were  the  supposed 
disease  a  form  of  moral  mania,  instead  of  epilepsy  (§  257). 
Cases  of  this  kind  should  be  closely  scrutinized,  and  where 
the  accused  has  been  undeniably  subject  to  epilepsy,  he 
should  have  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable  doubt  that  may 
arise  respecting  his  sanity.     Less  than  this  common  human- 


432  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

ity  could  not  ask ;  more  even  has  sometimes  been  granted 
under  the  operation  of  milder  codes  than  the  English  com- 
jnon  law. 

§  441.  Zacchias  contends  that  epileptics  should  not  be 
responsible  for  any  acts  committed  within  three  days  of  a  fit, 
both  before  and  after.^  The  principle  is  undoubtedly  sound 
as  it  regards  criminal  acts;  and  cerfainly,  civil  acts  performed 
within  two  or  three  days  after  a  fit,  deserve  to  be  closely 
scrutinized.  Not  unfrequently,  however,  the  intellect  may  be 
as  clear  and  strong  as  usual,  up  to  the  very  moment  of  an 
attack,  and,  therefore,  it  would  seem  as  if  other  and  satisfac- 
tory reasons  should  be  required  for  invalidating  transactions 
executed  under  such  circumstances. 

§  442,  In  the  following  case,  the  criminal  act  was  the 
result  of  that  morbid  irritability  which  sometimes  succeeds 
the  paroxysms.  Joachim  Hoewe,  twenty-nine  years  old,  had 
been  an  epileptic  since  his  sixth  year.  Since  the  age  of 
puberty,  the  disease  had  become  aggravated,  and  latterly  had 
attacked  him  once  in  three  weeks.  He  was  long  in  recover- 
ing from  the  effects  of  the  fits,  being  troubled  with  pain  in 
the  head  and  vertigo,  and  manifesting  strong  aversion  to 
food,  though  never  furious  or  insane.  In  July,  1826,  after  an 
hour's  walk,  he  experienced  a  fit,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
three  next  days,  he  had  several,  appearing  all  the  while  to  be 
quite  unconscious,  and  refusing  nourishment.  On  the  third 
day  he  arose  from  his  bed,  and  went  down  into  the  yard, 
where  he  met  with  a  son  of  his  brother  ten  years  old,  and  a 
daughter  of  a  relative  to  whom  he  was  attached,  eleven 
years  old.  The  boy  asked .  him  if  he  did  not  wish  to  eat. 
The  patient  made  no  reply,  but  struck  at  him,  when  the 
children  ran  off.  He  followed  them,  overtook  the  girl,  knocked 
her  down,  and  catching  up  a  hatchet  from  the  ground,  frac- 
tured her  skull  in  several  places,  when  the  neighbors  rushed 
in,  and,  after  considerable  resistance,  overpowered  him.  He 
now  remained  quiet,  till  they  proceeded  to  carry  him  to  the 


QusEstiones  medico  legales,  cons.  xvii.  lib.  9. 


EPILEPSY   AND   ITS   LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES.  433 

magistrate,  when  he  broke  out  into  violent  expressions  of 
hatred  against  his  fellow-townsmen.  In  prison  he  laid  two 
days  in  a  state  of  unconsciousness,  took  no  nourishment,  and 
had  a  fit.  On  the  third  day  his  reason  returned ;  he  ex- 
pressed some  interest  in  his  friends,  complained  bitterly  of 
his  sufferings,  but  had  no  recollection  of  what  had  occurred. 
The  question  having  been  put  to  the  medical  expert  (by 
whom  the  case  was  reported),  whether  the  accused  was  in  a 
responsible  condition  of  mind  when  he  committed  the  mur- 
der, it  was  answered  in  the  negative,  for  the  following 
reasons.  Unlike  real  criminals,  he  had  no  definite  purpose 
in  view,  and  did  not  fly,  after  having  committed  the  act. 
The  mental  condition  of  epileptics  just  before  and  after  the 
fit,  is  usually  very  peculiar,  and  for  many  years,  medical 
jurists  have  not  been  in  the  habit  of  considering  an  epileptic 
as  deserving  of  punishment  for  any  offence  fie  might  commit 
within  three  days  before  or  after  a  fit.  Among  the  exciting 
causes  of  his  fits  at  the  time  in  question,  and  of  the  criminal 
act,  the  reporter  mentioned  the  exercise  and  heat  of  the 
weather  to  which  the  accused  had  been  exposed,  and  the 
inquiry  of  the  child  whether  he  would  eat,  which,  on  account 
of  his  morbid  aversion  to  food,  excited  him,  in  his  uncon- 
scious and  irritable  condition,  to  expend  his  fury  on  the 
nearest  object.     Two  months  after,  he  died  in  a  fit.^ 

§  443.  The  following  case  illustrates  another  phasis  of 
epilepsy  of  great  importance  in  a  medico-legal  point  of  view. 
"  A  very  sober,  quiet,  and  industrious  tradesman,  aged  thirty, 
subject  to  occasional  fits  of  epilepsy,  and  who  had  lately 
much  inclined  to  religious  devotion,  was  sitting  calmly  read- 
ing his  Bible,  when  a  female  neighbor  came  in  to  ask  for  a 
little  milk.  He  looked  wildly  at  her,  instantly  seized  a  knife, 
and  attacked  her,  and  then  his  wife  and  daughter.  His  aim 
appeared  to  be,  to  decapitate  them,  as  he  commenced  with 
each  by  cutting  on  the  nape  of  the  neck.  Their  cries  brouglit 
assistance,  and  he  was  secured  before  he  had  inflicted  any 
fatal  wound. 

^  Jahn  in  Henke's  Zeitschrift,  1827,  iv.  282. 
37 


434  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

"  I  saw  him  on  the. following  day.  His  coantenance  then 
presented  a  most  hideous  and  ferocious  aspect :  the  com- 
plexion was  a  dusky  red,  his  eyes  starting  from  their  sockets, 
and  he  was  continually  sighing  deeply,  or  extending  his  jaws 
as  if  going  to  yawn.  The  pulsation  of  the  temporal  and 
radial  arteries  was  full  and  laborious.  He  could  make  no 
reply  to  questions,  although  he  attempted  so  to  do ;  but  he 
occasionally  exclaimed,  '  oh  dear ! '  He  appeared  to  be  on 
the  very  verge  of  apoplexy.  He  was  depleted  freely  both  by 
blood-letting  and  purging ;  his  head  was  shaved,  refrigerating 
lotions  were  applied  to  it,  and  a  very  low  diet  prescribed. 
On  the  third  day  his  intellects  were  much  improved,  and  he 
was  quiet.  He  soon  quite  recovered,  but  never  had  the  least 
recollection  of  the  acts  he  had  comnritted.  About  a  year 
before,  he  had  experienced  a  similar  attack  ;  but  then  showed 
only  a  slight  disposition  to  mischief.  Nine  years  have  since 
elapsed  without  a  recurrence  of  epilepsy,  or  disturbance  of 
his  mental  faculties."  ^ 

§  444.  Epilepsy  is  often  accompanied  by  imbecility,  con- 
genital or  acquired,  and  by  disordered  appetites  and  propen- 
sities. Although  its  immediate  effect  on  the  mind,  in  these 
cases,  may  not  be  so  definite  and  prominent  as  in  others,  yet 
it  is  no  less  effectual  in  weakening  and  perverting  its  facul- 
ties. The  medical  jurist  should  preserve  himself  from  the 
common  error  of  viewing  these  bad  propensities  as  indicative 
of  a  depraved  and  sin-loving  character,  instead  of  being  the 
result  of  an  abnormal  condition  of  the  nervous  system.  The 
following  case  from  an  old  writer,  will  illustrate  this  form  of 
the  disorder.  C.  F.  Oppel,  sixteen  years  old,  twice  set  fire 
to  the  royal  stables  in  Saxony,  —  once  in  April,  and  again  in 
May,  1725.  The  fire  was  discovered  before  much  damage 
was  done,  and  the  second  time,  he  extinguished  it  himself. 
It  appeared  in  evidence  that  he  had  always  manifested  a 
good  and  peaceable  disposition  ;  that  from  childhood,  he  had 
always  been  troubled,  especially  in  the  summer  time,  with 


*  Burrows,  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  156. 


EPILEPSY  AND   ITS   LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES.  435 

bleeding  from  the  nose ;  that  when  ten  years  old,  he  had  an 
attack  of  scarlet  fever ;  and  that  about  a  year  before  the  in- 
cendiary attempts,  he  began  to  suffer  from  epilepsy,  the  par- 
oxysms of  which  were  light  at  first,  but  gradually  increased 
in  severity.  Four  weeks  before  the  fire  he  had  a  fit,  and  two 
days  after  he  had  another,  and  they  continued  for  some  time 
to  be  very  frequent  and  severe.  The  reasons  which  he  him- 
self gave  for  the  act  were,  that  when  he  had  been  drinking, 
he  felt  strongly  impelled  to  commit  incendiary  acts,  and  that 
on  this  occasion,  he  also  hoped  to  save  something  from  the 
fire,  with  which  he  might  buy  drink,  instead  of  being  obliged 
to  ask  his  mother  for  money.  It  appeared  that  his  father 
was  an  epileptic,  and  addicted  to  drinking.  The  physician 
who  was  directed  to  inquire  whether  the  accused  was  in  per- 
fect possession  of  his  reason  when  he  committed  the  offence, 
reported  that  he  was  not,  and  had  been  of  unsound  mind 
from  childhood.  The  reasons  offered  in  support  of  his  opin- 
ion, though  remarkably  correct  for  the  time,  will  not  all  bear 
a  critical  examination  now,  and  therefore  it  will  not  be  worth 
our  while  to  state  them  at  length.  The  fact  that  he  might 
have  inherited  a  depraved  constitution  which  was  still  more 
weakened  by  the  accession  of  a  severe  nervous  disease,  is 
sufficient  to  warrant  the  suspicion  that  his  mind  may  have 
been  a  prey  to  morbid  impulses  which,  when  under  the  influ- 
ence of  drink,  he  would  find  it  difficult  to  resist.  The  fact 
that,  shortly  before  and  after  the  offence,  he  had  suffered 
from  epilepsy,  furnishes  a  presumption  that,  however  ra- 
tional he  may  have  appeared,  his  mind  was  far  from  being 
in  a  sound  and  healthy  condition.  True,  he  alleged  as  his 
motive,  the  gratification  of  an  appetite,  but  it  does  not 
appear  that  the  appetite  existed  till  after  the  invasion  of  the 
epilepsy.^ 

§  445.    The  difficulties  which  sometimes  attend  these  cases 
are  well  illustrated  in  one  reported  by  Dr.  Chambeyron,^  of 


^  Troppaneger,  decis.  med.  for.  quoted  in  Henke's  Abhandlung. 
*  Annates  d'llygiene,  xx.  99. 


436  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

which  we  give  the  essential  incidents.  D.  B.  a  laboring  man, 
was  put  upon  trial  at  Rennes,  February  14th,  1838,  for  the 
murder  of  a  young  child.  It  appeared  that  this  child  be- 
longed to  an  unmarried  sister  of  his,  and  was  put  to  board 
in  his  family  at  a  moderate  price.  On  the  16th  of  July, 
1837,  a  woman  passing  by  the  house,  heard  him  speaking, 
and  striking  a  child  who,  at  every  blow,  uttered  a  deep  groan. 
On  the  21st,  five  days  after,  the  mother  of  the  child  showed 
to  the  neighbors  excoriated  braises  on  its  backhand  abdomen. 
On  the  23d,  the  prisoner  who  was  left  alone  at  home,  his 
wife  and  sister  having  gone  to  mass,  was  seen  by  a  neighbor 
standing  in  the  doorway.  With  one  of  his  own  children  in 
his  arms,  he  accompanied  this  neighbor  to  his  house,  saying 
that  all  his  children  had  the  hooping-cough  very  badly,  and 
asking  for  some  cider  for  his  little  nephew  who  was  quite 
sick.  The  neighbor's  wife  went  with  him  to  his  own  house, 
and  there  found  the  child  dead.  On  preparing  the  body  for 
burial,  his  attention  was  called  to  numerous  bruises  which  he 
explained  by  saying  that  he  went  out  that  morning  for  a  few 
minutes  to  gather  cherries,  and  when  he  returned,  he  found 
the  child  stiff  on  the  floor  on  which  he  had  fallen  from  the 
bed,  and  that  the  fall  had  caused  these  bruises.  The  next 
day  he  was  arrested  and  sent  to  prison.  For  several  days  he 
had  daily  three  or  four  epileptic  fits,  marked  by  violence  and 
fury.  From  the  prison  he  was  finally  sent  to  a  hospital  for 
the  insane.  There,  from  the  28th  of  November,  the  day  he 
entered,  to  the  5th  of  December,  he  had  fourteen  fits  by  day, 
and  some,  probably,  by  night,  and  thenceforth  up  to  the  day 
of  trial  he  had  no  more.  In  the  intervals  he  was  dejected, 
taciturn,  and  restless,  fancying  that  people  were  continually 
around  him  trying  to  make  him  confess,  and  beating  and 
kicking  him  because  he  refused  to.  At  times  he  was  noisy 
and  violent.  In  regard  to  the  homicidal  act,  his  own  story  at 
the  trial  was,^  that  on  the  16th  of  July,  he  spanked  the  child 


^  In  the  French  moile  of  criminal  procedure,  the  prisoner  is  called  upon 
for  his  own  statement  of  the  case. 


EPILEPSY  AND   ITS   LEGAL   CONSEQUEiSrCES.  437 

a  little  to  make  him  take  goat's  milk  which  had  been  pre- 
scribed for  his  cough ;  that  on  the  21st  he  had  an  attack  in 
the  night,  as  he  supposed,  and  in  his  struggles  must  have 
bruised  the  child  who  slept  in  his  bed;  that  on  the  23d  he 
had  another  fit  during  which,  he  presumed  he  threw  the  child 
down  upon  the  floor,  though  not  conscious  of  having  done 
it.  No  one  in  the  hamlet  where  he  had  lived  a  year  or  more, 
had  ever  seen  him  in  a  fit,  or  heard  of  his  having  one ;  but 
his  wife  and  sister  were  not  examined.  Of  course,  then, 
there  was  no  evidence  that  he  had  a  fit  on  either  of  the  days 
in  question,  but  all  the  circumstances  favor  the  belief  that 
one  or  more  fits  actually  occurred  on  those  days.  It  is  im- 
probable that  the  fits  observed  in  the  prison  were  the  first  he 
ever  had.  He  was  fond  of  children.  There  was  no  motive 
for  his  wishing  to  be  rid  of  this  one,  and  he  had  the  reputa- 
tion of  being  kind  and  good-natured.  He  did  not  allege  the 
occurrence  of  fits  in  excuse  for  the  act,  until  after  the  exist- 
ence of  the  disease  was  revealed  in  the  prison.  The  ques- 
tion then  arises,  in  what  phasis  of  the  disease  were  these 
assault3>  committed  ?  during  the  height  of  paroxysm,  or  in 
the  comparative  calm  which  succeeded  it  ?  Both  supposi- 
tions are  burdened  with  difficulties,  and  the  evidence  does 
not  warrant  us  in  adopting  either.  The  fact.alone,  however, 
that  three  days  after  the  homicide,  the  prisoner  began  to  have 
epileptic  fits,  in  rapid  succession,  must  have  rendered  his 
mental  condition  so  doubtful  at  that  moment,  that  the  jury 
were  amply  justified  in  acquitting  him. 

§  446.  The  mental  condition  of  epileptics  may  come  into 
question,  in  civil  cases.  Even  those  who  show,  during  the 
intervals,  but  little,  if  any,  trace  of  the  disease,  may,  imme- 
diately before  or  after  a  fit,  labor  under  a  degree  of  mental 
obscurity  which  incapacitates  them  for  any  matter  of  busi- 
ness. Any  thing  of  the  kind  occurring  during  one  of  these 
periods,  ought  to  be  viewed  with  suspicion,  and  if  the  trans- 
action presents  any  indication  of  unfair  advantage,  little 
additional  evidence  should  be  required  to  invalidate  it.  An 
epileptic  may  be  required  to  testify,  in  a  court  of  justice, 
concerning  what  he  saw  or  did  immediately  after  he  came 

37* 


438  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

out  of  a  fit.  If  his  evidence  conflicts  with  that  of  others,  or 
is  in  any  respect  grossly  improbable,  it  may  justly  be  sus- 
pected, because,  at  such  a  moment,  there  is  a  dulness  and 
confusion  of  mind  that  must  necessarily  vitiate  its  subse- 
quent recollections. 


t 

CHAPTER    XIX. 


SUICIDE. 


§  447.  At  the  present  day,  the  subject  of  suicide  is  de- 
prived of  much  of  the  medico-legal  importance  which  it  once 
possessed.  Still,  however,  as  questions  occasionally  come 
up  in  which  dispositions  of  property  are  made  to  depend  on 
the  judicial  views  that  are  formed  respecting  its  relations  to 
mental  derangement,  it  is  highly  proper  that  mistakes  should 
not  be  committed  from  a  want  of  correct  notions  of  its  nature. 
With  all  the  light  on  the  subject  which  the  researches  of 
modern  inquirers  have  elicited,  many  probably  are  yet  unable 
to  answer  understandingly  the  question  so  often  started, 
whether  suicide  is  always  or  ever  the  result  of  insanity.  It 
may  be  proper,  therefore,  to  lay  before  the  reader  the  present 
state  of  our  knowledge  on  this  subject,  in  order  that  he  may 
have  the  materials  for  forming  correct  and  well-grounded 
opinions  respecting  it. 

§  448.  To  the  healthy  and  well-balanced  mind,  suicide 
appears  so  strange  and  unaccountable  a  phenomenon,  that 
many  distinguished  writers  have  inconsiderately  regarded  it 
as,  in  all  cases,  the  effect  of  mental  derangement ;  while,  by 
many  others,  it  has,  with  still  less  reason,  been  viewed  as 
always  the  act  of  a  sound,  rational  mind.  Neither  of  these 
views  can  be  supported  by  an  impartial  consideration  of  all 
the  facts,  and  the  truth  probably  lies  between  the  two  ex- 
tremes. Suicides  may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  founded 
upon  the  different  causes  or  circumstances  by  which  they 
are  actuated.  The  first  includes  those  who  have  dehberately 
committed  the  act  from  the  force  of  moral  motives  alone ; 
the  second,  those  who  have  been  affected  with  some  patho- 


440  MEDICAL  JURISPEUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

logical  condition  of  the  brain,  excited  or  not  by  moral  mo- 
tives. 

§  449.  If  it  be  considered,  that  life  is  not  the  only  nor  per- 
haps the  best  gift  we  have  received  from  the  author  of  our 
being,  it  ought  not  to  appear  strange  that  men  should  some- 
times be  willing  to  relinquish  it  for  the  sake  of  securing  a 
good,  or  avoiding  an  evil.  We  know  well  enough  that  life  is 
not  so  dear  that  it  will  not  be  readily  sacrificed,  when  all  that 
makes  it  worth  retaining  is  taken  away.  The  intrepid  Roman 
chose  rather  to  fall  on  his  own  sword,  than  survive  the  liber- 
ties of  his  country  or  live  an  ignominious  life ;  and  reverses 
of  fortune,  which  hurl  men  from  the  pinnacles  of  wealth  or 
power,  or  the  certain  prospect  of  infamy  and  the  world's 
scorn,  are  no  very  inadequate  motives  for  terminating  one's 
existence.  In  these  cases,  the  person,  no  doubt,  may  act 
from  error  of  judgment,  and  thus  be  guilty  of  foolish  and 
stupid  conduct,  but  we  have  no  right  to  confound  such  error 
with  unsoundness  of  mind.  Inasmuch  as  the  prospect  before 
him  may  be  s.uch  that  it  will  appear  to  his  mind  more  painful 
to  live  than  to  die,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  if,  for  want  of 
courage  to  bear  up  against  the  ills  that  threaten  to  over- 
whelm him,  and  battle  it  to  the  last,  he  should  prefer  the 
latter;  for,  after  all,  the  choice  might  indicate  less  folly  than 
that  which  often  characterizes  the  conduct  of  men.  True, 
the  motive  may  seem  sometimes  totally  inadequate  to  lead 
to  such  a  determination,  though  in  reality  it  may  be  the  only 
and  sufficient  motive  ;  and  this,  probably,  must  always  con- 
tinue to  be  one  of  the  mysterious  facts  in  our  constitution, 
that  the  termination  of  our  existence,  from  which  we  instinc- 
tively shrink  with  feelings  of  horror,  should  so  often  be  volun- 
tarily hastened  from  the  most  trivial  and  insignificant  motives. 
No  doubt  the  mental  disturbance  is  always  great,  but  the 
same  may  be  affirmed  of  all  cases  where  crime  is  committed 
under  the  excitement  of  strong  passions,  and,  therefore,  is  in 
Itself  no  proof  of  insanity.  It  cannot  be  denied,  however, 
that  the  cases  are  comparatively  few  in  regard  to  which  it 
would  be  safe  to  affirm,  that  the  excitement  of  the  organic 
action  of  the  brain  and  nervous  system,  which  accompanies 


SUICIDE.  441 

this  perturbation  of  mind,  had  not  transcended  the  limits  of 
health  and  passed  into  real  pathological  irritation.  Among 
these  few  we  can  have  no  hesitation  in  placing  the  case  of 
the  pair  of  youths,  noticed  by  Mrs.  Trollope,  who,  after 
dining  sumptuously  at  a  fashionable  restaurant  at  the  ex- 
pense of  their  entertainer,  went  to  their  lodgings,  and  suffoca- 
ted'themselves  together  in  the  same  bed;^  or  that  of  suicidal 
clubs,  the  members  of  which  bind  themselves  to  die  by  their 
own  hands  within  an  appointed  time.  Men  who,  with  cul- 
tivated intellects  and  refined  passio^^s,  entertain  only  the 
meanest  conceptions  of  the  great  moral  purposes  of  life,  may 
be  readv  to  terminate  their  existence  the  moment  it  ceases  to 
impart  its  usual  zest  to  sensual  gratification.  Here,  self-de- 
struction is  obviously  not  the  effect  of  physical  disease,  but  of 
moral  depravity.  But  how  are  we  to  account  for  those  in- 
stances of  juvenile  suicide  so  often  recorded,  where  the 
dreadful  propensity  is  excited  by  the  most  trivial  causes  ? 
Burrows  speaks  of  a  girl,  but  little  over  ten  years  of  age, 
who,  on  being  reproved  for  some  trifling  indiscretion,  cried 
and  sobbed  bitterly,  went  up  stairs  and  hung  herself  in  a 
pair  of  cotton  braces ;  and  of  another,  elqven  years  old,  who 
drowned  herself  for  fear  of  simple  correction.^  A  French 
journal  has  lately  reported  the  case  of  a  boy  twelve  years  old, 
who  hung  himself  by  fastening  his  handkerchief  to  a  nail  in 
the  wall,  and  passing  a  loop  of  it  around  his  neck,  for  no 
other  reason,  than  because  he  had  been  shut  up  in  his  room 
and  allowed  only  dry  bread,  as  a  punishment  for  breaking 
his  father's  watch.  Another  case  is  related  of  a  boy  eleven 
years  old,  who  killed  himself  because  reproved  by  his  father  ; 
and  several  more  of  a  similar  descriptiorl  are  also  recorded.^ 
In  these  cases,  the  moral  causes  seem  altogether  inadequate 
to  excite  the  suicidal  propensity,  without  first  producing 
some  serious  physical  disturbance,  for  here  are  none  of  those 


*  Paris  and  tlie  Parisians. 

°  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  440. 

*  Medico-Chirurgical  Keview,  N.  S.  xxvii.  21. 


442  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

motives  for  self-destruction  which  have  just  been  mentioned 
as  influencing  the  adult  mind. 

§  450.  That  suicide  is  often  committed  under  the  im- 
pulse of  mental  derangement,  even  when  mental  derange- 
ment would  not  otherwise  have  been  suspected,  is  a  doc- 
trine that  was  long  since  taught  by  some  medical  writers, 
and  has  been  confirmed  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  by 
the  researches  of  recent  inquirers.  The  propensity  to  suicide 
connected  with  an  obviously  melancholy  disposition,  is  now 
universally  recognized  as  a  form  of  monomania,  for  its  symp- 
toms are  plainly  indicative  of  cerebral  derangement.  These 
patients  labor  under  a  constant  melancholy,  conjuring  up  the 
darkest  prospects,  and  presaging  nothing  but  evil  fortune. 
They  have  been  guilty  of  some  sin,  real  or  imaginary,  which 
they  believe  to  be  of  the  most  heinous  nature,  and  thence- 
forth there  is  no  more  happiness  nor  comfort  in  the  world  for 
them.  They  imagine  their  friends  are  constantly  watching 
their  movements  and  engaged  in  machinations  against  them, 
or  silently  neglecting  and  despising  them  ;  at  one  time, 
morose  and  taciturn  ;  at  another,  uttering  the  most  bitter 
complaints,  weeping  and  traversing  the  room,  as  if  in  ex- 
treme mental  anguish.  If  their  thoughts  take  a  religious 
turn,  they  imagine  they  have  committed  the  unpardonable 
sin,  that  their  prayers  are  rejected,  that  the  Saviour  turns 
away  his  face  from  their  sight,  and  that  the  miseries  of  the 
damned  are  to  be  their  everlasting  portion.  This  unquiet 
and  melancholy  mood  will  occasionally  give  way  to  short 
periods  of  comparative  cheerfulness,  when  the  clouds  seem 
to  be  breaking  away,  and  the  individual  approximating  to 
his  natural  character.  Their  nervous  system  is  weak  and 
irritable,  the  circulation  is  quickened,  the  digestion  more  or 
less  impaired,  the  secretions,  especially  the  biliary,  more  or 
less  deficient,  or  vitiated,  and  the  mind  is  incapable  of  con- 
tinued exertion.  After  this  state*  has  continued  for  some 
time,  the  mental  derangement  becomes  more  prominent,  and 
the  wretched  victim  begins  to  see  visions  and  hear  strange 
voices,  and  believes  that  he  has  communications  from  supe- 
rior beings.     All  this  time  the  idea  of  self-destruction  is  fre- 


SUICIDE. 


443 


quently  if  not  constantly  before  the  mind,  and  unless  the 
patient  be  narrowly  watched,  he  will  finally  succeed,  after 
various  attempts,  in  accomplishing  his  purpose. 

§  451.  The  suicidal  propensity  here  described,  is  univer- 
sally attributed  to  pathological  causes ;  but  there  is,  besides, 
a  large  class  of  cases,  in  which  no  disorder  of  mind  or  body 
has  been  observed  or  suspected,  though  we  have  good  rea- 
son to  believe  its  existence.  That  one  may  be  so  harassed 
with  the  ills  of  life,  as  to  deem  it  best  to  rid  himself  at  once 
of  both,  is  not  perhaps  very  strange ;  but  when  a  person, 
apparently  in  good  health,  and  surrounded  with  every  thing 
that  can  make  life  dear  to  him,  deliberately  destroys  himself 
without  any  visible  cause,  no  balancing  of  motives  nor  scru- 
tiny of  private  circumstances  can  satisfactorily  explain  it,  and 
we  are  obliged  to  consider  it  as  a  form  of  partial  moral 
mania.  Within  a  few  years  past,  the  attention  of  the  medi- 
cal profession  has  been  directed  to  this  subject,  and  their 
researches  have  abundantly  established  the  fact,  that  the 
efficient  cause  is  some  pathological  change,  or  physical  pecu- 
liarity, not  in  every  case  easily  defined  or  understood,  but 
none  the  less  certain  on  that  account. 

•  §  452.  Sometimes  this  monomania  is  attended  apparently 
by  no  physical  or  moral  disorder,  the  individual  being  driven 
by  mere  impulse  to  self-destruction,  without  being  able  to 
assign  any  reason  therefor,  real  or  imaginary.  He  feels  that 
he  is  urged  on  by  an  impulse  he  can  neither  account  for  nor 
resist,  perhaps  deplores  his  sad  condition,  and  beseeches  his 
friends  to  protect  him  from  himself.  In  another  class  of  cases, 
some  powerful  physical  or  moral  impression  only  is  needed, 
to  call  the  suicidal  propensity  into  fatal  activity.  There  are 
persons  who  can  never  approach  the  water  without  feeling  a 
strong  desire  to  throw  themselves  in,  and  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  suicide  is  not  unfrequently  committed  in  this 
manner.  The  wonderful  effect  of  mental  inffuences  on  dis- 
eases of  the  bodily  organs,  is  so  common  a  fact,  that  we  have 
no  rational  ground  for  disbelieving  a  similar  kind  of  agency 
in  the  production  of  this  phenomenon.  The  distinguished 
accoucheur  who  attended  the  Princess  Charlotte  in  her  fatal 


444  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDEjS^CE    OF   IXSANITY. 

confinement,  observed  a  pair  of  pistols  in  the  room  to  which 
he  had  retired  for  repose,  the  sight  of  \vhich  was  sufficient, 
to  a  mind  harassed  by  long  and  anxious  attendance,  and 
overwhelmed,  as  it  were,  by  the  responsibilities  of  his  situa- 
tion, to  provoke  a  desire  —  \Vhich  he  may  never  have  felt 
before  —  to  die  by  his  own  hands.  The  case  of  Sir  Samuel 
Romilly,  who  committed  suicide  immediately  after  sustaining 
a  severe  domestic'  bereavement,  strongly  shows  how  far  the 
propensity  to  commit  this  act  is  beyond  the  control  of  moral 
principle  or  Christian  virtue,  even  when,  as  it  was  with  him', 
previously  contemplated  and  conditionally  determined  upon. 

§  453.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  that  in  many  cases  of  at- 
tempted suicide,  the  individual,  after  recovery,  has  no  recol- 
lection,-or  at  most,  but  a  faint  and  shadowy  one,  of  the  fact 
itself,  and  believes  it  upon  the  testimony  of  others.  And  yet 
he  may  have  evinced  considerable  forethought  and  ingenuity 
in  preparing  the  means,  and  when  detected  in  the  attempt, 
have  conversed  about  it  calmly  and  pertinently.  It  seems  to 
be  analogous  to  that  loss  of  recollection  in  regard  to  homicide, 
or  other  violent  acts  committed  in  acute  mania,  often  evinced 
by  patients  after  recovery.  The  fact  strongly  shows  us  what 
deep  and  serious  disorder  may  pervade  the  mind,  while  out- 
wardly all  is  calm  and  regular. 

§  454.  Anjong  the  features  which  ally  the  propensity  to 
suicide  with  ordinary  mania,  is  that  of  its  hereditary  dispo- 
sition. Dr.  Gall  knew  several  families  in  which  the  suicidal 
propensity  prevailed  through  several  generations.  Among 
the  cases  he  mentions,  is  the  following  very  remarkable  one. 
"  The  Sieur  Ganthier,  the  owner  of  various  houses  built 
without  the  barriers  of  Paris,  to  be  used  as  entrepots  of  goods, 
left  seven  children,  and  a  fortune  of  about  two  millions  of 
francs,  to  be  divided  among  them.  All  remained  at  Paris  or 
in  the  neighborhood,  and  preserved  their  patrimony ;  some 
even  increased  it  by  commercial  speculations.  None  of 
them  met  with  any  real  misfortunes,  but  all  enjoyed  good 
health,  a  competency,  and  general  esteem.  All,  however, 
were  possessed  with  a  rage  for  suicide,  and  all  seven  suc- 
cumbed to  it  within  the  space  of  thirty  or  forty  years.    Some 


SUICIDE.  445 

hanged,  some  drowned  themselves,  and  others  blew  out  their 
brains.  One  of  the  first  two  had  invited  sixteen  persons  to 
dine  with  him  one  Sunday.  The  company  collected,  the 
dinner  was  served,  and  the  guests  were  at  the  table.  The 
master  of  the  house  was  called,  but  did  not  answer,  —  he  was 
found  hanging  in  the  garret.  Scarcely  an  hour  before,  he 
was  quietly  giving  orders  to  the  servants,  and  chatting  with 
his  friends.  The  last,  the  owner  of  a  house  in  the  rue  de 
Richelieu,  having  raised  his  house  two  stories,  became  fright- 
ened at  the  expense,  imagined  himself  ruined,  and  was 
anxious  to  kill  himself.  Thrice  they  prevented  him,  but 
soon  after,  he  was  found  dead,  shot  by  a  pistol.  The  estate, 
after  all  the  debts  were  paid,  amounted  to  three  hundred 
thousand  francs,  and  he  might  have  been  forty-five  years  old 
at  the  time  of  his  death. 

"  In  the  family  of  M.  N.  *  *  *,  the  great-grandfather,  the 
grandfather,  and  the  father  committed  suicide."  ^ 

§  455.  Falret,  whose  researches  have  thrown  much  light 
on  this  affection,  believes  that  it  is  more  disposed  to  be  hered- 
itary than  any  other  kind  of  insanity.  He  saw  a  mother 
and  her  daughter  attacked  with  suicidal  melancholy,  and  the 
grandmother  of  the  latter  was  at  Charenton  for  the  same 
cause.  An  individual,  he  says,  committed  suicide  in  Paris ; 
his  brother  who  came  to  attend  the  funeral,  cried  out,  on 
seeing  the  body  —  "What  fatality  I  My  father  and  uncle 
both  destroyed  themselves;  my  brother  has  imitated  their 
example ;  and  twenty  times  during  my  journey  hither,  I 
thought  of  throwing  myself  into  the  Seine."  ^ 

§  456.  Gall  also  relates  the  case  of  a  dyer  of  a  very 
taciturn  humor,  who  had  five  sons  and  a  daughter.  The 
eldest  son,  after  being  settled  in  a  prosperous  business,  with 
a  family  around  him,  succeeded,  after  many  attempts,  in 
killing  himself  by  jumping  from  the  third  story  of  his  house. 
The  second  son  who  was  rather  taciturn,  had  some  domestic 
troubles,  lost  part  of  his  fortune  at  play,  and  strangled  him- 
self at  the  age  of  thirty-five.     The  third  threw  himself  from 

^  Sur  les  fonctions,  iv.  345.  '^  Sur  la  Hypochondria  et  Suicide. 

38 


446  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  window  into  his  garden,  but  did  not  hurt  himself;  he 
pretended  he  was  trying  to  fly.  The  fourth  tried  one  day 
to  fire  a  pistol  down  his  throat,  but  was  prevented.  The 
fifth  was  of  a  bilious,  melancholy  temperament,  quiet,  and 
devoted  to  business ;  he  and  his  sister  showed  no  signs  of 
being  affected  with  their  brothers'  malady.  One  of  their 
cousins  committed  suicide.^ 

§  457.  Like  other  kinds  of  mental  derangement,  the 
suicidal  propensity  undergoes  occasional  exacerbations,  from 
the  influence  of  the  seasons,  periodical  congestions,  etc. 
The  patient,  perhaps,  may  have  thrown  off"  some  of  the 
gloom  which  overshadowed  his  mind,  resumed  a  portion  of 
his  ordinary  cheerfulness  and  interest  in  his  affairs,  courted 
the  company  of  his  friends,  and  thus  excited  strong  expec- 
tations of  a  perfect  cure,  when  suddenly  his  malady  breaks 
out  afresh ;  the  sentiments  are  again  perverted,  the  judgment 
disturbed,  his  breast  torn  with  anguish  and  despair,  and  the 
utmost  watchfulness  is  necessary  to  prevent  him  from  accom- 
plishing his  fatal  designs. 

§  458.  Another  trait  which  the  suicidal  propensity  pos- 
sesses in  common  with  some  nervous  diseases,  though  not 
insanity,  is  its  disposition  to  prevail  epidemically,  as  it  were, 
in  consequence  of  that  law  of  our  constitution,  not  well  un- 
derstood, called  sympathy.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  obser- 
vation, that  the  occurrence  of  one  case  of  suicide  is  followed, 
oftener  than  not,  by  one  or  more  in  the  same  community. 
In  a  sitting  of  the  Academy  of  Medicine  at  Paris  a  few  years 
since,  it  was  mentioned  by  M.  Costel  that  a  soldier  at  the 
Hotel  des  Invalids  having  hanged  himself  on  a  post,  his 
example  was  followed  in  a  short  time  by  twelve  other  in- 
valids, and  that  by  removing  this  fatal  post,  the  suicidal 
epidemic  was  arrested.  It  is  related  that  thirteen  hundred 
people  destroyed  themselves  in  Versailles  in  1793 ;  and  that 
in  one  year,  1506,  sixty  perished  by  their  own  hands  in 
Ilouen.2 

§  459.    The   analogies,  thus  presented  between  the   suici- 

•  Op.  cit.  sup.  iv.  350.  *  Burrows's  Commentaries  on  Insanity,  438. 


SUICIDE.  447 

dal  propensity  and  insanity  or  other  nervous  diseases  in  its 
symptoms,  are  also  strengthened  by  the  pathological  changes 
observed  after  death.  In  the  larger  proportion  of  instances 
where  examination  is  made,  the  brain  or  abdominal  viscera 
are  found  to  have  suffered  organic  lesions,  more  or  less  ex- 
tensive, which,  when  confined  to  the  latter,  have  affected  the 
mind  by  sympathetic  irritation.  Even  in  those  cases  where  the 
fatal  act  was  preceded  by  no  indications  of  disease  or  other 
symptoms  that  excited  suspicions  that  the  individual  was 
tired  of  life,  dissection  has  often  revealed  the  most  serious  dis- 
ease, which  must  have  existed  for  some  time  previous  to 
death.  True,  the  most  careful  dissection  will  sometimes 
fail  of  revealing  the  slightest  deviation  from  the  healthy  struc- 
ture, and  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  support  of  the  above 
views  of  the  nature  of  this  affection,  that  it  always  should. 
For  here,  as  in  mania,  sometimes  the  pathological  change 
may  not  have  gone  beyond  its  primary  stage,  that  of  simple 
irritation,  which  is  not  appreciable  to  the  senses,  but  the  ex- 
istence of  which  we  are  bound  to  believe  on  the  strength  of 
the  symptoms. 


CHAPTER     XX. 

LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES     OF    SUICIDE. 

§  460.  By  the  common  law  of  England,  a  felo  de  se  for- 
feited all  chattels,  real  or  personal,  which  he  had  in  his 
own  right,  and  various  other  property,  and  his  will  became 
void  as  to  personal  property.^  Such  severity  has  been  gen- 
erally avoided  by  the  almost  universal  practice  of  coroners' 
juries  to  return  a  verdict  of  insanity.  At  present,  the  fact 
of  suicide  has  no  other  importance,  than  what  it  derives 
from  its  connection  with  the  mental  derangement  which  may 
be  supposed  to  have  given  rise  to  it.  Courts  would  very 
justly  refuse  to  consider  it  as  sufficient  proof  of  insanity,  in 
the  absence  of  other  proofs,  because  it  might  have  been  the 
act  of  a  rational  mind,  and  because,  too,  if  it  really  had  sprung 
from  insanity,  the  delusion  might  have  been  so  circumscribed, 
as  not  to  have  perverted  the  judgment  in  regard  to  testa- 
mentary dispositions  and  other  civil  acts.  The  principle 
adopted  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts  is,  that  in  cases  of  doubt- 
ful sanity,  —  among  which  those  of  suicide  must  always  be 
ranged,  —  the  validity  of  the  individual's  testament  must  be 
determined  solely  by  the  character  of  that  instrument  itself. 
Here  is  an  inherent  difficulty  that  courts  will  never  be  very 
anxious  to  encounter,  and  that  is,  to  determine  the  exact  con- 
nection of  suicide  with  insanity  —  supposing  the  latter  to  be 
admitted  —  in  point  of  time.  When  this  act  is  the  only 
proof  we  have  of  mental  derangement,  we  are  left  without 
the  means  of  ascertaining  when  this  condition  began  to  exist 
or   to   disappear,   and    consequently   nothing   can   be   more 

^  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  iv.  190. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   SUICIDE.  449 

difficult  than  to  decide  within  what  time,  either  before  or 
after  the  suicidal  attempt,  the  individual  can  be  pronounced 
insane.  It  not  uncommonly  happens,  that  a  person  kills 
himself,  or  makes  the  attempt,  shortly  after  making  his  will, 
when  the  question  requires  a  judicial  decision,  whether  or  not 
the  insanity  which  led  to  the  fatal  act  existed  at  the  time  of 
making  the  will.  The  practice  has  usually  been,  if  there 
were  no  other  evidence  of  unsound  mind,  either  in  his  con- 
duct or  conversation,  or  in  the  testamentary  dispositions 
themselves,  not  to  impeach  the  testator's  sanity.  In  a  cer- 
tain case  it  was  held  by  Sir  John  Nicholl,  that  where  there 
was  no  evidence  of  insanity  at  the  time  of  giving  instruc- 
tions for  a  will,  the  commission  of  suicide  three  days  after- 
wards did  not  invalidate  the  will,  by  raising  an  inference  of 
previous  derangement.^  Chief  Justice  Parker,  of  Massachu- 
setts, also  held  that  suicide  committed  fifteen  days  after  the 
date  of  the  person's  will,  was  not  sufficient,  in  the  absence  of 
other  evidence,  to  prove  him  insane  and  thus  invalidate  the 
will,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  we  have  just  mentioned.^ 
Similar  views  prevailed  in  Duffield  v.  Robeson  ^  and  Chambers 
V.  The  Queen's  Proctor'^  (§  392).  In  both  cases  the  suicide 
occurred  the  next  day  after  the  execution  of  the  will,  and  in 
the  latter,  delusions  were  proved  to  exist  on  the  three  days 
next  previous  to  the  will. 

§  461.  Even  where  the  suicidal  act  is  unquestionably  the 
effect  of  insanity,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  a  will 
ffrepared  within  a  short  time  of  it,  is  invalid;  for  it  may  be 
that  the  insanity  was  of  a  limited  kind  not  involving  ideas 
of  property  or  relations.  A  gentleman  made  his  will  a  few 
hours  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  on  his  life,  and  intrusted 
it  to  the  charge  of  a  person  with  the  injunction  that  he  should 

'  Burrows  v.  Burrows,  1  Haggard,  109. 

*  His  language  was,  that,  "  even  if  the  act  itself  [suicide]  should  be  con- 
sidered as  proof  demonstrative  that  the  reasoning  faculty  was  disturbed  at 
the  time  of  its  commission,  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  with  precision  the 
very  inception  of  derangement,  weakens  its  force  in  relation  to  any  ante- 
cedent act."     Brooks  and  others  v.  Barret  and  others,  7  Pickering,  94. 

s  2  Harrington,  583.  *  2  Curteis,  415. 

38* 


450  MEDICAL  JUKISPKUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

produce  it  after  his  death.  After  some  months'  treatment  he 
got  better,  and  promised  never  again  to  attempt  to  shorten 
his  life.  For  three  years  he  kept  his  promise,  and  showed  no 
signs  of  mental  derangement,  but  it  does  not  appear  of  what 
disease  he  died.^  The  dispositions  of  the  will  were  reason- 
able ;  but  since  it  was  undoubtedly  made  during  the  insanity 
of  the  testator,  it  could  not  be  deemed  valid  on  the  principles 
of  the  common  law.  When  we  consider,  however,  that  it 
was  a  rational  act,  and  that  the  testator  suffered  it  to  remain 
unaltered  during  the  three  years  that  he  was  free  from  dis- 
ease, we  are  bound  to  believe  that  it  expressed  his  true,  delib- 
erate intentions ;  and  being  such,  we  ought  to  be  cautious 
how  we  adopt  a  principle  that  would  have  defeated  them. 

§  462.  Generally,  then,  if  the  unreasonableness  of  the  will 
itself  raises  a  suspicion  of  the  testator's  sanity,  the  act  of 
suicide  within  a  short  time  will  always  be  strongly  confirma- 
tory of  it,  and,  in  connection  with  attending  circumstances, 
may,  in  some  instances,  turn  suspicion  into  conviction. 
There  will  be  little  danger  of  going  wrong  in  any  cases  of 
this  kind,  if  we  are  willing  to  be  governed  in  our  decisions  by 
the  principles  of  equity  and  common  sense,  rather  than 'by 
technical  distinctions  and  antiquated  maxims.  If  the  will 
be  a  rational  act  rationally  done,  a  suicidal  act  or  attempt 
ought  not  to  invalidate  it,  because  the  presumption  is,  either, 
that  the  will  was  made  before  the  mind  became  impaired,  or 
that  the  derangement  was  of  a  kind  that  did  not  prevent  the 
judgment  from  using  its  ordinary  discretion  in  the  final  dis- 
position of  property.  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  be  an  unreason- 
able act,  and  especially  if  it  be  contrary  to  the  previously 
expressed  intentions  of  the  testator,  then  the  act  of  suicide 
will  be  in  itself  strong  proof,  that  the  mind  was  impaired  at 
the  time  of  making  the  will. 

§  463.  In  one  of  the  courts  of  Massachusetts  was  tried  the 
following  case  (1856).  An  elderly  widow,  up  to  a  certain 
Saturday  night,  had  never  evinced  any  mental  or  nervous  dis- 
order.    She  went  to  bed  as  usual,  cheerful  and  natural,  hav- 

^  Georget,  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  114. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES   OF   SUICIDE.  451 

ing  just  satisfactorily  completed  some  prospective  arrange- 
ments. On  Sunday  morning  she  arose,  looking  haggard  and 
ill,  complained  that  she  had  slept  none,  and  said  she  felt 
wretchedly.  During  the  day,  she  was  up  and  down  stairs, 
greatly  agitated,  and  drinking  much  water.  She  was  last 
seen  alive,  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  at  six  was 
found  dead  by  suspension.  On  examination,  it  was  found 
that  she  had  assorted  her  clothing  and  other  valuables,  into 
several  parcels  to  which  she  had  attached  labels  bearing  the 
names  of  her  various  friends.  She  left  no  will  nor  other 
writing.  She  had  an  only  son  whose  character  rendered  it 
not  unlikely  that  she  would  be  disinclined  to  leave  him  prop- 
erty. About  a  week  after  her  decease,  a  promissory  note  of 
some  hundreds  of  dollars  was  found  in  the  ashes  of  an 
unused  sfove  in  her  room,  torn  into  fragments.  The  promisor 
of  the  note  refused  payment  on  the  ground  that  the  deceased 
designed  to  cancel  the  note,  she  being  a  friend  of  his,  but  no 
promise  or  intimation  to  that  effect  appeared  in  evidence. 
The  jury  disagreed,  and  subsequently  a  compromise  was 
effected.!  Had  the  case  gone  to  trial  again  and  the  jury 
agreed,  any  verdict  must  necessarily  have  been  unsatisfactory, 
because  the  essential  points  were  beyond  the  reach  of  mortal 
ken.  On  one  side  it  might  have  been  argued,  that  the  woman  ■ 
destroyed  the  note  with  the  same  motive,  and  in  the  same 
state  of  mind,  which  prompted  the  distribution  of  her  cloth- 
ing ;  that  the  latter  act  evinced  a  knowledge  of  the  claims  of 
friendship,  and  consequently  that  on  this  point,  the  mind  was 
unaffected  by  disease,  however  disordered  it  may  have  been 
on  others ;  that  both  acts  were  similar  in  kind,  and  must 
therefore  be  equally  valid.  On  the  other,  it  might  have  been 
argued,  that  persons  about  to  commit  suicide  often  display 
sagacity  and  forethought,  while,  there  is  much  reason  to 
believe,  their  views  of  persons  and  things  are  greatly  con- 
fused and  distorted ;  that  she  evinced  a  degree  of  perturba- 
tion that  unfitted  her,  very  probably,  for  mature,  correct,  judg- 

*  Furnished  by  Dr.  L.  V.  Bell  who  was  an  expert  in  the  case. 


452  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ments;  that  if  her  suicidal  design  had  been  frustrated,  and 
she  had  been  restored,  she  might  have  declared  that  she  was 
entirely  unconscious  of  having  done  either  of  the  acts  in 
question,  or  if  she  remembered  it  at  all,  her  language  about  it 
might  have  been,  "  it  was  not  such  a  distribution  of  my 
effects  as  I  ought  to  have  made,  or  such  as  I  should  make 
now.  Indeed,  I  felt  so  strange  and  confused  that  I  hardly 
knew  what  I  was  about.  It  now  seems  more  like  a  dream 
than  an  actual  occurrence." 

§  464.  Of  late  years  the  mental  condition  indicated  by 
suicide,  has  been  frequently  discussed  in  the  trials  of  cases  of 
life  insurance,  and  the  conflict  thus  provoked  between  the 
technicalities  of  the  law  and  the  dictates  of  common  sense  is 
both  curious  and  instructive.  By  the  rules  of  some  offices, 
the  policy  is  made  void  by  the  act  of  suicide,  which  is  some- 
times expressed  by  the  words,  died  by  his  own  hand.  Parties 
to  be  benefited  by  the  policy  have  endeavored  to  avoid  this 
result,  by  proving  that  the  self-destruction  was  not  that  kind 
of  suicide  which  is  regarded  by  the  common  law  as  a  felo- 
nious act,  but  rather  the  offspring  of  insanity.  Of  course, 
the  criterion  must  be  the  same  as  if  the  act  were  that  of  hom- 
icide, —  did  the  person  know  right  from  wrong,  etc.  In  the 
case  of  Borrodaile  v.  Hunter^  (1841),  the  court  instructed  the 
jury  that  if  the  deceased  threw  himself  into  the  river  know- 
ing he  should  destroy  himself,  and  intending  so  to  do,  then 
the  policy  would  be  void ;  but  if  he  did  not  know  right  from 
wrong,  when  the  act  was  committed,  then  the  policy  would 
not  be  void.  The  jury  found,  both  that  he  intended  to  de- 
stroy himself,  and  that  he  did  not  know  right  from  wrong. 
By  the  first  part  of  the  verdict,  it  was  made  a  case  of  felo  de 
se,  and  by  the  last  part,  a  case  of  insanity.  Judgment  was 
entered  for  the  office,  and  subsequently  confirmed  after  argu- 
ment before  four  of  the  judges  in  the  Common  Pleas,  chief 
justice  Tindal  dissenting  from  the  rest.  In  another  case, 
Schivabt  V.  C/ift^  (1845),  where  the  person  killed  himself  by 
taking  sulphuric  acid,  the  jury,  under  the  direction  of  the 

1  5  Man.  &  Gr.  639.  2  g  Car.  &  Kir.  134. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   SUICIDE.  453 

court,  Cresswell,  J.,  gave  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  thereby 
deciding  that  a  policy  was  not  necessarily  vitiated  by  suicide. 
On  an  appeal,  however,  this  judgment  was  reversed  by  a 
majority  of  the  judges,  and  a  new  trial  granted.^  "  Had  all 
the  judges  been  present,"  says  Taylor,  of  the  last  case,  "  the 
decision  might  have  been  different ;  for  five  have  already  ex- 
pressed themselves,  at  various  times,  in  favor  of  the  view, 
that  the  term  '  suicide,'  in  policies,  applies,  as  it  ought  to  do, 
only  to  cases  in  which  there  is  no  evidence  of  insanity  ;  while 
four  have  declared  their  opinion  to  be  that  it  includes  all  cases 
of  'intentional'  self-killing,  whether  the  person  be  sane  or 
insane."  ^  In  the  case  of  Breasted  v.  Farmers  Loan  Co.^ 
(1853),  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  decided  in  a  case  of 
this  kind,  where  the  pleadings  showed  that  the  party  "  was  of 
unsound  mind,  and  wholly  unconscious  of  the  acts,"  that  the 
insurers  were  responsible. 

§  465.  It  sometimes  happens  that  two  persons  desirous 
of  dying,  agree  to  kill  each  other,  while  the  plan  succeeds  but 
in  part,  and  one  survives.  In  this  case,  how  is  the  survivor  to 
be  treated  ?  We  do  not  know  that  any  trial  for  this  offence 
has  ever  taken  place  in  this  country  or  England,  but  in  all 
probability  it  would  be  viewed  by  the  light  of  the  common 
law,  as  nothing  short  of  manslaughter.  In  the  milder  spirit  of 
German  jurisprudence,  Professor  Mittermaier  thinks  that  the 
survivor  would  not  be  a  fit  subject  of  punishment;  but 
whether  because  he  considers  his  responsibility  as  annulled, 
or  that  the  act  is  not  criminal,  he  does  not  state.*  However, 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  an  agreement  to  commit  mutual 
homicide,  ought  to  be  regarded  as  but  questionable  evidence 
of  insanity,  and  therefore  should  receive  no  favor  on  that 
ground  alone. 


>  Clifi  V.  Schwabt,  3  Man.  &  Gr.  437. 
'^  Med.  Juris.  650. 

'  Wharton  &  Stille,  On  Mental  Unsoundness,  172. 

*  De  principio  imputatlonis  alienationum  mentis  in  jure  crimlnali  recte 
constituendo.    p.  26.     Heidi.  1838. 


CHAPTER    XXI. 


SOMNAMBULISM. 


§  466.  Whether  this  condition  is  really  any  thing  more 
than  a  cooperation  of  the  voluntary  muscles  with  the  thoughts 
which  occupy  the  mind  during  sleep,  is  a  point  very  far  from 
being  settled  among  physiologists.  While  to  some,  the  exer- 
cise of  the  natural  faculties  alone  seems  to  be  sufficient  to 
explain  its  phenomena,  others  have  deemed  it  necessary  to 
suppose,  that  some  new  and  extraordinary  powers  of  sensa- 
tion are  concerned  in  its  production,  though  unable  to  convey 
a  very  clear  idea  of  their  nature  or  mode  of  operation.  With- 
out discussing  this  question  here,  our  purpose  will  be  an- 
swered, by  inquiring  how  far  the  natural  faculties  are  exer- 
cised during  its  continuance,  and  thus  ascertaining,  as  well 
as  may  be,  in  what  respect  it  differs  from  the  sleeping  and 
the  waking  states. 

§  467.  Not  only  is  the  power  of  locomotion  enjoyed,  as 
the  etymology  of  the  term  signifies,  but  the  voluntary  mus- 
cles are  capable  of  executing  motions  of  the  most  delicate 
kind.  Thus,  the  somnambulist  will  walk  securely  on  the 
edge  of  a  precipice,  saddle  his  horse  and  ride  off  at  a  gallop, 
walk  on  stilts  over  a  swollen  torrent,  practise  airs  on  a  musi- 
cal instrument;  in  short,  he  may  read,  write,  run,  leap,  climb, 
and  swim,  as  well  as,  and  sometimes  even  better  than,  when 
fully  awake. 

§  468.  The  extent,  to  which  vision  is  exercised,  differs  in 
different  cases.  In  one  class  of  cases,  it  is  very  certain  that 
the  somnambulist  does  not  use  his  eyes  in  the  various  opera- 
tions which  he  performs.  Negretti,  an  Italian  servant,  whose 
celebrated    history  is    related    by  two    different    physicians, 


SOMNAMBULISM.  455 

would  rise  in  his  sleep,  go  into  the  dining-room,  spread  a 
table  for  dinner,  and  place  himself  behind  a  chair  with  a  plate 
in  his  hand,  as  if  waiting  on  his  master.  When  in  a  place 
with  which  he  was  not  perfectly  acquainted,  he  was  embar- 
rassed in  his  proceedings,  and  felt  about  him  with  his  hands ; 
and  sometimes  he  struck  himself  against  the  wall,  and  was 
severely  injured.  He  sometimes  carried  about  with  him  a 
candle  as  if  to  give  him  light,  but  when  it  was  taken  away, 
and  a  bottle  put  in  its  place,  he  failed  to  perceive  the  differ- 
ence.! Galen  says  of  himself,  that  he  once  walked  about  a 
whole  night  in  his  sleep,  till  awakened  by  stumbling  against 
a  stone  which  laid  in  his  way.  Here,  it  appears  that  the  long 
continued  habit  of  performing  certain  operations  enabled  the 
individual,  with  the  aid  of  feeling  alone,  to  repeat  them  in 
his  sleep. 

§  469.  At  other  times,  objects  are  clearly  discerned,  but 
the  imagination  transforms  them  into  those  with  which  the 
mind  happens,  at  the  moment,  to  be  engaged.  Thus,  a  som- 
nambulist described  by  Hoffman,  who  dreamed  he  was  about 
going  on  a  journey,  strided  across  the  sill  of  an  open  window, 
kicking  with  his  heels,  and  exerting  his  voice,  as  if  he  sup- 
posed himself  riding  on  his  horse. 

§  470.  In  other  instances  again,  things  are  done,  in  which 
vision,  or  an  analogous  power,  is  unquestionably  exercised. 
Castelli,  whose  case,  which  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable,  is 
related  by  Francesco  Soave,^  was,  one  night,  found  translat- 
ing Italian  into  French,  and  observed  to  look  for  the  words 
in  a  dictionary.  His  light  having  gone  out,  he  found  himself 
in  the  dark,  groped  about  for  a  candle,  and  went  into  the 
kitchen  to  light  it.  He  would  also  get  up,  and  go  into  his 
master's  shop,  and  weigh  out  medicines  for  supposed  cus- 
tomers. When  some  one  had  altered  the  marks  which  he 
had  placed  in  a  book  he  was  reading,  he  noticed  the  change 
and  was  puzzled,  saying,  "  Bel  piacere  di  sempre  togliermi  i 
segni."    Another  somnambulist,  a  priest,  whose  case  was  pub- 

^  Muratori :  della  forza  della  Fantazia  Umana. 
*  Riflessioni  sopra  11  Somnambolismo. 


456  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

lished  in  the  French  Encyclopedie,  would  arise  from  his  bed 
and  compose  sermons,  reading  over  every  page  when  finished, 
and  erasing  and  correcting  with  the  utmost  accuracy.  On 
one  occasion,  after  writing  "  ce  divine  enfant,"  he  erased  the 
word  "  divine,"  and  wrote  "  adorable "  over  it.  Perceiving 
that  ce  could  not  stand  before  the  last  word,  he  altered  it  to 
cet^  by  inserting  after  it  a  t.  He  would  also  write  music  with 
the  greatest  accuracy. 

§  471.  In  another  class  of  cases,  there  seems  to  be  no  rea- 
sonable ground  for  doubting,  that  the  power  of  vision  is  mani- 
fested to  an  almost  incredible  extent.  Jane  Rider,  whose 
curious  history  was  published  a  few  years  since,  was  able,  in 
a  dark  room,  to  make  out  the  date  of  coins,  the  figures  of 
which  were  nearly  obliterated,  and  to  read  the  motto  of  a  seal 
which  others  had  been  unable  to  decipher  by  the  light  of  a 
lamp.  With  her  eyes  covered  by  several  folds  of  handker- 
chief, she  could  still  read  and  write  as  if  nothing  intervened, 
and  play  at  backgammon  understandingly. 

§  472.  It  appears  that  the  eyes  of  somnambulists  are  some- 
times closed  while  walking  about,  and  perhaps  always  so 
when  they  first  get  up,  though  by  one  writer  they  are  de- 
scribed as  being  sometimes  half  open.  In  some  of  the  cases 
which  have  been  alluded  to,  the  eyes  were  observed  to  be 
open  and  staring. 

§  473.  The  senses  of  hearing  and  of  taste  present  as 
many  different  modifications  as  that  of  sight.  The  sound 
of  persons'  voices  talking  loud  in  his  presence  may  be  un- 
perceived  by  the  somnambulist,  and  that  of  a  trumpet  no 
better  heard,  unless  put  close  to  his  ears ;  in  other  cases,  very 
faint  sounds  may  be  heard  at  considerable  distances.  Negretti 
did  not  distinguish  between  strongly  seasoned  cabbage,  and 
some  salad  he  had  prepared.  He  drank  water  instead  of 
wine  which  he  had  asked  for,  and  snuffed  ground  coffee 
instead  of  snuff.  By  other  somnambulists,  however,  such 
deceptions  have  been  instantly  detected.  Generally,  som- 
nambulists take  but  Jittle  notice  of  what  is  passing  around 
them,  unless  it  is  naturally  connected  with  the  subject  of 
their  thoughts,  or  specially  obtruded  on  their  attention  ;  and 


SOMNAMBULISM.  457 

then  the  perceptions  will  be  associated  more  or  less  cohe- 
rently with  their  thoughts.  Jane  Rider  would  take  part  in 
the  conversation,  and  never  mistake  the  nature  of  outward 
objects ;  while  others  have  been  no  less  accurate  and  acute 
in  some  of  their  remarks,  though  unconscious  of  the  presence 
of  other  persons.  These  facts  show  a  strong  analogy  between 
somnambulism  and  dreaming.  It  is  well  known  that  a  per- 
son who  will  hear  and  reply  to  questions  addressed  to  him 
relative  to  the  subject  he  is  dreaming  about,  may  not  notice 
nor  be  aware  of  loud  sounds  made  near  him.  The  differ- 
ence in  the  sensorial  powers  of  different  somnambulists, 
probably  indicates  merely  a  difference  in  the  degree  to  which 
this  peculiar  condition  is  carried.  Where  it  is  but  little 
removed  from  that  of  ordinary  dreaming,  the  sense  of  feeling 
alone,  in  a  limited  measure,  is  added  to  the  locomotive 
power ;  when  still  further  removed,  the  senses  of  sight  and 
hearing  come  into  play,  though  bvit  partially  exercised  ;  and 
when  displayed  to  its  utmost  extent,  they  enjoy  a  range  and 
nicety  of  perception,  not  witnessed  in  the  ordinary  state,  and 
hardly  explicable  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge. 

§  474.  There  is  another  form  of  this  affection,  called 
ecstasis  or  cataleptic  somnambulism,  from  its  being  con- 
joined with  a  kind  of  catalepsy,  in  which  the  walking  and 
other  active  employments  are  replaced  by  what  appears  to  be 
a  deep,  quiet  sleep,  while  the  patient  converses  with  fluency 
and  spirit,  and  exercises  the  mental  faculties  with  activity 
and  acuteness.  Both  in  this  and  the  former  kind,  the  person 
generally  loses  all  recollection  of  whatever  transpires  during 
the  paroxysms,  though  it  may  be  revived  in  a  subsequent 
paroxysm.  In  some  cases  that  have  been  related,  the  mem- 
ory during  the  paroxysms  embraced  only  the  thoughts  and 
occurrences  of  those  periods;  those  of  the  lucid  intervals 
being  as  entirely  forgotten,  as  those  of  the  paroxysms  were, 
after  they  had  subsided. 

§  475.  It  now  scarcely  admits  of  a  doubt,  that  somnam- 
bulism results  from  some  morbid  condition  in  the  system, 
involving,  primarily  or  secondarily,  the  cerebral  organism. 
We  see  that  its  lighter  forms  are  but  a  slight  modification  of 

39 


458  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

dreaming,  which  is  universally  admitted  to  be  very  much 
influenced  by  the  state  of  the  corporeal  functions,  and  which 
in  certain  disorders,  is  produced  in  a  very  troublesome  de- 
gree. The  analogy  of  ecstasis  to  hysteria  and  epilepsy,  with 
which  it  is  often  conjoined,  is  too  strong  to  escape  the  most 
cursory  observation,  not  merely  in  its  phenomena,  but  in  its 
curability  by  the  use  of  remedial  means.  Indeed,  these 
affections  are  known  to  pass  into  each  other  by  frequent 
and  rapid  transitions,  and  to  possess  a  strong  common  rela- 
tion to  insanity.  The  attacks  of  cataleptic  somnambulism 
are  invariably  preceded  by  derangements  of  the  general 
health,  —  in  females,  of  the  uterine  functions  especially, 
and  their  recurrence  is  prevented  by  the  methods  of  treat- 
ment which  are  found  most  successful  in  those  affections 
with  which  it  is  pathologically  related.  The  more  active 
forms  of  sleep-walking,  seldom,  if  ever  exist,  except  in  con- 
nection with  those  habits  or  conditions  that  deteriorate  the 
general  health.  Intemperate  drinking  is  said  to  be  among 
the  causes  that  produce  it;  and  an  observer  of  Negretti's 
case  attributed  the  disorder  to  his  immoderate  fondness  for 
wine.  A  plethoric  condition  of  the  vessels  of  the  head  is 
also  a  strong  predisposing  cause  of  it;  and  in  proof  of  this, 
Muratori  relates  that  he  was  assured  by  a  physician,  that 
nothing  but  having  his  hair  cut  off  once  in  a  couple  of 
months,  saved  him  from  being  a  somnambulist.  Its  heredi- 
tary character,  which,  like  the  same  trait  in  insanity,  we  may 
fairly  conclude  depends  on  morbid  conditions,  also  indicates 
its  physical  origin  ;  and  the  same  inference  may  be  drawn 
fi?om  the  influence  of  age  and  sex  in  its  production.  The 
cataleptic  form  of  the  disorder  appears  chiefly  in  females 
before  the  last  critical  period ;  while  the  other  is  as  much 
confined  to  males,  in  whom  it  mostly  appears  in  childhood 
and  the  early  periods  of  manhood,  —  seldom  in  old  age. 

§  476.  In  the  somnambulist,  either  the  perceptive  organs 
are  inordinately  excited,  and  thus  he  is  led  to  mistake  inward 
for  outward  sensations;  or  the  perceptions,  if  correct,  are 
misapprehended  by  some  obliquity  of  the  reflective  powers; 
in  some  instances  probably,  both   these  events  take  place. 


SOMNAMBULISM.  459 

He  talks,  moves,  and  acts,  unconscious  of  his  real  condition, 
and  of  nearly  all  his  external  relations.  The  ideal  images 
that  are  brought  before  the  mind  are  mingled  and  con- 
founded with  the  real  objects  of  sense,  and  the  conduct  is 
regulated  accordingly.  Psychologically  considered,  then, 
somnambulism  appears  to  be  not  very  remote  from  mania, 
the  difference  consisting  in  some  circumstances  connected 
with  the  causes  that  give  rise  to  the  derangement  of  the  fac- 
ulties. In  the  latter,  the  pathological  affection  of  the  brain 
is  continuous ;  in  the  former,  it  appears  only  during  sleep, 
by  which  its  effects  are  greatly  modified.  When  the  maniac 
finds  himself  restored  to  health,  he  looks  on  the  period  of 
his  derangement  as  on  a  dream  crowded  with  grotesque 
images,  heterogeneous  associations,  and  ever-changing  scenes. 
So  the  somnambulist,  on  awaking,  is  conscious  only  of  hav- 
ing been  in  a  dream,  the  events  of  which  have  left  a  more  or 
less  vivid  impression  on  his  memory. 

§  477.  In  somnambulism,  as  well  as  in  mania,  intellectual 
powers  are  sometimes  evinced,  that  are  altogether  unknown 
in  the  waking  state.  Jane  Rider  would  sing  correctly,  though 
she  had  never  learned  to  sing,  nor  been  known  to  sing  when 
awake,  and  would  play  at  backgammon  with  considerable 
skill,  though  she  had  never  learned  the  game  in  the  waking 
state.  She  also  exhibited  a  power  of  imitating  the  manners 
and  language  of  people,  though  she  had  never  evinced  the 
slightest  trace  of  this  power  when  awake. 

§  478.  Like  the  maniac,  too,  the  sleep-walker's  sentiments 
and  propensities  are  often  included  in  the  same  circle  of 
morbid  action  in  which  the  operations  of  the  understanding 
are  involved.  The  case  of  a  Carthusian  monk  is  related, 
who,  while  awake,  was  remarkable  for  his  simplicity,  can- 
dor, and  probity ;  but  unfortunately,  almost  every  night 
walked  in  his  sleep,  and  like  the  fabled  Penelope,  undid 
all  the  good  actions  for  which  he  was  so  celebrated  by  day. 
On  such  occasions,  he  was  a  thief,  a  robber,  and  a  plunderer 
of  the  dead.  A  case  of  a  pious  clergyman  is  somewhere 
described,  who  in  his  fits  of  somnambulism  would  steal  and 
secrete  whatever  he  could  lay  his  hands  upon,  and  on  one 


460  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

occasion,  he  even  plundered  his  own  church.  In  a  case  of 
somnambulism  which  occurred  a  few  years  since  in  Maine, 
there  was  a  strong  disposition  to  commit  suicide.  The 
paroxysms  appeared  every  night,  and  watchers  were  required, 
as  if  the  somnambulist  had  been  laboring  under  an  acute 
disease.  He  always  attempted  to  escape  from  his  keepers, 
and  having  succeeded  one  night,  an  outcry  was  heard  from  a 
neighboring  pasture,  and  he  was  found  suspended  by  a  rope 
from  the  limb  of  a  high  tree.  Fortunately,  he  had  attached 
the  rope  to  his  feet  instead  of  his  neck,  and  consequently  was 
but  little  injured. 


CHAPTER    XXII. 

LEGAL    CONSEQUENCES    OF    SOMNAMBULISM. 

§  479.  Somnambulism  may  sometimes  incapacitate  a  per- 
son from  the  proper  performance  of  the  duties  and  engage- 
ments of  his  situation,  and  then  unquestionably  it  may 
impair  the  validity  of  contracts  and  other  civil  acts  to  which 
he  is  a  party.  By  rendering  him  troublesome,  mischievous, 
and  even  dangerous,  it  furnishes  good  ground  for  annulling 
contracts  of  service,  whether  it  existed  previously  and  was 
concealed,  or  had  made  its  appearance  at  a  later  date. 
Whether  it  should  be  considered  a '  sufficient  defence  of 
breach  of  promise  of  marriage,  or  a  valid  reason  for  divorce 
when  concealed  from  one  of  the  parties  previous  to  the  mar- 
riage, are  questions  which  do  not  properly  admit  of  a  gen- 
eral answer.  Since  its  evils  may  be,  in  some,  of  the  lightest, 
in  others,  of  the  most  serious  description,  each  particular 
case  ought,  in  justice,  to  be  decided  solely  on  its  own  merits, 
reference  being  had  to  the  amount  of  injury  as  compared 
with  the  magnitude  of  the  obligation  sought  to  be  avoided. 
If  studiously  concealed  or  denied,  when  its  avowal  would 
have  undoubtedly  prevented  the  other  party  from  entering 
into  a  contract,  the  latter  ought  to  be  enabled  to  set  aside  his 
own  obligations  on  the  ground  of  fraud. 

§  480.  As  the  somnambulist  does  not  enjoy  the  free  and 
rational  exercise  of  his  understanding,  and  is  more  or  less 
unconscious  of  his  outward  relations,  none  of  his  acts  dur- 
ing the  paroxysms,  can  rightfully  be  imputed  to  him  as 
crimes.  HofFbauer  places  him  on  the  same  footing  with 
one  who  labors  under  hallucinations,  except  that  the  former 
is  not  fully  excused,  if,  knowing  his  infirmity,  he  has  not 

39* 


462  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

taken  every  possible  means  to  prevent  injurious  consequences 
to  others.  Both  law  and  equity,  too,  would  undoubtedly 
hold  him  liable,  as  they  would  the  maniac,  for  injury  com- 
mitted to  the  property  of  others,  though  as  to  what  extent 
this  power  would  be  exercised,  we  have  no  means  of  form- 
ing an  opinion.  HofFbauer  suggests  as  a  reason  for  not  re- 
garding the  criminal  actions  of  the  somnambulist  with  too 
much  indulgence,  that  they  have  probably  originated,  if  not 
in  premeditation,  at  least  in  the  deep  and  deliberate  attention 
which  the  mind  has  given  to  the  subject  when  awake.  This 
is,  no  doubt,  the  case  in  many  instances,  and  if  men  were 
to  be  punished  for  their  meditations,  the  suggestion  would 
be  not  without  its  weight ;  but  as  such  is  not  the  law,  it  is 
not  very  obvious  how  this  fact  can  affect  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  somnambulism.  Fodere,  too,  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  acts  of  a  somnambulist,  instead  of  resulting 
from  mental  delusion,  are  more  independent  than  any  others, 
because  they  are  the  free  and  unconstrained  expression  of 
his  waking  thoughts  and  designs,  and  therefore  that  they  are 
not  altogether  excusable.  He  seems  to  have  forgotten  that 
by  no  human  law  are  men  responsible  for  their  secret 
thoughts,  but  only  for  their  words  and  acts.  To  these  only 
does  it  look,  and  if  they  are  found  to  have  proceeded  from  a 
mind  not  in  the  fiill  possession  of  its  powers,  they  must  be 
excused  without  the  slightest  reference  to  the  former.  And 
as  it  cannot  be  denied  that  they  are  sometimes  excited  by 
unfounded  delusions  that  have  no  affinity  with  the  natural 
character  and  purposes  of  the  individual,  every  sentiment  of 
justice  cries  out  against  ever  regarding  them  in  a  criminal 
light.  Georget  quotes  from  an  anonymous  work  a  curious 
instance  of  somnambulism  in  a  monk,  which  was  related  tg 
the  author  by  the  prior  of  the  convent  who  witnessed  it  him- 
self. Late  one  evening  this  somnambulist  entered  the  room 
of  the  prior,  his  eyes  open  but  fixed,  his  features  contracted 
into  a  frown,  and  with  a  knife  in  his  hand.  He  walked 
straight  up  to  the  bed,  as  if  to  ascertain  if  the  prior  werei 
there,  and  then  gave  three  stabs  which  penetrated  the  bed- 
clothes and  a  mat  which  served  the  purpose  of  a  mattress. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   SOMNAMBULISM.  463 

He  then  returned,  his  features  relaxed,  and  an  air  of  satis- 
faction on  his  countenance.  The  next  day,  the  prior  asked 
him  what  he  had  dreamed  about  the  preceding  night.  The 
monic  confessed,  that  having  dreamed  that  his  mother  had 
been  murdered  by  the  prior,  and  that  her  spirit  had  appeared 
to  him  and  cried  for  vengeance,  he  was  transported  with 
fury  at  the  sight,  and  ran  directly  to  stab  her  assassin. 
Shortly  after,  he  awoke,  covered  with  perspiration,  and  re- 
joiced to  find  that  it  was  only  a  dream.^  A  similar  case  is 
also  related  of  two  individuals  who,  finding  themselves  out 
over  night  in  a  place  infested  with  robbers,  one  engaged  to 
watch  while  the  other  slept,  but  the  former,  falling  asleep 
and  dreaming  of  being  pursued,  shot  his  friend  through  the 
heart. 

^  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  127. 


CHAPTER    XXIII. 


SIMULATED     SOMNAMBULISM. 


§  481.  This  disorder  may  be  simulated,  first,  by  those  who 
have,  at  other  times,  really  experienced  its  attacks;  secondly, 
by  those  who  have  not  at  any  time.  The  motive  may  be, 
either  to  do  something  which  the  individual  would  not  other- 
wise dare  to  attempt,  or  to  avoid  the  punishment  of  an  action 
which  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in  one  of  its  par- 
oxysms. The  difference,  however,  in  the  difficulty  of  proof, 
is  not  so  great,  as  at  first  sight  might  be  apprehended ;  for, 
since  the  mind  is  generally  unconscious  of  what  passes 
during  the  paroxysm,  the  somnambulist  possesses  but  little 
advantage  over  others,  from  his  experience,  in  feigning  this 
affection.  He  will  be  no  less  at  fault  in  respect  to  those  little 
traits  which  mark  the  difference  between  the  real  and  feigned 
attacks,  as  well  as  the  more  important  phenomena.  "When, 
however,  it  is  admitted  that  the  person  has  been  subject  to 
its  attacks,  this  fact  certainly  furnishes  a  presumption  of  its 
reality  in  doubtful  cases,  which  diminishes  the  strength  of  the 
evidence  which  the  alleged  case  requires. 

§  482.  When  the  feigned  paroxysm  is  witnessed  by  others 
who  are  capable  of  describing  minutely  what  they  saw,  a 
comparison  of  his  conversation  and  acts  with  those  observed 
in  real  paroxysms,  may  furnish  us  with  a  clew  to  the  true 
nature  of  the  act  imputed  to  him ;  for  it  is  scarcely  possible 
that,  if  feigning,  he  will  not  be  caught  tripping  in  some  of 
his  manoeuvres.  A  curious  case  is  quoted  by  Hoff'bauer 
from  an  old  writer,  where  nothing  was  wanting  but  a  tol- 
erable knowledge  of  the  state  of  the  mental  faculties  in  som- 


SIMULATED   SOMNAMBULISM.  465 

nambulism,  to  expose  the  deception.  An  old  ropemaker  fre- 
quently fell  into  a  profound  sleep  in  the  midst  of  his  occupa- 
tion, whether  sitting  or  standing,  or  walking  in  the  street, 
when  he  would  begin  to  repeat,  by  means  of  words  and  ges- 
tures, every  thing  he  had  been  doing  during  the  day,  from  his 
prayer  in  the  morning  till  the  very  moment  of  his  falling 
asleep.  If  taken  while  walking  abroad,  he  would  pursue  his 
course  just  as  if  he  had  been  awake,  avoiding  persons  and 
things  which  might  harm  him.  The  story  was  related  as  one 
of  genuine  somnambulism,  though  there  were  two  circum- 
stances in  it  sufficient  to  have  exposed  the  deception.  In  the 
first  place,  to  repeat  the  transactions  of  the  day  in  this  man- 
ner, is  contrary  ;to  what  we  know  of  somnambulists  who  do 
only  what  they  have  premeditated,  or  what  has  strongly 
engaged  their  attention.  Secondly,  this  man  acted  a  double, 
and  consequently  a  deceptive  part.  He  first  repeated  what 
he  had  done  during  the  day,  and  then  went  on  with  what  he 
was  in  the  act  of  doing  when  the  paroxysm  took  him.  The 
ruse  was  finally  discovered.  The  man  professed  himself 
cured,  as  soon  as  a  physician  charged  with  examining  his 
case  proposed  to  bandage  his  eyes,  to  see  if  he  would  then 
be  able  to  perform  those  actions  which  had  excited  so  much 
surprise.  No  doubt  can  remain  of  the  genuineness  of  the 
attack,  if  the  person  perform  feats  which  he  would  not  dare 
to  do  when  awake,  unless  —  which  would  hardly  be  possi- 
ble—  he  has  systematically  concealed  his  skill  and  abilities; 
the  converse  of  the  proposition,  however,  cannot  be  equally 
true.  It  will  also  be  a  strong  confirmation  of  the  evidence  in 
favor  of  its  reality,  if  the  physical  symptoms  we  have  men- 
tioned, as  sometimes  attending  the  somnambulic  disposition, 
are  shown  to  have  been  present.  But  it  generally  happens 
that  the  somnambulist  walks  unwitnessed,  and  must  rest  the 
proof  of  his  mental  condition  on  his  own  testimony  and  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  The  full  burden  of  proof  mani- 
festly devolves  on  him,  and  if  he  fail  of  establishing  it  satis- 
factorily, he  must  suffer  the  consequence.  There  can  be 
no  other  rule  ;  for  once  acquit  a  criminal  on  the  score  of 
somnambulism  which  is  imperfectly  or  at  best  but  plausibly 


466  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

proved,  and  it  will  soon  become  a  favorite  excuse  for  crime, 
whenever  the  offender  possesses  the  requisite  address  for 
maintaining  the  deception.  Among  the  proofs,  however, 
necessary  to  establish  this  defence,  a  prominent  place  should 
be  claimed  for  those  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  criminal 
act  itself.  If  this  be  manifestly  contrary  to  the  known  char- 
acter and  disposition  of  the  accused,  and  especially  if  it  can 
be  shown  that  he  could  have  entertained  no  motive  for  injur- 
ing the  other  party,  but  little  else  beyond  a  straight  story  and 
an  open  air  of  sincerity  ought  to  be  required  to  establish  the 
truth  of  his  own  assertions. 

§  483.  A  criminal  trial  in  Boston,  in  1846,  strikingly  illus- 
trated the  peculiar  difficulties  incident  to  cases  of  crime  in 
connection  with  somnambulism.  A  dissolute  young  man, 
named  Tirrell,  twenty-two  years  old,  was  tried  for  the  mur- 
der of  his  paramour,  a  woman  more  dissolute  than  himself, 
with  whom  he  had  cohabited  a  year  or  more.  For  some 
three  or  four  days  before  the  murder,  they  had  lodgings  in  a 
not  very  reputable  house,  and  were  last  seen  together  at  nine 
o'clock  in  the  evening.  About  four  o'clock  next  morning,  the 
landlord  and  his  wife  heard  some  one  come  down  the  stairs 
and  go  out  of  the  street  door.  At  the  same  moment,  they 
smelt  smoke,  and  on  going  to  Tirrell's  room,  they  found  the 
woman  lying  dead  on  the  floor  with  her  throat  cut  from  ear 
to  ear,  and  the  room  on  fire  in  several  different  places.  Be- 
.tween  four  and  five  o'clock,  he  called  at  a  livery  stable,  and 
engaged  the  keeper,  Fullam,  to  send  him  in  a  carriage  to  his 
family's  residence  in  the  country,  saying  that  he  had  got  into 
a  scrape,  and  also  saying  something  about  a  house  being  on 
fire.  Between  five  and  six,  according  to  the  evidence,  but 
probably  while  waiting  for  the  horse  to  be  harnessed,  he 
called  at  a  house  near  the  stable  to  get  some  articles  of  cloth- 
ing which  they  had  been  making  for  him.  "When  told  next 
day  that  he  was  charged  with  the  murder,  he  declared  he 
would  go  back  and  give  himself  up,  but,  by  the  advice  of  his 
friends,  ostensibly,  he  fled. 

§  484.    One  branch  of  the  defence  was,  that,  if  he  did  the 
deed,  which  was  very  questionable,  he  did  it  in  a  state  of  som- 


SIMULATED    SOMNAMBULISM.  467 

nambulism,  and  the  following  are  the  facts,  as  given  in  evi- 
dence, relied  on  for  this  purpose.  From  the  age  of  four  or 
iive  he  had  been  habitually  somnambulic,  the  paroxysms 
occurring  as  often,  at  least,  as  once  a  month.  While  in  the 
paroxysms,  he  always  uttered  some  peculiar  inarticulate 
sounds,  indicative,  it  was  thought,  of  distress.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  murder,  immediately  after  the  landlord  and  his 
wife  heard  some  one  passing  down  stairs,  they  heard,  in  the 
entry  and  soon  afterwards  in  the  yard,  a  peculiar,  distressing 
sound  uttered  by  some  man.  Heard,  at  whose  house  he 
called  for  his  clothing,  and  also  his  wife,  testified  that  he 
made  a  strange  noise.  They  said  he  appeared  strangely, 
and  they  thought  he  was  asleep  or  crazy,  and  being  a  little 
afraid  of  him,  refused  to  let  him  in.  The  man,  however, 
shook  him,  "  when,"  as  he  testified,  "  he  seemed  to  come  out 
of  a  state  of  stupor  and  come  to  himself,"  saying,  "  Sam, 
how  came  I  here  ?  "  Before  coming  to  himself  he  said  that 
Fullam  was  going  to  take  him  to  Weymouth. 

§  485.  The  other  facts  in  the  case,  however,  are  strongly  at 
variance  with  the  supposition  that  he  was  in  the  somnam- 
bulic state  during  the  interview  with  Heard.  In  the  parox- 
ysms as  described  by  his  family,  he  was  generally  walking 
about  merely,  without  any  obvious  purpose,  and  unconscious 
of  the  presence  of  others.  Once,  in  the  course  of  his  life,  he 
is  said  to  have  broken  a  window  and  torn  down  the  curtain, 
and  once  he  went  to  the  stable  and  kicked  against  the  door, 
saying  that  he  was  after  a  horse.  During  these  seventeen  or 
eighteen  years,  these  were  the  only  exceptions  to  the  general 
course  of  the  paroxysms ;  and  his  friends  would  not  have 
been  likely,  under  the  circumstances,  to  overlook  one.  How 
different  his  movements  on  this  occasion !  He  begins  by 
committing  murder,  and  setting  fire  in  the  bed  and  closet. 
He  then  goes  out  of  the  house,  proceeds  directly  to  a  stable, 
tells  the  people  there  they  must  take  him  out  of  town  as 
quick  as  possible;  then  goes  to  the  Heards,  wakes  them  up, 
inquires  for  some  handkerchiefs  they  were  making  for  him, 
and  says  Fallam  is  going  to  take  him  out  of  town.     Here 


468  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDEiSrCE   OF   INSANITY. 

was  not  only  a  remarkable  contrast  to  his  usual  proceedings 
in  the  somnambulic  state,  but  it  was  just  what  he  would 
have  done,  had  he  been  wide  awake,  flying  from  a  terrible 
scene  of  blood  and  fire.  Again,  if  it  bo  supposed  that  he 
committed  the  act  in  the  somnambulic  state,  it  must  also  be 
supposed,  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  phenomena  of 
somnambulism,  that  it  was  committed  in  a  state  of  great 
mental  confusion,  under  a  total  misapprehension  of  his  rela- 
tions to  the  woman,  and  mistaking  her  for  some  devil,  witch, 
or  other  creature,  designing  him  mischief.  Such  being  the 
case,  while  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  he  would  have  done 
next,  it  is  quite  certain  that  he  would  not  have  acted  pre- 
cisely as  if  he  had  consciously  and  deliberately  perpetrated  a 
great  crime.  And  even  if,  yielding  to  some  strange  fancy,  he 
had  determined  to  leave  the  house  and  go  to  Weymouth,  it 
must  be  supposed -that  the  moment  when  he  came  to  himself, 
he  regarded  this  purpose  as  a  mere  dream,  or  lost  his  con- 
sciousness of  it  altogether,-  and  returned  to  the  house.  An- 
other fact  which  weakens  the  theory  of  real  somnambulism, 
is,  that,  notwithstanding  his  appearance  as  described  by 
Heard  and  his  wife,  Fullam  and  his  servant  had  previously 
seen  nothing  strange  or  extraordinary  in  his  conduct  or  con- 
versation. According  to  the  testimony  of  the  Heards,  he 
came  to  himself  while  at  their  house,  exclaiming,  "  Sam, 
how  came  I  here  ?  "  but  nevertheless  he  proceeded  to  exe- 
cute his  design  already  formed,  to  escape  from  the  city. 
This  shows,  beyond  a  doubt,  that  he  did  know  how  he 
came  there.  The  suggestion  of  his  counsel  that  he  probably 
called  at  Heard's  before  he  called  at  Fullam's,  scarcely 
helps  the  matter,  because  the  fact  still  remains  that  he  car- 
ried out  the  purpose  which  was  in  his  mind  while  talking 
with  Heard.  The  idea  that  a  somnambulist  may  continue 
to  pursue  the  same  train  of  thought  and  the  same  course  of 
action,  after  coming  to  himself,  which  he  did  before,  is  di- 
rectly opposed  by  all  our  knowledge  of  this  mental  condi- 
tion. 

§  486.    There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  Heards  were 


SIMULATED   SOMNAMBULISM.  469 

mistaken  in  regard  to  his  appearance,  or  that  they  fabricated 
the  whole  story  about  it.  It  probably  was  precisely  as  they 
testified,  and  the  only  rational  explanation  of  it,  is,  that  in 
the  interview  with  them  he  was  simulating  somnambulism. 
No  possible  theory  of  this  case  is  without  difficulties,  but 
this  seems  to  be  encumbered  with  the  fewest.  It  can  hardly 
be  supposed  that  this  young  man  —  sharp  and  unscrupulous 
as  he  was  —  had  not  often  thought  how  he  might  make  this 
peculiar  affection  available  for  criminal  purposes,  when  the 
occasion  might  require  it.  Accordingly,  when,  from  some 
inscrutable  motive,  he  had  taken  the  life  of  the  partner  of  his 
guilty  pleasures,  and  saw  that  all  the  circumstances  would 
inevitably  point  to  him  as  the  author  of  the  crime,  what  more 
probable  than  that  he  should,  then  and  there,  conceive  the 
design  of  simulating  the  affection,  the  real  attacks  of  which 
he  had  so  long  suffered?  It,  certainly,  would  have  been 
more  strange  had  he  not  conceived  and  executed  this  design. 
It  must  have  seemed  to  him  the  only  course  which  furnished 
the  slightest  chance  of  escape.  The  Heards  were  selected 
for  the  witnesses  of  the  part  he  was  playing,  because  they 
were  acquainted  with  him,  and  were  favorably  disposed 
towards  him.  To  have  aroused  the  people  of  the  lodging- 
house  would  have  defeated  his  purpose  of  effacing  by  fire, 
the  evidences  of  his  guilt,  and  any  appearance  of  somnam- 
bulism to  Fullam  and  his  servant,  would  have  prevented  his 
getting  the  means  of  escape.  So  far  the  plot  was  ingen- 
iously contrived,  but  when  he  came  to  play  out  his  assumed 
part,  he  signally  failed,  for  the  simple  reason  that  no  one 
knows  less  than  the  individual  himself,  how  he  acts  when  in 
the  somnambulic  state.  His  peculiar  utterance  and  strange- 
ness of  manner,  he  had  been  often  told  of,  no  doubt,  and 
those  he  could  easily  manage ;  but  he  might  not  have  known 
that  the  correctness  and  pertinence  of  his  conversation  at  the 
Heards'  were  totally  unlike  any  of  his  manifestations  while 
in  the  real  paroxysms,  nor  that  a  true  somnambulist  would 
have  alluded,  in  that  interview,  to  the  scenes  he  had  just  wit- 
nessed, rather  than  to  an  ordinary  matter  of  business.  So 
little  did  he  seem  to  apprehend  his  part,  that,  pretending  to 

40 


470  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

be  somnambulic,  he  was,  for   all   practical   purposes,  fully 
awake. 

The  jury  acquitted  him,  because,  as  they  stated,  the  evi- 
dence that  he  did  the  deed  was  insufficient.  The  question  of 
somnambulism  they  did  not  consider.^ 


^  The  facts  of  tliis  case  are  obtained  from  reports  of  the  trial,  in  the 
papers  of  the  time. 


CHAPTER     XXIV 


SOMNOLENTIA. 


§  487.  The  sleeping  state  gives  rise,  in  one  way  or  an- 
other, to  a  mental  condition  in  which  all  moral  liberty  is  de- 
stroyed. What  the  essential  condition  of  the  brain  is  in 
sleep,  as  dretinguished  from  that  of  the  waking  state,  is  one 
of  the  problems  of  physiology  that  remain  to  be  solved.  The 
few  facts  which  meet  our  observation  throw  but  little  light  on 
this  point,  though  they  serve  to  indicate  the  general  features 
of  the  difference  between  the  two  states.  Opposite  as  they 
are,  the  passage  from  one  to  the  other  cannot  be  exactly  de- 
scribed. We  only  know  that,  in  going  to  sleep,  the  various- 
organs  of  sensation  and  motion,  one  after  another,  cease  from 
their  activity  and  lose  their  relations  to  the  world  without ; 
and  that,  in  waking,  these  organs  more  rapidly  resume  their 
activity,  until  the  consciousness  is  fully  restored.  In  either 
case  the  ordinary  course  of  things  may  be  interrupted,  from 
one  cause  or  another,  —  the  previous  thoughts  or  occupations 
of  the  individual,  external  circumstances  making  their  im- 
pressions upon  the  senses,  or  some  unusual,  if  not  abnormal 
activity  of  the  cerebral  system.  Especially  is  this  the  case  in 
the  passage  from  the  sleeping  to  the  waking  state,  the  ordinary 
phenomena  of  which  are  liable  to  be  disturbed  by  loud  noises, 
vivid  dreams,  or  attempts  to  arouse  the  sleeper  by  shaking 
and  pulling.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  also,  that  in  certain 
persons  the  sleeping  state  is  ordinarily  marked  by  peculiarities 
which  are  sometimes  continued  by  hereditary  transmission. 
A  distinguished  general  of  the  American  Revolutionary  army 
would  not  only  drop  asleep  while  conversing  with  a  friend, 
but  would  sleep  on  his  horse  during  a  march,  though  without 


472  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

losing  his  consciousness  of  whatever  he  ought  to  know.  His 
son,  too,  while  asleep,  would  hear  the  conversation  of  people 
about  him,  and  interpose  some  pertinent  remark,  without 
awaking.  His  son,  also,  while  asleep,  would  maintain  a  col- 
loquy with  another  person  in  the  room,  with  but  little  less 
coherence  and  correctness,  than  he  would  when  fully  awake. 
In  some  persons  too,  the  mind  is  more  active  occasionally, 
during  sleep,  than  when  awake ;  solving  problems,  or  writ- 
ing verses,  or  clearing  up  difficulties,  with  remarkable  suc- 
'  cess. 

§  488.  It  sometimes  happens  that,  in  passing  from  the 
sleeping  to  the  waking  state,  especially  when  the  sleeper  is 
suddenly  awakened,  the  mind  does  not  readily  resume  its 
proper  relations,  misapprehending  the  irapressions*iade  upon 
the  senses,  and  acting  accordingly.  The  mind  is  then  in  a 
state  of  temporary  delirium,  resembling  somewhat  that  of  in- 
toxication, and  which  has  received  in  Germany  the  name  of 
sleep-drunkenness.  Deceived  by  false  images  and  unable  to 
reason  correctly,  the  sleeper  may  commit  some  deed  of  violence 
that  shocks  no  one  more  than  himself  when  he  becomes  fully 
awake. 

§  489.  The  case  of  Bernard  Schimaidzig,  often  quoted  in 
this  connection,  is  one  of  peculiar  interest,  but  we  have  room 
for  only  a  few  particulars.  This  man  was  suddenly  waked 
up  at  midnight.  At  the  moment  of  waking,  he  saw  a  fright- 
ful phantom  standing  near  him ;  in  the  darkness  and  terror, 
he  distinguished  nothing  more.  Twice  he  called  out,  "  Who 
goes  there  ?  "  but  he  received  no  answer,  and  saw  the  phan- 
tom approaching  him.  He  leaped  from  his  couch,  seized  a 
hatchet  which  was  near  him,  and  attacked  the  formidable 
spectre.  All  this  was  the  work  of  a  moment.  At  the  first 
blow,  the  spectre  was  brought  to  the  ground,  uttering  a  heavy 
groan.  Awakened  by  the  noise,  he  found  that  the  object  of 
his  fears  was  his  own  wife  who  had  been  lying  beside  him, 
on  whom  he  had  inflicted  a  mortal  wound.  To  those  who 
ran  to  the  spot,  he  narrated  the  above  circumstances,  exclaim- 
ing, with  trembling  and  agitation,  "  My  God,  my  God,  what 
have  I  done  I  "     The  criminal  college  of  Upper  Silesia,  to 


SOMNOLENTIA.  473 

whom  the  case  was  referred  for  examination,  reported  that 
the  homicidal  act  was  committed  by  Schimaidzig  in  the  tran- 
sition state  between  sleeping  and  waking,  and  that  he  was 
not  then  responsible.  The  various  questions  raised  by  this 
case  were  elaborately  discussed  in  their  report,  which  is  well 
worth  the  attention  of  the  medical  jurist.^ 

§  490.  Very  recently  a  case  occurred  in  Germany  with  a 
similar  judicial  result.  "A  young  man,  named  A.  F.,  about 
twenty  years  of  age,  was  living  with  his  parents,  in  great 
apparent  harmony,  his  father  and  himself  being  alike  distin- 
guished for  their  extravagant  devotion  to  hunting.  In  conse- 
quence of  the  danger  of  nocturnal  attacks,  they  were  in  the 
habit  of  taking  their  arms  with  them  into  their  chamber.  On 
the  afternoon  of  September  1, 1839,  the  father  and  son  having 
just  returned  from  hunting,  their  danger  became  the  subject 
of  particular  conversation.  The  next  day  the  hunting  was 
repeated,  and  on  their  return,  after  taking  supper,  with  the 
usual  appearance  of  harmony,  the  family  retired  at  about  ten 
o'clock,  the  father  and  mother  occupying  one  apartment,  and 
the  son  the  next,  both  father  and  son  taking  their  loaded 
arms  with  them  to  bed.  At  one  o'clock,  the  father  got  up  to 
go  into  the  entry,  and  on  his  return,  jarred  against  the  door 
opening  into  the  entry,  upon  which  the  son  instantly  sprang 
up,  and  discharging  his  gun  at  the  father,  gave  the  latter  a 
fatal  wound  in  the  breast,  crying  at  the  same  time,  '  Dog, 
what  do  you  want  here  ? '  The  father  fell  immediately  to 
the  ground,  and  the  son,  then  first  recognizing  him,  sank  on 
the  floor  crying,  '  O,  Jesus,  it  is  my  father.'  The  evidence 
was  that  the  whole  family  were  subject  to  great  restlessness 
in  their  sleep,  and  that  the  defendant  in  particular  was  affect- 
ed by  a  tendency  to  be  easily  distressed  by  dreams,  which 
lasted  about  five  minutes  on  waking,  before  their  effect  was 
entirely  dissipated.  His  own  version  of  the  affair  was,  '  I 
must  have  fired  the  gun  in  my  sleep  ;  it  was  moonshine,  and 
we  were  accustomed  to  walk  and  talk  in  our  sleep.  I  recol- 
lect hearing  something  jar ;  I  jumped  up,  seized  my  gun,  and 

^  Marc,  de  la  Folie,  ii.  24. 
40* 


474  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

shot  where  I  heard  the  noise.  I  recollect  seeing  nothing,  nor 
am  I  conscious  of  having  spoken.  The  night  was  so  bright 
that  every  thing  could  have  been  seen.  I  must  have  been 
under  the  delusion  that  thieves  had  broken  in.'"  The  medical 
experts  examined  in  the  case  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
act  was  committed  in  a  state  of  somnolentia,  when  the  person 
was  not  a  responsible  agent.^ 

§  491.  Cases  of  this  kind  have  occasionally  made  their  ap- 
pearance in  the  annals  of  English  criminal  justice,  and  not 
always  regarded  with  the  same  indulgence  as  those  just 
mentioned.  "  A  peddler  who  was  in  the  habit  of  walking 
about  the  country  armed  with  a  sword-stick,  was  awakened, 
one  evening,  while  lying  asleep  on  the  high  road,  by  a  man 
who  was  accidentally  passing,  seizing  and  shaking  him  by 
the  shoulders.  The  peddler  suddenly  awoke,  drew  his  sword, 
and  stabbed  the  man,  who  soon  afterwards  died.  He  was 
tried  for  manslaughter.  His  irresponsibility  was  strongly 
urged  by  his  counsel,  on  the  ground  that  he  could  not  have 
been  conscious  of  an  act  perpetrated  in  a  half-waking  state." 
This  was  strengthened  by  the  opinion  of  the  medical  witness. 
The  prisoner  was,  however,  found  guilty.  ^ 

§  492.  In  an  earlier  case  —  the  earliest,  perhaps,  ever  re- 
ported —  the  verdict  was  more  creditable  to  the  intelligence 
of  the  court  and  jury.  Sir  Matthew  Hale  relates  that,  "  Wil- 
liam Levet  being  in  bed  and  asleep  in  the  night,  his  servant 
hired  Frances  Freeman  to  help  her  to  do  her  work,  and  about 
twelve  of  the  clock  in  the  night,  the  servant,  going  to  let  out 
Frances,  thought  she  heard  thieves  breaking  open  the  door  ; 
she  therefore  ran  up  speedily  to  her  master,  and  informed  him 
that  she  thought  thieves  were  breaking  open  the  door ;  the 
master  rising  suddenly,  and  taking  a  rapier,  ran  down  sud- 
denly ;  Frances  hid  herself  in  the  buttery,  lest  she  should  be 
discovered ;  Levet's  wife  spying  Frances  in  the  buttery,  cried 
out   to   her  husband,  '  Here  they  be  that  would  undo  us.' 


*  Henke's  Zeitsclirift,  Ixv.  190  (1853),  quoted  by  Wharton  and  Stille  in 
their  Unsoundness  of  Mind,  p.  121. 

^  Reg.  V.  Milligan,  Lincoln  Aut  Assizes,  1836,  in  Taylor,  Med.  Jur.  656. 


SOMNOLENTIA.  475 

Levet  runs  into  the  buttery  in  the  dark,  not  knowing  Frances, 
but  thinking  her  to  be  a  thief,  and  thrusting  with  his  rapier 
before  him  hit  Frances  in  the  breast  mortally,  whereof  she 
instantly  died.  This  was  resolved  to  be  neither  murder,  nor 
manslaughter,  nor  felony."  ^  Levet,  suddenly  awakened 
under  such  circumstances,  had  not  time  to  collect  his  senses, 
and,  no  doubt,  labored  under  much  confusion  of  mind,  but  it 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  a  case  of  proper  somnolentia. 
Still,  it  is  obvious  that  the  rule  of  responsibility  here  adopted, 
would  have  been  equally  applicable  had  it  been  an  unequiv- 
ocal instance  of  that  affection. 

§  493.  The  subject  of  the  following  case  was  a  distin- 
guished criminal  lawyer,  and  the  only  case  on  record,  prob- 
ably, experienced  and  described  by  an  intelligent  and  scientific 
observer.  "  I  was  obliged,"  says  Dr.  Meister,  "  to  take  a 
journey  of  eight  miles  on  a  very  hot  summer's  day,  my  seat 
being  with  my  back  to  the  horses,  and  the  sun  directly  in  my 
face.  On  reaching  the  place  of  destination,  and  being  very 
weary  and  with  a  slight  headache,  I  laid  myself  down,  with 
my  clothes  on,  on  a  couch.  1  fell  at  once  asleep,  my  head 
having  slipped  under  the  back  of  the  settee.  My  sleep  was 
deep,  and,  as  far  as  I  can  recollect,  without  dreams.  When 
it  became  dark,  the  lady  of  the  house  came  with  a  light  into 
the  room.  I  suddenly  awoke,  but  for  the  first  time  in  ray  life, 
without  collecting  myself.  I  was  seized  with  a  sudden  agony 
of  mind,  and  picturing  the  object  which  was  entering  the 
house  as  a  spectre,  I  sprang  up  and  seized  a  stool,  which,  in 
my  terror,  I  would  have  thrown  at  the  supposed  shade.  For- 
tunately, I  was  recalled  to  consciousness  by  the  firmness  and 
tact  of  the  lady  herself,  who,  with  the  greatest  presence  of 
mind,  succeeded  in  composing  my  attention  until  I  was  en- 
tirely awakened."  ^ 

§  494.  Somnolentia  when  plead  in  defence  of  criminal 
acts,  must  often  be  difficult  of  proof,  for  it  generally  occurs 


*  1  Pleas  of  the  Crown,  42. 

^  Vogel,  Beitriige  zur  Lehre  von  der  Zurechnungsfahigkeit,  §  147,  quoted 
by  Wharton  &  Stille,  Unsoundness  of  Mind,  122. 


476  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

in  the  darkness  of  night,  and  without  witnesses.  A  certain 
amount  of  probability  may  arise  from  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  among  which,  Mende,  a  German  medical  jurist, 
mentions  the  following,  as  confirmatory  of  the  plea.  It 
should  appear  that  the  person  is  habitually  a  deep,  heavy 
sleeper,  and  awakened  only  by  much  shaking  and  slapping; 
that  before  sleeping,  certain  things  occasioned  disquiet  which 
might  not  be  removed  by  sleep,  and  which,  consequently, 
might  give  rise  to  vivid  dreams  ;  that  the  criminal  act  occur- 
red at  the  time  when  the  person  was  usually  asleep  ;  that  the 
sudden  waking  was  produced  by  certain  specific  causes, 
unless  the  result  of  dreams  ;  that  the  act  is  clearly  indicative 
of  the  absence  of  consciousness  and  self-possession  ;  that  the 
person,  on  fully  awaking,  is  astonished  at  what  he  has  done, 
and  manifests  extreme  concern  and  sorrow.^  On  the  con- 
trary, the  plea  must  be  regarded  with  suspicion,  when  there 
were  motives  for  the  act  arising  from  interest  or  passion,  or 
when  there  were  appearances  of  design  and  opportunity.  In 
a  recent  case,  where  somnolentia  was  plead  in  defence,  it  ap- 
peared that  the  prisoner  had  showed  malicious  feeling  against 
the  other  party,  and  had  wished  him  dead ;  that  the  knife 
seemed  to  have  been  recently  sharpened,  and  that  the  pris- 
oner must  have  reached  over  another  person  sleeping  in  the 
same  bed,  in  order  to  inflict  the  wound.^ 


1  Handbuch  de  Gericlitl.  Med.  Thl.  vi.  p.  270. 

^  Reg.  V.  Jackson  (Liverpool  Aut.  Ass.  1847),  cited  by  Taylor,  Med. 
Juris.  G56. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

EFFECT  OF  INSANITY  ON  EVIDENCE. 

§  495.  The  insane  are  disqualified  by  law  ^  from  appear- 
ing as  witnesses  in  courts  of  justice,  their  incompetence 
being  inferred  from  their  mental  unsoundness.  The  fact  of 
incompetence  to  testify,  however,  is  not  necessarily  connected 
with  that  of  insanity,  and  it  would  be  far  more  correct  to 
consider  the  former  an  independent  fact  to  be  established  by 
a  distinct  order  of  proofs.  The  truth  is,  an  analogy,  in  a 
medico-legal  sense,  has  been  too  hastily  assumed,  between 
the  act  of  testifying,  and  that  of  performing  business  con- 
tracts or  other  civil  acts,  and,  in  consequence,  it  has  shared 
with  them  in  the  same  sentence  of  disqualification,  without 
an  attempt  to  ascertain  the  kind  and  degree  of  intellectual 
power  which  they  respectively  require.  The  practice  of  in- 
cluding them  in  the  same  category,  is  certainly  not  favored 
by  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  of  insanity,  nor  does 
it  approve  itself  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  To  see 
what  foundation  in  nature  this  rule  of  law  really  has,  we 
shall  proceed  to  inquire  how  far  the  competency  of  a  witness 
is  actually  impaired  by  the  different  forms  of  insanity. 

§  496.  According  to  Hoff"bauer,  before  a  witness  can  be 
deemed  competent,  it  is  necessary  that  his  senses  should  be 
sufficiently  sound  to  take  cognizance  of  the  facts  to  which  he 
testifies ;  that  their  impressions  should  have  been  really  what 
he  believes  they  were ;  that  his  testimony  should  coincide 
with  his  belief;  and  lastly,  that  he  should  be  able  to  convey 


^  Thomas's  Coke's  Littleton,  489 ;   Livingston  v.  Keirsted,  10  Johnson, 
362. 


478  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

to  others  his  own  ideas,  without  fear  of  being  misinterpreted. 
These  conditions,  it  may  be  added,  constitute  the  capacity  of 
a  witness,  and  wherever  they  are  present,  his  evidence  should 
be  received,  without  agitating  the  question  of  his  mental 
unsoundness,  which  is  not  absolutely  incompatible  with  their 
existence.^ 

§  497.  The  higher  degrees  of  imbecility  must  of  course 
disqualify  a  witness,  but  its  less  aggravated  forms  may  not, 
under  all  circumstances,  have  this  effect.  His  senses  may  be 
acute  enough  to  see  and  to  hear  what  he  deposes  to ;  no 
illusions  may  obtrude  and  mingle  with  their  impressions ; 
and  his  memory  may  be  retentive  enough,  provided  too  long 
a  space  of  time  do  not  intervene  between  the  occurrence  of 
the  facts  and  his  deposition  concerning  them,  to  bear  them 
in  mind  till  revealed  by  judicial  investigation.  The  facts  to 
which  he  testifies  must  be  of  the  simplest  kind,  requiring  the 
smallest  perceptive  effort  to  seize  and  appreciate,  and  so 
intelligible  to  the  meanest  understanding,  that  the  memory 
can  easily  retain  them.  If  the  details  are  too  numerous  and 
complicated,  and  especially  if  they  include  words  or  actions 
not  familiar  with  or  analogous  to  his  own  ordinary  experi- 
ence ;  or  if  they  happened  at  too  remote  a  period,  they  be- 
come confused  and  entangled  in  his  mind,  and  many  of  them 
fade  from  it  altogether,  while  some  important  members  of  the 
series  may  not  have  been  attended  to  at  all.  Hence,  the  evi- 
dence of  imbeciles  may  present  many  a  contradiction  and 
hiatus  of  which  they  may  be  perfectly  unconscious  them- 
selves, and  which  it  would  be  wrong  to  attribute  to  inten- 
tional omissions,  or  a  wish  to  deceive.  If  we  bear  in  mind, 
too,  that  these  persons  are  easily  embarrassed,  it  might  nat- 
urally be  expected  that  the  presence  of  spectators,  the  per- 


^  The  third  condition  above-mentioned,  may  not  at  first  sight  appear  to  be 
connected  with  capacity ;  but  if  the  reader  will  refer  to  tlie  observations 
(§  192)  on  a  class  of  people,  who,  in  consequence  of  some  natural  defect  or 
organic  disease,  are  incapable  of  telling  the  truth,  even  when  most  conducive 
to  their  own  interests,  he  will  be  convinced  of  the  propriety  of  jilacing  it  in 
this  connection. 


EFFECT   OP  INSANITY   ON   EVIDENCE.  479 

plexing  questions  of  counsel,  and  the  formalities  of  a  trial, 
would  so  disorder  their  ideas,  as  to  make  their  testimony 
appear  to  those  unacquainted  with  their  mental  deficiency, 
like  the  most  impudent  trifling  or  downright  mendacity. 
The  more,  however,  the  witness  is  permitted  to  tell  his  story 
in  his  own  way,  and  finds  encouragement  in  the  looks  of 
those  around  him,  the  less  of  this  will  be  observed.  The 
class  described  in  §  66  are  competent  to  testify  in  matters 
of  a  more  complicated  kind,  requiring  a  larger  grasp  of  the 
reflective  faculties  to  embrace,  and  more  tenacity  of  memory 
to  retain  them,  but,  like  the  others,  they  are  very  liable  to  be 
disconcerted  by  the  questions  of  strangers,  and,  in  conse- 
quence, betrayed  into  numerous  contradictions  of  their  own 
testimony.  Since,  then,  the  competency  of  these  imbeciles 
is  well  established,  nothing  can  be  clearer  than  the  propriety 
of  admitting  their  evidence,  and  leaving  it  for  the  jury  to 
decide  upon  its  credibility. 

§  498.  In  partial  intellectual  mania  the  capacity  of  testify- 
ing under  certain  circumstances  and  with  certain  reservations, 
is  still  preserved,  though  considerable  knowledge  of  the  case, 
and  extreme  caution  are  requisite  to  measure  the  witness's 
credibility.  In  regard  to  the  greater  proportion  of  cases,  the 
only  doubt  is  respecting  the  second  and  third  conditions  of 
capacity  (§  496),  no  question  being  raised  as  to  the  presence 
of  the  others ;  that  is,  whether  the  witness  has  really  seen, 
heard,  etc.,  what  he  believes  he  saw  and  heard,  and  whether 
his  testimony  coincides  with  his  belief.  That  he  may  offer 
in  evidence  the  offspring  of  a  disordered  imagination,  sin- 
cerely believing  it  to  have  come  under  the  cognizance  of  his 
own  senses,  is  undoubtedly  true ;  but  no  less  so,  however, 
that  he  may  testify  only  to  what  has  come  under  his  own 
observation.  Which  of  these  events  does  actually  take 
place,  is  a  question  to  be  settled  by  reference  to  the  nature 
of  the  evidence  and  the  character  of  the  witness's  insanity. 
When  the  matter  on  which  he  testifies,  is  remote  from  the 
insane  delusion  which  he  entertains,  and  cannot  very  obvi- 
ously come  within  the  circle  of  its  influence,  it  would  be 
wrong  to  reject  his  testimony  on.  the  score  of  incompetency. 


480  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

When  we  see  these  monomaniacs  rational  on  every  topic  but 
that,  which  constitutes  their  derangement,  shrewd  and  me- 
thodical in  the  transaction  of  business,  quick  to  perceive  and 
able  to  profit  by  whatever  appears  conducive  to  their  inter- 
ests, trusted  and  respected  by  their  neighbors,  it  seems  more 
difficult  to  disprove  than  to  prove  their  competency.  The 
power  of  remembering  and  telling  correctly  what  they  have 
seen  or  heard,  requires  no  more  strength  or  soundness  of 
mind,  than  numberless  other  duties  that  nobody  doubts  their 
ability  to  perform.  Even  on  topics  connected  with  their 
insane  belief,  their  capacity  is  not  necessarily  destroyed,  and 
in  doubtful  cases  it  would  seem  better  to  receive  their  evi- 
dence, and  leave  it  for  the  court  or  counsel  to  disprove  its 
credibility.  At  the  very  least,  the  burden  of  proof  should  lie 
on  the  party  that  alleges  the  incompetence.  Even  while  the 
predominant  idea  is  highly  false  and  absurd,  they  may,  and 
very  often  do,  reason  upon  it  with  force  and  correctness,  their 
deductions  being  sound  and  their  reflections  appropriate. 
Indeed,  this  mixture  of  the  rational  and  the  irrational,  this 
inability  to  discern  the  relations  of  congruity  between  the 
true  and  the  false,  constitutes  one  of  the  most  characteristic 
features  of  madness.  Hence,  it  would  not  be  unnatural  for 
them  to  see  things  somehow  connected  with  the  delusion, 
in  most  of  their  relations,  in  their  true  light ;  and  of  this  fact 
we  should  certainly  avail  ourselves  in  deciding  on  the  admis- 
sion of  their  evidence.  The  man  w^ho  believes  that  he  is 
charged  by  government  with  the  regulation  of  the  weather, 
may,  notwithstanding,  observe  meteorological  changes,  and 
testify  accurately  concerning  the  state  of  the  weather  at  a 
particular  time  —  perhaps  no  one  more  so ;  and  he  who 
believes  that  he  has  made  an  immense  fortune  by  a  com- 
mercial speculation,  may  talk  sensibly  on  mercantile  interests 
and  be  perfect  master  of  the  price-current,  and  thus  be  com- 
petent to  testify  on  any  matter  connected  with  the  same,  that 
has  come  under  his  observation.  The  credibility  of  such 
witnesses,  however,  depends  very  much  on  the  importance  of 
the  subject  on  which  they  testify,  and  on  the  relations  of 
their  evidence  to  that  of  other  witnesses.     When  they  cor- 


EFFECT   OF   INSANITY   ON   EVIDENCE.  481 

roborate  the  statements  of  other  witnesses,  they  may  justly 
challenge  our  belief,  while  we  should  very  properly  hesitate 
to  decide  upon  any  great  interests  of  person  or  property, 
solely  upon  the  ground  of  their  testimony. 

§  499.  The  reported  cases  where  the  competence  of  wit- 
nesses was  destroyed  by  reason  of  insanity,  are  too  few  to 
render  it  very  apparent  how  far  the  following  represents  the 
ordinary  practice  of  American  courts.  It  strikingly  illus- 
trates the  effect  of  a  rigid  adherence  to  the  common-law 
maxim,  that  the  insane  are  incapable  of  testifying ;  and, 
therefore,  may  be  properly  introduced  in  this  place.  In  May, 
1833,  Jacob  Schwartz  was  tried,  at  a  term  of  the  supreme 
court  for  the  county  of  Lincoln,  in  Maine,  on  an  indictment 
for  assaulting,  with  intent  to  kill,  Jonathan  Jones.  Jones 
himself  was  the  principal  witness,  and  he  stated  that  he  went 
into  Schwartz's  house  for  the  purpose  of  conversing  on  re- 
ligious subjects  with  his  wife  who  was  also  Jones's  sister ; 
that  Schwartz  who  had  often  forbidden  him  to  do  so,  follow- 
ed him  into  the  house,  drove  him  out,  seized  his  gun,  and 
threatened  to  shoot  him  ;  that  he  then  ran  several  rods, 
occasionally  looking  back  at  Schwartz  who  stood  in  his 
door-way  presenting  his  gun,  as  if  in  the  act  of  firing ; 
that  Schwartz  finally  fired  and  hit  him,  several  shot  lodging 
in  his  hat  and  coat,  and  a  few  penetrating  into  the  skin  of 
his  back,  from  which  they  were  taken  out  by  some  persons 
in  a  house  to  which  he  immediately  ran.  The  transaction 
was  witnessed  by  no  one  besides  Jones.  By  other  witnesses 
it  was  testified  that  Jones  ran  into  the  house  where  they 
were,  exclaiming  that  Schwartz  had  shot  him,  and  that  they 
assisted  in  taking  the  shot  out  of  the  skin.  Thus  far  his 
testimony  was  rational  and  consistent,  and  his  manner  calm 
and  composed.  On  being  cross-examined  by  the  defend- 
ant's counsel  who  had  some  knowledge  of  his  case,  he  tes- 
tified, that  he  used  to  work  on  a  piece  of  land  which  he 
owned,  but  that  feeling  himself  called  to  exhort  sinners  to 
repentance,  he  went  about  in  imitation  of  Christ  and  the 
apostles,  preaching  the  gospel  and  exhorting  sinners  to  for- 
sake their  evil  ways.     He  declared  himself  to  be  an  apostle, 

41 


482  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

and  inspired  by  the  Holy  Ghost ;  also,  that  he  was  one  of 
the  saints  who  are  to  judge  the  world,  and  that  he  should 
bear  a  part  in  the  judgment  of  the  great  day.  On  this  sub- 
ject he  dilated  largely  and  incoherently,  his  countenance 
being  animated,  and  his  language  and  manner  ardent  and 
impassioned.  Other  witnesses  having  testified  that  in  his 
domiciliary  visits  he  had  sometimes  represented  himself  to 
be  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  he  was  examined  on  this  point. 
Here  he  was  not  very  explicit,  and  did  not  seem  disposed  to 
make  a  full  disclosure,  as,  he  said,  he  could  not  perceive  its 
connection  with  the  question  at  issue.  He  did  not  expressly 
deny,  however,  that  he  so  considered  himself,  but  seemed 
disposed  to  leave  it  to  be  inferred  from  particular  things  in 
which  he  resembled  Jesus  Christ,  as  in  his  poverty,  in  his 
going  about  to  do  good,  and  in  the  persecution  he  suffered. 
The  jury,  not  thinking  it  safe  to  convict  the  defendant  on 
Jones's  testimony,  acquitted  him,  and  the  court  signified  its 
approval  of  the  verdict. 

§  500.  If  the  testimony  of  Jones  had  stood  alone,  un- 
supported by  confirmatory  circumstances,  no  fault  could 
be  reasonably  found  with  this  verdict.  It  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  the  jury  to  know  that  he  was  laboring  under 
extensive  delusions,  with  which  the  alleged  criminal  act  was 
not  very  remotely  connected  in  his  mind,  to  be  justified  in 
shrinking  from  the  responsibility  of  depriving  another,  on  his 
testimony,  of  his  good  name,  and  subjecting  him  to  legal 
punishment.  Of  the  two  evils,  that  of  convicting  on  insuffi- 
cient evidence,  and  that  of  suffering  a  guilty  person  to  escape 
a  few  years'  imprisonment,  they  would  not  have  been  liable 
to  blame,  for  choosing  to  incur  the  risk  of  that  which  they 
considered  the  least.  The  circumstances  of  this  case,  how- 
ever, being  very  diffisrent  from  what  is  here  supposed,  might 
we  not  have  reasonably  expected  a  different  verdict  ?  That 
Jones  was  assaulted  at,  or  very  near  the  time  alleged,  could 
not  be  doubted  for  a  moment,  and  his  exclamation,  as  he 
entered  the  house  with  the  appearance  of  sudden  fright,  that 
Schwartz  had  shot  him,  and  his  coming  in  the  direction  from 
Schwartz's  house,  strongly  authenticated  his  statement,  that 


EFFECT   OF   INSANITY   ON  EVIDENCE.  483 

the  assault  was  committed  by  Schwartz,  —  so  strongly,  in- 
deed, that  in  the  absence  of  any  conflicting  evidence  on  the 
part  of  the  defendant,  it  was  entitled  to  implicit  belief.  Such 
a  scene  might,  no  doubt,  have  been  got  up  by  a  sane  person, 
for  the  purpose  of  gratifying  some  malignant  feelings ;  but 
men,  affected  with  the  kind  of  insanity  under  which  Jones 
was  laboring,  rarely,  if  ever,  contrive  such  schemes.  It  was 
a  circumstance,  too,  which  should  have  had  its  weight,  that 
in  relating  the  facts  of  the  assault,  he  was  calm  and  consist- 
ent, and  that  it  was  only  when  touching  on  the  subject  of  his 
delusions,  that  he  was  excited  and  incoherent.  His  insanity 
was  not  of  the  kind  which  would  deprive  him  of  the  second 
condition  of  capacity  to  testify  (§  496),  and  it  is  the  third 
only,  in  regard  to  which  there  could  have  existed  any  reason- 
able doubts ;  and  these  were  obviated  more  or  less  satisfac- 
torily, by  the  above-mentioned  circumstances.^ 

§  501.  In  a  case  which  lately  came  before  the  court  of 
sessions  in  New  York,  the  principle  we  have  contended  for 
was  adopted  by  the  court.  A  gentleman  by  the  name  of 
Gracie  labored  under  the  delusion  that  various  persons  to 
him  unknown,  were  entertaining  designs  against  his  life, 
and  he  had  spent  much  money  in  attempting  to  discover  the 
conspirators.  Taking  advantage  of  this  delusion,  a  couple 
of  rogues  obtained  money  of  him  at  different  times,  under 
pretence  of  aiding  him  in  his  researches,  for  which  practices 
they  were  finally  indicted.  On  trial,  their  counsel  resisted 
the  admission  of  Mr.  Grade's  testimony,  on  the  ground  of 
monomania;  but  the  court  decided  that  this  objection  ap- 
plied only  to  his  credibility,  not  to  his  competency .^ 

§  502.  The  view  here  taken  of  the  competence  of  some 
monomaniacs,  as  witnesses,  is  not  without  some  support  in 
the  legal  profession.  "  Of  an  insane  person,"  says  Mr. 
Evans,  "it  might,  for  defect  of  other  evidence,  merit  to  be 


^  For  the  facts  of  the  above  case,  the  author  is  indebted  to  the  kindness 
of  J.  G.  Reed,  Esq.,  of  Waldoborough,  Me.,  who  was  the  defendant's 
counsel. 

*  Boston  Semifweekly  Advertiser,  July  15,  1843. 


484  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

considered,  whether,  in  civil  cases  at  least,  the  testimony  of 
such  might  not  be  admissible  upon  points  where  his  under- 
standing did  not  appear  to  be  subject  to  disturbance ;  it  be- 
ing well  known  that  in  many  of  these  melancholy  instances, 
especially  when  the  result  of  some  violent  passion,  the  party 
affected  is  entirely  cool,  clear,  and  collected  in  his  ideas,  and 
as  free  as  other  persons  from  the  delusions  of  a  perverted 
imagination,  in  every  thing  not  connected  with  the  cause  of 
his  insanity ;  with  regard  to  persons  who  have  only  tem- 
porary fits  of  madness  (those  usually  termed  lunacy),  and  at 
other  times  are  in  all  respects  sound  of  reason,  these  are  then 
considered  as  capable  of  testimony  as  of  any  other  legal 
act."  1 

§  503.  Tf  the  evidence  of  the  monomaniacs  in  question 
be  rejected,  it  must  be  from  a  fear  of  deception  ;  and,  proba- 
bly, most  of  the  distrust  manifested  towards  such  witnesses 
arises  from  a  lurking  suspicion,  that  their  mental  impair- 
ment is  necessarily  accompanied  with  impaired  veracity. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  is  some  ground  for  this  sus- 
picion, and  though  it  should  not  have  the  effect  of  totally 
invalidating  their  testimony,  it  is  proper  to  bear  it  in  mind 
whenever  their  credibility  is  in  question.  It  is  well  known 
how  prone  the  inmates  of  lunatic  asylums  are  to  complain 
of  the  servants,  the  overseers,  and  one  another,  and  prefer 
against  them  special  charges  that  are  without  any  founda- 
tion whatever;  whether  from  an  involuntary  propensity  to 
lying  and  mischief,  or  from  a  morbidly  exalted  imagination, 
which  distorts  and  discolors  its  perceptions,  it  is  not  easy 
to  decide.  Some,  however,  will  relate  very  accurately  what 
they  see  and  hear,  and  their  statements  are  received  with 
implicit  credit.  On  the  whole,  we  may  conclude  with 
Georget,  "that  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  patient,  the 
character  of  his  madness,  his  customary  relations  to  sur- 
rounding objects,  before  we  can  know  what  degree  of  confi- 
dence to  place  in  his  assertions."  It  should  not  be  forgotten, 
also,  that  in  the  greater  proportion  of  cases  of  mental  de- 

*  Potliier  on  Obligations,  Appendix,  259 


EFFECT   OF  INSANITY   ON   EVIDENCE.  485 

rangement,  there  is  a  weakness  of  memory  that  prevents  it 
from  retaining  impressions  so  long  and  so  faithfully,  as  when 
in  its  sound  condition  ;  and,  therefore,  the  facts  to  which  a 
monomaniac  testifies,  should  always  be  of  recent  occurrence, 
to  render  his  testimony  at  all  credible. 

§  504.  Since  the  second  edition  of  this  work  was  pub- 
lished, a  case  {Regina  v.  Hill)  (1851)  has  been  decided  in 
England,  sustaining  the  above  views,  by  implication,  at  least, 
in  all  their  length  and  breadth,  and  a  little  more.  The  con- 
siderations which  induced  the  court  thus  to  reverse  what 
seemed  to  be  a  well-settled  principle,  had  reference,  less  to 
the  nature  and  degree  of  the  witness's  mental  impairment, 
than  certain  technicalities  of  legal  procedure.  As  the  case  is 
destined,  no  doubt,  to  be  a  leading  one  on  this  point,  it  will 
be  proper  to  notice  it  here.  Hill,  it  seems,  was  an  attendant 
in  a  private  asylum,  and  was  committed  on  a  charge  of  man- 
slaughter, for  causing  the  death  of  one  of  the  patients,  by  vio- 
lent ill-treatment.  At  the  trial  before  the  central  criminal 
court,  London,  the  principal  witness  relied  upon  by  the 
government,  was  Donelly,  also  a  patient  in  the  asylum.  In 
reply  to  the  inquiries  of  the  prisoner's  counsel,  before  being 
sworn,  he  stated  that  he  had  within  him  twenty  thousand 
spirits,  but  they  were  not  all  his ;  that  his  ascended  from  his 
stomach  to  his  head  and  ears;  that  they  spoke  to  him  inces- 
santly and  were  speaking  to  him  at  that  moment ;  that  they 
were  immortal  and  would  live  after  he  was  in  his  grave ;  that 
they  came  from  various  directions  and  from  various  per- 
sons,—  some  from  the  Queen,  who  frequently  visited  him. 
He  believed  that  after  death,  his  spirit  would  ascend  to 
heaven  or  remain  in  purgatory.  He  said  he  understood  the 
meaning  of  an  oath,  having  learned  from  his  catechism,  in  in- 
fancy, that  it  was  lawful  to  swear  for  God's  honor  and  his 
neighbor's  good.  He  considered  an  oath  as  an  obligation 
imposed  upon  men  for  the  good  of  the  law,  and  that  if  he 
took  a  false  oath,  he  would  go  to  hell  to  all  eternity.  He  was 
then  sworn,  and  gave  a  perfectly  connected  and  rational 
account  of  the  abuse  inflicted  by  the  prisoner  on  the  de- 
ceased, and  which  was  supposed  to  have  led  to  the  death  of 

41* 


486  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  latter.  He  thought  it  occurred  on  a  Monday,  but  the 
spirits  told  him  that  it  was  on  Tuesday.  The  incidents  of 
the  transaction  were  not  told  him  by  the  spirits,  but  witnessed 
by  himself.  The  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty,  but  the 
case  was  reserved,  in  order  that  the  opinions  of  the  full 
bench  might  be  taken,  on  the  competence  of  Donelly.  On 
the  3d  of  May,  1851,  the  chief  justice.  Lord  Campbell,  de- 
livered the  opinion  of  the  court,  unanimously  sustaining  the 
decision  of  the  judge  at  the  trial.  He  declared  "  the  proper 
rule  to  be,  for  the  judge,  at  the  time  the  party  is  produced  as 
a  witness,  to  examine  him  whether  he  understands  the  nature 
of  an  oath,  and  say  whether  he  considers  him  a  competent 
witness,  and  then  leave  it  to  the  jury  to  estimate  the  value  of 
his  testimony.  He  may  be  cross-examined  as  to  the  state  of 
his  mind,  and  witnesses  may  be  called  to  prove  that  his  mind 
was  so  diseased  that  no  reliance  can  be  placed  upon  his 
statements ;  but  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  discredit  his 
testimony,  it  would  be  competent  for  the  jury  to  hear  what 
he  said,  and  to  act  upon  it." 

§  505.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  question  made  by  the 
court  in  this  case,  was,  whether  the  witness  was  capable, 
notwithstanding  his  disease,  of  comprehending  the  nature  of 
an  oath;  not  whether  his  disease  necessarily  incapacitated 
him  from  giving  testimony.  The  latter  consideration  was 
regarded  as  affecting  his  credibility  alone  ;  and  how  far  it  had 
this  effect,  was  a  point  for  the  jury  to  decide.  Instead  of 
the  four  conditions  of  competency  indicated  by  Hoffbauer 
(§  496),  all  having  direct  reference  to  the  object  in  view,  the 
court  here  insists  upon  only  one,  and  that  very  remotely  con- 
nected with  this  object.  This,  certainly,  is  to  disregard  old 
maxims  and  enlarge  the  competency  of  the  insane  to  testify, 
to  an  extent  hardly  warranted  by  our  knowledge  of  insanity. 
Many  an  insane  person  who  could  perfectly  understand  the 
nature  of  an  oath,  as  well  as  any  other  abstract  question  in 
morals  or  religion,  would  be  utterly  unreliable  as  a  witness 
of  things  which  had  come  under  his  own  observation.  None 
but  those  who  are  practically  conversant  with  the  insane,  can 
have  an  adequate  conception  of  their  liability,  both  to  receive 


EFFECT   OF  INSANITZ   ON  EVIDENCE.  487 

erroneous  impressions  from  what  passes  around  them,  and  to 
falsify  what  they  really  and  correctly  perceive.  After  habits 
of  the  closest  intimacy  with  the  insane,  continued  through 
many  years,  I  am  led  to  the  conclusion  that  those  who  con- 
verse so  correctly  and  shrewdly  with  the  transient  visitor,  and 
never  forget  the  common  observances  of  life,  are  scarcely  more 
capable  of  reporting  truly  what  they  see  and  hear,  than  those 
who  cannot  utter  a  single  coherent  sentence.  The  most  cir- 
cumscribed delusions,  after  having  existed  for  a  considerable 
time,  are  generally  accompanied  by  a  mental  condition  in 
which  the  most  ordinary  impressions  are  very  imperfectly 
perceived.  It  would  be  difficult  to  characterize  precisely 
the  deficiency  in  question,  because  it  differs,  probably,  in 
different  individuals.  It  would  seem  as  if  in  some,  the  im- 
pression were  mingled  with  and  distorted  by  the  delusion, 
while  in  others,  it  does  not  receive  the  degree  of  attention 
necessary  for  fixing  it  firmly  and  clearly  in  the  mind.  Thus, 
without  the  least  disposition  to  deceive,  their  statements  are 
apt  to  be  wide  of  the  truth.  In  that  other  class  of  the  insane, 
also,  whose  disorder  is  characterized  by  mental  excitement 
and  impropriety  of  conduct,  while  they  entertain  no  delu- 
sions whatever,  the  competence  to  testify  is  completely  an- 
nulled by  an  irresistible  propensity  to  exaggerate  and  color, 
and  frequently  to  lie  without  limitation  or  scruple.  Now  it 
is  hardly  a  satisfactory  answer  to  these  objections,  to  say 
that  these  traits  of  the  insane  would  be  duly  considered  by 
the  jury  when  brought  to  their  notice,  and  that  the  only 
difference  between  us,  is,  that  in  one  case  it  is  the  judge,  and 
the  other  the  jury,  that  decides  the  question  of  competency. 
The  evidence,  if  coherently  and  plausibly  given,  will  leave  an 
impression  upon  the  jury,  though  experts  may  testify  that  the 
witness  is  not  reliable,  and  the  instructions  of  the  court  may 
imply  the  same  opinion.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  credi- 
bility of  the  witness  in  the  present  case  was  impeached  in  the 
slightest  degree,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  a  physician  and 
some  other  witnesses  thought  him  capable  of  giving  a  correct 
account  of  any  transaction  he  may  have  observed.  All  this 
may  have  been,  in  effect,  quite  correct,  and  the  punishment  of 


488  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

the  offender  well  merited,  but  unless  the  physician  were 
familiarly  acquainted  with  the  witness,  his  opinion  ought  not 
to  have  affected  the  general  presumption  against  the  evi- 
dence of  this  class  of  patients. 

§  506.  It  was  assumed,  both  by  the  judges  and  the  medi- 
cal witnesses,  that  Donelly's  insanity  was  circumscribed 
within  very  narrow  limits,  and  that  beyond  the  sphere  of  his 
delusions,  his  mind  performed  its  customary  office  as  well  as 
ever.  This  position  is  unwarranted,  certainly,  by  the  state- 
ment of  his  case,  given  above,  which  shows  a  kind  and 
degree  of  mental  impairment  that  must  have  affected  the 
power  of  receiving  impressions,  and  recalling  them  precisely 
as  they  occurred,  unmixed  with  freaks  and  fancies ;  of  form- 
ing general  conclusions ;  and  appreciating  the  nature  and 
consequences  of  legal  testimony.  It  is  not  uncommon  to 
see  insane  persons  in  the  chronic  stage  of  disease  who  show, 
in  their  ways,  manners,  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling,  a  very 
obvious  degree  of  mental  impairment,  sufficient  to  destroy 
all  confidence  in  their  testimony  on  a  disputed  point,  but 
whose  delusions  are  few  and  limited  to  a  narrow  range. 

§  507.  It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  notice  one  of  the 
reasons  offered  by  the  court  for  admitting  the  testimony  of 
Donelly,  namely,  that  under  a  different  rule,  patients  in  asy- 
lums would  be  at  the  mercy  of  their  attendants.  It  is  quite 
as  obvious  that  under  the  rule  of  the  court,  the  attendants 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  patients;  and  if  this  were 
clearly  understood,  the  most  respectable  and  trustworthy 
attendants  in  our  asylums,  would  seek  some  other  calling 
immediately. 

§  508.  Another  consideration  upon  which  the  court  relied, 
ought  not  to  be  passed  over  in  silence,  because  it  evinces  a 
mistake  not  unfrequent  among  persons  who  have  no  profes- 
sional knowledge  of  the  subject.  A  rule  which  would  ex- 
clude this  witness,  said  the  court,  merely  because  he  thought 
he  had  twenty  thousand  spirits,  would  equally  have  excluded 
Socrates,  who  believed  that  a  spirit  always  haunted  him.  If 
there  were  to  be  no  distinction  between  a  gross  delusion 
admitted  to  be  the  offspring  of  disease,  and  a  notion  which, 


EFFECT   OF   INSANITY   ON   EVIDENCE.  489 

however  opposed  to  the  general  belief  of  mankind,  is  the 
deliberate  deduction  of  an  acute  and  healthy  niind,  then,  cer- 
tainly, the  reductio  ad  absurdum  would  be  fairly  made  out. 
But  where  is  the  warrant  for  disregarding  a  distinction  which 
the  world  has  always  made  ?  In  one  instance,  the  witness  is 
deemed  to  be  incompetent,  because  laboring  under  a  mental 
disease  which  is  indicated  by  strong  delusion  as  well  as  by 
other  traits  of  character;  in  the  other,  the  witness  is  admit- 
ted because  of  the  unquestioned  soundness  of  his  mind,  as 
evinced  by  its  ordinary  manifestations,  though  accompanied 
by  a  notion  which  may  be  extravagant  but  not  absurd.  In 
short,  the  two  cases  are  separated  by  all  the  difference  be- 
tween health  and  disease,  which,  however  difficult  to  be  dis- 
cerned sometimes,  is  obvious  enough  between  Socrates  and 
Donelly.i 

§  509.  In  the  subjects  of  general  mania,  all  competence 
to  testify  is  lost,  except  during  what  is  called  the  lucid  inter- 
val, when  they  may  testify  in  regard  to  transactions  that 
occurred  during  a  lucid  interval,  or  at  a  time  previous  to  their 
illness.  Their  evidence  should  be  implicitly  received,  only 
when  it  relates  to  simple  facts  easily  perceived,  for  their 
intellect  may  be  hardly  strong  enough  to  bring  to  mind  and 
expose  in  order,  a  complicated  mass  of  details. 

§  510.  In  partial  moral  mania,  there  is  nothing  to  inca- 
pacitate one  from  testifying,  unless  we  except  that  kind  of 
it  where  the  individual  labors  under  an  uncontrollable  pro- 
pensity for  lying.  Of  all  the  forms  of  mania,  this  really 
diminishes  competence  more  than  any  other,  but  it  will  be 
long,  probably,  before  it  will  be  considered  in  this  light,  in 
courts  of  justice. 

§  511.  In  general  moral  mania,  it  has  been  seen  that  the 
intellectual  powers  are  not  perceptibly  impaired,  and  that 
the  patient  loses  none  of  his  interest  in  what  passes  around 
him,  nor  of  his  power  to  observe  and  remember  them  with 
ordinary    distinctness.      Under    such    circumstances,    there 

*  15  Jurist,  470;  Law  Reporter,  n.  s.  iv.  141 ;  American  Journal  of  In- 
sanity, vii.  386 ;  2  Dennison,  Crown  Cases,  254. 


490  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

would  be  little  reason  for  rejecting  his  evidence  on  the  score 
of  incapacity.  Considering,  however,  the  great  derangement 
of  the  affective  powers  under  which  he  labors,  and  the  un- 
founded likes  and  dislikes  which  it  produces,  his  veracity- 
may  be  justly  suspected,  and  his  evidence  should  be  entitled 
to  little  weight,  except  when  limited  to  facts  in  regard  to 
which  it  can  be  shown  that  his  feelings  are  not  interested. 

§  512.  The  competence  of  old  men  in  the  early  stages  of 
dementia  to  testify,  is  a  point  frequently  discussed  in  courts 
of  justice,  and  the  want  is  severely  felt,  of  some  fixed  princi- 
ples that  shall  serve  as  a  guide  to  correct  decisions.  In 
every  stage  of  this  affection,  the  impairment  of  the  memory 
is  more  perceptible  in  regard  to  recent  than  remote  impres- 
sions, and  it  often  happens  that  a  person  may  have  a  distinct 
recollection  of  things  that  occurred  in  his  youth,  while  those 
of  a  month's  or  a  year's  date,  are  but  imperfectly  remembered, 
if  at  all.  To  test  the  strength  of  his  memory  respecting  cer- 
tain things,  it  is  only  necessary  to  ascertain  if  he  remembers 
various  other  transactions  of  about  the  same  date,  in  which 
he  is  known  to  have  been  engaged.  If  he  can  do  this,  it  is 
a  strong  presumption  in  favor  of  his  competency;  if  not,  it 
is  incumbent  on  the  party  offering  his  testimony  to  show 
why  his  memory  should  have  been  more  faithful  in  the  one 
case  than  in  the  other.  This  is  rendered  still  more  necessary 
by  the  fact,  that  the  weakness  of  mind  incident  to  this  con- 
dition makes  its  subjects  more  easily  swayed  by  the  sug- 
gestions of  others,  and  leads  them  to  believe  that  they  re- 
member what  they  are  told  they  ought  to  remember,  or  what 
they  are  assured  they  actually  did  remember  till  within  a 
recent  period.  The  slightest  examination  will  show  how 
much  dependence  can  be  placed  on  their  recollections  of 
recent  events. 


CHAPTER    XXVI. 

DRUNKENNESS. 

§  513.  Before  we  can  properly  appreciate  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  drunkenness,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  its 
immediate  and  remote  effects  on  the  mind,  and  the  organism 
with  which  it  is  connected.  Correct  information  of  this  kind 
will  enable  us  to  avoid  many  of  the  prevalent  errors  that 
have  arisen  from  vague  and  imperfect  notions  respecting  the 
nature  of  drunkenness.  We  shall  first  consider  the  symp- 
toms, or  immediate  effects,  of  free  indulgence  in  intoxicating 
drinks  ;  for  the  following  account  of  which  we  are  chiefly  in- 
debted to  Hoff  bauer  and  Macnish.^ 

§  514.  The  first  effect  of  alcoholic  liquors  is  to  exalt  the 
general  sentiment  of  self-satisfaction,  and  diffuse  an  unusual 
serenity  over  the  mind.  The  intellectual  as  well  as  physical 
powers  act  with  increased  vigor  and  activity,  the  thoughts 
flow  with  more  facility  and  accuracy,  and  the  individual 
becomes  perfectly  well  pleased  with  himself  and  others.  He 
feels  an  exhilaration  of  spirits,  a  sense  of  warmth  and  gaiety, 
and  his  imagination  is  crowded  with  delightful  images.  The 
sight  and  hearing  are  very  slightly  affected  ;  a  low,  humming 
sound  is  heard  in  the  pauses  of  the  conversation  ;  and  objects 
are  enveloped  in  a  slight  mist  which  prevents  them  from 
being  seen  distinctly.  Thus  far  there  is  no  appearance  of 
drunkenness.  Soon  the  torrent  of  his  ideas  becomes  more 
rapid  and  violent,  and  he  can  scarcely  repress  them.  This  is 
the  moment  of  his  happiest  sallies,  and  he  pours  forth  his 
thoughts  with  a  force  of  expression  and  a  richness  of  concep- 

^  Anatomy  of  Drunkenness. 


492  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

tion  unknown  in  his  sober  hours,  and  now  he  feels  the  ecstatic 
pleasures  of  getting  drunk.  As  yet  the  brain  is  in  tolerable 
order,  though  a  great  effort  is  necessary  to  relate  a  story  or 
transaction  at  all  complicated  in  its  details,  for  the  thoughts 
succeed  one  another  too  rapidly,  to  allow  sufficient  time  to 
arrange  them  in  the  order  that  the  recital  requires.  This  is 
the  first  well-marked  symptom  of  intoxication.  Now  his 
ideas  succeed  one  another  with  constantly  increasing 'force 
and  rapidity ;  his  sensations  lose  their  ordinary  delicacy ; 
and  his  imagination  gains  as  fast  as  they  lose.  His  language 
is,  in  some  respects,  more  oratorical  and  poetical,  and  though 
he  now  feels  an  irresistible  propensity  to  talk  nonsense,  he  is 
perfectly  conscious,  all  the  while,  that  it  is  nonsense.  His 
voice  is  louder,  because  he  hears  less  acutely,  and  judges  of 
the  hearing  of  others  by  his  own.  Now  the  organic  activity 
of  the  brain  is  at  its  height.  His  imagination  is  filled  with 
strange  and  queer  images,  and  he  is  conscious,  if  so  it  may 
be  called,  of  a  sense  of  oppression  and  giddiness  in  his  head. 
His  perceptions  of  color,  form,  distance,  and  number  become 
utterly  confused ;  he  confounds  one  person  with  another  ; 
the  candles  burn  all  colors  in  succession,  and  are  multiplied 
fourfold ;  and  in  stretching  forth  his  glass  to  set  it  on  the 
table,  he  lets  it  go  before  reaching  its  edge.  He  is  apt  to 
imagine,  either  that  he  has  offended  some  one,  and  shows 
a  ludicrous  anxiety  to  apologize,  or  that  he  has  been  offended 
and  fixes  upon  some  one  as  the  object  of  his  maledictions,  per- 
haps his  blows.  Judging  from  his  discourse,  his  ideas  begin 
to  want  connection,  notwithstanding  their  vivacity,  but  this 
vivacity  and  rapidity  of  his  ideas  give  to  his  passions  an  insur- 
mountable power,  against  which  reason  has  nothing  to  oppose, 
and  unless  some  accident  divert  him  from  their  object,  he  is 
hurried  on  wherever  they  impel  him.  Soon  his  tongue 
stammers  and  his  voice  gets  thick  ;  his  legs  falter ;  he  falls 
from  his  seat;  and  is  plunged  into  a  profound  sleep,  in  which 
the  manifestation  of  his  physical  and  intellectual  powers  is 
completely  extinguished.  In  this  condition,  he  is  said  to  be 
dead  drunk.  Such  is  the  ordinary  course  of  a  fit  of  drunk- 
enness, but  it  sometimes  varies,  more  or  less,  with  the  tem- 


DRUNKENNESS.  493 

perament  or  habits  of  the  individual,  and  the  attending  cir- 
cumstances. 

§  515.  Such  is  the  immediate  effect  of  drunkenness  on  the 
mind ;  we  have  now  to  show  how  the  long-continued  and 
excessive  use  of  alcoholic  liquors  affects  the  moral  and  intel- 
lectual powers.  Except  in  some  happily  organized  natures, 
the  original  delicacy  and  acuteness  of  the  moral  perceptions 
are  invariably  blunted  ;  the  relations  of  neighbor,  citizen, 
father,  spouse,  have  lost  their  accustomed  place  in  his 
thoughts;  great  moral  interests  no  longer  obtain  a  strong 
hold  on  his  attention ;  the  voice  of  distress  is  apt  to  fall  on 
his  ear  like  an  unmeaning  sound;  and  the  finer  emotions  of 
the  soul,  which  will  occasionally  be  felt  by  the  least  culti- 
vated minds,  have  entirely  deserted  his  nature.  The  injury 
sustained  by  the  intellect  is  more  obvious,  if  not  more 
deplorable.  The  course  of  the  ideas  is  sluggish,  and  they 
want  their  former  force  and  brilliancy ;  the  mind  has  lost  its 
comprehensiveness  of  grasp,  and  experiences  a  difficulty  in 
seizing  the  relations  of  one  idea  to  another;  it  is  incapable 
of  the  long-continued  efforts  which  were  once  easy,  and  of 
concentrating  the  whole  force  of  its  faculties  on  the  subjects 
submitted  to  its  examination.  In  consequence,  too,  of  the 
brain  having  been  so  much  accustomed  to  artificial  stimulus, 
according  to  a  well-known  law  of  the  animal  economy,  it 
becomes  incapable  of  an  effort  without  the  aid  of  this  stimu- 
lus, which  is  necessary  to  the  performance  of  even  its  most 
ordinary  exercise.  Drinking  is  thus  made  an  indispensable 
habit,  and  by  this  means,  it  sometimes  happens  that  the 
tame,  cold,  and  lifeless  being,  as  if  touched  by  a  spark  of 
Promethean  fire,  is  converted  into  the  animated,  sociable,  and 
efficient  man  of  his  better  days.  Sheridan  never  spoke  in 
the  House  of  Commons  without  the  inspiration  of  half  a  pint 
of  brandy ;  and  numberless  are  the  heroes  of  the  buskin  and 
the  sock,  who  require  to  be  wound  up,  as  it  were,  to  a  cer- 
tain pitch,  by  artificial  stimulus,  before  they  venture  to  under- 
take the  labors  of  the  night. 

§  516.    This  account  of  the  pathological  effects  of  drunk- 
enness would  be  incomplete,  without  some  mention  of  that 

42 


494  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

curious  disease  to  which  it  often  leads,  called  delirium  tre- 
mens, or  mania  a  potu.  It  may  be  the  immediate  effect  of  an 
excess,  or  series  of  excesses,  in  those  who  are  not  habitually- 
intemperate,  as  well  as  in  those  who  are;  but  it  most  com- 
monly occurs  in  habitual  drinkers,  after  a  few  days  of  total 
abstinence  from  spirituous  liquors.  It  is  also  verj  liable  to 
occur  in  this  latter  class  when  laboring  under  other  diseases, 
or  severe  external  injuries,  that  give  rise  to  any  degree  of 
constitutional  disturbance.  The  approach  of  the  disease  is 
generally  indicated  by  a  slight  tremor  and  faltering  of  the 
hands  and  lower  extremities,  a  tremulousness  of  the  voice,  a 
certain  restlessness  and  sense  of  anxiety  which  the  patient 
knows  not  how  to  describe  or  account  for,  disturbed  sleep, 
and  impaired  appetite.  These  symptoms  having  continued 
two  or  three  days,  at  the  end  of  which  time  they  have  obvi- 
ously increased  in  severity,  the  patient  ceases  to  sleep  alto- 
gether, and  soon  becomes  delirious.  At  first,  the  delirium  is 
not  constant,  the  mind  wandering  during  the  night,  but,  dur- 
ing the  day,  when  its  attention  is  fixed,  capable  of  rational 
discourse.  It  is  not  long,  however,  before  it  becomes  con- 
stant, and  constitutes  the  most  prominent  feature  of  the  dis- 
ease. Occasionally,  the  delirium  occurs  at  an  earlier  period 
of  the  disease,  and  may  even  be  the  first  symptom  of  any 
disorder.  This  state  of  watchfulness  and  delirium  continues 
three  or  four  days,  when,  if  the  patient  recover,  it  is  suc- 
ceeded by  sleep,  which,  at  first,  appears  in  uneasy  and 
irregular  naps,  and,  lastly,  in  long,  sound,  and  refreshing 
slumbers.  When  sleep  does  not  supervene  about  this  period, 
the  disease  is  fatal ;  and  whether  subjected  to  medical  treat- 
ment, or  left  to  itself,  neither  its  symptoms  nor  duration  are 
materially  modified. 

§  517.  The  character  of  the  delirium  in  this  disease  is 
peculiar,  bearing  a  stronger  resemblance  than  any  other  form 
of  mental  derangement,  to  dreaming.  It  would  seem  as 
if  the  dreams  which  disturb  and  harass  the  mind  during  the 
imperfect  sleep  that  precedes  the  explosion  of  the  disease 
continue  to  occupy  it  when  awake,  being  then  viewed  as 
realities,  instead  of  dreams.     The  patient  imagines  himself, 


DRUNKENNESS.  495 

for  instance,  to  be  in  some  peculiar  situation,  or  engaged 
in  certain  occupations,  according  to  each  individual's  habits 
and  profession  ;  and  his  discourse  and  conduct  are  conformed 
to  this  delusion,  with  this  striking  peculiarity,  however,  that 
he  is  thwarted  at  every  step,  and  is  constantly  meeting  with 
obstacles  that  defy  his  utmost  efforts  to  remove.  Almost 
invariably,  the  patient  manifests,  more  or  less,  feelings  of 
suspicion  and  fear,  laboring  under  continual  apprehension 
of  being  made  the  victim  of  sinister  designs  and  practices. 
He  imagines  that  certain  people  have  conspired  to  rob  or 
murder  him,  and  insists  that  he  can  hear  them  in  an  adjoin- 
ing apartment,  arranging  their  plans  and  preparing  to  rush 
into  his  room ;  or  that  he  is  in  a  strange  place,  where  he  is 
forcibly  detained  and  prevented  from  going  to  his  own  home. 
One  of  the  most  common  hallucinations  is,  to  be  constantly 
seeing  devils,  snakes,  vermin,  and  all  manner  of  unclean 
things  around  him  and  about  him,  and  filling  every  nook  and 
corner  of  his  apartment.  The  extreme  terror  which  these 
delusions  often  inspire,  produces  in  the  countenance  an  unut- 
terable expression  of  anguish,  and,  in  the  hope  of  escaping 
from  his  fancied  tormentors,  the  wretched  patient  endeavors 
to  cut  his  throat,  or  jump  from  the  window.  Under  the  in- 
fluence of  these  terrible  apprehensions,  he  sometimes  mur- 
ders his  wife  or  attendant  whom  his  disordered  imagination 
identifies  with  his  enemies,  though  he  is  generally  tractable 
and  not  inclined  to  be  mischievous.  After  perpetrating  an 
act  of  this  kind,  he  generally  gives  some  illusive  reason  for 
his  conduct,  rejoices  in  his  success,  and  expresses  his  regret 
at  not  having  done  it  before.  So  complete  and  obvious  is 
the  mental  derangement  in  this  disease,  so  entirely  are  the 
thoughts  and  actions  governed  by  the  most  unfounded  and 
absurd  delusions,  that  if  any  form  of  insanity  should  absolve 
from  criminal  responsibility,  this  certainly  should  have  that 
effect. 

§  518.  Persons  much  conversant  with  the  subjects  of  de- 
lirium tremens,  have  recognized  a  phasis  of  this  disease  dif- 
fering .materially  from  its  ordinary  type.  "It  occurs  most 
frequently  in  such  persons  as   have  from  any  cause  been 


496  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

induced  or  obliged  to  abstain  from  the  use  of  ardent  spirits 
for  a  considerable  time,  and  have  again  had  free  access  to 
them.  Hence  it  is  often  seen  in  sailors  after  a  long  voyage, 
or  in  those  who  have  been  permitted  to  go  on  shore  from  a 
vessel  of  war  for  a  few  days.  But  it  may  also  occur  in  any 
intemperate  person,  who,  without  having  previously  intermit- 
ted the  use  of  spirits,  has  been  tempted  to  a  course  of  unu- 
sual indulgence  for  several  days  in  succession.  Thus  it  is 
very  common  in  those  who  are  taken  up  in  a  state  of  intoxi- 
cation by  the  civil  authority,  and  committed  to  almshouses 
or  houses  of  correction  for  actual  drunkenness.  This  form 
of  the  disease  is  usually  denominated  by  the  vulgar,  the 
'  Horrors,'  but  the  same  name  is  frequently  given  to  the 
other  more  severe  and  aggravated  cases.  A  considerable 
number  of  cases  of  this  description  fell  under  my  observation 
at  the  Boston  almshouse  when  that  place  was  made  the 
receptacle  of  persons  taken  up  in  a  state  of  intoxication. 
The  usual  symptoms  of  delirium  manifested  themselves  in  a 
period  varying  from  a  few  hours  to  one  or  two  days  from  the 
time  of  entrance.  They  were  not  less  severe,  not  less  dis- 
tinctly marked  than  those  which  occur  in  the  more  important 
cases;  but  the  paroxysm  did  not  uniformly  continue  for  so 
great  a  length  of  time.  It  sometimes  subsided  spontaneously 
in  twenty-four  hours,  though  more  frequently  running  out  to 
the  full  length  which  has  been  spoken  of  as  common  to  the 
disease  generally."  ^  It  is  added  that  in  this  form  of  the  dis- 
ease, the  patient  always  recovers. 

§  519.  Before  being  able  to  decide  the  question  under- 
standingly,  of  the  relation  of  drunkenness  to  moral  agency, 
it  is  necessary  to  proceed  one  step  further  in  this  investiga- 
tion, and  inquire  into  the  pathological,  or,  as  it  is  technically 
called,  the  proximate  cause  of  drunkenness.  No  impres- 
sions, whether  from  within  or  without,  can  affect  the  mind, 
but  through  the  brain.     In  drunkenness,  therefore,  it  is  this 

^  History  and  Treatment  of  Delirium  Tremens,  by  John  Ware,  M.  D. 
1831,  p.  17.  An  admirable  monograph  characterized  by  good  sense  and 
sound  philosophy. 


DRUNKENNESS.  497 

organ  which  is  principally  affected,  and  that  portion  of  it 
more  particularly  which  is  connected  with  the  manifestation 
of  the  moral  and  intellectual  powers.  The  vital  actions  of 
which  it  is  the  seat,  receive  an  increased  share  of  activity, 
so  that  every  process  that  goes  on,  is  conducted  with  fresh 
energy  and  speed.  Drunkenness,  however,  depends  on  some- 
thing more  than  mere  increase  of  cerebral  action,  because  it 
varies,  in  some  degree,  with  the  nature  of  the  intoxicating 
agent,  but  what  this  specific  action  is  exactly,  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  us  to  know.  As  the  fit  proceeds,  this  increase  of 
action  continues,  until  it  arrives  at  such  a  pitch,  that  the 
organ  is  unable  to  perform  its  functions  properly;  hence,  the 
disorder  and  tumult  of  mind  that  attend  the  last  stages  of  the 
fit.  The  torpor  arid  exhaustion  that  follow,  are  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  previous  excessive  stimulation,  and  the 
one  is  generally  proportioned  to  the  other.  This  increased 
action  that  takes  place  in  drunkenness,  degenerates,  after  fre- 
quent repetition,  into  a  permanent  state  of  irritation  which, 
at  last,  becomes  real  inflammation.  The  coats  of  the  vessels 
are  thickened  and  less  transparent  than  usual,  and,  in  some 
places,  they  assume  a  varicose  appearance.  The  cerebral 
texture  is  less  delicate  and  elastic,  becoming  either  unnat- 
urally hard,  or  soft.  Slight  effusions  of  water  are  not  un- 
common. These  appearances,  to  a  more  or  less  extent, 
are  found  in  the  brains  of  nearly  all  confirmed  drunkards, 
and  it  may  be  now  considered  a  well-established  fact,  that 
the  habitual  drunkard  has  always  more  or  less  of  cerebral 
disease. 

§  520.  Obviously  as  these  pathological  changes  are  the 
effect  of  a  long-continued  voluntary  habit,  there  is  strong 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  idea  that  they,  in  turn,  become 
efficient  causes,  and  act  powerfully  in  maintaining  this  habit, 
even  in  spite  of  the  resistance  of  the  will.  So  deplorably 
common  has  drunkenness  been  in  this  country,  that  there 
are  few  who  have  not  seen  the  melancholy  spectacle  of  the 
most  powerful  motives,  the  most  solemn  promises  and  reso- 
lutions, a  constant  sense  of  shame  and  danger,  bodily  pain 
and  chastisements,  the  prayers  and  supplications  of  friend- 

42* 


498  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

ship,  of  as  little  avail  in  reforming  the  drunkard,  as  they 
would  be  in  averting  an  attack  of  fever  or  consumption. 
With  a  full  knowledge  of  the  dreadful  consequences  to  for- 
tune, character,  and  family,  he  plunges  on  in  his  mad  career, 
deploring,  it  may  be,  with  unutterable  agony  of  spirit,  the 
resistless  impulse  by  which  he  is  mastered.  Macnish  re- 
lates the  case  of  a  young  man  of  fortune,  twenty-six  years 
old,  which  presents  an  impressive  illustration  of  this  truth. 
"  Every  morning  before  breakfast,"  he  says,  "  he  drank  a 
bottle  of  brandy;  another  he  consumed  between  breakfast 
and  dinner,  and  a  third,  shortly  before  going  to  bed.  Inde- 
pendently of  this,  he  indulged  in  wine  and  whatever  liquor 
came  within  his  reach.  Even  during  the  hours  usually  ap- 
propriated to  sleep,  the  same  system  was  pursued  —  brandy 
being  placed  at  the  bed-side  for  his  use  in  the  night  time. 
To  this  destructive  vice  he  had  been  addicted  since  his  six- 
teenth year ;  and  it  had  gone  on  increasing  from  day  to  day 
till  it  had  acquired  its  then  alarming  and  incredible  mag- 
nitude. In  vain  did  he  try  to  resist  the  insidious  poison. 
With  the  perfect  consciousness  that  he  was  destroying  him- 
self, and  with  every  desire  to  struggle  against  the  insatiable 
cravings  of  his  diseased  appetite,  he  found  it  utterly  impossi- 
ble to  offer  the  slightest  opposition  to  them."  ^  Another, 
whose  case  he  quotes,  replied  to  the  remonstrances  of  his 
friend,  who  painted  the  distresses  of  his  family,  the  loss  of 
his  business  and  character,  and  the  ruin  of  his  health,  "  My 
good  friend,  your  remarks  are  just;  they  are  indeed  too  true; 
but  I  can  no  longer  resist  temptation.  If  a  bottle  of  brandy 
stood  at  one  hand,  and  the  pit  of  hell  yav/ned  at  the  other, 
and  I  were  convinced  that  I  would  be  pushed  in  as  sure  as 
I  took  one  glass,  I  could  not  refrain.  You  are  very  kind ;  I 
ought  to  be  grateful  for  so  many  kind,  good  friends,  but  you 
may  spare  yourselves  the  trouble  of  trying  to  reform  me  ;  the 
thing  is  out  of  the  question."  ^ 

§  521.    These  phenomena  strongly  remind  us  of  some  of 
the  manifestations  of  moral  mania,  and  if  further  evidence  is 

*  Anatomy  of  Drunkenness,  163.  ^  Idem,  1G2. 


DRUNKENNESS.  499 

necessary  to  convince  ns  that  they  are  both  connected  with 
similar  pathological  conditions,  it  is  abundantly  furnished  in 
some  other  phenomena  of  drunkenness.  It  is  now  well 
understood  that  this  vice  sometitties  assumes  a  periodic 
character,  persons  indulging  in  the  greatest  excesses  peri- 
odically, who  are  perfectly  sober  during  the  intervals  which 
may  continue  from  a  month  to  a  year.  From  a  state 
of  complete  sobriety,  they  suddenly  lapse  into  the  most  un- 
bounded indulgence  in  stimulating  drinks,  and  nothing  but 
absolute  confinement  can  restrain  them.  Macnish  who  saw 
several  cases,  says  that  they  "  seemed  to  be  quite  aware  of 
the  uncontrollable  nature- of  their  passion,  and  proceeded  sys- 
tematically, confining  themselves  to  their  room,  ancl  procur- 
ing a  large  quantity  of  ardent  spirits.  As  soon  as  this  was 
done,  they  commenced  and  drank  to  excess  till  vomiting  en- 
sued, and  the  stomach  absolutely  refused  to  receive  another 
drop  of  liquor.  This  state  may  last  a  few  days  or  a  few 
weeks,  according  to  constitutional  strength,  or  the  rapidity 
with  which  the  libations  are  poured  down.  So  soon  as  the 
stomach  rejects  every  thing  that  is  swallowed,  and  severe 
sickness  comes  on,  the  fit  ceases.  From  that  moment  re- 
covery takes  place,  and  his  former  fondness  for  liquor  is  suc- 
ceeded by  aversion  or  disgust.  This  gains  such  an  ascen- 
dency over  him,  that  he  abstains  religiously  from  it  for  weeks, 
or  months,  or  even  for  a  year,  as  the  case  may  be.  During 
this  interval  he  leads  a  life  of  the  most  exemplary  temperance, 
drinking  nothing  but  cold  water,  and  probably  shunning 
every  society  where  he  is  likely  to  be  exposed  to  indul- 
gence." 1 

§  522.  Esquirol  has  distinctly  recognized  this  disorder,^ 
both  in  its  continued  and  periodical  form,  under  the  name  of 
dipsomania ;  and  attributing  it  to  the  influence  of  patho- 
logical changes,  considers  its  unhappy  victims  as  not  morally 
responsible.  This  distinguished  observer  of  mental  affections 
affirms,  that   "  sometimes  the   abuse  of  intoxicating   drinks 


•  Op.  cit.  36. 

^  Note  in  Hoffbauer,  §  195,  an^  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  80. 


500  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  drunkenness  are  the  first  symptoms,  or  rather  the  most 
prominent  symptoms,  of  the  first  stages  of  madness;"  that 
"  the  stomach  being  in  that  peculiar  condition  which  pro- 
duces an  extremely  paififul,  moral,  and  physical  depression, 
craves  strong  drink;"  that  "this  craving  is  imperious  and 
irresistible  ; "  that  "  it  continues  as  long  as  the  paroxysm,  after 
which  the  patient  becomes  sober  and  assumes  all  the  habits- of 
a  temperate  life."  He  also  says,  that  these  people  "  obey  an 
impulse  which  they  have  not  the  power  of  resisting ; "  that 
they  are  "  true  monomaniacs ; "  and  that  if  carefully  observed, 
we  shall  find  in  them  "  all  the  characteristic  features  of  par- 
tial madness."  In  illustration  of  his  views  he  relates  the  fol- 
lowing case.  "  M.  N.,  a  merchant,  aged  about  forty,  of  a 
robust  but  nervous  constitution,  became,  six  years  before, 
towards  the  beginning  of  autumn,  gloomy  and  disquieted,  in 
consequence,  apparently,  of  some  reverses  in  his  affairs. 
After  a  few  weeks,  he  neglected  his  business,  and  became 
irritable  and  ill-tempered  in  his  family.  His  taste  and  habits 
changed ;  he  took  to  drinking,  and  seriously  endangered  the 
safety  of  his  fortune  and  his  family.  The  prayers  and  tears 
of  his  wife  and  children,  the  authority  of  his  father,  and  the 
inroads  upon  his  property,  were  equally  unavailing  in  check- 
ing his  career.  Thus  passed  the  winter ;  at  the  approach  of 
spring,  the  craving  for  drink  ceased.  M.  N.  resumed  his 
regular  and  sober  habits,  and  by  his  application  to  business 
and  increased  tenderness  towards  his  family,  he  endeavored 
to  forget  the  occurrences  of  the  past  winter.  In  the  follow- 
ing autumn  there  appeared  the  same  phenomenon,  the  same 
disorders,  and  the  same  spontaneous  cure  in  the  spring.  It 
was  the  same  for  the  two  following  years,  except  that  the 
symptoms  were  so  aggravated,  that  his  property  suffered 
severely,  and  his  wife's  life  was  sometimes  endangered.  At 
the  end  of  his  fourth  paroxysm,  in  1817,  M.  N.  came  to  Paris 
to  consult  me  and  submit  to  my  directions,  conjuring  me  to 
deliver  him  from  a  disease  that  rendered  him  the  most  miser- 
able of  men."  Esquirol  subjected  him  to  a  course  of  medi- 
cal treatment,  and  in  August  sent  him  off  on  a  journey  into 
Italy.     That  year  he  escaped,  except  that  in  December  he 


DRUNKENNESS.  501 

manifested  a  slight  desire  to  drink,  but  found  himself  able  to 
resist,  and  never  afterwards  had  a  return  of  his  complaint. 
He  also  relates  the  case  of  a  lady  who,  after  being  melan- 
choly for  six  weeks,  with  weakness  of  the  stomach,  and  indis- 
position to  take  the  least  exercise,  was  suddenly  seized  with 
the  strongest  craving  for  spirituous  drinks,  together  with 
sleeplessness,  agitation,  disturbance  of  mind,  and  perversion 
of  the  affections.  For  six  years,  these  symptoms  made  their 
appearance  annually,  and  continued  two  months. 

§  523.  A  case  is  related  of  a  Parisian  bookbinder,  sixty 
years  old,  who  for  fifteen  years  was  afflicted  with  periodical 
drunkenness,  having  previously  been  a  model  of  sobriety  and 
virtue.  The  paroxysm  lasted  two  or  three  months  with  an 
interval  of  equal  duration.  M.  Pierquin,  the  narrator  of  the 
case,  observed  him  closely  for  the  space  of  two  years,  and 
found  that  his  daily  habit  was,  to  rise  at  five  or  six  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  take  some  money  out  of  the  till,  and  hasten  to 
the  nearest  cabaret,  where  he  would  drink  incessantly,  until 
ten  or  eleven  o'clock.  He  would  then  stagger  home,  go 
down  into  his  cellar,  bring  up  some  large  bottles  of  wine, 
and  drink  night  and  day,  seldom  sleeping,  and  very  rarely 
eating.  During  the  early  period  of  the  attack,  he  would  go 
to  the  cabaret,  forenoon  and  afternoon  ;  but  during  the  last 
eighteen  or  twenty  days,  he  never  went  from  home.  Then 
he  became  reserved,  passionate,  avoiding  the  light,  and  seek- 
ing the  darkest  corner  of  the  kitchen.  He  was  never  observed 
to  be  delirious,  nor  deranged  in  mind,  but  would  answer 
questions  correctly,  and  follow  the  train  of  conversation. 
The  paroxysm  ended  in  a  profound  sleep,  from  which  he 
would  awake  in  his  sober  senses,  and  resume  his  avocations 
as  if  he  had  just  quitted  them  the  preceding  evening,  being 
unconscious,  or  pretending  to  be  so,  of  any  thing  that  had 
occurred.^ 

§  5^4.  It  can  scarcely  be  doubted,  that  the  above  cases 
originated  in  pathological  changes  ;  and  there  is  also  another 
class  of  cases  which  strongly  point  to  the  same  origin,  and 

*  Journal  des  Progress,  etc.  xi. 


502  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

present  a  close  affinity,  both  in  this  respect,  and  in  that  of 
their  symptoms.  In  the  cases  referred  to,  the  persons,  who 
are  habitually  sober,  are  irresistibly  impelled  to  indulge  in 
the  reckless,  unlimited  use  of  intoxicating  drinks,  whenever 
agitated  by  strong  moral  emotions.  The  author  was  once 
acquainted  with  a  very  amiable,  intelligent,  and  virtuous 
young  seaman,  who,  by  means  of  strict  attention  to  his 
duties,  his  staid  deportment,  and  his  knowledge  of  navigation, 
rose  to  the  command  of  a  ship,  at  a  very  early  age.  During 
his  second  voyage  as  captain,  while  in  a  foreign  port,  in  a 
hot  climate,  some  circumstances  occurred,  which  subjected 
him  to  considerable  fatigue,  exposure,  and  great  anxiety  of 
mind,  and  seriously  affected  his  health.  By  this  and  some 
other  things  which  took  place  on  the  passage  home,  his  mind 
was  so  disturbed,  that  this  young  man  who  hardly  knew  the 
taste  of  ardent  spirits,  suddenly  abandoned  himself  to  the 
wildest  excesses.  The  fit  continued  till  within  a  few  days  of 
their  arrival  at  port,  during  which  time  he  was  totally  uncon- 
scious of  what  was  going  on,  and  the  first  officer  took  charge 
of  the  vessel.  The  same  scenes  again  occurred  the  next 
voyage,  and  he  lost  his  employment ;  but  with  these  two 
exceptions,  no  man  living  practised  more  rigid  abstinence 
from  every  kind  of  intoxicating  drink.  Nothing  could  tempt 
him  to  the  slightest  indulgence,  and  he  evinced  the  strongest 
repugnance  to  all  spirituous  liquors  of  whatever  kind.  The 
author  also  knew  another  young  man  of  similar  character, 
who  rose  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  command  of  a  ship ;  but 
no  sooner  did  he  reach  this  reward  of  his  merits,  than  he 
began  to  drink  with  all  the  recklessness  of  an  old  toper.  As 
soon  as  he  was  degraded  to  an  inferior  station,  no  man  could 
be  more  temperate,  and  this  appearance  of  reform  each  time 
encouraging  his  friends  with  the  hope,  that  he  had  aban- 
doned his  bad  habits  altogether,  they  would  restore  him  to 
the  station  he  had  lost,  to  be  again  and  again  forfeited  by 
his  mad  propensity.  In  these  cases,  it  seems  as  if  the  anx- 
iety arising  from  a  sense  of  heavy  responsibility,  and  from 
adverse  circumstances,  produced  an  irritation,  if  not  inflam- 
mation  of  some    portion   of  the  brain, — of  that   which,   if 


DKUNKENNESS.  503 

phrenology  be  true,  is  connected  with  the  appetite  of  hunger 
and  thirst. 

§  525.  Esquirol  mentions  the  case  of  a  servant  girl  in  the 
Salpetriere,  who,  upon  the  slightest  cross  or  contradiction, 
began  and  continued  to  drink  until  prevented  by  strict  seclu- 
sion. If  not  prevented  in  time,  she  got  drunk,  became  furi- 
ous, and  attempted  suicide.^ 

§  526.  Marc  observes  that  dipsomania  sometimes  occurs 
in  women  at  the  turn  of  life,  as  it  is  called,  as  a  result  of  the 
important  physiological  changes,  which,  at  that  period,  take 
place  in  the  female  constitution.  He  has  met  with  many 
examples  of  it  in  women  who  previously  had  exhibited  all 
the  virtues  of  their  sex,  and  especially  temperance.^ 

*  Des  Maladies  Mentales,  ii.  73.  *  De  la  folie,  etc.  ii.  605. 


CHAPTER    XXVII. 

LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OP  DRUNKENNESS. 

§  527.  Before  we  undertake  to  estimate  the  legal  re- 
sponsibilities of  drunkards,  it  will  be  necessary  to  retrace 
our  steps  for  a  moment,  in  order  to  ascertain  what  is  the 
exact  state  of  the  mind  while  under  the  immediate  influence 
of  intoxicating  drinks;  and  for  this  purpose  we  shall  dis- 
tinguish, with  Holi'bauer,  three  degrees  or  periods  of  drunk- 
enness. In  the  first  degree,  to  use  in  some  measure  the 
language  of  this  writer,  the  ideas  are  only  uncommonly 
vivacious;  consequently-  the  empire  of  the  understanding 
over  the  actions  is  so  little  weakened,  that  the  individual 
perfectly  retains  the  consciousness  of  his  external  condition, 
and  in  fact  may  be  said  to  be  in  complete  possession  of  his 
senses.  Still  this  rapid  flow  of  ideas  is  unfavorable  to  reflec- 
tion, and  there  also  accompany  it  great  irritability,  and  ac- 
tivity of  the  moral  emotions.  It  must  be  remembered,  how- 
ever, that  anger  is  more  rare  in  this  degree  of  drunkenness, 
in  consequence  of  the  self-satisfaction  which  the  person 
enjoys,  and  which  renders  him  more  patient;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  some  previous  circumstances  that  may  have  in- 
creased his  susceptibility,  even  the  sallies  of  a  wild  gayety, 
or  a  simple  dispute  of  words,  though  conducted  with  cour- 
tesy, strongly  dispose  him  to  transports  of  passion.  Still,  as 
long  as  drunkenness  does  not  exceed  the  first  degree,  the 
passions  can  be  repressed.  In  the  second  degree  of  drunk- 
enness a  man  has  still  the  use  of  his  senses,  though  they  are 
remarkably  enfeebled ;  but  he  is  entirely  beside  himself, 
memory  and  judgment  having  abandoned  him.  He  acts  as  if 
he  lived  only  for  the  present,  with  no  idea  of  the  consequences 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DRUNKENNESS.  505 

of  his  actions,  nor  their  relations  to  one  another.  The  past 
has  gone  from  his  mind,  and  he  cannot  be  influenced  by 
considerations  which  he  no  longer  remembers.  He  conducts 
himself  as  if  no  control  over  his  actions  were  necessary.  The 
shghtest  provocation  is  sufficient  to  awaken  the  most  un- 
bounded rage.  He  is,  therefore,  not  unlike  the  maniac,  and 
can  be  responsible  for  his  actions  only  so  far  as  he  is  for  his 
drunkenness.  In  the  last  degree,  he  not  only  loses  the  pos- 
session of  his  reason,  but  his  senses  are  so.  enfeebled,  that 
he  is  no  longer  conscious  of  his  external  relations.  In  this 
condition  he  is  more  dangerous  to  himself  than  to  others. 

§  528.  In  the  first  stage  of  drunkenness,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  legal  relations  of  the  individual  cannot  be  affected, 
inasmuch  as  he  has  lost  none  of  the  ordinary  soundness  of 
his  judgment.  In  the  second  and  third  stages,  so  much  are 
the  soundness  of  his  understanding  and  clearness  of  his  per- 
ceptions impaired,  and  his  passions  excited,  that  he  acts 
more  or  less  unconsciously  and  without  deliberation.  But 
since  drunkenness  is  itself  a  sin,  it  becomes  a  question,  how 
far  a  person's  liability  for  the  consequences  of  his  acts  in 
that  state,  can  be  affected  by  a  condition  which  is  itself 
utterly  inexcusable. 

§  529.  The  common  law  of  England  has  shown  but  little 
disposition  to  afford  relief  from  any  of  the  immediate  con- 
sequences of  drunkenness,  either  in  civil  or  criminal  cases. 
It  has  never  considered  mere  drunkenness  alone  a  sufficient 
reason  for  invalidating  a  deed  or  agreement,  except  when 
carried  to  that  excessive  degree  which  deprives  the  party  of 
all  consciousness  of  what  he  is  doing.  Courts  of  equity, 
also,  have  strenuously  refused  their  relief  in  moderate  drvmk- 
enness,  unless  it  were  procured  by  the  contrivance  of  the 
other  party,  or  were  made  the  means  of  obtaining  some 
unfair  advantage.^  The  general  doctrine  to  be  derived  from 
modern  English  decisions  is,  first,  that  moderate  drunken- 
ness does  not  necessarily  deprive  the  mind  of  the  power  of 
rational  consent,  is  not  always  apparent  to  others,  and  ought 

^  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity,.  1,  §  232. 

43 


506  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

not,  of  itself,  to  avoid  any  deed  or  contract;  secondly,  that 
inasmuch  as  excessive  drunkenness  deprives  a  person,  more 
or  less,  of  the  consciousness  of  what  he  is  doing,  and  is  per- 
fectly obvious  to  every  one,  all  acts  executed  while  in  this 
condition  may  be  avoided  at  law  on  the  ground  of  incom- 
petency, and  in  equity,  on  that  of  fraud. ^  Nothing,  cer- 
tainly, can  be  fairer  than  this,  since  it  equally  guards  the 
interests  of  the  drunken  party,  and  of  those  who  deal  with 
him.  In  this  country,  the  English  practice  has  been  fol- 
lowed,^  and  in  France  the  courts  have  been  governed  by 
similar  views.^  Writers  on  natural  and  public  law  have 
regarded  drunkenness  under  any  circumstances,  as  a  sufficient 
cause  for  avoiding  any  acts  that  may  have  been  executed 
under  its  influence,  upon  the  principle  that  the  free  and  delib- 
erate consent  of  the  understanding  is  essential  to  the  validity 
of  such  acts.^ 

§  530.  It  is  the  legal  relations  of  drunkenness  in  regard 
to  criminal  acts,  however,  which  more  particularly  require 
our  attention.  A  remarkable  diversity  of  views  has  pre- 
vailed on  this  point  at  different  times  and  among  different 
nations,  and  it  would  certainly  be  a  curious,  if  not  useful 
inquiry,  to  investigate  the  peculiar  circumstances  that  have 
given  rise  to  it.  Respecting  the  principles  and  practice  of 
the  ancient  Greeks  on  this  subject,  we  know  but  little  more 
than  that  Solon  condemned  to  death  a  drunken  Archon;  and 
that  by  a  law  of  Pittacus,  he  who  committed  a  crime  when 
drunk,  was  to  receive  a  double  punishment,  —  one  for  the 
crime  itself,  another  for  the  drunkenness  in  consequence  of 
which  it  was  committed.^  The  Roman  law  contains  no 
general  provision  on  the  subject,  but  in  practice  it  had  the 
effect  of  depriving  a  criminal  act  of  Ihe  quality  of  malicious 
intention,  and  thus  lessening  the  amount  of  punishment.^     In 

'  Shaw  V.  Thackeray,  23  Eng.  Rep.  21. 

^  Amer.  Jurist,  xxi.  G. 

'  Pothier,  Tralte  des  Oblig.  by  Evans,  26. 

♦  Puffendorf,  Law  of  Nat.  and  Nat.  ch.  4,  §  8. 

'  Bruning's  Compend.  antiquatat.  graecar.  C.  2,  p.  20. 

'  Mittermaier,  Effect  of  Drunkenness  upon  criminal  responsibility.    Amer. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  507 

the  canon,  imperial,  and  common  criminal  law  of  Germany, 
drunkenness  was  viewed  as  a  ground  of  extenuation,  and 
in  the  sixteenth  century,  writers  began  to  distinguish  its 
various  kinds,  and  discriminate  between  their  legal  conse- 
quences. Excessive  drunkenness  was  regarded  as  exempting 
from  the  punishment  of  dolus^  intentional  injury,  though  not 
from  that  of  culpa,  fault ;  unless  it  were  intentional,  or  pre- 
ceded by  a  consciousness  that  it  might  lead  to  crime,  in 
which  case  it  was  to  have  no  exculpatory  effect.  When  not 
so  severe  as  to  deprive  the  subject  of  the  use  of  reason,  it 
was  to  receive  no  consideration.  These  views,  which  gradu- 
ally determined  the  German  practice,  prevailed  also  in  the 
practice  of  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  Holland,  and  the  Nether- 
lands. 

§  531.  Modern  legislation,  in  Germany,  remains  true  to 
the  old  practice  Q|j|lfehe  subject  of  drunkenness.  In  the  Aus- 
trian code  of  1S03;  §  2,  lit.  c,  it  is  made  a  ground  of  exculpa- 
tion from  responsibility,  when  not  produced  with  a  view  of 
committing  the  crime.  In  the  Prussian  Landrecht,  p.  ii.  tit. 
20,  §  22,  it  is  intimated,  that  a  criminal  act,  committed  in  a 
state  of  drunkenness  which  originates  in  fault,  is  punishable 
for  the  fault  only ;  and  a  case  has  been  mentioned,  where  a 
man  who  killed  his  child  in  a  drunken  fit,  was  punished  by 
only  one  year's  imprisonment.  In  the  Bavarian  code,  art. 
121,  "  inculpable  disorder  of  the  senses,  or  of  the  under- 
standing," which  includes  drunkenness,  is  mentioned  as  one 
of  the  grounds  that  exempt  from  responsibility.  But  if  it  be 
intentional,  and  for  the  purpose  of  committing  the  crime,  the 
code  expressly  declares,  art.  40,  that  it  shall  be  no  ground  of 
exculpation.  In  the  revised  project  of  the  Bavarian  code  of 
1827,  art.  67,  the  above-quoted  language  is  retained,  with  the 
exception  of  the  w^ord  "  inculpable."  The  Hanover  project, 
art.  99,  contains  the  words  of  the  code,  with  the  following 


Jurist,  xxlii.  For  the  following  notices  of  the  law  of  Germany  on  this  sub- 
ject, we  are  also  indebted  to  this  article,  in  which  the  subject  of  drunkenness 
in  connection  with  crime,  is  amply  and  ably  discussed  in  the  spirit  of  a 
learned  and  enlightened  jurisprudence. 


508  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

additional  clause  —  "  namely,  in  cases  of  the  highest  degree 
of  inculpable  drunkenness."  Drunkenness  is  also  mentioned 
generally  as  a  ground  of  extenuation,  art.  109.  The  Zurich 
project  of  1829,  art.  159,  declares  that  one  who  commits  a 
crime,  in  a  state  of  inculpable  drunkenness  of  the  highest 
degree,  is  punishable  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were  under 
legal  age. 

§  532.  Very  different  from  this  has  been  the  legislation 
of  France,  England,  and  Scotland,  into  which  these  milder 
views  of  the  legal  consequences  of  drunkenness  have  never 
been  suffered  to  enter.  In  France,  an  ordinance  of  Francis  I. 
declares  that  it  shall  not  in  any  case  absolve  from  the  ordi- 
nary punishment  of  crime.  In  the  present  penal  code  of 
that  country,  drunkenness  is  not  mentioned,  expressly  or  by 
implication,  as  a  ground  of  exculpatiori.  Accordingly  in 
1837,  the  court  of  cassation,  which  is  thedjfchest  in  the  king- 
dom, and  receives  appeals  from  all  ot^CT  courts,  formally 
decided  that  drunkenness  being  a  voluntary  and  reprehensi- 
ble state,  could  never  constitute  a  legal  or  moral  excuse. 
Many  eminent  French  jurists,  however,  have  lamented  the 
deficiencies  of  the  code  on  this  subject,  and  contended  for 
the  introduction  of  milder  principles.  It  has  even  been  con- 
tended that  the  penal  code,  art.  64,  which  declares  insanity, 
without  distinction  of  any  kind,  to  be  a  ground  of  entire  ex- 
culpation, would  justify  the  admission  of  drunkenness  which 
produces  a  temporary  insanity,  among  the  grounds  of  exten- 
uation. Within  a  few  years,  juries  have  availed  themselves 
of  the  suggestion,  although  in  affording  relief  in  the  only 
way  they  could,  that  is,  acquitting  the  accused  altogether, 
they  have  certainly  gone  too  far.  In  the  case  of  J.  M.  Erion, 
mentioned  by  Georget,^  who  was  tried  for  an  assault  on  his 
mother,  he  being  intoxicated  at  the  time,  the  verdict  of  the 
jury  was,  that  he  was  guilty,  but  acted  involunlarUij.  Con- 
sequently, he  was  discharged  in  virtue  of  the  364th  art.  of  the 
code  of  criminal  instruction,  namely:  "The  court  will  dis- 
charge the  accused  if  the  act  for  which  he  is  indicted  is  not 

*  Discussion  medlco-legale,  23. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  509 

prohibited  by  any  penal  law."  ^  In  another  case  the  jury 
returned  that  the  accused  "was  guilty,  but  acted  without  dis- 
cernment and  without  will."  ^ 

§  533.  In  England  drunkenness  has  never  been  admitted 
as  a  ground  of  extenuation  for  any  offences  committed  under 
its  influence.  "  A  drunkard  who  is  volunlarius  demo,  hath 
no  privilege  thereby,"  said  a  learned  expounder  of  the  com- 
mon law  ;  "  whatever  ill  or  hurt  he  doth,  his  drunkenness 
doth  aggravate  it."  ^  It  is  not  strictly  true,  however,  that 
drunkenness  is  an  aggravating  circumstance  when  attending 
the  commission  of  real  offences.  It  may  be  said  more  cor- 
rectly, that  it  has  no  legal  effect  whatever,  on  any  offence 
which  it  accompanies ;  it  neither  modifies  its  nature,  nor 
increases  its  penalties.  Nothing  can  be  further  from  the 
spirit  of  English  jurisprudence  than  the  idea  that  drunken- 
ness, unless  produced  by  force  or  fraud,  should  affot-d  any 
relief  from  the  ordinary  consequences  of  crime.  Owing  to 
the  exclusive  influence  of  this  spirit,  few  are  able  to  contem- 
plate the  milder  views  that  have  prevailed  in  some  parts  of 
Europe,  with  any  other  than  feelings  of  deep  distrust  and 
aversion.  The  inevitable  consequence  thereof,  it  is  alleged, 
is  to  increase  the  temptations  to  crime,  and  to  obliterate 
some  of  the  most  important  distinctions  of  morality.  To 
one  who  comes  to  the  examination  of  this  subject  with  an 
unbiased  and  inquiring  mind,  it  certainly  is  not  very  obvious 
how  the  views  in  question  lead  only  to  mischief.     The  ap- 

*  The  apparent  -want  of  connection  between  the  discharge  of  the  accused 
and  the  provisions  of  this  article,  is  to  be  explained  by  a  difference  of  pro- 
cedure In  French  and  English  courts.  The  former,  unlike  the  latter,  permit 
the  jury  in  criminal  as  well  as  in  civil  cases,  to  render  a  special  verdict,  and 
accordingly  they  found  Erion  guilty  of  the  assault,  but  that  having  "  acted 
involuntarily,  he  was  guilty  of  no  crime"  and  was  entitled  to  a  discharge  from 
the  court,  as  much  as  if  he  had  been  found  by  the  same  verdict,  guilty  of  the 
assault,  but  deranged,  and  not  acting  voluntarily.  The  law  makes  no  man 
responsible  for  an  involuntary  act,  and  drunkenness  is  not  recognized  as  a 
circumstance  that  deprives  acts  of  this  quality,  which  are  committed  under 
its  influence. 

"-  Gazette  des  Tribunaux,  1828,  nr.  839. 

'  Thomas's  Coke's  Littleton,  46. 

43* 


510  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

prehension  that  men  would  intentionally  make  themselves 
drunk  for  the  purpose  of  committing  a  crime  with  impunity, 
has  hardly  the  shadow  of  a  foundation.  In  the  first  place, 
the  existence  of  the  previous  intention  is  liable  to  be  de- 
tected ;  and  again,  if  the  accused  be  successful  in  concealing 
it,  and  his  plea  is  admitted,  still,  at  the  very  least,  the  pen- 
alty would  probably  be  severe,  for  the  drunkenness  is  merely 
a  ground  of  exculpation.  We  do  not  apprehend,  therefore, 
that  men  would  abandon  the  ordinary  method  of  committing 
crime,  in  secrecy  and  silence,  for  one  that  is  sure  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  severe  punishment — perhaps  the  very  punishment 
they  would  avoid. 

§  534.  While  we  are  far  from  believing  that  these  milder 
views  manifest  too  much  indulgence  to  drunkenness,  we  have 
no  hesitation  in  saying  that  English  jurisprudence  has  erred 
most  widely  in  the  other  direction.  The  whole  theory  of  the 
English  law  in  regard  to  drunkenness,  is  founded  on  the 
fallacy,  that  because  the  act  of  drinking  is  voluntary,  the  per- 
son is  responsible  for  whatever  actions  it  may  lead  him  to 
commit.  An  act  that  unintentionally  leads  to  the  commission 
of  crime,  is  thus  confounded  with  such  as  are  deliberately 
designed  to  have  this  effect,  —  the  distinction  being  utterly 
overlooked  between  what  the  law  calls  culpa  and  dolus,  fault 
and  intentional  injury  or  crime.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive 
why  such  a  confusion  of  moral  and  legal  distinctions  should 
be  —  not  overlooked  —  but  actually  acknowledged  and  de- 
fended, even  at  the  present  day.  An  essential  element  of 
crime  is  the  previous  intention,  and  unless  the  criminal  act 
be  accompanied  by  wrong  intention,  the  author  thereof  is 
regarded  by  the  laws  of  all  civilized  people,  and  even  by  the 
English  law,  except  in  a  few  instances,  as  guilty  of  culpa,  not 
of  dolus.  We  are  not  satisfied  that  there  should  be  an  ex- 
•  ception  to  this  principle,  in  the  case  of  drunkenness.  If  a 
person  who  enters  a  stable  with  a  lighted  candle  not  properly- 
protected,  and  carelessly  drops  it  into  a  hay-mow,  where- 
by the  building  is  destroyed,  is  not  deemed  guilty  of  arson, 
no  more  should  one  who,  in  a  fit  of  drunkenness,  kills  a  fel- 
low being  without  any  previous  intention  so  to  do,  be  deemed 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  511 

guilty  of  murder.  True,  the  fault  of  drunkenness  is  far 
greater  than  that  of  carelessness,  and  consequently  should  be 
punished  with  proportionate  severity  ;  but  the  difference  is 
one  merely  of  degree.  The  doctrine  of  the  common  law 
would  have  a  shadow  of  support,  if  drunkenness  were  really 
a  crime  of  some  magnitude  ;  but  it  is  not  so  regarded  by  the 
laws  of  England,  and  in  most  parts  of  this  country  it  is  no 
crime  at  all.  The  free,  unembarrassed  use  of  the  reasoning 
powers  is  essential  to  responsibility  ;  but  while  the  contrary 
condition  of  these  powers  in  insanity  absolves  its  subjects 
from  the  legal  consequences  of  crime,  it  is  not  permitted  to 
have  the  same  effect  when  produced  and  accompanied  by 
drunkenness.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  a  sufficient  reason  for 
this  distinction,  that  in  the  latter  case,  the  loss  of  moral  lib- 
erty is  the  voluntary  act  of  the  party,  while  in  the  former  it 
is  the  effect  of  disease.  In  the  first  place,  the  only  object 
which  the  drunkard  has  in  view,  is  animal  enjoyment ;  for 
the  loss  of  his  reason,  though  a  certain  result,  is  not  the  mo- 
tive for  his  indulgence  ;  and,  secondly,  the  very  insanity  which 
is  admitted  in  excuse  for  crime,  may  be,  as  in  a  very  large 
proportion  of  cases  it  really  is,  the  result  of  habits  of  drunk- 
enness in  which  the  party  has  voluntarily  persisted.  Where 
the  moral  guilt  is  very  nearly,  if  not  precisely  equal,  it  seems 
unjust  that  the  legal  consequences  should  differ  so  widely,  as 
they  do  in  regard  to  criminal  acts  according  as  they  are  com- 
mitted under  the  influence  of  drunkenness,  or  of  that  insanity 
which  may  be  one  of  its  direct  results. 

§  535.  Drunkenness,  in  reference  to  its  moral  and  legal 
character,  may  be  divided  into  three  kinds,  dolous  or  crimi- 
nal, culpable,  and  inculpable.  Bearing  these  distinctions  in 
mind,  we  shall  be  able  to  arrive  at  more  accurate  notions  in 
regard  to  the  effect  which  this  condition  should  produce  on 
criminal  responsibility.  Dolous  drunkenness  is  that  which 
is  deliberately  produced  for-  the  purpose  of  committing  a 
crime  while  under  its  influence,  and  is  generally  regarded 
as  affording  no  relief  from  the  ordinary  punishment  of  that 
crime.  Drunkenness  is  culpable  when,  though  knowingly 
produced,  it  is  accompanied  by  no  previous  criminal  inten- 


512  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

tion.  Of  course  there  miist  be  various  degrees  of  culpability, 
and  the  amount  of  punishment  they  severally  require,  must 
be  determined  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  The  Eng- 
lish law,  however,  as  has  been  already  observed,  does  not 
admit  this  kind  of  drunkenness  as  aground  of  extenuation, 
though  it  would  seem  to  be  incompatible  with  one  crime  at 
least  with  which  drunkards  are  often  charged,  that  of  murder, 
as  defined  by  legal  authorities.  If,  previous  to  the  drunken 
fit,  there  were  no  design  nor  malice,  which  is  essential  to 
murder,  we  are  obliged  to  suppose  that  it  arose  in  the 
mind  after  it  had  been  brought  under  the  influence  of  drunk- 
enness. But  a  mind  which  has  lost  the  perfect  use  of  its 
reasoning  powers,  cannot,  without  an  unwarranted  abuse  of 
language,  be  deemed  guilty  of  originating  the  feeling  of 
malice.  Lawyers  have  occasionally  suspected  that  it  is  going 
too  far  to  attribute  malice  to  a  mind  under  the  influence  of 
drunkenness,  but  until  lately  their  doubts  have  never  been 
suffered  to  affect  their  practice, 

§  536.  Within  a  few  years,  th^re  has  been  an  obvious  dis- 
position, both  in  this  country  and  England,  to  qualify  the 
doctrine  of  the  common  law  on  this  subject.  It  has  been 
witnessed  only  in  cases  where  the  drunkenness  might  possibly 
have  affected  some  essential  element  of  the  crime.  Justice 
Holroyd  decided,  in  1819,  that  the  fact  of  drunkenness  might 
be  taken  into  consideration  in  determining  the  question 
whether  the  act  was  premeditated,  or  done  only  with  sudden 
heat  and  impulse.^  This  particular  decision,  however,  was 
subsequently  (1835),  pronounced  to  be  not  law.^  In  1837, 
it  was  stated  by  Baron  Parke,  that  drunkenness  may  be 
taken  into  consideration  in  cases  where  what  the  law  deems 
sufficient  provocation  has  been  given ;  because  the  question 
is,  in  such  cases,  whether  the  fatal  act  is  to  be  attributed  to 
the  passion  of  anger  excited  by  the  previous  provocation, 
and  that  passion  h  more  easily  excitable  in  a  person  when  in 
a  state  of  intoxication,  than  when  he  is  sober.     But  he  was 


'  Rex  V.  Grindey,  1  Russell  on  Crimes,  8. 
*  Rex  V.  Carrol,  7  Car.  &  Paine,  145. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  513 

careful  to  say  that  a  previous  determination  to  commit  a  cer- 
tain criminal  act  being  proved,  drunkenness  at  the  time  of  its 
commission,  v^'^ould  furnish  no  excuse.^  In  a  charge  of  assault 
with  intent  to  murder.  Justice  Patterson  told  the  jury  that  if 
they  were  not  satisfied  the  prisoners  had  formed  a  positive 
intention  of  murdering  the  child,  they  might  find  them  guilty 
of  an  assault.2  In  a  later  case  (1849),  Justice  Coleridge  said, 
"such  a  state  of  drunkenness  [one  which  takes  away  the 
power  of  forming  any  specific  intention]  may,  no  doubt, 
exist."  ^  Similar  views  have  the  more  readily  been  adopted 
in  this  country,  because  often  favored  by  the  positive  requi- 
sitions of  the  statute.  Where  murder  in  the  first  degree  is 
defined  to  be  wilful,  deliberate,  malicious  and  premeditated 
killing,  it  has  been  questioned  whether  the  existence  of  these 
attributes  is  compatible  with  that  of  drunkenness.  "  The 
mental  state  required  for  that  crime  being  one  of  deliberation 
and  premeditation,  the  fact  of  the  prisoner's  drunkenness  was 
material,  not  as  an  excuse  for  the  crime,  but  to  show  it  had 
not  been  committed."*  The  same  doctrine  has  been  repeat- 
edly held  of  late  years.^  In  a  little  different  shape,  it  was 
presented  as  long  ago  as  1794,  in  a  case  of  murder.  "  Drunk- 
enness," said  the  judge,  "does  not  incapacitate  a  man  from 
forming  a  premeditated  design  of  murder,  but  frequently  sug- 
gests it.  But  as  drunkenness  clouds  the  understanding  and 
excites  passion,  it  may  be  evidence  of  passion  only,  and  of 
want  of  malice  and  design."  ^  In  another  case,  it  was  held 
that  drunkenness  might  be  taken  into  the  account  in  connec- 
tion with  other  circumstances,  in  determining  the  question  of 
intent.''' 


1  Rex  V.  Thomas,  7  Car.  &  Paine,  817. 

*  Reg.  V.  Cruse,  8  Car.  &  P.  546. 

^  Reg.  V.  Monkhouse,  4  Cox,  C.  C.  55. 

*  The  Slate  v.  Bullock,  13  Alabama,  413  (1848). 

^  Swan  V.  The  Stale,  A  Humphreys,  136;  Pirlle  v.  The  Slate,  9  Hum- 
phreys, 570;  Haile  v.  The  State,  11  Humphreys,  154. 

«  Penn  v.  Fall,  Addison,  257. 

'  The  Stale  v.  Ale  Cants,  1  Speers,  384.  The  reader  will  find  the  course 
of  opinion  on  this  subject  very  thoroughly  and  fully  displayed  in  Bennett  & 


514  MEDICAL  JURISPKUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

§  537.  Inculpable  drunkenness  is  that  which  occurs  with- 
out any  fault  in  the  party,  and  consequently  renders  him 
irresponsible  for  whatever  acts  he  may  commit,  while  under 
its  influence.  The  common  law  recognizes  but  two  ways  in 
which  it  can  be  produced,  namely,  by  "the  unskilfulness 
of  the  physician,  or  the  contrivance  of  enemies."  ^  It  ap- 
pears to  us,  that  it  may  also  be  produced  in  at  least  two 
other  ways ;  b)'^  the  party's  drinking  no  more  liquor  than  he 
has  habitually  taken  without  being  intoxicated,  but  which, 
from  some  cause  unknown  to  him  at  the  time  is  much 
stronger  than  usual ;  or  which,  without  any  change  in  its 
quantity  or  quality,  exerts  an  unusually  potent  effect  on  the 
brain,  in  consequence  of  certain  pathological  conditions. 
This  latter  kind  of  inculpable  drunkenness,  is  not  an  uncom- 
mon occasion  of  crime,  but  in  English  and  American  courts, 
it  has  never,  that  I  am  aware  of,  been  admitted  in  extenua- 
tion of  punishment.  The  following  passage  contains  in  a 
few  words,  the  spirit  of  the  law  on  this  subject.  "  There  are 
many  men,  soldiers,  who  have  been  severely  wounded,  in  the 
head  especially,  who  well  know  that  excess  makes  them  mad; 
but  if  such  persons  wilfully  deprive  themselves  of  reason, 
they  ought  not  to  be  excused  one  crime  by  the  voluntary  per- 
petration of  another y^  It  is  not  very  obvious  how  that  can 
be  properly  called  a  crime,  which  may  not  be  once  mentioned 
in  the  statute-book ;  nor,  if  it  be  a  crime,  why  in  the  absence 
of  any  legislative  enactment  on  the  subject,  it  should  be 
visited  with  capital  punishment,  as  it  virtually  is  when  it 
leads  to  a  capital  crime.  In  the  following  cases,  we  have 
instances  of  this  kind  of  drunkenness,  and  a  practical  illus- 
tration of  the  spirit  in  which  they  are  regarded. 

§  538.  William  M'Donough  was  tried  and  convicted  on 
an  indictment  for  the  murder  of  his  wife,  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Massachusetts,  in  November,  1817.     It  appeared  in 


Heard's  Leading  Cases  in  Criminal  Law,  i.  113  (185G),  to  which  I  am  in- 
debted for  the  above  citations. 

*  Russell  on  Crimes,  8. 

*  Paris  and  Fonblanque,  Medical  Jurisprudence,  iii. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DRUNKENNESS.  515 

evidence,  that,  many  years  previous,  the  defendant  had  re- 
ceived a  severe  injury  of  the  head,  in  consequence  of  which 
he  had  suffered  occasional  paroxysms  of  insanity,  though  the 
general  habit  of  his  mind  was  sound  and  clear.  It  appeared 
that  they  were  often  produced  by  intoxication,  and  there  was 
some  evidence  to  prove  that  they  sometimes  occurred,  uncon- 
nected with  any  apparent  exciting  cause.  In  one  of  these 
fits  of  insanity  induced  by  drinking,  and  while  actually  under 
the  influence  of  liquor,  he  murdered  his  wife.  The  court,  in 
its  charge  to  the  jury,  observed,  that  "  if  they  believed  the 
prisoner  was  in  a  fit  of  lunacy  when  he  committed  the 
act,  he  should  be  acquitted ;  but  if  they  believed  he  was 
of  sound  mind,  or  if  his  reason  was  impaired,  and  that  it 
was  caused  by  intoxication  only,  the  fact  being  proved 
and  no  palliating  circumstances  existing,  he  must  be  con- 
victed." ^  If,  in  using  this  language,  the  court  had  in  view 
any  circumstances  that  might  be  deemed  to  be  of  a  palliating 
character,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  what  it  was,  unless  it  were  the 
pathological  condition  resulting  from  the  injury  of  the  head, 
which  rendered  him  peculiarly  susceptible  to  the  effects  of 
ardent  spirits.  If  the  court  actually  did  consider  this  a  pal- 
liating circumstance,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  its  language 
was  not  more  explicit  on  this  point.  It  is  very  probable,  that 
in  this  case  also,  the  jury  were  considerably  influenced  by  the 
character  of  the  exciting  cause  of  M'Donough's  insanity.  If 
it  had  been  testified,  that,  instead  of  getting  drunk,  he  was 
in  the  habit  of  attending  religious  meetings,  where  warm  and 
pungent  appeals  were  addressed  to  his  feelings ;  that  the  ex- 
citement thus  produced  occasionally  degenerated  into  a  fit  of 
madness,  in  one  of  which  he  killed  his  wife,  the  jury  would 
have  acquitted  him  without  leaving  their  seats.  Yet  the 
essential  condition  of  guilt  would  have  been  the  same  as  in 
the  case  that  actually  happened.  "  The  voluntary  use  of  a 
stimulus,"  as  it  is  expressed  by  Dr.  Beck,  "  which  he  was 
well  aware  would  disorder  his  mind,  fully  placed  him  under 


^  Trial  of  William  MDonough  for  the  murder  of  his  wife,  65. 


516  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDEXCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  purview  of  the  law."  ^  It  is  not  a  satisfactory  reply  to 
this  objection,  that,  in  the  one  case,  the  exciting  cause  is,  in 
itself,  of  a  commendable  character,  while  in  the  other,  i  is  in 
the  highest  degree  sinful  and  pernicious.  Drunkenness  in 
itself,  is  not  by  law  a  crime ;  and  though  the  moral  sense  of 
the  community  at  the  present  day  condemns  even  the  mod- 
erate use  of  intoxicating  drinks,  it  must  be  recollected  that 
twenty  years  ago,  and  especially  in  the  class  to  which 
M'Donough  belonged,  such  use  was  generally  considered, 
not  only  harmless,  but  absolutely  necessary  to  the  bodily 
health.  Had  he  not  labored  under  this  peculiar  irritability 
of  the  brain,  it  is  not  supposed  that  the  bloody  act  would 
have  been  committed  or  even  thought  of,  so  that  M'Donough 
was  virtually  convicted  for  the  consequences  of  a  bodily  in- 
firmity. 

§  539.  The  following  case,  related  by  Georget,  presents  us 
with  another  striking  illustration  of  mental  disorder  excited 
by  the  use  of  spirituous  liquors.  Vatelot,  a  gendarme,  while 
passing  the  Place  Louis  Quinze,  suddenly  struck  the  Sieur 
Chardon  with  his  sabre.  The  latter  turned  round,  and  see- 
ing a  stranger  brandishing  a  sabre  over  bis  head,  asked  if  he 
knew  him,  and  what  he  meant.  "  I  know  you,"  replied 
Vatelot,  "  you  are  mine  enemy,  and  I  will  give  it  to  you." 
At  the  same  moment  he  aimed  at  him  another  blow,  and 
after  pursuing  him  awhile  with  his  drawn  sword,  left  him. 
He  soon  met  the  Sieur  Bellon  whom  he  struck  on  the  head, 
and  aimed  two  blows  at  Sieur  Avenell  who  accompanied 
Bellon.  The  Sieur  Beaupied  who  ran  to  their  assistance, 
and  another  person  who  never  injured  him,  he  also  threat- 
ened ;  and  finally,  observing  a  young  lady  standing  at  her 
door,  he  struck  her  over  the  head  with  his  sabre,  and  then  fled. 
On  trial  before  the  court  of  assizes  at  Paris,  he  denied  the 
facts,  and  admitted  that  he  had  been  drinking,  but  was  not 


^  Medical  Jurisprudence,  i.  811.  In  a  subsequent  edition  of  his  Tvork, 
however,  the  Doctor  observes,  that  in  using  the  language  above  quoted,  he 
has  "  probably  expressed  himself  too  strongly,  in  a  medical  point  of  view," 
and  seems  inclined  to  retract  his  approval  of  the  verdict  of  the  jury. 


LEGAIi  CONSEQUENCES    OF   DRUNKENNESS.  517 

drunk.  He  was  convicted  of  homicide  committed  volun- 
tarily but  without  premeditation,  and  condemned  to  hard 
labor  for  life.^ 

§  540.  The  homicidal  acts  of  Vatelot  obviously  have  all 
the  characteristics  that  distinguish  those  committed  by  furi- 
ous maniacs.  "  He  attacked  indiscriminately  all  whom  he 
met,"  said  the  court,  "  and  made  four  successive  attempts  at 
homicide,  without  being  moved  by  any  of  the  passions 
characteristic  of  crime,  but  in  consequence  of  a  fatal  phrenzy 
which  impelled  him  to  the  shedding  of  blood  whenever  an 
opportunity  offered."  One  of  the  elements  of  guilt  in 
M'Donough's  case  is  wanting  in  this ;  for  it  does  not  appear 
that  strong  drink  had  ever  produced  a  fit  of  insanity  before, 
and  thus  it  could  not  be  urged  that  Vatelot  sinned  against 
the  light  of  his  own  experience.  If  he  had  not  drank  enough 
to  intoxicate  him  under  ordinary  circumstances,  he  had  done 
nothing  which  the  law  or  public  opinion  recognized  to  be 
wrong,  and  there  was  not  a  shadow  of  justice  in  rejecting 
his  plea  of  insanity.  Even  if  he  had,  are  we  to  make  no 
distinction,  as  Georget  forcibly  inquires,  between  a  drunken 
person  who  commits  a  crime  from  motives  of  interest,  such 
as  theft,  or  to  gratify  a  criminal  passion  existing  before  the 
intoxication,  and  one,  who  like  Vatelot,  becomes  a  murderer, 
without  interest,  without  motive,  without  any  rational  cause 
for  his  conduct  ? 

§  541.  We  shall  close  our  observations  on  this  form  of 
inculpable  drunkenness,  with  a  couple  of  passages  from  re- 
cent writers.  "  If  either  the  insanity  has  supervened  from 
drinking,"  says  Mr.  Alison,  "  without  the  panel's  having 
been  aware  that  such  an  indulgence  in  his  case  leads  to  such 
a  consequence ;  or  if  it  has  arisen  from  the  combination  of 
drinking  with  a  half  crazy  or  infirm  state  of  mind,  or  a  pre- 
vious wound  or  illness  which  rendered  spirits  fatal  to  his 
intellect,  to  a  degree  unusual  in  other  men,  or  which  could 
not  have  been  anticipated,  it  seems  inhuman  to  visit  him  with 
the  extreme  punishment  which  was  suitable  in  the  other  case. 

^  Discussion  Medico-Legale,  159. 

44 


518  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

In  such  a  case,  the  proper  course  is  to  convict ;  but  in  con- 
sideration of  the  degree  of  infirmity  proved,  recommend  to 
th'e  royal  mercy."  ^ 
ip  "  There  is  a  class  of  cases  in  which  persons  have  sus- 
tained injuries  to  the  head,  as  often  happens  with  soldiers 
and  sailors,  where  drunkenness,  even  when  existing  to  a 
slight  degree,  produces  sometimes  temporary  insanity,  and 
leaves  the  mind  in  possession  of   its  habitual  sanity  when 

the  drunken  fit  is  over Such  persons  certainly  ought 

not  to  undergo  the  same  punishment  as  sane  criminals, 
unless  the  crime  be  accompanied  by  many  circumstances  of 
aggravation,  and  the  plea  rest  rather  upon  suspicion  than 
proof."  2 

§  542.  In  regard  to  the  effect  of  delirium  tremens  on  re- 
sponsibility, the  principles  and  practice  of  American  courts 
will  be  best  exhibited  by  presenting  a  few  of  the  cases  that 
have  been  tried. 

§  543.  At  the  May  term,  in  1828,  of  the  Circuit  Court  of 
the  United  States,  Alexander  Drew,  commander  of  the 
whaling  ship  John  Jay,  was  tried  for  the  murder  of  his 
second  mate,  Charles  F.  Clark.  It  appeared  in  evidence, 
that  previously  to  the  voyage  during  which  this  fatal  act 
occurred.  Drew  had  sustained  a  fair  character,  and  was  a 
man  of  humane  and  benevolent  disposition,  though  addicted 
to  the  excessive  use  of  ardent  spirits.  After  recovering  from 
a  drunken  debauch,  in  the  latter  part  of  August,  1827,  he 
resolved  to  drink  no  more,  and  all  the  liquor  on  board  of  the 
ship  was  thrown  overboard.  In  two  or  three  days  after,  he 
lost  his  appetite,  was  unable  to  sleep,  and  manifested  various 
hallucinations.  He  thought  the  crew  had  conspired  to  kill 
him,  and  expressed  great  fear  of  an  Indian  belonging  t9  the 
ship,  calling  him  by  name  when  not  present,  and  promising 
that  he  would  drink  no  more  rum,  if  he  would  not  kill  him. 
Sometimes  he  would  sing  obscene  songs,  and  sometimes 
hymns,  and  would  pray  and  swear  alternately.     In  the  night 


'  Principles  of  the  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  654. 
^  British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review,  x.  161. 


i 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DRUNKENNESS.  519 

of  the  31st  August,  he  went  on  deck,  and  attempted  to  throw 
himself  overboard,  but  was  restrained  by  the  witness.  At 
seven  o'clock  in  the  forenoon,  September  1st,  while  the  wit- 
ness, Drew,  and  Clark,  were  at  breakfast,  Drew  suddenly  left 
the  table,  and  appeared  to  conceal  something  under  his 
jacket  which  was  on  the  transom  in  another  part  of  the  cabin. 
He  immediately  turned  round  to  Clark,  and  requested  him  to 
go  upon  deck.  The  latter  replied  that  he  would  when  he 
should  have  finished  his  breakfast.  Drew  then  exclaimed, 
"  go  upon  deck,  or  I  will  help  you ; "  and  immediately  took 
a  knife  that  had  been  covered  over  by  his  jacket,  and  before 
another  word  was  spoken  by  either,  he  plunged  it  into  the 
right  side  of  Clark's  breast.  Clark  fell  instantly,  but  soon 
afterwards  rose  and  went  upon  deck.  As  the  witness  left  the 
cabin.  Drew  cocked  his  pistol,  pointed  it  at  him  and  snapped 
it,  but  it  missed  fire.  Drew  followed  them  upon  deck,  and, 
addressing  the  mate,  said,  "  Mr.  Coffin,  in  twenty-four  hours 
the  ship  shall  go  ashore."  He  was  then  seized  and  confined. 
His  whole  demeanor,  for  some  weeks  after,  was  that  of  an 
insane  person.  When  he  first  appeared  to  be  in  his  right 
mind  he  was  informed  of  Clark's  death  and  its  cause ;  he 
replied  that  he  knew  nothing  about  it ;  that,  when  he  awoke 
he  found  himself  handcuffed,  and  that  it  appeared  to  him 
like  a  dream.  It  also  appeared  that  there  had  not  been  for 
months  any  quarrel  between  Clark  and  Drew. 

§  544.  After  hearing  the  witness  who  testified  the  above 
facts,  the  court  interposed,  and  through  Mr.  Justice  Story, 
delivered  its  opinion,  that  on  these  admitted  facts  the  indict- 
ment could  not  be  maintained,  because  the  prisoner  was  un- 
questionably insane  at  the  time  of  committing  the  offence. 
"  The  question  made  at  the  bar,"  continued  the  court,  "  is 
whether  insanity,  whose  remote  cause  is  habitual  drunken- 
ness, is,  or  is  not  an  excuse  in  a  court  of  law,  for  a  homicide 
committed  by  the  party  while  so  insane,  but  not  at  the  time 
intoxicated  or  under  the  influence  of  liquor.  We  are  clearly 
of  opinion  that  insanity  is  a  competent  excuse  in  such  a 
case.  In  general,  insanity  is  an  excuse  for  any  crime,  be- 
cause the  party  has  not  the  possession  of  his  reason,  which 


520  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

includes  responsibility.  An  exception  is,  when  the  crime  is 
committed  while  the  party  is  in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  and 
while  it  lasts ;  and  not,  as  in  this  case,  a  remote  consequence, 
superinduced  by  the  antecedent  exhaustion  of  the  party  aris- 
ing from  gross  and  habitual  drunkenness.  However  criminal, 
in  a  moral  point  of  view,  such  an  indulgence  is,  and  however 
justly  a  party  may  be  responsible  for  his  acts  arising  from  it 
to  Almighty  God,  human  tribunals  are  generally  restricted 
from  punishing  them,  since  they  are  not  the  acts  of  a  reason- 
able being.  Had  the  crime  been  committed  when  Drew  was 
in  a  fit  of  intoxication,  he  would  have  been  liable  to  be  con- 
victed of  murder.  As  he  was  not  then  intoxicated  but  merely 
insane  from  an  abstinence  from  liquor,  he  cannot  be  pro- 
nounced guilty  of  the  offence.  The  law  looks  to  the  imme- 
diate, and  not  to  the  remote  cause,  to  the  actual  state  of 
the  party,  and  not  to  the  cause  which  remotely  produced  it. 
Many  species  of  insanity  arise  remotely  from  what  In  a 
moral  point  of  view,  is  a  criminal  neglect  or  fault  of  the 
party ;  as  from  religious  melancholy,  undue  exposure,  ex- 
travagant pride,  ambition,  etc. ;  yet  such  insanity  has  always 
been  deemed  a  sufficient  excuse  for  any  crime  done  under  its 
influence."     The  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  not  guilty.^ 

§  545.  At  a  term  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  York  county, 
Me.,  April,  1836,  Theodore  Wilson  was  tried  for  the  murder 
of  his  wife  in  June,  1835,  at  Kittery.  It  appeared  in  evi- 
dence, that  for  several  years  Wilson  had  been  addicted  to 
intemperate  drinking;  that  on  the  Saturday  previous  to  the 
murder,  he  had  brought  some  rum  from  Portsmouth,  N.  H., 
and  that  on  the  next  day  he  had  drank  it  all.  It  did  not 
appear  that  he  drank  any  more  after  this,  and  circumstances 
render  it  probable  that  he  did  not.  There  was  nothing 
strange  or  unusual  in  his  conduct  till  Wednesday  morning, 
when  he  arose  early  and  went  to  the  house  of  a  neighbor  to 
get  some  barley  and  procure  a  person  to  sow  it  for  him.  He 
returned  home  about  six  o'clock,  and  then  complained  of 
being  sick.     His  wife  assisted  him  to  undress,  and  he  laid 

^  3  American  Jurist,  7-9 ;  5  Mason,  28. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  521 

down,  saying  that  he  was  dying.  In  the  mean  time  he  com- 
plained that  his  wife  would  do  nothing  for  him  ;  that  she  had 
often  set  traps  for  him,  and  once  put  fire  and  wood  into  the 
oven  to  burn  him  up.  He  ate  some  porridge  only  for  his 
breakfast,  was  constantly  talking,  and  among  other  things, 
spoke  of  his  having  been  fishing  when  he  was  four  years  old. 
While  the  family  were  at  dinner,  He  rose  from  bed  and  walked 
about  in  great  agitation,  striking  the  walls  with  his  fists,  and 
beating  in  the  door  with  the  tongs.  As  he  became  more  furi- 
ous, a  woman  who  resided  with  him. at  this  time,  left  the 
house,  he  and  his  wife  then  being  the  only  persons  in  it.  A 
short  time  after,  he  was  seen  coming  out  of  the  house  stark 
naked ;  and  in  this  condition  he  walked  rapidly  down  the 
road,  throwing  up  his  arms,  and  making  a  wild  howling  noise, 
and  finally  laid  down  by  a  fence.  It  appeared  that  after  he 
left  the  house,  his  wife  went  to  one  of  the  neighbors  to  ask 
his  aid  in  getting  her  husband  back,  and  this  person  declining 
to  interfere,  she  went  alone.  As  she  approached  him  still 
lying  by  the  fence,  she  asked  him  why  he  was  lying  there 
and  making  such  a  noise.  He  immediately  sprang  up,  put 
his  hands  upon  her  shoulders,  threw  her  down,  and  beat  out 
her  brains  with  a  stone.  He  then  left  the  body,  and  on  reach- 
ing a  house  near  by,  broke  in  the  windows  with  his  fists,  and 
also  struck  at  the  doors  and  side  of  the  house,  to  seal  it,  as 
he  said,  with  his  wife's  blood.  Here  he  proclaimed  that  he 
had  killed  his  wife,  and  meant  to  kill  two  more ;  he  was  then 
arrested.  To  those  who  watched  with  him  during  the  night, 
he  declared  he  was  not  sorry  for  what  he  had  done,  but  was 
glad  of  it,  and  intended  to  have  done  it  before.  He  con- 
•  tinned  furious,  talking  wildly  and  incoherently,  making  un- 
natural noises,  sleeping  none,  and  apparently  anxious  to  kill 
himself,  till  the  next  Saturday  morning,  when  he  became, 
and  remained,  rational.  It  further  appeared,  that  in  1830,  he 
went  on  a  fishing  voyage,  and,  that  being  deprived  of  spirits, 
he  became  deranged  after  three  days'  sailing,  and  had  to  be 
confined.  He  then  began  to  tear  his  clothes,  and  try  to  tear 
the  clothes  of  others.  He  complained  of  being  sick,  said  he 
should  die,  and  requested  the  captain  to  tell  his  sons  to  take 

44* 


522  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

care  of  their  mother.  He  was  afterwards  set  ashore,  and  did 
not  go  on  the  voyage.  His  counsel  set  up  the  plea  of 
insanity  in  his  defence ;  and  the  court,  in  charging  the  jury, 
observed  that  it  was  not  material  for  them  to  determine  what 
species  of  insanity  it  was  under  which  the  prisoner  had  been 
suffering,  if  satisfied  with  the  fact  of  its  existence.  He  was 
acquitted.^ 

§  546.  John  Birdsell  was  tried,  in  1829,  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Ohio,  on  an  indictment  for  the  murder  of  his  wife, 
on  Thursday,  5th  of  March,  1829.  It  appeared  in  evidence, 
that  for  several  years  the  prisoner  had  indulged  in  fits  of  in- 
toxication, which,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  time,  had  been 
followed  by  delirium  tremens,  which  generally  lasted  for 
several  days,  and  went  off"  spontaneously.  In  these  parox- 
ysms he  had  the  physical  and  moral  symptoms  that  usually 
characterize  the  disease.  Among  many  hallucinations  under 
which  he  labored,  the  prevailing  one  was,  that  his  wife  was 
in  combination  with  three  of  his  neighbors,  one  of  whom 
was  his  son  by  a  former  wife,  and  that  they  had  conspired 
to  take  his  life.  He  imagined  that  his  wife  had  a  criminal 
intimacy  with  these  persons,  and  even  threatened  to  kill  her 
if  she  did  not  desist.  On  the  Sunday  before  the  murder,  he 
drank  freely,  and  was  intoxicated ;  in  which  condition  he 
was  quiet,  dull,  and  disposed  'to  lie  in  bed.  Monday, 
Tuesday,  and  Wednesday,  ^5resented  nothing  especial.  On 
Wednesday  evening  he  complained  to  a  neighbor  of  feeling 
unwell,  and  asked  his  son's  assistance  in  the  performance  of 
some  necessary  manual  labor  for  his  family.  He  seemed  to 
the  witness  to  be  rational.  During  the  night  he  slept  none, 
and  complained  of  cramp  in  the  stomach.  The  next  morn- 
ing his  family  thought  him  crazy,  but  were  not  alarmed,  as 
they  were  accustomed  to  such  attacks.  In  the  course  of  the 
day  he  took  an  axe,  and  walked  rapidly  to  the  house  of  a 
neighbor  whom  he  desired  to  go  home  with  him,  saying 
that  they  wanted  to  kill  him  ;  and  about  the  same  time  he 

^  For  the  facts  in  this  case,  the  author  acknowledges  his  obligations  to 
Nathan  Dane  Appleton,  Esq.,  one  of  the  defendant's  counsel. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES    OF   DRUNKENNESS.  523 

told  another  of  the  supposed  conspirators  that  he  overheard 
his  wife  and  him,  that  morning,  whispering  about  taking  his 
[the  witness's]  life.  He  spent  the  day  at  home  in  the  midst 
of  his  family,  apparently  in  agitation  and  terror;  but  said  he 
would  not  hurt  any  one,  and  did  not  wish  to  be  hurt.  He 
also  placed  an  axe  with  a  scythe  under  the  bed,  where  the 
former  was  often  kept.  He  manifested  jealousy  of  his  wife, 
and  told  her  to  act  better,  for  she  had  already  caused  the 
death  of  thirty  thousand  men.  He  fancied  that  the  persons 
of  whom  he  was  jealous  were  in  the  loft  manufacturing  ropes 
.to  hang  him,  and  going  up,  returned,  saying  that  he  had  cut 
the  ropes  in  pieces,  and  brought  down  the  fragments  in  his 
hands,  though  he  had  nothing  in  them.  In  the  course  of  the 
afternoon  he  fastened  both  the  doors  of  his  house.  At  the 
usual  time  the  wife  went  out  to  milk,  and  he  barred  the  door 
after  her.  On  her  return,  he  fastened  it  again.  She  was 
seated  near  the  fire,  and  he  was  walking  the  room.  At  length 
he  took  the  axe  from  under  the  bed,  and  gave  the  fatal  blow, 
following  it  up  with  two  others  on  the  face.  His  eldest 
daughter  caught  the  axe,  which'  he  yielded  up;  and  then  he 
seized  the  scythe,  with  which  he  attempted  to  strike  her. 
She  defended  herself  with  a  chair,  till,  the  smaller  children 
having  opened  the  door,  she  escaped.  He  took  the  youngest 
child  in  his  arms,  and  sat  down  by  the  window.  The  child 
exclaimed,  "  Mamma  bleeds ! "  which  he  said  made  him 
feel  badly.  When  his  neighbors  arrived,  immediately  after- 
wards, he  gave  himself  up,  acknowledged  what  he  had  done, 
said  he  knew  he  should  be  hanged  for  it,  but  that  he  ought 
to  have  done  it  nine  months  sooner ;  that  if  he  had  to  do  it 
again,  he  would  strike  two  blows  where  he  only  struck  one. 
It  was  testified,  that  he  talked  so  rationally,  that  many  of  the 
witnesses  could  not  believe  him  deranged ;  that  he  evinced 
no  dread  of  punishment  for  his  crime,  but  was  still  in  great 
apprehension  from  the  persons  who,  as  he  believed,  had 
intended  to  kill  him ;  and  that  he  was  glad  he  had  defeated 
their  calculations.  On  his  way  to  jail  he  talked  rationally 
and  composedly  about  his  affairs  and  various  other  subjects ; 
but  frequently  asked  the  guard  if  they  did  not  hear  sweet 


524  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

sounds  of  different  kinds;  and,  on  being  answered  in  the 
negative,  insisted  he  could  not  be  mistaken.  After  his  com- 
mittal he  became  rational,  and  expressed  his  regret  at  what 
he  had  done. 

§  547.  The  point  submitted  to  the  jury  for  their  deter- 
mination was,  whether  the  prisoner  was  capable  of  discrimi- 
nating between  right  and  wrong.  They  concluded  that  he 
was,  and  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty.  In  consequence  of  a 
petition  from  a  number  of  persons  who  had  no  doubts  of 
Birdsell's  insanity,  the  punishment  was  commuted  by  the 
governor  to  that  of  imprisonment.  Previous  to  the  com- 
mutation, he  again  became  insane,  and  continued  so  per- 
manently.^ 

§  548.  The  essential  features  of  the  above  cases  being 
alike  in  every  thing  relative  to  their  pathological  nature,  we 
are  left,  without  any  satisfactory  reason  to  account  for  the 
issue  of  the  last.  It  is  probable  that  the  court  adhered  to 
the  antiquated  maxims  of  the  common  law  on  the  subject  of 
insanity,  and  that  the  jury  was  governed  by  the  opinions  of 
the  court,  or  relied,  with  that  confidence  which  ignorance 
usually  inspires,  on  their  own  crude  and  erroneous  notions. 
The  verdict  of  the  jury  in  Birdsell's  case  furnishes  another 
instance  of  the  deplorable  consequences  of  obliging  a  body 
of  men,  the  most  of  whom  are  utterly  unacquainted  with  the 
phenomena  of  insanity,  to  decide  the  question  of  its  exist- 
ence in  a  given  example,  and  with  it  the  fate  of  an  unfor- 
tunate fellow  being,  for  weal  or  woe,  here  and  hereafter. 
They  concluded  that  the  accused  was  capable  of  dislinguish- 
ing  right  from  wrongs  probably  because  others  who  knew  as 
little  of  insanity  as  themselves  testified,  that  immediately 
after  committing  the  murder,  "he  talked  so  rationally  that 
they  could  not  believe  him  deranged ; "  and  on  such  a  con- 
clusion they  founded  their  fatal,  verdict.     Of  course,  it  would 


*  This  case  "was  reported,  and  the  medico-legal  questions  growing  out  of  it 
discussed  at  considerable  length  by  Dr.  Drake,  in  the  Western  Journal  of  the 
IMedical  and  Physical  Sciences,  vol.  iii. ;  extracts  from  his  papers  may  be 
found  iu  the  American  Jurist,  iii.  10-16. 


LEGAL  CONSEQUENCES   OP  DRUNKENNESS.  525 

have  been  too  violent  a  contradiction  in  terms,  to  have 
denied  the  existence  of  any  insanity  at  all  in  a  disease  whose 
very  name  is  delirium ;  but  it  appeared  that  the  prisoner  was 
not  altogether  bereft  of  his  senses,  not  quite  reduced  to  the 
condition  of  a  brute  or  an  idiot.  Now,  without  resting  upon 
the  general  fact  that  the  mind  is  always  and  unequivocally 
deranged  in  delirium  tremens,  there  is  proof  enough  that 
various  hallucinations  took  possession  of  Birdsell's  mind, 
and  prompted  him  to  the  bloody  deed  for  which  he  was  con- 
demned ;  that  he  was  under  the  influence  of  manifest,  un- 
equivocal, strong,  delusion,  that  test  of  insanity  which,  when 
present,  never  deceives.  If  any  one,  on  being  made  ac- 
quainted with  the  particulars  of  Birdsell's  case,  can  pronounce 
it  to  be  not  insanity,  he  must  have  derived  his  notions  of  this 
disease  from  some  other  source  than  the  wards  of  the  hospital 
and  asylum. 

§  549.  In  the  first  two  cases,  the  directions  of  the  court  to 
the  jury  were,  substantially,  that  if  they  were  satisfied  the 
accused  was  insane  when  he  committed  the  criminal  act, 
they  were  not  to  go  back  and  inquire  into  the  cause  of  the 
insanity  ;  but,  on  this  fact  being  established  in  their  minds, 
the  prisoner  was  entitled  to  an  acquittal.  In  the  first  case, 
the  court  examined  the  question  whether  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  insanity  are  affected  by  the  character  of  the  cause 
which  produces  it ;  and  so  clear  and  satisfactory  is  its  opin- 
ion, that  any  thing  further  on  this  point  is  rendered  unneces- 
sary here.  But  we  are  not  so  well  satisfied  with  its  distinc- 
tion between  the  insanity  which  is  the  remote,  and  that 
which  is  the  immediate  effect  of  drunkenness.  Where  the 
moral  guilt  is  so  nearly  alike,  as  it  certainly  is  in  the  two 
cases,  we  are  unable  to  perceive  the  justice  of  making  such 
a  fearful  difference  in  regard  to  their  legal  consequences. 
The  distinction  is  not  only  unjust,  but  we  apprehend  that 
there  would  often  be  no  little  difficulty  in  applying  it  to 
practice.  It  would  not  be  very  easy  to  determine  the  precise 
period  when. the  drunken  fit  is  over,  —  when  the  individual 
ceases  to  be  under  the  influence  of  the  intoxicating  liquor. 
A  case  is  related  by  Hitzig  in  which  this  difficulty  would 


526  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

have  been  experienced,  if  the  legal  consequences  of  the  act 
in  question  had  not  been  determined  by  very  different  princi- 
ples. A  carpenter  in  Pregelswalde,  named  Thiel,  had  con- 
tracted such  a  propensity  for  drink,  that  he  finally  became  a 
dipsomaniac.  During  the  fits  he  would  continue  drunk  from 
eight  to  fifteen  days  together,  taking  no  food  in  the  mean 
time,  and  on  two  occasions,  he  continued  for  three  weeks  in 
a  complete  state  of  drunken  stupor.  While  the  fit  was  on 
him,  he  was  quiet,  taciturn,  and  peaceable,  and  during  the 
last  three  or  four  days,  extremely  stupid.  The  fit  that  occa- 
sioned the  criminal  act  with  which  he  was  charged,  began 
on  the  27th  of  May,  1824,  and  continued  till  the  2d  of  June, 
on  which  day  he  drank  less,  and  on  the  following  day  (3d  of 
June),  he  drank  only  one  glass  of  beer,  and  one  of  brandy. 
At  noon-time  he  assisted  his  wife  in  sawing  wood,  though 
she  had  to  tell  him  just  what  he  was  to  do.  In  the  evening 
he  slept  a  few  hours,  awoke,  walked  about,  and  finally  went 
to  bed  with  his  wife.  The  latter,  on  getting  out  of  the  bed 
for  the  purpose  of  going  to  the  window,  to  watch  some  cloth 
that  was  bleaching,  awoke  him  again.  Soon  after,  he  ex- 
perienced a  strong  sense  of  anxiety,  and  felt  a  trembling  over 
his  whole  body,  and  he  imagined  that  he  heard  an  inward 
voice  commanding  him  to  kill  his  youngest  child,  a  boy  of 
five  years  old,  who  with  two  other  children,  were  sleeping  in 
the  same  room.  After  a  while  the  command  was  repeated 
so  peremptorily  that  he  could  no  longer  resist,  and  he  accord- 
ingly murdered  his  favorite  child.  Whether  at  this  moment 
he  was  under  the  direct  influence  of  the  liquor  he  had  drank 
on  the  3d,  is  a  question  to  which  it  would  be  impossible  to 
give  a  satisfactory  answer.  In  the  present  case  it  was  not 
required,  for  drunkenness  being  regarded  by  the  German  law, 
as  an  extenuating  circumstance,  he  was  condemned  to  one 
year's  imprisonment,  and  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  prosecu- 
tion.^ 

§  550.    In  Birdsell's  case  there  was  presented  a  new  feat- 
ure of  no  little  interest  to  the  medico-legal  student,  which. 


^  Henke's  Annalen,  viii.  186. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  527 

though  it  was  suffered  to  have  no  influence  on  the  verdict, 
might,  if  the  court  had  chosen  to  urge  its  opinion  respecting 
it  upon  the  jury,  have  prevented  an  acquittal,  even  if  they 
had  satisfied  themselves  beyond  a  doubt  that  the  party  was 
incapable  of  distinguishing  right  from  wrong.  In  replying 
to  the  arguments  of  counsel  for  a  new  trial,  the  court  ob- 
served in  the  course  of  its  remarks,  "  that  they  were  not 
called  upon  to  give  an  opinion  whether  Mania  a  pohi  would, 
under  any  circumstances,  be  an  excuse  for  the  commission 
of  a  crime ;  but  they  felt  no  unwillingness  to  express  their 
opinion,  that  if  the  insanity  were  the  offspring  of  intemper- 
ance, and  the  prisoner  kneiv  that  intoxication  would  produce 
it,  he  could  not  plead  it  as  an  apology."  Birdsell,  it  has 
been  seen,  had  experienced  several  fits  of  delirium  tremens 
following  his  drunken  debauches,  previous  to  that  in  which 
he  destroyed  his  wife,  and  consequently  kneiu  that  intoxica- 
tion would  be  like!//  to  produce  insanity.  How  far  this  fact 
changes  the  attitude  of  the  case,  is  a  point  which  deserves 
a  careful  examination,  before  being  allowed  to  have  a  bear- 
ing on  judicial  decisions.  If  the  party  had  known  that,  in 
his  previous  attacks  of  delirium  tremens,  he  had  attempted 
the  life  of  his  wife,  then  indeed  this  opinion  would  not  have 
been  without  some  foundation ;  for  in  that  case,  perhaps,  he 
might  have  been  justly  held  responsible  for  whatever  crim- 
inal acts  he  committed  while  in  a  state  of  insanity,  just  so 
far  as  he  was  responsible  for  the  intoxication  that  produced 
it.  All  that  Birdsell  kneiv  on  this  subject,  however,  was, 
that  indulgence  in  drinking  having  frequently  occasioned 
delirium  tremens,  would  be  liable  to  produce  a  renewal  of 
its  attacks.  As  to  what  acts  he  might  commit  while  under 
their  influence,  he  knew  absolutely  nothing.  It  is  not  very 
clear  how  delirium  tremens  can  have  a  different  effect  on 
legal  responsibility,  from  that  which  would  follow  any  other 
form  of  mental  derangement  resulting  from  habits  of  intem- 
perance. If  Birdsell's  habits  had  led  to  attacks  of  common 
mania  instead  of  delirium  tremens,  his  guilt,  in  a  moral 
point  of  view,  would  certainly  have  been  no  less ;  nor,  on 
the  hypothesis  of  the  court  that  insanity  is  no  apology  for 


528  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

crime,  if  the  party  knew  that  intoxication  would  produce  it, 
would  his  legal  responsibility  have  been  diminished.  It  does 
not  appear,  however,  that  in  ordinary  cases  where  insanity  is 
pleaded  in  excuse  for  crime,  the  question  is  ever  raised 
whether  the  insanity  be  a  consequence  of  intemperate  drink- 
ing ;  and,  in  the  event  of  its  being  so,  whether  the  party  kneio 
that  such  a  result  might  be  expected.  It  is  not  easy  to  resist 
the  impression,  that  the  opinion  of  the  court  against  the  ex- 
culpatory effects  of  Birdsell's  insanity  was  determined,  in 
some  measure,  by  the  reprehensible  character  of  its  cause. 
If  his  insanity  had  been  produced  by  mingling  in  scenes  of 
religious  excitement,  by  indulging  in  schemes  of  commercial 
Bpeculation,  or  a  more  criminal  species  of  gambling,  would 
the  court  have  said  it  afforded  no  apology  for  crime,  because 
he  had  suffered  previous  attacks  in  consequence  of  exposure 
to  the  action  of  these  same  causes  ?  Probably  not ;  and  yet 
if  guilt  is  made  to  consist  in  disregarding  the  lessons  of 
experience  relative  to  the  manner  in  which  the  insanity  is 
produced,  then  the  nature  of  its  exciting  causes  is  clearly  an 
immaterial  circumstance.  In  short,  the  opinion  of  the  court 
of  Ohio  conflicts  with  the  principles  laid  down  by  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Story  (§  544)  ;  and  if  the  latter  be  admitted,  as  they 
must  be  undoubtedly,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  causes  of 
insanity,  the  former  is  untenable  for  a  moment,  and  therefore 
it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  pursue  this  train  of  reflections  any 
further. 

§  551.  The  decision  of  Mr.  Justice  Story  in  Drew's  case, 
as  above  related,  has  unquestionably  settled  the  law  on  this 
point,  in  this  country.  In  England  the  cases  have  been  too 
few,  perhaps,  to  render  it  quite  certain,  that  such  also  is  the 
law  there.  Two  cases  ^  are  cited  by  Taylor,^  in  which  the 
plea  of  delirium  tremens  was  admitted  as  a  sufficient  excuse 
for  crime,  and  they  seem  to  be  the  only  ones  reported. 

§  552.    Few  diseases   are   better    marked    than    delirium 

*  Reg.  V.  Simpson,  Appleby,  Sum.  Ass.  1845  ;  and  Reg.  v.  Watson,  York 
Winter  Ass.  1845. 

*  Med.  Jurisprudence,  656. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  529 

tremens,  yet  occasionally  it  is  not  easy  to  distinguish  it  from 
other  forms  of  mental  disturbance  directly  or  indirectly  pro- 
duced by  drinking.  The  importance  of  making  this  distinc- 
tion correctly,  was  recently  illustrated  in  the  trial  of  James 
McGlue,  for  the  murder  of  Charles  A.  Johnson,  in  the  United 
States  Circuit  Court  held  at  Boston,  October  30,  1851.  It 
appeared  in  evidence  that  on  Thursday,  the  15th  of  May, 
1851,  the  bark  Lewis  came  to  anchor  off  the  coast  of 
Zanzibar,  about  5  o'clock,  p.m. ;  and  that  immediately  after, 
McGlue,  who  was  second  mate  of  the  vessel,  without  any 
provocation  or  exchange  of  words,  rushed  upon  Johnson,  who 
was  chief  mate,  and  killed  him  with  the  sheath-knife  which 
sailors  usually  carry  at  their  side.  After  being  secured,  he 
was  very  restless,  rolled  about  the  deck,  laughed,  talked 
wildly  and  incoherently,  cursed  and  swore,  until  daylight  the 
next  morning,  when  he  came  to  himself,  and  was  greatly  sur- 
prised and  shocked  on  learning  what  he  had  done.  It  was 
obvious  enough  that  McGlue,  when  he  committed  the  act, 
was  laboring  under  some  kind  of  mental  disturbance  result- 
ing more  or  less  directly  from  intemperate  habits.  It  was  all- 
important  for  the  prisoner's  counsel  to  show  that  this  was 
delirium  tremens,  but  the  evidence  was  not  so  satisfactory  as 
it  might  have  been.  It  was  proved  that  on  the  Sunday 
previous  to  the  murder,  McGlue  drank  to  excess,  but  it  was 
not  quite  clear  that  he  had  not  drank  more  or  less,  up  to  the 
very  day  of  the  murder.  Between  Sunday  and  Thursday,  he 
was  described  as  looking  pale  and  stupid,  and  by  one  wit- 
ness, as  having  trembled,  but  he  performed  his  duty  without 
interruption.  On  Thursday  afternoon  he  talked  in  a  wild 
and  rambling  manner.  About  half  an  hour  before  the  fatal 
act,  he  asked  some  of  the  crew  if  they  wanted  to  make 
money,  and  to  their  inquiry  how  it  was  to  be  done,  he  replied, 
"  keep  a  hard  cheek  on  from  this  hour."  Immediately  after 
the  act,  he  said,  he  was  captain  of  the  ship,  and  told  the  men 
to  arm  themselves  with  clubs,  handspikes,  etc.  He  told  the 
captain  to  give  up  the  command,  unless  he  wished  to  be 
killed  too.  It  was  dearly  established  that  he  did  not  sleep 
for  a  moment,  until  after  he  came  to  his  senses.     It  also  ap- 

45 


530  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

peared  that  McGlue  did  occasionally  drink  hard,  when  he 
seemed  to  the  witness  to  be  "  crazy,"  and  "  hallooing  like  a 
madman."  Several  medical  gentlemen  gave  their  opinions, 
as  experts,  all  of  whom  had  enjoyed  extraordinary  opportuni- 
ties for  witnessing  delirium  tremens.  While  some  were 
satisfied  that  McGlue  was  suffering  an  attack  of  that  disease, 
and  some  were  equally  satisfied  that  he  was  not,  all  were 
agreed  in  stating  it  as  one  of  the  results  of  their  experience, 
that  they  had  never  met  with  an  instance  of  recovery  from 
delirium  tremens,  prior  to  the  occurrence  of  sleep.  The  jury 
acquitted  the  prisoner,  and  their  verdict  could  not  well  have 
been  otherwise.  It  was  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
that  McGlue  was  unconscious  of  what  he  was  doing  when 
he  committed  the  homicide,  or,  in  more  general  phrase,  was 
insane.  The  government  did  not  prove  —  as  they  were 
bound  to,  in  order  to  convict  the  prisoner — that  this  in- 
sanity was  the  direct  and  immediate  effect  of  drunkenness, 
and  therefore  the  prisoner's  plea  of  insanity  was  not  vitiated, 
though  his  counsel  failed  to  show  beyond  dispute,  that  his 
insanity  was  that  particular,  indirect  effect  of  drunkenness, 
called  delirium  tremens. 

§  553.  Not  unlike  this  was  the  case  of  Murray,  tried  in 
Scotland,  1858,  for  murder,  and  defended  on  the  ground  of 
insanity,  which  disease,  it  was  admitted,  was  the  result,  more 
or  less  directly,  of  drinking.  He  was  addicted  occasionally 
to  excessive  drinking,  but  it  did  not  appear  in  evidence  that 
he  drank  on  the  day  of  the  homicide.  He  stayed  at  home 
that  day,  appearing  strangely,  and  imagining  that  people 
were  making  a  great  noise  in  the  house,  and  were  after  him 
to  carry  him  off.  He  had  some  delusions  also  about  the  devil. 
In  the  night  he  killed  his  mother  without  the  slightest  provo- 
cation. The  next  day  he  was  calmer,  and  in  the  course  of  a 
day  or  two  more,  he  had  regained  his  usual  condition,  though 
it  does  not  appear  that  he  slept  before  this  improvement  took 
place.  One  medical  witness  regarded  the  case  as  one  of 
delirium  tremens,  but  Dr.  Christison,  the  eminent  toxicologist, 
and  Dr.  Skae,  physician  of  the  Edinburgh  Lunatic  Asylum, 
considered  it  one  of  temporary  mental  disturbance  —  a  kind 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF  DRUNKENNESS.  531 

of  transitory  mania  —  produced  by  previous  intemperance. 
The  last-named  gentlemen  were,  undoubtedly  right.  Mur- 
ray's case  wanted  two  essential  elements  of  delirium  tremens 
—  sleep  before  recovery,  and  several  days'  duration  of  the 
stage  of  suspicion  and  delusion.^ 

§  554.  The  following  is  another  of  these  embarrassing 
cases.  I.  S.,  a  man  of  intemperate  habits,  after  some  adverse 
domestic  incidents,  began  to  be  excited  and  restless,  travelling 
about  the  neighborhood  without  any  end  or  object.  At  the 
end  of  a  week,  he  became  suspicious  of  others,  imagined  peo- 
ple were  after  him,  and  armed  himself  with  pistols.  In  a 
letter  to  his  father  about  this  time,  he  said,  "  I  have  been 
troubled,  the  last  week  or  two,  with  several  attacks  on  person 
and  house.  I  have  killed  seven  persons,  in  self-defence,  three 
this  morning,  but  have  lost  my  last  pistol  and  gun,  and  had, 
last  night,  to  guard  my  house  against  about  twenty.  I  am 
now  going  to  P.  to  purchase  gun,  pistol  and  knife.     I  draw 

an  order  on  you  for  $ ,  my  next  monthly  allowance."     In 

the  course  of  two  or  three  days,  his  family,  apprehensive  for 
their  own  safety,  sent  him  to  me.  Daring  all  this  time  he 
had  drank  more  or  less  every  day,  and  for  the  last  two  or 
three,  slept  none.  At  first  sight,  he  presented  that  anxious, 
troubled  expression,  that  hurried  manner,  cold  sweat,  and  in- 
tolerable apprehension  of  sheriffs  and  foes,  so  characteristic  of 
delirium  tremens.  During  the  day  he  was  very  agitated,  walk- 
ing back  and  forth,  imagining  he  heard  people  in  the  neighbor- 
ing rooms  plotting  against  him,  and  vociferating  at  the  top  of 
his  voice.  Once,  while  out  of  sight  for  a  moment,  he  tried  to 
strangle  himself.  Towards  evening  he  became  calmer,  went 
to  bed  quietly,  and  slept  the  greater  part  of  the  night.  In  the 
morning,  his  mind,  to  all  appearance,  was  completely  re- 
stored, and  so  continued  without  any  relapse.  Much  as  this 
case  looked  like  delirium  tremens,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether 
it  actually  was  that  disease.  Delirium  tremens  seldom,  if 
ever,  passes  off  with  one  long,  continued  sleep.  Such  a  sleep 
occurs  in  the  course  of  the  disease,  but  it  is  generally,  per- 

^  Edinburgh  Medical  and  Surgical  Journal,  Jan.  1859. 


532  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCB   OF  INSANITY. 

haps  invariably,  preceded  by  several  short  naps.  In  delirium 
tremens  the  patient  ceases  to  drink  for  a  period  ranging  from 
one  to  three  days,  before  the  attack  begins.  Here,  he  con- 
tinned  to  drink  even  after  the  mental  disturbance  appeared. 
In  this  case,  too,  the  patient  manifested  some  mental  disorder 
for  a  week  or  more  prior  to  the  appearance  of  any  character- 
istic symptom  of  delirium  tremens.  Neither  can  this  case  be 
regarded  as  one  of  intoxication  simply,  for  many  of  its  feat- 
ures conflict  with  this  supposition.  Never,  under  the  imme- 
diate effects  of  drink  only,  does  a  person  exhibit  that  kind  of 
terror  and  apprehension  which  this  man  did,  though  it  is  char- 
acteristic of  delirium  tremens  ;  or  go  without  sleep  so  long  as 
he  did.  We  are  forced  to  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  ordi- 
nary effects  of  intoxication  were  mingled  with  those  of  proper 
insanity.  Had  he  committed  homicide,  he  would  scarcely 
have  escaped  conviction,  in  face  of  the  evidence  that  he  con- 
tinued to  drink  up  to  the  moment  of  the  fatal  act.  Had  the 
jury  acquitted  him,  however,  in  the  belief  that  the  homicidal 
act  was  as  much  the  result  of  insanity  as  of  intoxication,  if 
not  more,  the  case  would  long  be  quoted  as  a  signal  illus- 
tration of  the  criminal  leniency  of  juries,  whenever  insanity  is 
urged  in  defence  of  crime. 

§  555.  Criminal  acts  are  sometimes  committed  by  drunken 
people,  in  consequence  of  the  illusions  by  which  their  minds 
are  frequently  possessed.  Although  the  ordinary  legal  con- 
sequences of  such  acts  would  not  be  regarded  by  the  English 
law  as  being  modified  at  all  in  consequence  of  the  mental 
illusion  under  which  it  is  committed,  yet  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  person  is  actuated  by  no  criminal  intention,  nor  any 
other  improper  motive.  Such  acts  have  been  viewed  in 
France,  Germany,  and  in  one  instance,  at  least,  extraordinary 
as  it  may  seem,  even  in  England,  with  more  indulgence  than 
those  which  arise  from  the  excited  passions  and  quarrels  pro- 
duced by  drunkenness.  On  the  Norfolk  Circuit,  10th  of 
March,  1840,  a  man  was  tried  for  killing  his  friend,  both  being 
intoxicated,  "under  the  illusion  that  he  was  some  other 
person  who  had  come  to  attack  him.  The  judge  made  the 
prisoner's  guilt  to  rest  upon  the  fact,  whether,  had  he  been 


LEGAL   COK-SEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  533 

sober,  he  would  have  perpetrated  the  act  under  a  similar 
illusion.  As  he  had  voluntarily  brought  himself  into  a  state 
of  intoxication,  that  was  no  justification.  He  was  found 
guilty  of  manslaughter,  and  sentenced  to  two  months'  im- 
prisonment." ^ 

§  556.  After  the  thirty  years'  war  in  Germany,  it  was  a 
popular  superstition,  on  the  banks  of  the  Elbe,  that  the  spirits 
of  Swedish  cavaliers  were  sometimes  seen  at  midnight 
mounted  on  horses  and  dressed  in  a  blue  uniform  faced  with 
red.  Two  peasants  who  had  always  been  intimate  friends, 
were  on  their  return  in  the  evening  from  their  labors  in  the 
fields,  when  they  stopped  to  rest  their  limbs  under  a  tree,  and 
there  they  drank  from  a  bottle  of  brandy  they  happened  to 
have,  until  they  became  quite  drunk.  In  this  condition  they 
talked  about  the  Swedish  cavaliers,  till  their  imaginations, 
heated  by  the  drink,  made  them  believe  that  they  were  sur- 
rounded by  the  spirits,  and  that  they  could  only  escape  by 
fighting  them.  Each  had  a  staff,  and  they  proceeded  to  be- 
labor each  other,  believing  they  were  contending  with  the 
cavaliers,  till  one  was  finally  killed.  The  victor  went  home 
and  proclaimed  his  triumph  over  the  devils  that  tried  to  carry 
him  off.     He  was  condemned  to  ten  years'  imprisonment.^ 

§  557.  On  the  17th  of  December,  1838,  two  young  French 
peasants  in  the  commune  of  the  Prairie  of  Sept  Vents, 
started  to  walk  home  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,  after 
having  drank  excessively.  According  to  the  account  of  the 
survivor,  they  were  conversing  about  witches,  on  their  way 
home,  when  they  arrived  at  a  little  bridge  which  it  was 
rather  difficult  and  dangerous  to  pass.  The  survivor  offered 
to  carry  over  the  deceased  on  his  shoulders,  but  the  latter 
refused,  and  passed  over  first  on  his  hands  and  knees.  The 
former  did  not  know  how  he  got  over ;  he  only  remembered 
that  when  he  reached  the  other  side,  he  could  not  find  his 
companion,  but  that  in  groping  about,  he  stumbled  against 
something  white  with  long  hair  on  its  legs.     He  called  out 

^  Eeg.  V.  Patterson,  British  and  Foreign  Medical  Keview,  x.  172. 
^  Marc,  De  la  Folic,  etc.  ii.  635. 
45* 


534  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

and  summoned  the  strange  thing  to  get  up  and  speak,  but 
receiving  no  answer,  and  getting  more  and  more  frightened, 
he  took  out  his  knife  and  stabbed  it  repeatedly.  Losing  the 
knife,  he  broke  the  branch  of  a  tree,  and  attacked  the  object 
of  his  fears  with  renewed  fury,  trying,  at  last,  to  break  one 
of  its  legs,  that  he  might  be  sure  of  finding  it  next  morning. 
Being  cold  and  tired,  however,  he  concluded  to  go  home,  and 
the  body  of  his  companion  was  found  next  day,  near  the 
bridge,  horribly  mutilated.  The  prisoner  was  condemned  to 
hard  labor  for  life,  and  to  exposition.^ 

§  558.  In  the  first  of  the  above  cases,  the  verdict  of  the 
jury,  it  will  be  observed,  is  directly  at  variance  with  the 
principle  laid  down  by  the  court,  as,  indeed,  it  is  with  the 
whole  doctrine  of  the  English  criminal  law  in  regard  to  this 
subject.  When  a  man  voluntarily  deprives  himself  of  the 
perfect  use  of  his  reason,  and  in  this  condition  commits  a 
criminal  act,  it  is  immaterial,  so  far  as  his  moral  guilt  is  con- 
cerned, whether  the  act  be  prompted  by  passion,  frenzy,  or 
hallucination.  The  verdict  is  a  memorable  one,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  the  first  within  our  knowledge,  in  which  an  English 
jury  has  made  any  distinction  between  a  homicide  commit- 
ted in  a  state  of  drunkenness  though  without  any  criminal 
intention,  and  one  deliberately  planned  and  deliberately  exe- 
cuted, in  the  full  possession  of  the  reasoning  powers. 

§  559.  Criminal  cases  are  not  very  unfrequent  in  which 
intemperance  and  insanity  are  so  mingled  together,  that  it  is 
impossible  to  unravel  their  relations  to  each  other,  and  ascer- 
tain their  respective  shares  of  influence  in  producing  the 
criminal  act.  The  following  will  serve  as  an  illustration  of 
this  class  of  cases. 

§  560.  David  Abbot  was  tried  by  the  Superior  Court  of 
Connecticut,  for  the  murder  of  his  wife  in  July,  1841.  The 
facts,  as  they  appeared  from  the  testimony,  were  substan- 
tially as  follows.  The  prisoner  belonged  to  a  respectable 
family,  possessed  some  property,  and  had  twelve  children  by 
his  wife.     For  several  years  prior  to  the  event,  he  had  been 

1  Idem,  ii.  639. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  5o5 

very  intemperate,  but  not  to  such  a  degree  as  to  prevent  his 
walking  about  and  conversing  as  at  other  times.  Habitually 
harsh  and  cruel  to  his  wife,  he  became  still  more  so  when 
under  the  immediate  influence  of  liquor.  He  became  jeal- 
ous of  her,  and  believed  that  she  had  frequent  criminal  inter- 
course with  two  of  their  neighbors.  But  it  was  admitted  by 
all  parties  that  the  conduct  of  these  persons  and  of  his  wife 
was  perfectly  unexceptionable,  so  far  as  this  subject  was 
concerned.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  day  when  the  murder 
was  committed,  he  was  observed  to  drink  rum  and  cider 
several  times.  After  he  and  his  wife  had  gone  to  bed,  they 
were  heard  talking  together,  and  at  eleven  o'clock  he  called 
up  one  of  his  daughters,  and  directed  her  to  summon  the 
neighbors,  "  as  they  were  all  dead,  or  would  be  soon."  The 
wife  was  found  dead,  apparently  choked  to  death,  and  he 
lying  on  the  floor  with  his  throat  cut  in  several  places,  but 
not  fatally.  When  asked  what  he  had  been  doing,  he  re- 
plied, "  that  the  devil  had  been  there,  that  he  had  had  a  clinch 
with  him,  and  that  the  devil  had  been  trying  to  kill  them 
both,  and  had  cut  his  throat."  Subsequently,  however, 
when  he  became  more  composed,  he  stated  that  after  they 
went  to  bed,  an  altercation  ensued ;  that  he  became  pro- 
voked, and  seized  her  by  the  throat,  holding  her  five  or 
six  minutes,  when  he  found  she  was  dead.  He  then  at- 
tempted to  cut  his  own  throat  with  a  razor,  but  having  lost 
the  razor,  and  bled  a  while,  he  changed  his  mind,  and  called 
up  his  daughter.  It  also  appeared  in  evidence  that  his  father, 
two  brothers,  and  sister  had  been  insane ;  that  the  prisoner 
himself,  when  about  eighteen  years  old,  was  delirious  for 
several  weeks  immediately  after  attending  a  camp-meeting; 
and  that  about  seven  years  before  the  death  of  his  wife,  he 
went  to  one  of  his  neighbors,  with  both  hands  on  the  top  of 
his  head,  saying  that  he  had  lost  the  top  of  his  head  and 
must  go  home  and  get  his  wife  to  put  it  on  again.  The 
court,  in  laying  down  the  law,  relative  to  the  legal  conse- 
quences of  intemperance,  adopted  the  principles  of  Mr. 
Justice  Story  in  the  case  of  Dr^,  and  the  jury  was  also  told, 
that  if  they  found  the  prisoner  insane,  but  not  to  such  a  de- 


536  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

gree  as  to  render  him  wholly  irresponsible  for  his  acts,  they 
had  a  right  to  take  such  partial  insanity  into  consideration  in 
connection  with  the  provocation,  in  determining  upon  its 
sufficiency.  If  they  found  that  the  provocation,  in  that  case, 
operating  upon  a  mind  partially  insane,  was  equal  in  its  effect 
to  a  provocation  which  would  reduce  a  homicide,  committed 
by  a  man  of  perfectly  sound  mind,  from  murder  to  man- 
slaughter, they  would  have  a  right  to  find  the  prisoner  guilty 
of  manslaughter  only.  The  prisoner  was  found  guilty  of 
murder.^ 

§  561.  In  the  present  state  of  public  opinion,  it  would  be 
difficult,  perhaps,  to  convince  a  jury  that  the  wretched  victims 
of  periodical  drunkenness,  or  of  that  other  form  of  the  dis- 
order which  we  have  illustrated  (§  524)  ought  not  to  be  held 
responsible  for  their  criminal  acts.  It  would  be  objected, 
probably,  that  these  conditions  are  the  result  of  habitual 
indulgence,  and  that  at  the  utmost,  the  only  difference  be- 
tween these  and  other  drunkards  is,  that  they  are  impelled  to 
the  gratification  of  their  insatiable  cravings  by  different 
degrees  of  violence,  —  a  circumstance  which  it  would  be 
mischievous  to  recognize  in  estimating  the  degree  of  criminal 
responsibility.  The  truth  would  be  overlooked  or  disputed, 
that  this  irresistible  propensity  to  excessive  drinking  is  mani- 
fested as  often,  if  not  oftener,  in  temperate  men,  as  in  habit- 
ual drunkards;  and  that  it  is  either  a  symptom  of  the  first 
stage  of  madness,  or  of  a  temporary  impairment  of  the  mind 
produced  by  some  disturbance  of  the  cerebral  circulation. 
The  drunkenness  being  thus  an  accidental,  involuntary  con- 
sequence of  a  maniacal  state  of  the  mind,  it  cannot  impart 
the  character  of  criminality  to  any  action  to  which  it  may 
give  rise.  If  the  merchant,  or  servant  girl  whose  cases  we 
have  quoted  from  Esquirol  (§  522,  525),  had  committed  mur- 
der in  one  of  their  paroxysms,  we  should,  no  doubt,  have 
had  the  testimony  of  that  distinguished  physician,  as  he  has 
already  recorded   it   in   his  writings,  that  they  were  "  true 

^  MS.  of  Mr.  Justice  Waite,  whflpat  upon  the  case,  and  kindly  furnished 
by  him. 


LEGAL   CONSEQUENCES   OF   DRUNKENNESS.  537 

monomaniacs,  not  morally  responsible."  The  other  cases  we 
have  related,  though  differing  a  little  from  these,  in  some  of 
their  accidental  symptoms,  evidently  proceeded  from  the  same 
pathological  causes ;  and  if  moral  responsibility  ceases  in  the 
former,  it  must  equally  cease  in  the  latter. 


CHAPTER    XXVIII. 


INTERDICTION   AND    ISOLATION. 


§  562.  With  respect  to  the  kind  and  degree  of  mental 
impairment  that  warrant  interdiction,  there  prevails  the  ut- 
most diversity  of  opinion;  and  such  must  continue  to  be 
the  case,  till  sounder  views  are  entertained  of  the  true  pur- 
poses of  this  measure.  The  radical  fault  oLspeculations  on 
this  subject  is,  that  the  attention  has  been  directed  to  gen- 
eral rules  and  abstract  distinctions,  rather  than  to  a  thorough 
and  discriminating  examination  of  the  particular  circum- 
stances of  each  individual  case.  In  the  following  para- 
graphs will  be  found  abundant  illustrations  of  the  truth  of 
this  remark. 

§  563.  Imbeciles  in  the  first  degree  cannot  be  justly  de- 
prived of  the  management  of  their  property,  on  the  ground 
of  mental  deficiency  alone.  If  they  have  shown  no  disposi- 
tion to  squander  their  money  on  trifles,  nor  suffered  their 
affairs  to  be  grossly  neglected,  there  can  be  no  reasonable 
pretence  for  taking  it  altogether  from  their  control  and  enjoy- 
ment. Neither  should  we  be  too  rigid  in  our  scrutiny  of 
these  cases.  If  a  whole  life  of  extravagance,  or  hazardous 
speculation,  is  not  enough  to  produce  the  interdiction  of  a 
sound  person,  why  should  an  occasional  act  of  either  in  one 
of  feeble  intellect,  provoke  that  measure  ?  Of  course  there 
can  be  no  question  of  its  propriety  when  it  is  perfectly  obvi- 
ous that  he  is  dissipating  his  fortune,  to  the  great  detriment 
of  himself  and  of  those  who  are  dependent  on  him. 

§  564.  Much  discussion  and  tedious  litigation  have  arisen, 
from  the  difficulty  of  determining  the  exact  measure  of  in- 
tellectual capacity  requisite   to   the  undisturbed  enjoyment 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION.  539 

of  civil  rights  and  privileges,  chiefly  in  consequence  of  losing 
sight  of  the  real  object  before  us,  and  pursuing  a  shadow  of 
our  own  creating.  It  is  a  question  of  capacity  in  reference 
to  certain  ends  and  duties,  and  we  are  not  called  on  to  go 
beyond  the  consideration  of  these,  in  our  endeavors  to  settle 
this  question.  The  speculative  opinions  of  the  imbecile  per- 
son, the  little  peculiarities  of  his  conduct,  his  style  of  living 
and  talking,  and  his  general  deportment  in  society,  are  points 
that  require  but  little  attention  in  this  inquiry.  Our  business 
is  with  the  manner  in  which  he  has  conducted  his  affairs, 
and  from  this  chiefly,  we  are  to  draw  our  inferences  respect- 
ing his  probable  future  conduct  and  capacity.  And  here  we 
are  not  bound  to  institute  a  rigid  comparison  between  his 
habits,  and  those  of  people  enjoying  ordinary  soundness  and 
vigor  of  intellect.  We  are  not  warranted  in  stripping  him 
of  all  his  possessions  and  leaving  him  at  the  mercy  of  others, 
the  moment  we  can  fix  upon  a  single  instance  in  the  course 
of  his  life,  where  he  has  neglected  to  profit  by  a  happy  turn 
of  fortune,  or  has  rewarded  a  service,  or  bestowed  his  boun- 
ties, in  a  manner  altogether  opposed  to  our  ideas  of  fore- 
thought and  economy.  Has  the  individual  indulged  in  re- 
peated acts  of  extravagance,  or  of  profitless  expenditure? 
Has  he  engaged  in  the  execution  of  visionary  projects  with 
reckless  indifference  as  to  the  extent  of  his  means  and  appli- 
ances ?  Has  he  squandered  his  money  on  favorites,  or 
become  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  designing  and  profli- 
gate associates  for  advancing  their  oxvn  selfish  projects  ? 
These  are  among  the  most  prominent  questions  that  require 
a  satisfactory  answer;  and  if  they  are  kept  steadily  before 
us,  there  will  be  little  fear  of  losing  ourselves  in  the  maze  of 
perplexities  w4iich  the  judicial  investigation  of  cases  of  imbe- 
cility frequently  creates. 

§  565.  These  views,  it  will  be  seen,  afford  no  countenance 
to  the  usual  practice  of  canvassing  the  whole  history  of  the 
imbecile  person,  arraying  act  against  act,  and  speech  against 
speech,  and  drawing  from  each  an  inference  for  or  against 
his  capacity  of  managing  his  own  affairs,  in  his  own  way. 
Few  of  those  whose  interests  become  involved  in  protracted 


540  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

litigation,  are  so  destitute  of  intellect  as  never  to  conduct 
like  persons  of  well-developed  minds  under  similar  circum- 
stances. They  may  write  sensible  letters,  make  shrewd 
bargains,  and  converse  on  ordinary  topics  without  betraying 
any  mental  deficiency,  while  yielding  implicitly  to  the  will 
of  others,  and  committing  acts  of  folly  that  can  arise  from 
nothing  short  of  unequivocal  imbecility.  The  popular  error 
that  imbecility  is  only  an  inferior  endowment  of  mind,  con- 
sidered in  regard  to  its  absolute  quantity,  has  led  people  to 
forget  that  in  this  condition,  the  mental  faculties  may  be  very 
unequally  defective ;  and,  therefore,  that  very  different  con- 
clusions would  be  formed  respecting  an  individual's  capacity, 
according  as  the  attention  is  exclusively  directed  to  the  man- 
ifestation of  this  or  that  faculty.  Many  also,  who,  while  sur- 
rounded by  their  usual  circle  of  associations,  manage  their 
slender  means  with  the  utmost  prudence  and  econom.y,  would 
prove  themselves  totally  inadequate  to  the  management  of  a 
large  property,  and  be  easily  led,  by  the  influence  of  new 
associates  and  the  excitement  of  new  desires,  into  habits  of 
extravagance  and  dissipation. 

§  566.  The  little  success  that  has  attended  every  attempt 
to  fix  upon  certain  criteria  as  tests  of  that  degree  of  imbe- 
cility which  is  incompatible  with  the  management  of  prop- 
erty, and  to  run  the  line  between  this  mental  condition  and 
that  of  legal  capacity,  is  another  circumstance  in  favor  of 
the  course  here  indicated.  "  In  order  to  arrive  at  the  true 
meaning  of  '  imbecility  of  mind,' "  says  Sir  John  Nicholl, 
"  we  may  resort  to  what  the  law  describes  as  perfect  capac- 
ity, which  is  most  correctly  found  in  the  form  of  pleadings 
used  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  in  the  averment  in  support 
of  a  will,  that  the  testator  was  of  '  sound  mind,  memory, 
and  understanding  —  talked  and  discoursed  rationally  and 
sensibly,  and  was  fully  capable  of  any  rational  act  requiring 
thought,  judgment,  and  reflection.'  Here  is  the  legal  stand- 
ard." ^  It  may  be  doubted  if  this  definition  can  ever  be  of 
much  practical  service,  for  no  definition  can  be  so  which 

*  Ingram  v.  Wijatt,  1  Haggard,  401. 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  -541 

embraces  either  more  or  less  than  is  strictly  warranted  by 
the  exact  nature  of  the  thing  defined.  Many  an  imbecile 
who  could  not  be  safely  trusted  with  the  control  of  property 
for  a  single  week,  may  nevertheless  "  talk  and  discourse 
rationally  and  sensibly,"  so  long  as  the  conversation  is  con- 
fined to  simple  subjects  that  have  long  been  familiar  to  the 
mind ;  and  many  a  man  of  legal  capacity  may  be  found,  of 
whom  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  is  "  fully  capable  of  any 
rational  act"  whatever,  "requiring  thought,  judgment,  and 
reflection."  The  very  point  to  be  decided  is,  whether  the 
person  in  question,  who  talks  and  discourses  so  rationally 
and  sensibly,  and  does  so  many  rational  acts,  is  or  is  not 
capable  of  managing  his  affairs ;  and,  however  much  we 
may  scrutinize  the  character  of  his  intellect,  the  only  just 
and  accurate  test  of  such  capacity  is  the  manner  in  which  he 
has  already  managed  his  affairs.  The  tests  of  legal  capacity 
so  much  sought  after  in  imbecility,  cannot  be  obtained,  from 
the  nature  of  things,  because  the  general  strength  of  mind  is 
but  an  uncertain  index  of  its  ability  when  exercised  on  par- 
ticular subjects.  The  ministers  of  the  law,  therefore,  should 
be  extremely  cautious  how  they  are  moved  by  theoretical 
considerations,  instead  of  particular  facts  bearing  on  the 
point  at  issue,  in  examining  requests  for  interdiction  on  the 
ground  of  imbecility. 

§  567.  General  intellectual  and  general  moral  mania  are 
always  a  sufficient  cause  of  interdiction ;  for  the  reflective 
faculties  are  too  much  disturbed  in  the  former,  and  the  moral 
in  the  latter,  to  appreciate  properly  the  relations  of  property, 
or  to  provide  the  necessary  arrangements  for  preserving  and 
improving  it.  The  only  question  is,  how  soon  after  the  man- 
ifestation of  the  disease,  are  we  warranted  in  taking  this 
measure.  Since  its  publicity  serves  to  expose  the  patient  and 
his  family  to  the  popular  and  not  unfounded  prejudice  against 
insanity,  and  since  mania,  when  early  attended  to,  is  cured, 
in  the  larger  proportion  of  cases,  witljin  the  first  or  second 
year,  this  step  should  be  delayed,  unless  extraordinary  reasons 
require  immediate  action,  till  the  effect  of  judicious  treatment 
has  been  observed.     The  restraint  and  seclusion  which  cura- 

46 


542  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

tive  measures  necessarily  require,  prevent  the  patient  from 
engaging  in  business,  and  indeed  place  him  in  the  same  con- 
dition as  would  sickness  of  any  other  kind.  Neither  is  this 
measure  always  justifiable  when  the  disease  is  so  slight  as 
not  to  prevent  him  from  going  abroad  and  mingling  in  the 
affairs  of  the  world.  If,  however,  the  patient  is  a  merchant, 
for  instance,  and  continues  to  engage  in  the  transaction  of 
business,  immediate  interdiction  would  be  required,  perhaps, 
to  save  him  from  the  effects  of  ruinous  contracts.  Generally 
speaking,  no  harm  is  done  by  a  little  delay,  but  the  practice 
of  taking  property  from  its  lawful  possessors  to  place  it  in 
the  control  of  others  who  may  have  no  other  object  than  that 
of  enriching  themselves  by  their  trust,  the  first  moment  the 
presence  of  insanity  is  satisfactorily  established,  must  lead  to 
positive  and  considerable  evils.  So  jealous  is  the  French  law 
of  this  hasty  interference,  that  it  permits  nothing  less  than 
habitual  insanity  to  procure  interdiction.^ 

§  568.  In  partial  mania,  Hoffbauer^  thinks  we  should  be 
governed  by  the  nature  of  the  predominant  idea,  not  con- 
sidering it  a  sufficient  ground  of  interdiction,  unless  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  property  in  a  manner  likely  to 
lead  to  its  wasteful  and  improvident  management.  Such,  too, 
was  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Rush,^  and  a  late  writer^  has  con- 
tended against  the  opposite  practice  with  signal  ability 
and  skill.  "  Mental  derangement,  to  be  a  sufficient  reason 
for  interdiction,"  says  a  French  jurist,  "  should  have  refer- 
ence to  the  ordinary  affairs  of  civil  life,  and  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  person  and  property  of  the  individual ;  a  man 
who  is  merely  visionary,  or  entertains  speculative  notions 
that  are  palpably  false,  should  not  be  interdicted,  if  he  manage 
his  afi'airs  well  enough  in  other  respects."^  Georget,  how- 
ever, thinks  that  monomaniacs  are  not  to  be  trusted,  and  that 
we  can  never  be  sure  that  the  predominant  idea  may  not,  by 


>  Code  civil,  art.  489.  ^  Op.  cit.  §  110. 

'  Lecture  on  Medical  Jurisprudence,  Philadelphia,  1811. 

*  Conolly,  Indications  of  Insanity,  430,445. 

*  TouUier,  le  Droit  civil  Fran9ais,  etc.  1811. 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  543 

means  of  some  mental  associations,  lead  to  the  dissipation 
of  their  fortunes.  Accordingly,  he  is  dissatisfied  with  the  de- 
cision of  the  tribunal  of  La  Seine,  who  rejected  a  petition  for 
the  interdiction  of  M.  Selves,  a  celebrated  advocate,  although 
admitted  to  be  a  "  meddler  in  his  family,  litigious  in  society, 
impertinent  towards  the  magistrates,  vainly  profuse  in  his 
expenditures,  and  subject  to  some  illusions."  ^ 

§  569.  This  distrust  of  the  insane  of  whatever  descrip- 
tion, is  nowhere  more  strongly  implied  than  in  the  habitual 
practice  of  Great  Britain  at  the  present  day.  One  finds  it 
difficult  to  believe  on  what  slight  grounds  interdiction  is 
there  every  day  procured,  —  a  measure,  that  with  the  osten- 
sible purpose  of  protecting  the  interest  of  the  insane  party, 
is  too  often,  in  reality,  designed  to  promote  the  selfish  views 
of  relatives  and  friends.  A  kind  and  degree  of  mental  im- 
pairment that  have  never  obscured  the  patient's  knowledge 
of  his  relative  situation,  never  altered  his  disposition  to  be 
kind  and  useful  to  those  around  him,  never  weakened  his 
enjoyment  of  social  pleasures,  and  never  affected  his  capac- 
ity to  manage  his  concerns  with  his  usual  prudence,  have 
been  repeatedly  deemed  a  sufficient  reason  for  depriving 
him  of  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  his  own  property,  and  sub- 
jecting him  to  all  the  disabilities  the  law  can  impose.  Dr. 
Conolly  speaks  of  a  gentleman  on  whose  account  his  family 
applied  for  a  commission  of  lunacy,  because  he  had  become 
possessed  with  the  idea,  that  the  queen  of  England  was  in 
love  with  him.  Yet  this  person  conducted  himself  very  well 
in  most  of  the  offices  of  life,  and  on  one  occasion  after  this 
application  was  made,  while  dining  with  a  party  of  friends 
in  company  with  the  lord  chancellor,  he  contributed  so  re- 
markably to  the  enjoyment  of  the  day  by  his  polite,  agreea- 
ble, and  amusing  manner,  that  this  functionary  could  not 
help  expressing  to  him  how  much  he  had  been  gratified  by 
his  introduction  to  him,  and  how  utterly  absurd  it  now  ap- 
peared to  him,  to  have  ever  given  credit  to  the  story  of  his 
delusion.     This  was  enough  to  produce  its  avowal  from  the 

*  Des  Maladies  mentales,  108. 


544  .      MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

patient,  and  the  issuing  of  the  comnnission  fron:i  the  lord 
chancellor.  The  sequel  furnished  a  striking  comment  on 
the  injustice  of  this  act;  for  the  insane  gentleman  gave  so 
much  assistance  to  those  intrusted  with  the  management  of 
his  affairs,  that  he  was  the  means  of  their  getting  over  diffi- 
culties, which,  without  his  aid,  would  have  been  insurmount- 
able ;  and  in  the  end,  he  was  actually,  if  not  formally,  con- 
stituted the  steward  of  his  own  estate.  It  is  well  known 
that  a  monomaniac  in  England,  who  fancied  himself  duke 
of  Hexham,  and  was  accordingly  interdicted,  became  the 
agent  of  his  own  committee  for  the  management  of  his  own 
estate,  and  did  the  duties  of  the  office,  for  a  time  at  least,  not 
incorrectly. 

§  570.  The  case  of  Mr.  Edward  Davies,  which  engrossed 
the  attention  of  the  English  pubUc  a  few  years  since,  being, 
says  Dr.  Gooch,  "by  far  the  most  important  lunatic  cause 
which  has  been  tried  in  our  time,"  furnishes  a  striking  illus- 
tration of  the  manner  in  which  these  things  were  managed  in 
England.  Mr.  Edward  Davies  was  born  of  humble  parents, 
and  though  particularly  shy  and  reserved  among  his  school- 
fellows, he  was  generally  considered  sharp  and  intelligent. 
On  leaving  school,  he  commenced  the  business  of  a  tea- 
dealer  in  London,  and  by  indefatigable  industry  and  cautious 
management,  rapidly  became  rich.  It  appears  that  his 
health,  at  best,  was  deficate,  and  that  he  suffered  much  from 
dyspepsia  and  nervous  excitement.  He  was  fond  of  reading 
medical  books ;  and,  like  most  persons  who  indulge  in  such 
a  taste,  was  fanciful  about  his  complaints,  and  subject  to 
false  alarms.  The  defects  of  his  early  education  he  en- 
deavored to  remedy,  by  reading  what  he  took  to  be  the  best 
authors,  and  was  often  guilty  of  making  a  ridiculous  display 
of  his  acquirements,  by  making  long  quotations  which  he 
would  spout  with  a  theatrical  air.  He  was  of  a  remarkably 
timid  and  yielding  disposition,  to  such  a  degree  as  to  be  com- 
pletely subjected  to  the  authority  of  his  mother.  Though  he 
was  twenty-seven  years  of  age,  and  managing  an  extensive 
and  lucrative  business,  she  would  not  allow  him  to  carry 
any  money  in  his  pocket,  nor  to  spend  the  most  trifling  sum 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  545 

withoat  her  permission.  He  dared  not  go  to  the  play,  nor 
leave  the  house  for  a  few  hours,  without  asking  her  leave.  She 
was  particularly  at  great  pains  to  prevent  his  meeting  young 
women,  lest,  in  the  event  of  his  marriage,  she  might  be  dis- 
placed from  the  control  of  his  conduct  and  the  command  of 
his  purse  ;  and  she  took  various  opportunities  of  inducing 
him  to  give  considerable  sums  of  money  to  different  branches 
of  her  family.  At  the  age  of  twenty-seven,  he  grew  restive 
under  the  maternal  restraints,  and  made  many  attempts  to 
emancipate  himself.  He  offered  to  leave  the  shop  to  his 
mother  and  take  his  own  property  away  ;  or  to  give  her  seven 
thousand  pounds,  on  her  consenting  to  leave  the  concern; 
but  she  was  not  to  be  got  rid  of  at  that  price.  The  incessant 
state  of  contention  at  last  seriously  impaired  his  health  and 
his  mental  tranquillity,  and  on  the  first  of  July,  1829,  he  ap- 
plied to  Mr.  Lawrence,  the  surgeon.  He  told  this  gentleman 
a  long  story  about  his  health  and  his  tea-trade;  and  at 
another  interview,  he  recited  poetry  and  expressed  a  strong 
antipathy  to  his  mother  and  several  relations.  Mr.  Lawrence 
considered  him  of  unsound  mind,  but  thought  that  if  he 
could  be  reconciled  to  his  mother  and  family,  the  disease 
would  be  at  an  end  —  that  his  antipathy  to  his  mother  was 
his  chief  delusion. 

§  571.  About  this  time,  he  applied  to  Dr.  Latham,  claim- 
ing his  protection.  His  discourse  was  wild  and  rambling, 
and  his  manner  strange  and  excited.  He  told  the  doctor  in 
a  sort  of  a  whisper,  that  he  had  a  tale  to  relate  of  the 
greatest  horror,  and  then  flung  himself  away  and  stalked  into 
the  middle  of  the  room.  He  appeared  very  apprehensive 
lest  he  might  be  overheard,  and  begged  that  he  might  lock 
the  doors  and  close  the  windows.  He  spoke  of  his  wealth 
and  his  trade,  and  quoted  poetry  largely,  using  great  gesticu- 
lation and  throwing  his  arms  about.  Several  times  he  asked 
if  he  looked  insane,  and  on  leaving  the  house,  he  said  :  "  If 
you  fail  (in  his  promise  to  call  on  him)  dread  the  vengeance 
of  a  madman  ;  for  I  carry  a  loaded  pistol."  Dr.  Latham 
thought  him  insane,  though  not  prepared  to  recommend  that 
he  should  be  shut  up  as  an  acknowledged  lunatic.     Shortly 

46* 


546  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

after  this,  he  left  his  own  house  and  went  to  spend  the  night 
at  Furnival  Inn,  on  the  third  of  August.  About  one  o'clock, 
in  the  night,  he  rang  the  bell,  and  told  the  waiter  that  there 
were  thieves  in  the  house  ;  that  he  heard  thein  snapping  off 
pistols,  and  striking  a  light.  On  being  remonstrated  with  by 
the  waiter,  on  the  impropriety  of  his  ringing  the  bell,  and 
thus  disturbing  the  lodgers,  he  said  he  was' sorry  for  it,  went 
upon  his  knees,  and  humbly  begged  his  pardon. 

§  572.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that  on  the  same  days  on 
which  Dr.  Latham,  Mr.  Lawrence,  and  others,  saw  him  in  his 
most  explosive  state,  his  friends  who  had  known  him  long, 
passed  hours  with  him  ;  and  though  he  was  ill  and  terrified, 
he  appeared  to  them  quite  himself,  and  as  equal  as  ever  he 
had  been  to  give  directions  about  his  shop  affairs.  Indeed, 
the  very  persons  who  were  trying  to  confine  him  as  unfit  to 
take  care  of  his  business,  were  themselves  consulting  him 
about  the  management  of  that  business. 

§  573.  Mr.  Davies  was  shortly  after  this  removed  to  a  pri- 
vate asylum,  where  he  remained  till  the  end  of  December, 
when  he  was  liberated  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury.  Here  his 
agitation  subsided,  his  incoherence  diminished  almost  to 
nothing;  and  the  only  remaining  grounds  for  believing  him 
a  lunatic,  were  his  antipathy  to  his  mother,  and  certain  sus- 
picions that  were  considered  to  be  delirious.  Nevertheless,  a 
commission  of  lunacy  was  granted  by  the  lord  chancellor, 
which  finally  resulted  in  restoring  him  to  liberty,  and  the 
management  of  his  property.  The  evidence  of  the  physicians 
who  were  sent  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  examining  Mr. 
Davies  at  various  interviews,  and  who  pronounced  him  to  be 
mad,  is  worthy  of  a  little  notice,  inasmuch  as  they  present 
the  grounds  on  which,  in  the  year  1829,  physicians  of  some 
eminence  recommended  the  interdiction  of  the  insane. 

§  574.  Sir  George  Tuthill  testified,  that  he  was  of  unsound 
mind,  at  the  period  of  his  last  visit;  principally,  because  he 
spoke  indignantly  of  the  manner  in  which  he  had  been 
treated  by  his  family.  His  additional  reasons  for  thinking 
him  insane,  and  unable  to  manage  his  affairs,  were  his  learn- 
ing to  box,  his  purchasing  a  fowl  for  ten  shillings,  and  his 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  547 

saying  that  he  could  weep  over  his  little  rabbits,  which  he 
had  not  seen  for  six  weeks. 

Dr.  Algernon  Frainpton  testified,  that  he  could  not  con- 
sider him  sane  on  the  seventh  of  December,  because  he 
would  not  admit  himself  to  have  been  insane  on  the  eighth 
of  August.  He  thought  there  was  a  delusion  in  his  mind  as 
to  his  mother's  conduct,  though  he  admitted  there  would  be 
no  delusion,  if  his  mother  had  interfered  as  Davies  described, 
and  as  other  witnesses  testified.  He  thought  that  the  pur- 
chase of  a  certain  estate  for  6,000  guineas  was  in  itself  an 
act-  of  insanity,  considering  his  circumstances,  though  he 
admitted  he  knew  nothing  of  his  circumstances.  A  man 
of  business,  he  thought,  ought  not  to  lock  up  so  much  of 
his  capital.  He  never  inquired  how  Mr.  Davies  managed  his 
business,  though  he  declared  that  he  was  incapable  of  man- 
aging it. 

Mr.  Haslam  testified,  that  he  was  induced  to  consider 
him  insane,  from  his  manner  of  complaining  of  the  dirty 
habits  of  the. keepers  of  the  establishment  where  he  was  con- 
fined. He  said  decidedly,  that  as  long  as  his  morbid  hostiUty 
remained  against  his  mother,  it  was  not  safe  for  him  to  go  at 
large. 

§  575.  In  opposition  to  this  evidence  —  and  it  is  but  a 
small  portion  of  what  might  be  given  —  it  may  be  well  to 
exhibit  a  specimen  or  two  of  that  given  by  Mr.  Davies's 
medical  witnesses.  Dr.  Macmichael,  who  had  been  sent 
down  by  the  lord  chancellor  to  examine  into  the  state  of  his 
mind,  satisfactorily  showed  that  Mr.  Davies's  peculiar  no- 
tions and  views  which  had  been  considered  by  many  as  delu- 
sions, either  did  not  exist  at  all,  or  proved,  upon  examina- 
tion, to  be  perfectly  rational  and  proper.  In  attributing  his 
prosperity  to  the  favor  of  Providence,  which  had  been  men- 
tioned as  one  of  his  delusions,  he  said  he  did  not  mean 
immediate  or  special  interference,  but  that  general  providence 
which  regulates  human  affairs.  His  boast  of  having  improved 
the  revenue  by  his  biddings,  which  had  also  been  im- 
puted to  him  as  a  delusion,  he  explained  by  saying  that  there 
was  a  certain  kind  of  tea  that  was  now  almost  given  away ; 


548  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

that  if  he  bid  higher  than  others,  the  duty  would  be  in- 
creased, and  that  thus  he  should  put  money  into  the  pocket 
of  government.  He  showed,  that  instead  of  sacrificing  his 
property  by  thJfe  course,  he  realized  a  large  sum  of  money  in 
a  very  short  time.  Dr.  Macmichael  was  not  willing  to  admit 
that  his  learning  pugilism,  or  carrying  pistols,  was  any  evi- 
dence of  unsoundness  of  mind,  for  he  might  have  had  good 
reason  for  doing  both. 

§  576.  Dr.  INIackinnon,  who  was  connected  by  marriage 
with  the  family  of  Mr.  Davies,  and  had  visited  him  several 
times  during  his  confinement,  thought  him,  from  the  first 
interview  to  the  last,  capable  of  managing  himself  and  his 
affairs.  He  showed  that  many  of  his  peculiar  habits  and 
manners  which  had  given  rise  to  the  idea  of  insanity,  he 
had  always  manifested  when  in  good  health.  His  letters 
which,  from  being  full  of  quotations  and  puns,  were  thought 
to  indicate  disordered  mind,  he  showed  were  not  different,  in 
that  respect,  from  those  he  wrote  long  before  insanity  was 
imputed  to  him.  He  conversed  with  him  freely  on  the  affairs 
of  his  family,  and  his  remarks  upon  his  mother's  interference 
were  rational,  just,  and  free  from  excitement.  His  inquiry 
into  the  imputed  delusions,  ended  in  the  same  result  as  Dr. 
Macmichael's.  In  particular,  he  did  not  consider  his  hostility 
to  his  mother  as  a  delusion,  for,  from  the  son's  account,  there 
was  good  reason  for  it.  On  a  variety  of  other  subjects,  his 
discourse  was  calm  and  rational. 

§  577.  This  case  is  not  calculated  to  recommend  the  opin- 
ion of  those  who  look  on  the  slightest  mental  aberration  as 
a  sufficient  ground  of  interdiction.  The  principle  to  be  fol- 
lowed here  is  precisely  that  which  we  have  indicated  as 
applicable  to  cases  of  imbecility.  Instead  of  puzzling  our- 
selves with  vain  attempts  to  gauge  the  depth  and  breadth  of 
the  absolute  capacity  of  the  mind,  our  duty  is  simply  to 
ascertain  if  the  individual  has  been  guilty  of  any  instances 
of  gross  improvidence,  of  expenditure  beyond  his  means,  or 
for  objects  unsuited  to  his  station  and  pursuits.  If  it  be 
found  that  he  has,  then  interdiction  is  implicitly  required  by 
a  regard   to    his    own    and  the  interests  of  those  who  are 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  549 

dependent  on  him  for  support,  or  entertain  rational  expecta- 
tions of  being  benefited  by  his  wealth.  If  he  has  not,  it  is 
not  very  clear  how  his  property  can  be  taken  from  his  con- 
trol, without  violating  the  first  principles  of  civil  liberty.  If 
no  one  doubts  that  the  mental  operations  in  monomania 
may  be  perfectly  sound,  except  within  a  certain  very  narrow 
circle,  why  should  it  be  a  matter  of  surprise,  that  ideas  of 
property  should  sometimes  be  among  those  which  are  un- 
affected by.  the  influence  of  the  disorder?  To  deprive  a 
person  laboring  under  a  partial  mania  that  does  not  involve 
his  notions  of  property,  of  the  natural  right  of  controlling 
and  disposing  of  his  own  fortune,  is  as  unjust  and  irrational 
as  it  would  be  to  inflict  upon  a  felon  convicted  of  theft,  the 
penalties  attached  to  the  violation  of  every  article  in  the 
criminal  code.  If,  too,  we  interdict  one  monomaniac  whose 
derangement  is  limited  to  a  single  subject,  we  are  bound  in 
consistency  to  proceed  till  we  have  included  all,  from  him 
who  believes  he  has  lost  his  rational  soul,  to  the  poor  hypo- 
chondriac who  imagines  his  legs  are  made  of  glass,  or  that 
a  fish  has  taken  up  its  abode  in  his  stomach.  The'  mischief 
that  would  arise  from  such  a  course  of  disqualification,  may 
be  easily  enough  conceived,  without  the  aid  of  any  more 
particular  description.  Even  when  the  hallucination  has 
reference  to  property,  as  the  idea,  for  instance,  that  the  indi- 
vidual possesses  immense  wealth,  or  that  every  ship  which 
enters  the  harbor  is  his  and  freighted  with  his  goods,  we  are 
not  too  hastily  to  strip  him  of  what  is  really  his  own,  for  he 
might,  nevertheless,  in  the  management  of  it,  evince  the  most 
commendable  prudence  and  economy.  It  is  a  remarkable, 
but  not  an  uncommon  fact,  that  monomaniacs  often  make 
no  practical  application  of  their  insane  notions  to  their  own. 
conduct  or  concerns,  but  continue  to  manage  both  as  if  no 
such  delusion  existed. 

§  578.  In  the  progress  of  dementia,  there  always  comes  a 
period  sooner  or  later,  when  interdiction  is  required,  where- 
ever  the  patient  has  much  property,  or  conflicting  interests 
are  involved  in  its  disposition.  To  decide  when  this  period 
has  actually  arrived,  is  generally  a  difficult  and  a  responsible 


550  MEDICAL  JUPJSPRUDEXCE    OF   INSANITY. 

duty.  To  avoid  the  disagreeable  alternative  of  favoring  the 
designs  of  selfish  relatives,  which  would  be  promoted  by  the 
interdiction  and  seclusion  of  the  old  man,  by  premature  in- 
terference, or  of  delaying  proper  measures,  for  fear  of  being 
thought  accessory  to  schemes  of  fraud  and  oppression,  until 
too  late  to  be  of  any  service,  is  to  gain  the  happy  medium 
which  all  should  seek,  but  which  few  perhaps  are  successful 
enough  to  obtain.  The  difficulties  which  medical  men  have 
to  encounter,  who  are  consulted  in  such  cases,  are  graphi- 
cally described  by  Dr.  Conolly.  "  An  old  gentleman,"  he 
says,  "whose  intellects  are  so  impaired  that  he  does  not 
know  whether  he  has  received  his  rents  or  not,  or  who  is 
unable  to  arrange  his  own  dress  decently,  and  requires,  when 
up  stairs,  all  the  attention  of  a  child,  is  seen  by  the  medical 
practitioner,  for  the  purpose  of  its  being  ascertained  how  far 
interference  with  his  property  is  justifiable.  The  very  ser- 
vant who  is  hourly  robbing  him,  takes  care  to  send  him  down 
very  carefully  drest.  The  mere  effect  of  habit  is  to  cause  the 
patient  himself  to  be  more  guarded  and  exact  in  his  manner 
and  words  in  the  presence  of  a  stranger ;  he  feels  under  a 
temporary  and  a  wholesome  restraint ;  asks  and  answers 
common  questions  as  well  as  most  other  old  men,  and  is  per- 
fectly correct  in  his  deportment.  Two  very  serious  evils  may 
ensue.  If  the  practitioner  is  unacquainted  with  the  varieties 
of  the  mind  and  their  tendencies;  and  imagines  that  insanity 
and  sanity  cannot  be  mixed  up  together  in  the  mind  as  they 
are  in  the  body ;  he  feels  a  degree  of  conscientious  horror 
concerning  any  interference  with  an  old  gentleman  who  may 
be  a  little  weak,  but  who,  he  is  quite  convinced,  is  no  more 
mad  than  any  of  those  about  him.  He  turns  his  thoughts  to 
the  probable  motives  of  interest,  in  the  children  or  the  friends, 
and,  determining  not  to  warrant  any  kind  of  restraint,  in- 
wardly applauds  his  own  sagacity  and  incorruptibility.  The 
friends,  now  more  afraid  to  interfere  than  before,  allow  the 
old  man  to  do  as  he  likes,  and  he  sets  off,  and  gets  married 
to  a  worthless  and  designing  woman,  or  he  alters  his  will  in 
favor  of  some  unprincipled  person,  or  finds  his  way  to  some 
neighboring  town,  where  he  becomes  a  disgraceful  spectacle, 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  551 

and  gets  robbed  of  his  money  and  ill-treated  ;  or  perhaps  he 
falls  into  the  pond,  and  is  drowned  ;  all  the  world  then  ex- 
claiming against  the  heartlessness  and  inattention  of  those 
about  him,  and  the  unaccountable  supineness  of  those  who 
were  consulted  about  the  case.  Thus,  the  vie^v  of  a  very 
plain  and  easy  duty  is,  not  unfrequently,  obscured  by  preva- 
lent opinions  respecting  the  nature  of  insanity,  and  respecting 
the  measures  which  insanity  is  supposed  to  render  indispen- 
sable. If  the  patient  whom  I  have  described,  as  conducting 
himself  so  satisfactorily  in  a  short  and  common  conversation, 
is  left  to  his  own  thought  for  a  little  time,  and  his  attention  is 
not  excited  by  those  about  him,  his  state  will  become  evident 
enough.  He  will  be  seen  to  be  wandering,  and  lost  in  his 
reflections,  and  will  perhaps  rise  up  and  endeavor. to  make 
his  way  out  of  the  room,  but  without  seeming  to  remember 
the  situation  of  the  door.  Or  he  will  declare  his  intention  to 
set  off  on  a  long  journey,  or  by  many  slight  indications  show 
that  his  mind  is  reduced  to  imbecility.  In  some,  the  effects 
of  the  recent  restraint  of  a  stranger's  presence  may  be  more 
permanent  than  in  others ;  but  half  an  hour,  or  a  few  hours 
at  the  utmost,  will  suffice  to  show  the  state  of  the  case. 
The  decision  is  important,  and  due  time  must  be  allowed 
for  it.  If  one  visit  is  not  sufficient,  the  visit  should  be  re- 
peated, until  the  practitioner  can  give  a  clear  and  decided 
opinion. 

"  But  now  comes  the  other  danger.  A  sanguine  practi- 
tioner sees  the  undoubted  signs  of  folly  and  weakness  in  the 
old  man,  and  forgetting  that  they  are  as  much  the  effects  of 
age  as  are  the  unsteadiness  of  his  limbs,  and  the  dulness  of 
his  hearing,  pronounces  the  patient  to  be  mad ;  and  to 
gratify  persons  of  no  feeling  or  compunction,  consigns  the 
poor  patient  to  strange  hands,  and  causes  him-  to  spend  the 
little  remnant  of  his  days  away  from  his  own  house,  and 
unseen  by  any  of  those  whom  his  former  care  perhaps 
preserved,  and  whom  his  wealth  will  enrich."  ^ 

§  579.    The   principles   we   have   indicated,    as   proper   to 

^  Indications  of  Insanity,  440. 


552  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE    OF   INSANITY. 

guide  us  in  deciding  questions  of  interdiction  in  the  various 
forms  of  imbecility  and  mania,  are  not  to  be  so  implicitly 
relied  on  here,  because  the  unfitness  of  the  patient  to  man- 
age his  own  concerns  is  often  proved,  not  so  much  by  spe- 
cific acts  of  extravagance  or  folly  as  by  his  subjection  to  the 
will  of  those  who  are  deliberately  and  cautiously  preying 
upon  his  substance.  We  may  also  bear  in  mind,  that 
although  we  take  from  him  the  control  of  his  property,  even 
while  his  faculties  are  sound  enough  to  make  him  capable  of 
performing  the  duty  himself,  yet  we  are  only  prematurely 
taking  a  measure  which  a  few  weeks  or  months  will  generally 
render  absolutely  necessary. 

§  580.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  in  cases  of  insanity  where 
the  mental  disorder  does  not  seem  sufficient  to  warrant  so 
extreme  a  measure  as  complete  interdiction,  while  it  occa- 
sions reasonable  doubts  of  the  ability  to  manage  property 
with  ordinary  prudence,  our  laws  have  established  no  inferior 
grades  of  restraint.  The  civil  code  of  France  ordains  that, 
"  in  rejecting  a  demand  for  interdiction,  the  court  may,  never- 
theless, if  circumstances  require  it,  debar  the  defendant  from 
appearing  in  suits,  making  contracts,  borrowing,  receiving 
payment  for  debts  or  giving  a  discharge,  alienating  or  pledg- 
ing his  property,  without  the  aid  of  a  council  which  shall  be 
appointed  in  the  same  judgment,"^  It  would  be  well,  if 
something  of  this  kind  always  found  a  place  in  the  legal 
regulations  of  the  insane. 

§  581.  The  views  here  presented  on  the  propriety  of  in- 
terdiction in  different  kinds  of  insanity,  can,  at  the  most, 
affect  only  the  opinions  of  the  expert,  or  the  conclusions  of 
the  judge.  They  cannot  easily  be  embodied  into  a  legisla- 
tive enactment,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  the  slightest  attempt 
thereto,  would  not  be  productive  of  uncertainty  and  embar- 
rassment. In  the  French  civil  code  it  is  enacted  that  only 
habitual  imbecility,  dementia,  or  furor,  can  be  a  sufficient 
cause  of  interdiction.^  In  thus  requiring  the  alienation  to 
have  been  habitual,  it  was  the  object  of  the  legislator,  no 

»  Code  Civil,  art.  499.  ^  ^^t.  489. 


INTERDICTION  AND   ISOLATION.  553 

doubt,  to  prevent  the  abuses  that  might  arise,  if  this  measure 
were  allowed  in  those  temporary  alienations  that  readily 
yield  to  medical  treatment.  But  as  no  two  individuals 
would  probably  agree  as  to  the  number  of  weeks  or  months 
necessary  to  make  a  case  of  insanity  habitual,  the  law  must, 
of  necessity,  either  be  entirely  disregarded  in  practice,  or  be- 
come, the  means  of  great  injustice,  in  consequence  of  the 
diversity  of  interpretation  to  which  it  is  liable.  Georget 
observes,  that  in  Paris,  the  judge  is  always  governed  by  the 
opinion  of  the  patient's  physician,  relative  to  the  future  pro- 
gress and  result  of  the  disease,  rather  than  its  previous  dura- 
tion.i  The  French  jurists  have  disagreed  as  to  the  construc- 
tion intended  to  be  put  on  the  terms,  imbecility,  etc.  While 
some  contend  that  these  terms  are  thus  multiplied,  merely 
in  order  to  embrace  every  possible  form  of  mental  disorder, 
it  is  contended  by  others,  that  the  legislator's  object  was  to 
prevent  interdiction  on  account  of  any  mental  disorder  which 
could  not  fairly  be  brought  under  one  of  these  divisions. 
The  consequence  is  what  might  be  expected  —  the  law  is 
practically  disregarded  altogether. 

§  582.  What  the  legislator  can  and  ought  to  do  is,  to 
provide  for  the  impartial  administration  of  justice  where  in- 
terdiction is  provoked,  by  such  a  course  of  procedure  as 
will  tend  to  bring  out  all  the  material  facts.  In  France  the 
facts  of  the  case  must  be  stated  in  writing,  and  supported 
by  documents  and  witnesses  ;  the  family-council  gives  its 
opinion  touching  the  utility  of  the  measure ;  and  the  re- 
spondent is  examined  by  the  court  and  the  attorney-general. 
If  the  examination  and  the  documents  are  not  satisfactory, 
the  court  may  order  an  inquest.  The  same  formalities  are 
required  for  removing  the  interdiction.'^  In  England  inter- 
diction is  obtained  by  application  to  the  Lord  Chancellor 
who  appoints  a  Commission  of  Lunacy,  consisting  of  three 
or  five  persons,  who  cause  a  jury  to  be  summoned  with 
whom  the  commissioners  sit  as  a  court,  and  hear  the  evi- 
dence adduced.     The  inquisition  may  be  traversed,  though 

*  Discussion  med.  leg.  174.  ^  Code  civil,  art.  493,  494,  495. 

47 


554  MEDICAL  JUKISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

the  chancellor  be  satisfied  with  it.  In  sonne  of  the  United 
States,  this  method  is  still  preserved,  except  that  in  such  as 
have  no  chancery  court,  the  commission  is  issued  by  a  court 
of  law.  In  most  of  them,  however,  application  is  made  to  the 
judge  of  probate,  who  gives  due  notice  to  the  respondent,  ap- 
points a  time  and  place  for  the  hearing  of  the  case,  and  de- 
cides without  the  intervention  of  a  jury.  This  course  is  far 
preferable  to  the  English,  on  the  ground  of  expense,  and  prob- 
ably the  ends  of  justice  are  as  fully  obtained  as  if  the  case 
were  submitted  to  a  jury.  In  the.  German  States,  medical 
evidence  is  always  required  by  the  law,  and  the  opinions  of 
the  physicians  govern  the  decision  of  the  judge.  In  Prussia, 
for  instance,  the  law  ordains  that  in  all  cases  involving  the 
question  of  insanity,  the  opinions  thereon  of  two  physicians 
shall  be  obtained,  one  of  whom  is  to  be  chosen  by  the  friends 
or  relations  of  the  party  whose  sanity  is  questioned,  and  the 
other  by  the  court ;  and  no  person  can  be  pronounced  insane 
by  the  court,  unless  so  considered  by  both  physicians.^  No 
provision  can  be  better  than  this  for  settling  the  question 
of  insanity,  though  whether  it  be  sufficient  to  warrant  inter- 
diction, is  another  question,  in  the  decision  of  which  other 
considerations  must  enter. 

§  583.  Isolation  is  a  measure  entirely  distinct  from  that 
of  interdiction,  and  neither  should  be  considered,  as  they 
sometimes  are,  necessarily  dependent  on  the  other.  On  no 
point  in  the  whole  range  of  the  subject  under  consideration, 
is  it  more  necessary  that  we  entertain  clear  and  definite 
notions,  than  on  that  of  the  restraint  of  the  insane,  because, 
while  often  essential  to  the  restoration  or  comfort  of  the 
patient,  and  to  the  safety  of  the  community,  it  is,  at  the  same 
time,  liable  to  serious  abuses.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  this 
measure,  important  as  it  is,  has  seldom  been  regulated  by 
any  express  provisions  of  law.  In  France  this  measure  is  al- 
together unknown  to  the  laws,  except  in  relation  to  those 
whose  liberty  might  endanger  the  safety  of  society.  Such, 
and  such  only,  the  municipal  authorities  are  required  to  con- 


Schroder,  de  legibus  in  commodum  mente  alienatorum,  197. 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  555 

fine.  The  Penal  Code,  art.  341,  inflicts  the  punishment  of 
hard  labor  on  any  one  who  shall  arrest,  detain,  or  sequester 
the  person  of  another  not  charged  with  any  criminal  offence, 
without  the  order  of  the  constituted  authorities.  The  4th 
article  of  the  charter  of  1830,  also  declares  that  "  no  person 
can  be  pursued  or  arrested,  except  in  cases  provided  by  the 
law,  and  in  the  forms  that  it  prescribes."  Of  course,  estab- 
lishments for  the  reception  of  the  insane  exist,  but  their  whole 
economy  is  regulated  by  their  respective  governments.  "  In 
many  departments,"  says  Esquirol,  "  it  is  sufficient  to  apply 
to  the  administration  of  the  hospital  or  asylum,  in  order  to 
obtain  the  admission  of  a  patient.  In  some  places  the 
authorization  of  the  mayor  is  necessary,  if  the  establishment 
is  communal ;  of  the  prefect,  if  it  is  departmental.  In  a  few 
establishments,  the  patient  must  be  interdicted  before  he  can 
gain  admission."  The  necessity  of  express  legislation  on 
this  subject  is  generally  felt,  and  within  the  last  year  or  two, 
it  has  received  the  attention  of  the  legislature,  but  with 
what  result  we  are  unable  to  say.  In  the  civil  code  of  Aus- 
tria, it  is  ordained  that  no  person  can  be  confined  on  account 
of  insanity,  who  has  not  been  legally  declared  to  be  insane 
by  physicians  appointed  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  his 
mental  condition.  In  this  country,  the  law  as  it  relates  to 
the  isolation  of  the  insane,  is  in  very  nearly  the  same  con- 
dition as  that  of  France,  except  in  those  States  which  pos- 
sess hospitals  that  are  controlled  and  supported  by  govern- 
ment. Isolation  is  also  sanctioned  by  the  law  when  adopted 
as  a  measure  of  police.  In  England,  a  person  cannot  be  ad- 
mitted into  any  lunatic  asylum,  without  a  certificate  of  his 
insanity,  signed  by  two  physicians,  within  seven  days  of  his 
admission,  and  they  must  state  the  facts  on  which  their  opin- 
ion is  founded. 

§  584.  The  seclusion  of  a  person  from  his  family  and  cus- 
tomary pursuits,  on  account  of  insanity,  should  be  regulated 
by  provisions  having  reference  to  the  varying  circumstances 
that  may  arise,  and  applicable  with  a  suitable  degree  of  ease 
and  quietness.  A  uniform  mode  of  proceeding  would  secure 
no  advantages  that  would  not  be  counterbalanced,  either  by 


556  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

a  degree  of  publicity  and  delay  exceedingly  painful  in  a 
majority  of  cases,  while  totally  unnecessary  and  uncalled  for, 
or  by  a  want  of  that  impartial  inquisition  which,  in  a  few 
cases,  is  necessary  to  remove  every  suspicion  of  unfair  deal- 
ing. It  seems  better  to  suit  the  provision  to  the  nature  of  the 
case,  and  on  this  principle  we  have  acted  in  making  the  fol- 
lowing suggestions. 

§  585.  When  a  person  is  struck  down  by  disease,  and  is 
no  longer  capable  of  caring  for  himself,  he  is  completely  de- 
pendent on  those  around  him  —  his  family,  his  relatives,  his 
neighbors,  and  even  the  passing  stranger.  To  this  appeal  for 
sympathy  and  care,  the  ties  of  kindred,  the  holiest  instincts 
of  our  nature,  a  sense  of  duty,  a  decent  regard  for  the  opin- 
ion of  mankind,  each  or  all  prompt  a  favorable  answer,  and 
the  sacred  ministry  thus  exercised  is  instinctively  regarded 
with  feelings  of  respect  and  honor.  It  does  not  appear,  at 
first  sight  at  least,  that  there  is  any  difference  in  the  relations 
of  the  parties,  when  the  disease  is  mental,  instead  of  bodily. 
The  essential  conditions  of  the  case  are  the  same.  The  indi- 
vidual, if  not  utterly  helpless,  is  incapable  of  judging  what  is 
best  for  himself,  and  needs  appropriate  attendance  and 
medical  treatment.  Here  then,  as  in  case  of  bodily  disease, 
the  duty  of  making  such  provisions  as  the  welfare  of  the 
patient  may  require,  naturally  falls  upon  those  immediately 
around  him  or  near  him.  Nature  prompts  it,  the  common 
sentiment  of  mankind  expects  it,  in  most  cases  all  parties 
are  ultimately  satisfied  with  it,  and  the  legislature  should 
legalize  it. 

§  586.  The  doctrine  of  the  common  lav/  on  this  point 
has  not  been  interpreted  with  the  uniformity  which  the  im- 
portance of  the  subject  requires.  Not  long  since,  Chief  Jus- 
tice Shaw,  of  Massachusetts,  laid  down  the  broad  principle, 
that  the  friends  of  an  insane  person  are  authorized  in  confin- 
ing him  in  a  hospital,  by  "  the  great  law  of  humanity."  ^  On 
the  other  hand,  within  a  year  or  two,  the  Lord  Chief  Baron 
of  the  English  Court  of  Exchequer  incidentally  remarked,  that 

'  In  the  matter  of  Oakcs,  Law  Reporter,  viii.  122. 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  557 

insane  persons  could  not  be  legally  held  in  confinement  un- 
less dangerous  to  themselves  or  to  others.^  In  this  opinion 
he  was  undoubtedly  wrong,  because  the  legislature  had 
granted  the  power  (8  &  9  Victoria,  c.  100),  but  it  indicates 
his  interpretation  of  the  common  law  on  the  subject.  If, 
therefore,  the  friends  of  the  insane  are  to  enjoy  the  privilege 
of  providing  for  them  in  such  3,  manner  as  they  may  deem 
most  suitable  for  their  welfare,  there  seems  to  be  a  manifest 
propriety  in  securing  it  by  a  legislative  act.  The  provision 
which,  in  accordance  with  these  views  we  have  adopted,  in- 
sures the  indispensable  requisites  of  a  great  majority  of 
cases,  —  despatch,  domestic  privacy,  and  those  natural  rights 
that  flow  from  the  family  relation, —  and,  considered  in  all  its 
aspects,  is  both  wise  and  humane.  That  the  power  might 
sometimes  be  abused,  is  not  denied,  but  such  a  result  would 
be  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  and  would  be  effectually 
remedied  by  the  provisions  hereafter  mentioned.  For  obvi- 
ous reasons  we  would  give  the  same  power  to  the  guardian 
over  his  ward,  and  to  the  proper  municipal  authorities  over 
their  paupers. 

§  587.  A  very  different  provision  is  required  for  another, 
smaller  class  of  cases,  in  order  to  secure,  in  the  fullest  degree, 
the  rights  of  persons  and  the  confidence  of  the  public.  We 
all  know  that  insanity  does  not  always  derange  every  opera- 
tion of  the  mind,  and  deprive  the  patient  of  every  attribute  of 
a  rational  being.  Under  certain  circumstances,  his  conduct 
and  conversation  are  marked  by  ordinary  propriety  and  dis- 
cretion, and  to  those  who  regard  him  superficially,  he  appears 
to  be  governed  by  the  ordinary  feelings  and  motives  of  men. 
At  the  worst,  he  may  be  supposed  to  be  only  a  little  eccen- 
tric, or  to  give  way  too  readily  to  passion  and  impulse.  To 
those,  however,  whose  relations  towards  him  place  them 
immediately  under  his  control,  and  whose  presence  furnishes 
no  check  upon  the  manifestations  of  his  character,  he  appears 
very  differently.  They  witness  a  degree  of  mental  excite- 
ment and  restlessness,  an  extravagance  in  his  prospects  and 

*  Nottidge  v.  Ripley,  Law  Reporter,  n.  s.  li.  277. 

<    47* 


558  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

plans,  a  readiness  to  embark  in  new  and  hazardous  specula- 
tions, an  iiidulgence  in  habits  of  living  beyond  his  means  or 
unsuitable  to  his  condition,  an  impatience  at  the  slightest 
show  of  opposition  or  restraint,  unfounded  suspicions  and 
jealousies,  and  the  most  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  conduct  in 
his  family,  all  which  traits  are  foreign  to  his  natural  charac- 
ter, and  perhaps  of  recent  origin.  He  at  last  evinces  so  little 
control  over  his  passions,  or  is  so  completely  possessed  by 
his  morbid  fancies,  that  the  peace  and  comfort  of  those  in  any 
way  dependent  upon  him,  are  destroyed,  and  they  are  in 
momentary  fear  of  personal  violence.  Besides  this,  he  may 
be  squandering  his  estate  in  a  series  of  ruinous  undertakings, 
and  rapidly  bringing  his  family  to  beggary,  or  plunging  into 
unlawful  indulgences  that  fill  them  with  shame  and  sorrow. 
Now  when  such  a  person  is  placed  by  his  friends  in  a  hos- 
pital, the  discipline  of  which  is  necessary,  not  only  to  secure 
the  safety  of  others,  but  to  restore  him  to  his  natural  and 
healthy  condition  of  mind,  he  declares  that  he  is  the  victim 
of  an  iniquitous  cabal,  and  so  plausible  and  ingenious  are  his 
representations,  that  the  most  intelligent  and  cautious  are 
sometimes  led  to  suspect  that  he  has  not  been  fairly  dealt 
with.  Wearied  by  his  incessant  importunities,  and  doubtful, 
perhaps,  of  the  propriety  of  his  confinement,  he  is  finally 
discharged  by  the  directors  of  the  institution,  to  renew  the 
same  course  of  ruinous  enterprises  and  domestic  tyranny, 
with  the  addition,  it  may  be,  of  a  lawsuit  against  his  friends 
for  false  imprisonment.  Even  though  he  fail  by  these  manoeu- 
vres to  shorten  the  period  of  his  confinement  before  it  has 
produced  any  salutary  effects,  his  mind  is  kept  in  a  state  of 
agitation  and  wrath  that  might,  in  some  degree,  have  been 
avoided,  if  the  .measure  had  come  from  a  different  quarter, 
and  with  some  of  the  formalities  of  a  legal  procedure. 

§  588.  The  condition  of  a  family  whose  head  is  laboring 
under  the  form  of  insanity  described  above,  is  sufficiently 
painful  and  embarrassing,  without  imposing  upon  it  the 
necessity  of  adopting  the  only  appropriate  measure,  unaided 
by  any  of  the  sanctions  and  helps  of  law.  To  provoke  the 
wrath  of  such  a  person  by  what  he  would  consider  the  most 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  559 

flagrant  indignity  and  outrage,  would  be  too  fearful  a  thing 
to  be  ventured  upon  until  patience  had  been  tried  to  the 
utmost  limit  of  endurance,  or  some  overt  act  of  violence 
called  for  immediate  action.  Neither  is  it  a  small  thing  to 
provoke  the  criticism  of  the  public  by  taking  a  step  of  this 
importance,  the  necessity  of  which  may  not  be  unequivocally 
obvious  to  the  world.  In  such  cases  the  public  is  severe  in 
its  judgments,  and  not  particularly  careful  to  weigh  the  par- 
ties in  an  even  balance. 

§  5S9.  In  the  same  category,  too,  we  would  place  those 
persons  who  are  insane  enough  to  require  confinement,  but 
have  no  relatives  or  friends  with  sufficient  interest  in  their 
welfare  to  induce  them  to  assume  so  unpleasant  and  respon- 
sible a  duty  as  that  of  placing  them  in  confinement. 

§  590.  After  due  consideration  of  the  various  means  that 
might  be  adopted  for  determining  the  question  of  seclusion, 
in  regard  to  the  cases  above-mentioned,  we  .can  think  of 
none  better  than  that  of  a  commission,  so  constituted  that 
its  decisions  shall  command  the  respect  and  confidence  of  the 
community.  It  should  consist  of  not  less  than  four  nor  more 
than  six  persons,  one  of  them  a  lawyer  and  another  a  physi- 
cian, for  the  purpose  of  giving  a  suitable  direction  to  the 
inquisition,  who  should  have  the  party  brought  before  them, 
hear  the  testimony,  and  render  a  decision  accordingly.  Of 
course  they  should  have  the  power  of  ordering  him  to  be  held 
in  custody  pending  the  proceedings.  The  authority  appoint- 
ing the  commission  should  be  as  accessible  as  possible,  to 
insure  the  necessary  despatch,  and  might  be  lodged  with  the 
judges  of  the  law  courts,  and  also  with  judges  of  probate 
where  these  functionaries  are  at  all  distinguished  from  the 
average  run  of  men  by  superior  knowledge  and  respectabil- 
ity. The  application  should  be  made  in  writing  by  some 
friend  or  relative,  and  should  present  the  grounds  on  which 
the  allegation  of  insanity  is  to  be  established.  The  success 
of  this  proceeding  would  very  much  depend  on  the  character 
of  the  individuals  composing  the  commission,  and  no  act  of 
the  legislature  could  regulate  that  exactly.  It  is  probable, 
however,  that  the  importance  would  be  felt  of  intrusting  so 


560  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OP  INSANITY. 

delicate  and  responsible  a  duty  to  men,  whose  intelligence 
and  virtues  had  given  them  a  merited  weight  of  character  in 
the  public  estimation. 

§  591.  There  is  still  another  class  of  the  insane  for  whose 
committal  a  mode  of  procedure  is  required,  different  from 
both  of  those  already  mentioned,  —  those  whose  disorder 
renders  them  dangerous  to  the  community,  and  who  have 
no  friends  to  take  them  in  charge,  and  provide  for  them  ac- 
cording as  their  necessities  may  require.  Most,  if  not  all  the 
New  England  States,  and  perhaps  others,  have  a  statute 
which  gives  to  a  magistrate  the  power  of  committing  to 
some  place  of  confinement,  "persons  furiously  mad  and  dan- 
gerous to  be  at  large."  This  provision  should  be  retained. 
Indeed,  there  seems  to  be  no  other  way  by  which  this  class 
of  persons  can  receive  the  attentions  that  common  feelings 
of  humanity  and  a  regard  for  public  order  would  dictate. 
As  they  are,  for  the  most  part,  destitute  and  friendless,  and 
become  a  charge  to  the  community  where  they  are  arrested, 
there  can  be  no  inducement  to  seek  their  confinement  un- 
justly. It  would  not  be  impossible,  certainly,  for  wicked  and 
cunning  men  to  make  the  statute  an  instrument  of  great 
injustice;  but  the  objection  arising  from  such  a  contingency 
may  be  obviated  by  the  fact,  that  if  the  case  present  any 
suspicious  circumstances,  the  magistrate  may  decline  to  take 
cognizance  thereof,  and  refer  the  parties  to  the  provisions  just 
mentioned. 

§  592.  Having  thus  provided  for  the  restraint  of  the  dif- 
ferent classes  of  persons  who  may  require  it,  the  next  step 
would  be  to  provide  for  their  restoration  to  liberty.  For  the 
most  part,  the  latter  measure,  like  the  original  restraint, 
should  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  family  or  friends.  The 
same  authority,  also,  which  commits  persons  "furiously  mad 
and  dangerous  to  be  at  large,"  should  have  the  power  of  dis- 
charging tliem,  when  satisfied  that  the  original  objects  of 
their  confinement  will  be  properly  cared  for.  It  is  proper, 
too,  that  those  who  have  guaranteed  the  payment  of  the  ex- 
penses of  an  insane  person  in  a  place  of  confinement,  should 
have  the  power  of  removing  him,  if  that  is  requisite  in  order 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  561 

to  close  their  liabilities.  Reasons  may  occur  that  would  ren- 
der it  as  expedient  to  withdraw  from  such  an  obligation,  as 
it  might  have  been  to  assume  it  originally,  and  if,  by  the  con- 
ditions of  the  obligation,  the  patient  must  be  removed  before 
it  can  be  discharged,  then  most  clearly  the  surety  should  have 
that  powder. 

§  593.  ■  There  now  remains  but  one  more  class  whose  dis- 
charge from  confinement  we  have  to  consider,  —  those  who 
claim  their  liberty  on  the  ground  of  being  unjustly  confined. 
The  injustice  may  consist  in  being  .confined  without  having 
ever  been  insane,  or  in  the  confinement  being  continued 
after  recovery  from  the  disorder.  We  can  conceive  of  no 
better  mode  of  meeting  such  cases,  than  by  a  process  very 
similar  to  that  by  which  those  are  committed  whose  friends 
do  not  choose  to  assume  the  responsibility.  There  would 
be  a  convenience  in  making  the  trustees,  directors,  or  by 
whatever  name  that  body  may  be  called  which  has  the  gen- 
eral supervision  of  the  hospital,  this  committee,  as  they  could 
discharge  the  duty  quietly  and  cheaply,  with  the  peculiar 
advantage  of  having  often  observed  the  party  in  question  and 
heard  his  statements  from  his  own  lips.  But  their  official 
connection  with  the  institution  might  be  thought  to  bias 
their  opinions,  and  therefore  there  seems  to  be  a  propriety 
in  forming  the  commission  of  persons  having  no  previous 
knowledge  of  the  parties.  It  should  be  an  indispensable  con- 
dition that  they  should  have  an  interview  with  the  patient, 
but  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  should  be  attended  with  any 
formalities,  or  that  he  should  be  aware  of  its  object.  The 
proceeding  is  in  the  nature  of  an  inquisition,  not  a  trial  by 
jury,  and  hence  the  commission  may  not  be  bound  by  any 
formal  rules  in  pursuing  their  object.  Indeed,  the  great  ad- 
vantage of  this  method  over  a  judicial  investigation  procured 
by  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  is,  that  it  is  not  necessarily 
attended  with  a  degree  of  formality  and  publicity  calculated 
to  excite  injuriously  the  mind  of  an  insane  person,  and  also 
to  produce  a  mischievous  effect  upon  the  minds  of  other 
patients  in  the  same  establishment. 

§  594.    It  often  happens,  that  insane  persons  are  attacked 


562  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

with  bodily  disease,  when  their  friends  are  desirous  of  taking 
them  home,  and  contributing  whatever  may  be  in  their 
power  to  the  solace  of  their  declining  days.  The  character 
of  their  disorder  also  often  changes,  so  that  they  can  be 
safely  managed  at  their  own  homes ;  and  sometimes  there 
may  be  reasons  for  merely  changing  the  place  of  confine- 
ment. In  all  these  contingencies,  the  grounds  on  which  the 
discharge  of  the  patient  is  sought  for,  are  so  reasonable,  that 
the  order  of  a  judge  should  be  sufficient  without  the  inter- 
ference of  a  commission, 

§  595.  The  above  provisions,  we  apprehend,  will  meet 
every  contingency  incident  to  the  confinement,  or  discharge 
therefrom,  of  the  insane.  They  possess  the  necessary  requi- 
sites of  despatch,  convenience,  cheapness,  and  regard  to  pri- 
vate feelings.  By  suiting  the  provision  to  the  particular 
emergency,  we  avoid  the  insuperable  objections  that  would 
lie  against  any  single  provision  intended  for  application  to 
all  classes  of  cases.  By  far  the  larger  class  require  no  legal 
procedure  at  all,  and  are  better  left  to  the  management  of  the 
family  or  friends.  To  subject  them  to  any  legal  formalities 
beyond  a  compliance  with  a  few  simple  rules,  would  be  to 
inflict  needless  pain,  and  thus  produce  a  certain  evil  in  order 
to  avoid  a  contingent  one.  The  much  smaller  class,  which 
require  some  judicial  investigation,  are  provided  for  by  a 
mode  of  procedure,  familiar  to  our  practices,  accessible, 
cheap,  and  well  calculated  to  satisfy  the  public  mind.  The 
commission,  let  it  be  observed,  is  its  only  essential  feature. 
The  manner  in  which  it  shall  be  constituted,  and  the  au- 
thority from  which  it  shall  emanate,  are  subordinate,  though 
important  points,  which  must  or  ought  to  vary  with  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  particular  community.  To  insure  the 
successful  working  of  the  system,  the  appointment  of  the 
commission  should  be  conferred  upon  functionaries  having 
some  practical  acquaintance  with  law  proceedings,  and  suffi- 
ciently cultivated  and  enlightened  to  be  above  the  influence 
of  vulgar  prejudices.  On  this  account  we  have  selected  for 
the  purpose,  the  justices  of  the  law  courts,  and  perhaps  those 
of  the  probate  courts,  and  in  sparsely  populated  parts  of  our 


INTERDICTION   AND   ISOLATION.  563 

country,  the  public  convenience  might  be  served  by  adding 
to  them  the  sheriff  of  the  county.  In  most  respects,  it  would 
be  decidedly  better  if  the  duties  of  these  commissions  were 
performed  by  a  single  permanent  board  appointed  by  the 
government.  The  members  of  such  a  board  would  naturally 
make  themselves  acquainted,  by  all  the  means  in  their 
power,  with  the  subjects  of  inquiry  that  would  come  before 
them,  and  frequent  practice  would  give  that  familiarity  with 
their  duty  that  would  enable  them  to  avoid  mistake,  and 
inspire  confidence  in  their  decisions.  The  only  conceivable 
objection  to  the  plan  would  be,  the  large  amount  of  travelling 
expenses  to  which  it  would  lead,  especially  in  large  States, 
and  this  would  be  sufficient,  probably,  to  outweigh  its  ac- 
knowledged advantages. 

§  596.  In  order  to  prevent  any  infringement  of  the  laws 
respecting  the  confinement  of  the  insane,  the  first  step  would 
be,  to  render  it  a  penal  offence  for  the  directors  or  superin- 
tendents of  hospitals  to  receive  patients,  except  in  strict  con- 
formity to  the  laws.  In  respect  to  persons  admitted  under 
the  first  section,  a  certificate  of  insanity  from  one  or  more 
physicians  should  be  required,  as  well  as  a  written  request 
for  admission  from  some  relative  or  friend.  Beyond  this  we 
do  not  know  that  any  safeguard  would  be  practicable  or 
necessary,  and,  considering  the  provisions  that  furnish  a 
remedy  against  any  possible  abuse,  we  see  not  how  any  fault 
can  be  reasonably  found  with  it. 


CHAPTER     XXIX. 


DUTIES    OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES. 


§  597.  Books  on  Medical  Jurisprudence  usually  contain 
a  chapter  on  Medical  Evidence,  in  which  the  general  sub- 
ject is  discussed.  There  are  some  points,  however,  connected 
with  such  evidence  in  cases  involving  questions  of  insanity, 
which  require  a  more  special  consideration.  Cases  of  this 
kind  have  now  become  so  common,  that  it  is  highly  impor- 
tant for  the  luedical  witness  to  know  precisely  what  are  his 
duties,  as  well  as  the  difficulties  which  he  is  likely  to  encoun- 
ter. 

§  59S.  Unlike  the  ordinary  witness  who  relates  only  what 
comes  within  the  cognizance  of  his  ov\^n  senses,  the  expert 
testifies  respecting  the  inferences  that  may  be  drawn  from  the 
facts  related  by  others.  In  other  words,  certain  facts  being 
given,  the  expert  is  required  to  state  the  general  principle 
which  they  indicate  in  regard  to  the  question  at  issue.  This 
method  of  obtaining  information  on  scientific  subjects  is  as 
inappropriate  as  possible,  but,  in  this  respect,  our  rules  'of 
evidence  recognize  no  distinction  between  matters  of  fact  and 
matters  of  opinion.  In  regard  to  the  latter  as  well  as  the 
former,  the  testimony  is  off-hand,  with  no  other  preparation 
than  what  may  have  been  anticipated  by  a  shre\^d  conjec- 
ture as  to  the  course  of  inquiry  which  the  examination  may 
pursue.  Objectionable,  however,  as  this  method  is,  it  is  the 
only  one  known  to  our  laws,  and  its  requirements  must  be 
met  in  the  best  possible  manner. 

§  599.  The  expert  should  be  prepared  for  his  duty  by 
a  well-ordered,  well-digested,  comprehensive  knowledge  of 
mental   phenomena   in    a  sound  as  well  as   unsound  state. 


DUTIES   OF  MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  •  565 

The  question  which,  in  one  shape  or  another,  is  put  to  him, 
is  whether  or  not  certain  mental  phenomena  indicate  mental 
unsoundness.     The  true  character  of  doubtful  cases  cannot 
be   discerned  at  a  glance.     The  delicate  shades  of  disorder 
can  only  be  recognized  by  one  who  has  closely  studied  the 
operations  of  the   healthy  mind,  and  is  familiar  with  that 
broad,  debatable   ground  that  lies   between   unquestionable 
sanity  and  unquestionable  insanity.     How  little  dependence 
could  be  placed  on  the  testimony  of  a  physician  concerning 
the  results  of  a  cadaveric  autopsy,  who  has  not,  by  frequent 
inspection,  made  himself  acquainted  with  the  healthy  appear- 
ance of  the  organs.     How  this  knowledge  is  to  be  obtained, 
is  a  question  not  easily  answered.     In  books  on  mental  phi- 
losophy the  various  faculties  and  operations  of  the  mind  are 
unfolded  and  described,  with  a  show  of  scientific  precision. 
But  the  expert  will  derive  from  them  little  aid  in  preparing 
himself  for  his  duties,  for  the  reason  that  their  investigations 
are  partial,  being  confined  chiefly  to    the  individual's  own 
mind,  overlooking  the  manifestations  of  mind  as  affected  by 
disease.     If  any  books  are  to  be.  studied,  it  should  be  those 
immortal  works  which  represent  men  in  the  concrete,  living, 
acting,  speaking  men,  displaying  the  affections  and  passions, 
the  manners  and  motives  of  actual  men.    Locke  and  Stewart 
will   here   be   found   of  less   service   than    Shakspeare   and 
Moliere.    But  better  than  all  books,  though  their  aid  is  not  to 
be  despised,  are  personal  observation,  and  study  of  mental 
phenomena  as  strikingly  exhibited  in  real  life.     Every  men- 
tal peculiarity,  especially  in  the  normal  condition,  and,  above 
all,  those  traits  of.  character  that  mark  the  transition  between 
health  and  disease,  should  be  closely  observed.     The  expert 
should  learn  to  distinguish  the  thoughts  and  manners  of  the 
one  condition  from  those  of  the  other,  and  endeavor  to  gain  a 
rqady  perception  of  the  general  air  and  tone  characteristic  of 
each.     No  kind  of  preparation  will  better  fit  him  for  perform- 
ing the  peculiar  duty  of  an  expert,  which  consists  in  forming 
opinions  respecting  mental  conditions,  from  a  few  and  per- 
haps disconnected  facts.     Without  it  he  will  be  constantly 
liable  to  the  mistake  of  regarding  a  trait  or  act  as  indicative 

■      48 


566  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

of  disease,  for  no  other  reason  perhaps,  than  because  it  occurs 
in  a  case  supposed  to  be  doubtful,  and  of  confounding  natu- 
ral eccentricities  and  impulses  with  the  manifestations  of  ac- 
tive insanity.  The  expert  who  is  deficient  in  this  kind  of 
knowledge  can  never  be  a  reliable  witness  in  questions  of 
insanity. 

§  600.  However  well  prepared  the  witness  may  be,  he  will 
find  it  necessary  to  be  on  his  guard  against  another  disad- 
vantage incident  to  our  method  of  eliciting  evidence.  He 
is  called  by  the  party  that  has  reason  to  believe,  that  his  tes- 
timony will  serve  the  purpose  of  the  latter.  He  is,  in  form 
at  least,  that  party's  witness,  engaged  by  him,  and  by  him 
made  acquainted  with  all  that  he  knows  respecting  the  merits 
of  the  case.  Counsel  look  at  one  side  of  the  question  only, 
and  naturally  endeavor  to  make  the  expert  participate  in  their 
views,  while  their  intercourse  is  marked  by  a  kind  of  cor- 
diality and  fellow-feeling  somewhat  adverse  to  that  independ- 
ence which  the  expert  should  never  relinquish.  The  conse- 
quence of  such  a  relation  is,  that  he  can  scarcely  help  testify- 
ing under  a  bias.  In  many  cases,  no  doubt,  this  would  be 
unavoidable  under  any  mode  of  procedure,  and  the  only 
thing  the  expert  can  do,  is  to  shun  the  evils  of  this  arrange- 
ment as  much  as  he  possibly  can. 

There  are  other  points  in  regard  to  which  an  expert  not 
much  familiar  with  courts,  may  be  benefited  by  a  word  or 
two  of  advice. 

§  601.  In  the  first  place,  let  him  beware  how  he  suffers  the 
dread  of  being  thought  ignorant  of  his  profession,  to  draw 
from  him  a  positive  and  unqualified  reply,  where  a  modest 
doubt  would  better  express  the  extent  of  his  knowledge.  It 
is  not  expected,  that  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  without  any 
special  preparation,  he  should  always  be  ready  to  express  an 
opinion  on  an  obscure  point,  or  one  somewhat  remote  from 
the  line  of  his  ordinary  duties.  Neither  court  nor  counsel 
ever  commit  a  folly  like  this.  They  are  careful  to  make 
their  opinions  the  result  of  calm,  deliberate  reflection,  and 
thorough  research.  And  why  should  the  physician  do  other- 
wise?    Life  and  death  may  be  involved  in  his  testimony, 


DUTIES    OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  567 

and  the  consequence  of  his  rash  confidence  may  be  the  ruin 
of  a  fellow  being,  and  a  harvest  of  self-upbraiding  to  himself. 
He  loses  no  reputation  necessarily,  by  honestly  stating  that 
he  is  unprepared  to  give  an  opinion  without  mature  consider- 
ation, but  he  cannot  hplp  losing  much  by  taking  the  opposite 
course.  He  should  also  bear  in  mind  that  the  object  of 
counsel,  as  everybody  knows,  is  not  so  much  to  elicit  the 
truth  as  to  serve  their  client,  and  thus  every  particular  ques- 
tion, as  well  as  the  general  tenor  of  the  examination,  is 
adapted  to  this  purpose.  They  form  an  hypothesis,  or  lay 
down  a  plan  of  Operations,  and  then  frame  their  questions  so 
as  to  bring  out  the  wished  for  reply.  Let  the  witness  never 
forget,  therefore,  that  every  question  has  its  object,  and  take 
care  that  his  answer  be  carefully  considered. 

§  602.  It  also  happens  that  an  ignorance  of  medical  terms, 
if  not  of  medical  subjects,  often  prevents  the  counsel  from 
using  language  with  that  degree  of  precision  which  is  indis- 
pensable in  the  discussion  of  scientific  subjects.  The  wit- 
ness should  insist,  therefore,  on  having  the  question  clearly 
expressed,  and  never  allow  himself  to  answer  a  question 
he  does  not  thoroughly  comprehend.  Equally  necessary  is 
it  for  him  to  be  careful  how  he  returns  categorical  answers 
to  the  questions  put  to  him,  for  they  are  apt  to  leave  wrong 
impressions  upon  those  who  are  imperfectly  acquainted  with 
the  subject,  and  may  be  adroitly  used  to  embarrass  the  wit- 
ness and  discredit  his  testimony.  If  he  would  avoid  this 
result,  he  must,  in  spite  of  the  authoritative  demand  for  a  yes 
or  a  no,  so  qualify  and  explain  his  answers,  as  to  prevent  any 
mistake  of  their  meaning,  and  no  dread  of  amplification 
should  deter  him  from  this  purpose.  Let  him  bear  in  mind 
that  he  has  an  unquestionable  right  to  express  his  opinion  in 
his  own  way,  and  that  he  is  put  upon  the  stand,  not  solely 
to  answer  such  questions  as  the  ingenuity  of  counsel  may 
prompt  to  further  their  ends,  but  to  give  an  opinion  on  a 
scientific  subject  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  cause  of 
justice.  Such,  in  point  of  fact,  notwithstanding  our  modes 
of  procedure,  is  the  proper  function  of  the  expert,  and,  as 
courts  generally  are    disposed    to    receive  any  light  he  can 


568  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

furnish,  they  will  sustain  him  in  his  endeavor  to  make  him- 
self thoroughly  understood.  Indeed,  they  are  less  likely  to 
yield  their  confidence  to  categorical  and  unqualified  state- 
ments, indicative  as  they  must  be,  either  of  ignorance  or 
trepidation,  than  to  the  cautious  and  guarded  manner  charac- 
teristic of  true  science. 

§  603.  The  medical  witness  must  be  on  his  guard  against 
another  favorite  manoeuvre  of  counsel  —  that  of  supposing 
cases,  and  drawing  out  of  the  witness  an  opinion  that  may 
be  advantageously  applied  to  the  case  in  hand.  It  is  easy 
enough  for  an  active  imagination  to  create  a'  case  apparently 
favorable  to  a  certain  hypothesis.  And  this  is  its  radical 
fault,  that  it  is  without  life  or  substantiality,  a  mere  figment 
of  the  brain.  It  is  a  well-settled  principle,  that  in  matters  of 
science,  opinions  must  not  be  formed  on  a  partial  statement 
of  facts  ;  but  how  can  any  statement  be  regarded  as  com- 
plete or  incomplete,  which  is  professedly  fictitious  ?  In  a 
case  where  the  validity  of  a  will  was  contested  on  the  ground 
of  the  insanity  of  one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  it  ap- 
peared in  evidence,  that  he  had,  at  one  time,  entertained 
some  gross  delusions  and  attempted  suicide,  but  that  for  a 
few  months  previous  to  the  execution  of  the  will,  he  had 
renounced  the  delusions,  pursued  his  studies,  wrote  a  very 
good  book,  and  in  short,  seemed  to  be  entirely  like  himself, 
with  the  exception  of  unusual  shyness  and  desire  for  solitude. 
To  one  of  the  experts  who  had  expressed  the  opinion  that 
this  person  was  of  sound  mind,  this  question  was  put;  — 
"  Supposing  he  had  committed  murder  about  the  time  he 
witnessed  the  will,  would  you  have  considered  him  as  mor- 
ally responsible  for  the  act  ? "  The  question  was  artfully 
founded  upon  the  imputed  disposition  of  the  expert  to  admit 
too  readily  the  plea  of  insaiiity  in  criminal  cases.  The  court 
did  not  permit  it  to  be  answered,  but  the  reply  would  have 
availed  the  party  nothing.  An  act  of  homicide  is  a  fact,  or 
more  properly  a  body  of  facts,  a  knowledge  of  every  one  of 
which  may  be  necessary  to  throw  any  light  on  the  mental 
condition  of  the  person  committing  it.  Nothing  could  be 
more  presumptuous  than  to  form  an  opinion  in  such  a  case, 


DUTIES    OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  569 

without  an  exact  knowledge  of  all,  even  the  minutest  of  the 
circumstances  attending  it.  Here  was -an  endeavor  to  draw 
out  a  professional  opinion  on  an  abstract  idea,  and  even  if  a 
tissue  of  circumstances  had  been  supposed,  they  would  have 
formed  no  ground  for  an  opinion. 

§  604.  Another  professional  manoeuvre  of  a  kindred  nature, 
is  that  of  selecting  one  or  more  particulars  which  have  been 
adduced  among  the  indications  of  insanity,  and  then  asking 
the  medical  witness  if  he  regards  that  as  a  proof  of  insanity. 
It  is  always  one  of  those  things  which,  whatever  they  may 
signify  when  viewed  in  connection  with  one  another,  yet, 
singly  considered,  prove  nothing  respecting  the  mental  con- 
dition. And  it  is  for  this  very  reason,  that  the  attempt  is 
made  to  throw  the  expert  upon  the  horns  of  a  dilemma,  for, 
if  he  replies  in  the  negative,  he  appears  to  deny  what  he  has 
but  just  virtually  affirmed;  if  in  the  affirmative,  he  stultifies 
himself  in  his  eagerness  to  avoid  a  fancied  inconsistency. 
The  only  course  for  him  is,  to  state  the  general  principles 
which  no  one  sees  exemplified  oftener  than  himself;  that,  in 
a  large  proportion  of  cases,  insanity  is  manifested,  not  so 
much  by  any  particular  trait,  as  by  the  general  character  of 
the  person's  conduct  and  conversation,  as  compared  with 
that  which  he  exhibited  when  admitted  to  be  sane ;  that,  in 
regard  to  many,  patients,  it  would  be  impossible  to  mention 
di  single  trait  that  none  but  an  insane  man  would  exhibit; 
that  even  in  the  strongest  cases,  it  would  often  be  difficult 
to  give  reasons  for  a  belief  that  would  be  satisfactory  to  those 
who  have  no  practical  knowledge  of  insanity;  and  that  this 
difficulty  becomes  an  impossibility  when  the  indications  are 
obscure,  or  consist  more  in  the  general  style  of  the  conduct 
and  discourse  than  in  any  single  act  or  notion.  At  any  rate, 
let  him  firmly  decline  to  form  an  opinion  on  one  or  two 
selected  facts.  ^ 

§  605.  Lawyers  are  much  disposed  to  ask  for  a  definition 
of  insanity,  and  it  will  be  well  for  the  witness  to  be  prepared 
on  this  point,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  object  of  the  question 
is,  not  so  much  to  obtain  any  light  on  the  subject,  as  to  per- 
plex and  embarrass   him.     Medical  writers* have  exercised 

48* 


570  MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   OE   INSANITY. 

their  wits  in  seeking  what  they  are  pleased  to  call  a  definition 
of  insanity,  in  the  belief  that  if  once  discovered,  they  would 
know  precisely  what  insanity  is  and  what  it  is  not.  It  is 
generally  admitted,  that  no  one  has  yet  succeeded  in  accom- 
plishing this  laudable  purpose,  for  insanity  belongs  to  a  class 
of  phenomena  that  may  be  described  and  explained,  but  are 
not  the  proper  object  of  a  definition  ;  and  the  reason  why  an 
unexceptionable  one  has  not  appeared,  is  not  so  much  on 
account  of  the  obscurity  of  the  subject,  as  because  the  thing 
is  inappropriate  and  nugatory.  If  the  medical  witness  suffer 
himself  to  be  drawn  into  a  metaphysical  discussion,  he  will 
be  sure  to  be  worsted,  for  his  opponent  is  cool  and  prepared, 
while  he  is  taken  by  surprise,  and  unable  to  see  the  point  to 
which  he  is  dexterously  led. 

§  606.  The  witness  is  sometimes  asked  if  all  people  are 
not  more  or  less  insane,  and  if  all  crime  is  not  temporary 
madness.  The  object  of  the  question  is  to  excite  a  preju- 
dice against  the  plea  of  insanity  generally,  by  implying  that 
it  is  psed  to  shield  the  evil-doer  from  the  penal  consequences 
of  unbridled  passion.  Although  never  relevant  to  the  case 
in  hand,  yet  the  witness  may  sometimes  deem  it  proper  to 
return  a  formal  and  deliberate  answer;  and  if  his  views  on 
the  subject  agree  with  ours,  he  will  firmly  maintain  the  dis- 
tinction between  normal  passion  and  maniacal  fury, — be- 
tween the  infirmities  and  short-comings  of  a  limited  nature, 
and  the  manifestations  of  unequivocal  disease.  ■  If  people 
choose  to  set  up,  in  good  faith  or  otherwise,  a  fancied  ideal 
of  perfection,  and  regard  every  one  who  falls  short  of  it  as 
more  or  less  unsound,  the  only  objection  is  the  misapplica- 
tion of  terms ;  but  while  we  acknowledge  the  difficulty  some- 
times of  running  the  line  between  vice  and  insanity  where 
they  border  on  each  other,  for  the  most  part  they  are  wide 
enough  asunder  and  easily^istinguished.  Nature  draws  no 
dividing  lines  in  the  realms  of  moral  or  natural  science. 
Classes  and  orders  and  genera  are  merged  in  one  another,  and 
the  inquirer  is  ever  treading  upon  some  debatable  ground, 
where  the  clearest  distinctions  and  definitions  quite  vanish 
away.     Why  then  should  it  be  thought  so  strange,  that  the 


DUTIES   OF  MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  571 

empire  of  health  should  be  divided  by  no  palpable  line  from 
that  of  disease  ?  or  that  this  fact  does  not  authorize  the  con- 
clusion that  their  respective  phenomena  can  seldom  be  accu- 
rately distinguished  from  one  another  ?  Our  knowledge  of 
the  philosophy  of  .crime,  if  we  may  use  the  phrase,  has  been 
greatly  enriched  of  late  years,  by  observations  in  hospitals, 
jails,  and  court-rooms,  in  the  purlieus  of  vice  and  the  walks  of 
respectable  society ;  but  the  old  landmarks,  the  fundamental 
distinctions,  remain  as  prominent  as  ever. 

§  607.  In  this  country  the  course  usually  adopted  for 
eliciting  the  opinion  of  the  expert,  is,  to  ask  him  if  he  has 
heard  the  evidence,  and  if  he  has,  and  supposing  it  to  be 
true,  what  is  his  opinion  respecting  the  mental  condition  of 
the  party.  In  CommoniveaUh  v.  Rogers  ^  (1844),  the  court  said, 
"  the  proper  question  to  be  put  to  the  professional  witnesses  is 
this  :  If  the  symptoms  and  indications  testified  to  by  other 
witnesses  are  proved,  and  if  the  jury  are  satisfied  of  the  truth 
of  them,  whether,  in  their  opinion,  the  party  was  insane,"  etc. 
"  They  are  not,"  the  court  adds,  "  to  judge  of  the  credit  of 
the  witnesses,  or  of  the  truth  of  the  facts  thus  testified  by 
others.  It  is  for  the  jury  to  decide  whether  such  facts  are  sat- 
isfactorily proved." 

§  608.  For  the  first  time  in  this  country,  a  different  rale  was 
adopted  by  the  federal  court  of  this  circuit,  in  United  States  v. 
McGlue^  (1851).  The -medical  experts  "were  not  allowed," 
says  the  court,  Mr.  Justice  Curtis  presiding,  "  to  give  their 
opinions  on  the  case.  It  is  not  the  province  of  the  expert  to 
draw  inferences  of  fact  from  the  evidence,  but  simply  to  de- 
clare his  opinion  on  a  known  or  hypothetical  state  of  facts ; 
and  therefore,  the  counsel  on  each  side  have  put  .to  the  phy- 
sicians such  states  of  fact  as  they  deem  warranted  by  the 
evidence,  and  have  taken  their  opinions  thereon.  If  you  con- 
sider any  of  these  states  of  fact  put  to  the  physicians  are 
proved,  then  the  opinions  thereon  are  admissible  evidence  to 
be  weighed  by  you.     Otherwise,  their  opinions  are  not  appli- 


7  Metcalf,  500.  '  ^  1  Curtis,  1. 


572  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

cable  to  this  case."  English  decisions  to  the  same  effect, 
chiefly  of  very  recent  occurrence,  may  be  found  in  the 
books,  and  may  be  briefly  noticed. 

§  609.  At  the  trial  of  Earl  Ferrers,^  in  1760,  his  counsel 
proposed  to  ask  the  medical  witness,  "whether  any  and 
which  of  the  circumstances  which  have  been  proved  by  the 
witnesses,  are  symptoms  of  lunacy."  Whereupon,  the  ques- 
tion being  objected  to  by  the  Attorney- General,  Baron  Hen- 
ley, who  presided  as  Lord  High  Steward,  observed  that  it 
"  tended  to  ask  the  doctor's  opinion  upon  the  result  of  the  evi- 
dence," and  that  he  "  must  be  asked  whether  this  or  that  fact 
is  a  symptom  of  lunacy."^  More  recently  in  Regina  v. 
Francis  ^  (1849),  a  physician  who  had  heard  all  the  evidence, 
was  asked  whether  from  all  he  had  thus  heard,  he  was  of 
opinion  that  the  prisoner,  at  the  time  he  did  the  act  in  ques- 
tion, was  of  unsound  mind.  The  court.  Baron  Alderson, 
interposed,  saying,  "  I  cannot  allow  such  a  question  to  be 
put;"  and  on  being  reminded  that  the  question  was  so  put 
in  McNaughton's  case,  he  added,  "  I  am  quite  sure  that 
decision  was  wrong.  The  proper  mode  is,  to  ask  what  are 
the  symptoms  of  insanity,  or  to  take  particular  facts,  and 
assuming  them  to  be  true,  to  ask  whether  they  indicate  insan- 
ity on  the  part  of  the  prisoner.  To  take  the  course  sug- 
gested, is  really  to  substitute  the  witness  for  the  jury,  and 
allow  him  to  decide  upon  the  whole  case."  Shortly  after,  in 
Doe  d.  Bainbrigge  v.  Bainbrigge^  (1850),  Lord  Campbell 
ruled  out  the  same  question,  and  for  the  same  reason.  In 
Reg.  V.  McNaughton^  (1843),  the  question  was  put  to  an 
expert  who  had  heard  the  whole  trial,  "judging  from  the  evi- 


1  19  Howell,  943. 

'^  This  ruling  of  Baron  Henley  ivhicli  we  have  given  in  full,  precisely  as 
reported,  besides  being  wrongly  attributed  to  Lord  Hardwicke,  is  wonder- 
fully amplified  and  embellished  in  Lord  Brougham's  version  of  it,  contained 
in  his  remarks  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  McNaughton  case.  See  67 
Hansard,  614. 

'  4  Cox,  C.  C.  57.  *  Ibid.  451. 

*  Report  of  the  trial  of  D.  McNaughton  by  Bousfield  &Merrett,  73. 


DUTIES    OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  573 

dence  which  you  have  heard,  what  is  youi*  opinion  as  to  the 
prisoner's  state  of  mind  ? "  and  no  objection  was  made. 
The  judges,  in  their  replies  to  the  questions  proposed  by  the 
House  of  Lords  in  consequence  of  this  trial,  say,  however, 
that  although  "  where  the  facts  are  admitted,  or  not  disputed, 
and  the  question  becomes  substantially  one  of  science  only, 
it  may  be  convenient  to  allow  the  questions  to  be  put  in  that 
general  form,  yet  the  same  cannot  be  insisted  on  as  a  matter 
of  right." 

§  610.  Such  are  the  principal  decisions  which  fnrnish  the 
authority  in  the  case  of  United  States  v.  McGlue,  for  depart- 
ing from  the  American  practice  on  this  subject.  It  will  be 
observed  that  in  these  cases,  the  question  to  the  expert,  disal- 
lowed by  the  court,  was  not  exactly  in  the  terms  of  that 
allowed  in  the  Rogers  case,  as  quoted  above.  Tn  the  former, 
.the  opinion  is  given  under  the  single  condition  that  the  ex- 
pert has  heard  all  the  evidence,  so  that  in  fact,  he  passes 
upon  the  evidence  precisely  like  the  jury.  In  the  latter,  there 
is  another  condition,  —  he  must  suppose  the  evidence  to  be 
true.  It  is  not  for  him  to  exercise  any  judgment  on  this 
point,  but  to  regard  it  as  all  true,  without  restriction  or 
qualification.  This  is  an  important  difference,  and  it  may 
be  fairly  questioned  whether  this  additional  ingredient  in 
the  terras  of  the  query,  would  not  have  obviated  the  practical 
difficulty  contemplated  by  the  English  courts.  It  thus  be- 
comes the  hypothetical  case  which  they  require.  It  may 
have  no  foundation  in  truth.  It  may  have  no  more  reality 
than  the  baseless  fabric  of  a  vision,  yet  for  the  present  pur- 
pose, it  is  to  be  regarded  as  true,  and  made  the  basis  of  an 
opinion.  It  is  immaterial,  certainly,  whether  the  hypotheti- 
cal case  is  presented  in  the  language  of  the  counsel,  or  of  the 
witnesses,  —  whether  it  is  to  be  received  directly  from  the 
latter,  or,  at  second  hand,  by  a  tedious  process  of  circum- 
locution. 

§  611.  That  the  rule  would  have  been  modified  in  the 
manner  here  supposed,  seems  not  unlikely  in  view  of  the 
fact,  that  in  other  cases,  similar  in  principle,  the  question  as 
put  in  the  Rogers  case,  was  allowed,  though  objected  to  by 


574  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF   INSANITY. 

counsel.  In  Malton  v.  NeshitO  (1824),  and  Fenwick  v.  Bell^ 
(1844), —  cases  resulting  from  collision  of  vessels — where  the 
question  at  issue  was  one  of  negligence  or  unskilfulness  on 
the  part  of  the  master,  nautical  men  who  had  attended  the 
trial,  were  asked  whether,  supposing  the  evidence  to  be  true, 
the  master  was,  in  their  opinion,  guilty  of  negligence.  In 
Beckwith  v.  Sidebotham^  (1807),  this  mode  of  putting  the 
question  was  sanctioned  by  Lord  Ellenborough.  The  ques- 
tion at  issue  was  the  unseaworthiness  of  a  vessel,  and  emi- 
nent surveyors  of  ships  were  allowed,  upon  the  evidence  of 
other  witnesses,  to  give  their  opinion  on  this  point. 

§  612.  The  principal,  if  not  the  only  objection,  to  this  mode 
of  putting  the  question  to  experts,  is  that  it  essentially  re- 
moves the  expert  from  the  witness-box  to  the  jury-box,  and 
allows  him  to  usurp  the  functions  of  both  judge  and  jury. 
How  a  witness  can  be  said  to  usurp  the  functions  of  the* 
jury,  who  may,  if  they  please,  render  a  verdict  in  the  very 
teeth  of  his  opinion,  is  not  very  obvious.  If  the  jury-choose 
to  shape  their  verdict  by  his  opinions,  they  no  more  surrender 
to  him  their  functions,  than  they  do  to  the  court  or  counsel 
whose  remarks  may  influence  their  decisions.  Neither  is  it 
easy  to  understand,  so  far  as  this  issue  is  concerned,  why  the 
opinion  of  the  expert  upon  the  facts  which  have  appeared  in 
evidence,  should  be  more  objectionable  than  his  opinion  upon 
a  hypothetical  state  of  facts,  because  if  the  latter  is  at  all 
similar  to  the  former,  his  opinion  upon  it  may  equally  affect 
the  conclusions  of  the  jury.  Lord  Brougham,  in  his  remark- 
able version  of  Baron  Henley's  decision,  seems  to  have  appre- 
ciated the  force  of  this  conclusion,  by  prohibiting  the  expert 
from  giving  his  opinion  upon  the  evidence  in  any  shape. 
"  You  shall  ask  them,"  he  says,  "  if  such  a  fact  is  an  indica- 
tion of  insanity  or  not  —  you  shall  ask  them,  upon  their 
experience,  what  is  an  indication  of  insanity  —  you  shall 
draw  from  them  what  amount  of  symptoms  constitute  insan- 
ity,"  "  but  you   must  not  ask  a  witness  whether  the  facts 

"  1  Car.  &  Payne,  70.  '  1  Car.  &  Kir.  312. 

»  1  Campbell,  116. 


DUTIES   OF  MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  575 

sworn  to  by  other  witnesses  preceding  him^  amount  to  a  proof 
of  insanity."  1  So,  too,  in  the  case  cited  above.  Lord  Camp- 
bell said,  "  The  witness  may  give  general  scientific  evidence 
on  the  causes  and  symptoms  of  insanity,  but  he  must  not 
express  an  opinion  as  to  the  result  of  the  evidence  he  had 
heard  with  reference  to  the  sanity  or  insanity  of  the  testa- 
tor." ^  Not  a  word  is  said  in  either  case  about  making  a 
hypothetical  statement  of  facts. 

§  613.    To  say  that  an  expert,  in  expressing  an  opinion 
upon  the  facts  given  in  evidence,  is  thereby  assuming  the 
functions  of  the  jury,  indicates  a  confusion  of  ideas  in   a 
quarter  where  it  would  have  been  least  expected.     Nothing 
would  seem  to  be  plainer  than  the  distinction  between  the 
duty  of  the  jury  and  that  of  the  expert,  and  that  distinction 
authorizes  no  apprehension  of  their  being  confounded  under 
any  tolerably  intelligent  administration  of  the  law.     The  jury 
are  bound  to  decide  for  themselves  as  to  the  truth  of  the  facts 
which  appear  in  evidence.     What  those  facts  may  signify,  it 
is  for  the  expert  to  say.     To  render  a  just  verdict,  the  jiary. 
must  of  necessity  rely  more  or  less  on  the  opinions  of  the 
experts.     So  far  as  those  opinions  are  allowed  to  influence 
the  verdict,  so  far  may  the  expert  be  said  to  assume  the  func- 
tions of  the  jury ;  but,  be  it  it  observed,  in  the  legitimate  per- 
formance of  his  own  part.     Perhaps  the  opinion  of  the  expert 
may  be  decisive  of  the  question  at  issue,  and  thus  determine 
the  verdict.     And  why  should  it  not  ?     If  that  opinion  is 
correct,  it  would  be  highly  reprehensible  in  the  jury  to  disre- 
gard it,  although  not  bound  by  any  legal  enactments.     When 
a  person  is  convicted  of  some  criminal  act,  though  regarded 
by  men  long  familiar  with  the  phenomena  of  insanity  to 
have  been  insane  at  the  time  of  its  commission,  the  jury  no 
more  deserve  the  praise  of  intelligence  and  courage,  than  if 
they  had  disregarded  the  calculations  of  a  mathematician  on 
a  question  of  water-power. 

§  614.    In  the  construction  of  a  doubtful  rule  of  evidence, 

1  67  Hansard,  614. 

^  Doe  d.  Bainhrigge  v.  Bairibrigge,  4  Cox,  C.  C.  451. 


576  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

it  would  seem  as  if  that  should  be  preferred  which  let  in 
upon  the  jury  in  the  largest  measure,  the  light  of  science  and 
liberal  knowledge,  —  directly  and  clearly,  without  the  inter- 
vention of  refracting  media.  What  the  jury  want  is  light 
upon  the  dark  points  of  the  case  before  them.  The  question 
is  not  what  may  be  the  expert's  views  in  regard  to  the  mental 
condition  of  A,  B,  C,  or  any  other  individual,  real  or  imag- 
inary, but  what  he  thinks  of  the  only  person  with  whom  the 
court  has  any  concern.  In  a  case  involving  a  question  of 
insanity,  the  expert  is  called  in  expressly  to  give  the  jury  the 
benefit  of  his  special  acquaintance  with  the  subject,  —  a  ben- 
efit which  he  has  a  right  to  give,  and  they  a  right  to  re- 
ceive —  and  thus  assist  them  in  arriving  at  a  correct  verdict. 
For  this  purpose  he  hears  all  the  evidence,  and  carefully 
forms  his  opinion  upon  it.  The  next  step,  it  might  be  nat- 
urally supposed,  would  be  to  express  that  opinion  on  the  wit- 
ness stand.  But  here  the  new  rule  is  interposed,  and  the 
expert  is  told  that  he  must  not  utter  a  word  respecting  the 
case,  the  details  of  which  he  has  been  following  day  after 
day,  perhaps  for  weeks  together,  but  he  may  tell  them  what 
he  thinks  about  some  other  case.  The  admirable  fitness  of 
this  rule  for  promoting  the  ends  of  justice  must  be  obvious 
to  the  dullest  apprehension.  The  jury,  embarrassed  and 
perplexed  by  a  multitude  of  traits  and  incidents,  the  full 
significance  of  which  is  utterly  beyond  their  reach ;  anxious 
to  get  at  the  truth,  but  unable  rightly  to  appreciate  the  facts 
on  which  it  is  to  be  founded,  would  gladly  avail  themselves 
of  the  superior  insight  of  men  to  whom  such  facts  are  familiar 
as  household  words,  but  this  privilege  is  refused.  Experts 
may  be  called,  it  is  true,  but  they  are  to  talk  about  any  thing 
rather  than  the  case  in  hand  —  the  only  case  regarding  which 
the  jury  care  to  have  their  opinion  at  all. 

§  615.  But,  it  is  replied,  you  may  state  a  hypothetical  case, 
embracing  all  the  essential  facts  related  by  the  witnesses, 
and.  thereby  obtain  from  the  expert  precisely  the  same 
opinion  as  if  the  question  had  been  put  to  him  according 
to  the  formula  used  in  the  State  courts.  If  this  is  really  so, 
it  is  not  very  clear  how  the  technical  difficulty  is  avoided. 


DUTIES   OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  577 

You  may  not  ask  the  expert,  say  the  court,  whether,  suppos- 
ing the  evidence  to  be  true,  he  believes  the  party  to  have 
been  insane,  but  you  may  repeat  to  him  in  detail  all  the 
symptoms  and  occurrences  related  by  the  witnesses,  and  ask 
him  whether,  supposing  them  to  have  really  happened,  the 
person  concerned  was  insane.  If  there  is  any  difference  be- 
tween these  two  propositions,  it  seems  to  be  very  much  like 
that  between  "  Come  out  here,  Mr.  McCarthy,"  and  "  Mr. 
McCarthy,  come  out  here."  In  neither  case  is  the  expert 
bound  to  believe  that  the  facts  on  which  he  founds  his  opin- 
ion, have  actually  occurred,  while  in  both,  it  is  understood 
that  these  facts,  whether  real  or  imaginary,  are  precisely  the 
same.  It  is  hardly  credible  that  a  difficulty  like  this,  which 
could  be  removed  by  a  paltry  shuffling  of  words,  should  be 
allowed  to  change  a  rule  of  evidence  universally  recognized 
in  the  courts  of  the  country.  Besides,  if  the  case  put  to  the 
jury  is  precisely  that  which  has  appeared  in  evidence,  it  is 
but  little  better  than  quibbling  to  call  it  a  hypothetical  case. 
It  certainly  is  regarded  by  jury  and  expert  as  the  case  which 
is  on  trial,  and  in  spite  of  any  modification  of  language  or 
change  of  subordinate  points,  the  opinion  of  the  latter  will 
inevitably  be  shaped  by  what  he  has  heard  from  the  wit- 
nesses. If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  case  truly  hypothetical  is  put 
to  the  expert,  then  it  needs  but  little  reflection  to  see  that  the 
less  it  resembles  the  case  exhibited  by  the  witnesses,  the  less 
will  it  enlighten  the  jury  in  the  formation  of  their  verdict. 
But  this  method  is  not  only  useless,  it  is  positively  mischiev- 
ous. It  is  very  easy  for  counsel,  by  suppressing  some  circum- 
stances and  adding  others,  to  present  a  case  sufficiently  like 
the  one  on  trial,  to  seem  to  the  jury  the  same,  but  really  so 
different  as  to  elicit  from  the  expert,  an  opinion  very  different 
from  that  he  had  formed  respecting  the  actual  case,  and 
which,  perhaps,  he  had  already  expressed.  The  jury  are  mys- 
tified by  such  apparently  contradictory  views,  and  it  would 
not  be  strange  if  they  concluded  to  disregard  such  deceptive 
lights  altogether,  and  rely  on  their  own  unassisted  judg- 
ment. 

§  616.    Another  objection  to  this  new  mode  of  obtaining 

49 


578  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE    OF  INSANITY. 

an  expert's  opinion  is,  that  it  violates  one  of  the  settled  rules 
of  philosophy.  It  is  well  understood  among  scientific  men 
that  they  are  not  to  enter  on  the  discussion  of  facts  that  have 
not  been  carefully  observed,  and  duly  authenticated.  The 
true  disciple  of  modern  science  will  scarcely  allow  himself  to 
talk  of  the  attributes  and  incidents  of  a  thing  that  never  had 
an  objective  existence,  because,  if  the  thing  never  really  ex- 
isted, we  are  liable,  with  our  limited  faculties  and  scanty 
knowledge,  to  attribute  to  it  incidents  more  or  less  incom- 
patible with  one  another.  A  hypothetical  case  must  be 
always  open  to  this  objection,  that  being  the  offspring  of 
fancy  it  may  be  such  a  case  as  never  did  and  never  could 
exist  in  nature ;  and  therefore  that  the  opinion  of  an  expert 
on  such  a  case  must  be  more  or  less  unreliable.  Indeed, 
nobody  supposes  that  the  hypothetical  cases  stated  by  coun- 
sel always  represent  cases  that  have  actually  occurred,  for  it 
is  well  understood  that  they  may  be  merely  a  collection  of 
such  particulars  as  best  suit  the  counsel's  purpose.  Were 
we  to  enumerate  a  train  of  symptoms  chosen  at  random,  and 
ask  an  expert  what  disease  they  would  signify  in  a  patient 
who  might  exhibit  them,  we  should  commit  no  greater  ab- 
surdity than  the  counsel  does  who  picks  out  an  incident  here 
and  there  from  a  man's  conduct  and  discourse,  and  then  asks 
the  expert  on  the  witness-stand,  if  he  considers  them  as  con- 
clusive proof  of  insanity. 

§  617.  It  would  seem  as  if  the  soundness  of  this  principle 
would  be  instantly  recognized  by  lawyers,  with  whom  it  is  a 
sort  of  professional  rule  never  to  give  counsel  on  a  suppositi- 
tious case.  We  know  very  well  what  would  be  the  reply  of 
any  lawyer  having  the  slightest  regard  for  his  reputation,  to 
one  who  should  seek  his  opinion  in  this  manner.  "  If  the 
case  you  put  is  merely  a  matter  of  speculation  or  curiosity,  I 
am  willing  to  talk  about  it,  but  if  you  wish  ray  opinion  for  a 
practical  purpose,  on  a  case  that  has  a  real  existence,  you 
must  state  that  case  with  all  its  particulars,  without  addi- 
tion or  suppression ;  and  since  your  imperfect  knowledge  of 
these  things  might  lead  you  unconsciously  to  misrepresent 
the  case,  you  had  better  get  a  lawyer  to  state  it  for  you." 


DUTIES   OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  579 

And  yet,  when  the  opinion  of  an  expert  on  a  matter  of 
science  is  required,  distinguished  lawyers  say  he  must  not 
be  asked  about  facts  which  have  been  stated  with  all  that 
precision  and  completeness  which  only  a  judicial  examina- 
tion can  secure,  but  you  may  draw  upon  your  memory  or 
your  imagination  for  the  materials  of  a  hypothetical  case, 
and  ask  his  opinion  about  that.  A  fiction,  an  acknowledged 
creation  of  fancy,  is  supposed  to  serve  the  ends  of  truth  and 
justice  better  than  actual  facts  I 

§  618.  Thus  far  we  have  gone  upon  the  supposition  that 
the  rule  now  advanced,  is,  at  least,  practicable.  Unquestion- 
ably, it  may  be  in  many  cases ;  but  in  those  cases,  by  no 
means  few,  where  the  facts  touching  the  mental  condition  of 
the  party  proceed  from  a  cloud  of  witnesses,  each  one  con- 
tributing something  towards  the  general  impression  which  is 
made  upon  the  mind  of  the  expert,  it  cannot  be  strictly  car- 
ried out  without  manifest  injustice.  We  had  an  opportunity 
a  few  months  ago,  of  seeing  it  applied  in  a  criminal  trial,  in 
a  federal  court  held  in  a  neighboring  district.  A  ship-master 
was  on  trial  for  beating  to  death  one  of  his  crew,  and  de- 
fended on  the  plea  of  insanity.  After  a  large  number  of 
witnesses  had  been  examined,  the  prisoner's  counsel  pro- 
ceeded to  put  the  question  to  the  experts  in  the  usual  way, 
whereupon  the  district  attorney  objected,  and  his  objection 
was  sustained  in  an  elaborate  opinion  fron^  the  circuit  judge. 
No  better  illustration  of  the  folly  of  the  rule  could  be  had 
than  was  furnished  by  the  actual  result  of  all  the  discussion 
which  it  provoked  on  this  occasion.  The  court  having  pro- 
nounced its  decision,  the  following  colloquy  took  place  be- 
tween the  court  and  the  prisoner's  counsel : 

Counsel.  —  I  may  assume  a  state  of  facts,  I  suppose  ? 

Court.  —  Unquestionably  that  may  be  done.  That  is  the 
decision  of  Judge  Curtis. 

Counsel.  —  Then  am  I  to  ask  the  witness  thus:  Taking 
all  the  facts  as  testified  by  the  mother  of  the  prisoner,  the 
statement  of  Capt.  F.,  and  then  the  account  given  by  C,  etc., 
what  would  be  his  opinion  as  to  the  state  of  the  prisoner's 
mind,  or  am  I  to  read  over  my  notes,  and  point  out  certain 
facts  ? 


580  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

Court.  —  You  can  ask  your  question. 

Counsel. —  (To  witness.)  Taking  all  the  testimony  of 
Mrs.  H.  in  regard  to  the  condition  and  history  of  her  son  up 
to  the  time  of  this  occurrence  of  the  22d  of  January  ;  the 
statements  and  testimony  of  young  C.  as  to  the  sickness 
which,  prior  to  the  22d  of  January,  the  prisoner  had  endured; 
all  the  testimony  of  his  previous  life  which  goes  to  show  his 
nervous  sensibilities ;  the  testimony  of  Capt.  F.  and  Capt.  N. 
as  to  the  occurrences  at  the  Chincha  Islands,  and  the  extent 
of  the  injury  which  occurred  to  him  there ;  the  testimony  of 
C.  and  F.  in  regard  to  the  occurrences  of  the  22d  of  January, 
during  the  whole  of  that  day  and  the  succeeding  and  follow- 
ing days  and  nights,  until  they  arrived  at  P ; upon  the 

assumption  and  basis  that  all  that  testimony  is  true  and 
believed  by  the  jury,  what,  in  your  opinion,  was  the  mental 
condition  of  Capt.  H.  on  the  22d  of  January  ? 

§  619.  Here  were  a  multitude  of  transactions  bearing  upon 
the  question  of  the  prisoner's  mental  condition,  every  one  of 
which  it  was  necessary  for  the  expert  to  take  into  the 
account  in  making  up  his  opinion.  They  could  not  be 
stated  hypothetically  in  any  other  language  than  that  of  the 
witnesses,  with  all  the  collateral  circumstances,  and  so  obvi- 
ous was  this,  that  neither  the  opposing  counsel  nor  the 
court  objected ;  and  thus,  in  this  case,  the  new  rule  was 
utterly  disregarded.  Thus,  we  apprehend,  it  must  always 
be  disregarded,  where  the  evidence  unfolds  a  large  mass  of 
particulars  essential  to  the  right  understanding  of  the  ques- 
tion at  issue. 

§  620.  It  is  a  curious  fact,  not  without  some  significance, 
we  imagine,  if  we  could  but  see  it,  that  in  all  the  cases 
where  the  new  rule  of  evidence  has  been  applied,  the  ques- 
tion at  issue  was  one  of  mental  disease,  while  in  cases  where 
it  was  a  question  of  other  diseases,  or  wounds,  no  objection 
has  been  made  to  the  application  of  the  old  rule."  In  the 
trial  of  Capt.  Donellan  for  the  murder  of  Sir  T.  Boughton 
(1780),  for  instance,  several  physicians  had  stated  the  symp- 
toms observed  before  death,  and  the  results  of  the  autopsy 
after  death,  when  the  celebrated  John  Hunter  was  called,  and 
examined  as  follows : 


DUTIES   OF  .MEDICAL  WITNESSES.  581 

Question.  —  Have  you  heard  the  evidence  that  has  been 
given  by  these  gentlemen  ? 

Ansiver.  —  I  have  been  present  the  whole  time. 

Q.  —  Did  you  hear  Lady  Boughton's  evidence  ? 

A.  —  I  heard  the  whole. 

Q.  —  Did  you  attend  to  the  symptoms  her  Ladyship  de- 
scribed, as  appearing  upon  Sir  Theodosius  Boughton,  after 
the  medicine  w^as  given  him? 

A  — I  did. 

Q. —  Can  any  certain  inference  upon  physical  or  chirur- 
gical  principles  be  drawn  from  those  symptoms,  or  from  the 
appearances  externally  or  internally  of  the  body,  to  enable 
you,  in  your  judgment,  to  decide  that  the  death  was  occa- 
sioned by  poison  ?  ^ 

§  621.  Had  the  question  been  whether  or  not  Capt.  Donel- 
lan  was  insane  when  he  took  the  life  of  Sir  T.  Boughton, 
then  probably  the  court  would  have  said,  Mr.  Hunter  must 
not  be  asked  what  opinion  respecting  the  prisoner's  mental 
condition  the  evidence  has  led  him  to  form,  but  he  may  give 
his  opinion  on  a  hypothetical  state  of  facts.  He  has  no 
right  to  believe  that  a  single  word  which  he  has  heard 
from  the  witnesses  is  true,  but  you  may  set  up  a  fictitious 
Capt.  Donellan  and  a  fictitious  Sir  Theodosius  Boughton, 
and  an  imaginary  chapter  of  incidents,  and  ask  what  he 
thinks  about  them.  This,  and -numerous  similar  instances 
which  might  be  cited  did  our  limits  permit,  constrain  us  to 
ask,  why  this  distinction  ?  Is  it  because  insanity  is  sup- 
posed to  be  plead  in  defence  of  crime  more  frequently  than 
it  should  be,  and  therefore  to  be  met  with  every  kind  of 
restriction  and  hinderance  which  the  practice  of  the  law  will 
permit?  If  this  is  the  reason,  we  need  only  say  that  there 
never  was  a  greater  mistake  than  to  imagine  that  error  or 
nonsense  can  be  put  down  by  denying  it  fair  play  and  full 
discussion. 

§  622.    We  are  brought  to  the  conclusibn  that  the  rule  in 

^  Trial  of  Capt.  John  Donellan,  etc.,  reported  by  Joseph  Gurney.  Quo- 
ted in  Beck,  ii.  p.  792. 

49* 


582  MEDICAL  JURISPRUDENCE   OF  INSANITY. 

question  is  not  calculated  to  promote  the  ends  of  justice 
and  humanity ;  and  that  a  true  reform  would  be  to  confine 
the  expert  to  the  case  in  hand  as  revealed  by  the  evidence, 
and  debar  him  entirely  from  giving  opinions  upon  hypotheti- 
cal cases.  Such  a  course  is  not  entirely  without  judicial 
sanction.  In  the  trial  of  Prescott  for  the  murder  of  Mrs. 
Cochran,  in  New  Hampshire,  (1834),  the  defence  being  insan- 
ity, an  expert  was  asked  by  the  attorney-general  the  follow- 
ing question  :  "  If  no  act  of  violence  precede  or  follow  the 
fatal  deed,  and  no  apparent  motive  can  be  found  for  the  mur- 
der, should  you  believe  a  homicide  to  be  insane,  merely 
because  he  has  insane  ancestors?"  To  this  the  prisoner's 
counsel  [Hon.  Ichabod  Bartlett]  objected,  simply  because  it 
was  improper  to  get  the  opinion  on  a  supposed  case.  The 
attorney-general  replied  that  "  the  prisoner  was  setting  up  the 
plea  of  insanity  on  the  ground  that  some  remote  ancestor  of 
his  was  crazy ;  and  that  the  court  would  perceive  that  the 
question  was  only  to  get  the  opinion  of  the  witness  on  a  case 
precisely  such  as  may  be  proved  to  exist  in  this  instance." 
The  court  [Chief  Justice  Richardson]  observed  "that  the 
question  being  founded  on  a  supposed  case,  could  not  prop- 
erly be  put."  ^ 

§  623.  If  we  are  to  have  a  new  rule  on  the  subject  to  pre- 
vent the  expert  from  encroaching  on  the  province  of  the  jury, 
let  it  be  that  laid  down  by  lords  Henley  and  Brougham, 
whereby  the  expert  is  debarred  from  giving  opinions  re- 
specting the  case  on  trial,  or  any  other  case,  and  allowed 
only  to  answer  questions  as  to  the  causes,  symptoms,  and 
other  incidents  of  insanity.  In  this  way  very  important 
information  would  no  doubt  be  kept  from  the  jury,  but  the 
mischief  arising  from  hypothetical  cases  would  also  be  pre- 
vented. 

§  624.  It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  the  course  per- 
mitted by  our  State  courts  is  encumbered  by  a  practical  diffi- 
culty which  should  be  carefully  considered.     It  not  unfre- 


^  Report  of  the  Trial  of  Abraham  Prescott  for  the  Murder  of   Sally 
Cochran,  etc.,  etc.     Concord,  N.  II.  1834. 


DUTIES    OF   MEDICAL   WITNESSES.  583 

quently  happens  that  discrepancies  and  contradictions  appear 
in  the  testimony,  quite  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  its  being 
all  true.  Having  no  right  to  decide  for  hinnself,  between 
the  true  and  the  false,  what  is  the  expert  to  do  ?  We  can 
only  say  that  where  these  contradictions  are  of  a  trivial  char- 
acter and  confined  to  subordinate  points,  they  may  be  over- 
looked, apparently  without  any  impropriety  ;  but  where  they 
involve  the  main  facts  at  issue,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  he 
can  arrive  at  any  conclusions  without  assuming  the  func- 
tions of  the  jury.  In  this  contingency,  he  can  only  candidly 
state  his  embarrassment  and  show  how  the  testimony  clashes, 
describe  the  bearing  which  its  several  portions  may  have  on 
his  opinion,  and  leave  the  further  disposal  of  the  matter  to 
the  court. 

§  625.  It  often  happens,  too,  that  the  evidence,  without 
involving  any  manifest  contradiction  of  facts,  bears  the 
marks  of  high  coloring,  of  exaggerated  statement,  or  unin- 
tentional omissions.  Different  witnesses,  we  well  know,  sel- 
dom state  the  same  facts  precisely  alike.  There  will  be 
something  either  of  addition  or  omission,  in  the  testimony  of 
each,  calculated  to  leave  an  impression  different  from  that 
produced  by  the  rest.  Here  the  expert  is  permitted,  if*  not 
required,  to  make  such  allowances  as  are  naturally  made  by 
every  other  person  around  him,  otherwise  he  would  be  for- 
ever debarred  from  giving  an  opinion  in  a  judicial  inquiry. 
But  the  expert  must  never  forget,  that  it  is  the  ivhole  evi- 
dence on  Which  his  opinion  must  be  founded,  and  if  it  be 
contradictory  or  deficient,  he  will  best  consult  his  own  repu- 
tation and  promote  the  ends  of  justice,  by  candidly  stating 
the  fact. 


I]^D  EX. 


[the   figures   EEFEK  to   TliE   SECTIONS.] 


A.  B.,  case  of,  251. 

Abbot,  case  of,  560. 

Abraham,  B.,  case  of,  185. 

Aidoiomania,  195. 

Alderson,  Baron,  on  the  exculpatory  effect  of  delusions,  28C  ;  on  moral 
insanity,  303  ;  on  the  examination  of  experts,  609. 

Alison,  on  the  test  of  right  and  wrong,  21  ;  on  delusion,  21 ;  on  drunken- 
ness, 541. 

Allis,  case  of,  305. 

Amos,  on  unsoundness,  5. 

Arithmetical  acquirements,  not  proof  of  capacity,  86,  118. 

Arnold,  case  of,  10. 

Association  of  ideas  In  the  insane,  288. 


B. 

Bagster,  case  of,  85. 

Barblei',  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  230. 

Barclay,  case  of,  111. 

Beauquaire,  his  will  established,  119. 

Beck,  on  recent  trials,  38  ;  on  McDonough's  case,  538. 

Bell,  on  insanity  from  masturbation,   188;  case  of  Col.  M.,  187;  case  of 

L.  M.,  253;  on  a  symptom  of  dementia,  364;  cases  of  simulation,  416, 

419;  a  case  of  suicide,  463. 
Belllngham,  case  of,  16,  37,  46. 
Ben  Jonson's  hallucination,  151. 
Bertet,  case  of,  298. 
Bichat,  on  old  age,  334. 
Birdsell,  case  of,  540  v 


586  INDEX. 

Boileau  de  Castleneau,  case  of  transitory  mania,  147. 

Boys  de  Loury,  cases  of  propensity  to  steal,  192. 

Brain,  small  or  diseased  in  idiocy,  55  ;  the  seat  of  mania,  123  ;  how  affected 
by.  liquor,  51-4. 

Brierre  de  Boismont,  case  of  obscure  incubation,  133. 

British  and  Foreign  Medical  Review,  on  Miss  Bagster's  case,  86 ;  on  drunk- 
enness, 541. 

Brixey,  case  of,  229. 

Brougham,  Lord,  on  the  plea  of  insanity  in  criminal  cases,  3  7 ;  annoyed  by 
insane  persons,  39;  on  punishment  of  the  insane,  39  ;  on  partial  insan- 
ity, 279. 

Broussonet,  case  of,  161. 

Brown,  William,  case  of,  218. 

Browne,  Rev.  Simeon,  his  delusion,  158. 

Bucknill,  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  225  ;  case  of  simulation,  419. 

Burrows,  case  of  epilepsy,  443. 


C. 

Campbell,  Lord,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  37;  on  competence  to  testify,  504. 

Cartwrlght,  case  of,  390. 

Castelli,  case  of,  470. 

Chambeyron,  case  of  monomania,  160;  of  epilepsy,  445. 

Change  of  character,  a  proof  of  insanity,  129. 

Charolais,  Count,  case  of,  83. 

Chltty,  on  right  and  wrong,  20 ;  moral  insanity,  303. 

Civil  and  criminal  cases,  how  distinguished,  11. 

Classification  of  mental  diseases,  3,  52. 

Coke,  on  insanity,  3 ;  on  drunkenness,  533. 

Coleridge,  J.,  on  the  legal  effect  of  drunkenness,  536. 

Combe,  Dr.,  on  change  of  character,  129 ;  on  lucid  intervals,  386. 

Combe,  George,  a  case  of  moral  imbecility,  78. 

Commission  of  lunacy,  its  proper  duty,  5. 

Committees  of  physicians,  often  differ  in  their  conclusions,  431. 

Competency  of  a  witness,  conditions  of,  496. 

Conolly,  definition  of  Insanity,  153  ;  on  simulated  insanity,  396,  413;  on  the 

writing  of  the  insane,  434;  on  interdiction,  567,  578. 
Contracts,  of  the  Insane,  7;  of  somnambulists,  479;  of  imbeciles,  120;  of 

epileptics,  446;  of  drunkards,  529. 
Cornier,  case  of,  242. 
Cory,  case  of,  41. 

Courts,  on  their  decisions  in  cases  of  insanity,  42. 
Cox,  on  moral  mania,  169. 
Crawford,  case  of  moral  imbecility,  78. 
Cretinism,  58. 


INDEX.        •  587 

Crime,  distinguished  from  Insanity,  25. 

Criminal  law  of  insanity,  -why  so  slowly  improved  in  England,  15;  ex- 
pounded by  English  judges,  2T;  debate  on,  in  the  House  of  Lords,  37  ; 
statutes  of  different  nations  on,  43. 

Cumming,  Mrs.,  allusion  to  her  case,  431. 

Cunning,  active  in  the  insane,  22 ;  in  the  imbecile,  76. 

Curability  of  insanity  at  different  periods,  369. 

Curtis,  J.,  decision  in  the  McGlue  case,  41. 

D. 

D'Aguesseau  on  lucid  intervals,  37D,  388. 

Daniel,  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  224. 

Davies,  case  of,  570. 

Deafness  in  old  age,  334. 

Decisions,  on  the  law  (Jt  insanity,  in  English  courts,  26  ;  in  American,  41. 

Delay  in  trying  cases  of  insanity,  297. 

Delepine,  case  of,  102. 

Delirium  tremens  described,  516  ;  cases  of,  542  et  seq. 

Delusions,  considered  as  a  test  of  insanity,  23;  of  monomaniacs,  157;  their 
effect  on  mental  unsoundness,  267. 

Denman,  Lord,  decision  in  Oxford's  case,  26. 

Depression,  alternating  with  excitement,  171. 

Design,  not  a  test  of  sanity,  22. 

Devay,  case  of  obscure  incubation,  133. 

Dewey,  J.,  charge  in  a  case,  312 ;  on  lucid  intervals,  388. 

Dipsomania,  Esquirol  on,  522  ;  cases  of,  522;  Marc  on,  526. 

Dolus  and  culpa,  in  relation  to  drunkenness,  534. 

Donelly,  case  of,  504. 

Donellan,  case  of,  620. 

Dreaming  compared  with  insanity,  288  ;  with  somnambulism,  473. 

Drew,  case  of,  543. 

Drink,  fondness  for,  sometimes  an  effect  of  mania,  147 ;  sometimes  irresisti- 
ble, 520. 

Dyce  Sombre,  allusion  to  his  case,  431. 

E. 

Eccentricity,  in  relation  to  insanity,  128. 

Ecstasis,  474. 

Edmonds,  J.,  decision  in  Kleim's  case,  41  ;  on  moral  insanity,  303. 

Education,  of  idiots,  57  ;  neglected,  a  cause  of  ignorance,  not  imbecilitj',  86. 

Eldon,  Lord,  on  unsound  mind,  5  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  388 ;  case  of  concealed 

insanity,  427. 
Epidemic  character  of  homicidal  insanity,  294  ;  of  suicide,  458. 
Erion,  case  of,  532. 


588  •  INDEX. 

Errington,  case  of,  23. 

Erskine,  Lord,  his  objection  to  a  verdict,  5  ;  distinguislies  between  civil  and 
criminal  cases,  10;  mistakes  the  facts  in  Arnold's  case,  15;  on  delusion 
as  a  test  of  insanity,  15. 

E.  S.,  case  of,  78. 

Esquirol,  on  hallucinations  and  illusions,  151  ;  case  of  impaired  language, 
161;  cases  of  homicidal  insanity,  213,  219,  230;  on  the  validity  of  a 
monomaniac's  will,  277;  on  the  mental  condition  after  recovery,  373; 
on  design  as  a  test  of  responsibility,  22  ;  on  recurrent  insanity,  373  ;  on 
dementia,  324;  on  the  proportion  of  epileptics  to  other  insane,  437;  on 
periodical  drunkenness,  522;  on  curability  of  insanity,  3G9;  on  isola- 
tion, 583. 

Evans,  on  partial  mania,  273,  502;  on  the  evidence  of  monomaniacs,  502. 

Evidence  of  medical  men,  46,  47;  of  epileptics,  446. 

Evolution  of  the  sexual  functions,  209.  * 

Excitement  alternating  with  depression,  171. 

Experts,  their  duties  defined,  46 ;  the  necessity  of,  illustrated,  343 ;  how 
they  are  to  express  their  opinions,  607. 

F. 

Falret,  cases  of  suicide,  455. 

Ferocity,  not  the  cause  of  homicidal  insanity,  300. 

Ferrers,  Earl,  case  of,  180. 

Flight  of  homicidal  maniacs,  not  a  proof  of  guilt,  259.' 

Fodere,  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  192;  on  lucid  intervals,  387;  on  som- 
nambulism, 480  ;  on  suspected  simulation,  417. 

Franck,  case  of,  202. 

Frederick  William,  case  of,  189. 

French  code  relative  to  insanity,  13,  43  ;  relative  to  interdiction,  119,  581, 
583. 

Friedrich,  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  192  ;  on  lucid  intervals,  394. 

G. 

Galen,  a  somnambulist,  468. 

Gall,  cases  of  propensity  to  steal,  192;  of  aidoiomania,  196;  of  homicidal 
insanity,  202,  217,  221,  233;  of  suicide,  454,  456. 

George  III.,  allusion  to  his  case,  372. 

Georget,  on  Hale's  doctrine,  11  ;  on  imbeciles,  76 ;  a  case  of  monomania, 
160  ;  on  Cornier's  case,  246  ;  on  the  incubation  of  insanity,  130  ;  on  the 
effect  of  monomania  generally,  285  ;  propositions  on  homicidal  insanity, 
299;  on  lucid  intervals,  384,  396;  on  Jean  Pierre's  case,  399;  on  the 
inquest,  435  ;  on  somnambulism,  480  ;  on  competency  of  witnesses, 
503  ;  comments  on  a  special  verdict,  14. 

Gerard,  case  of,  418.  » 


INDEX.  589 

Gibbs,  Sir  Vickery,  on  tlie  criminal  law  of  insanity,  10  ;  on  design  as  a  test 

of  sanity,  22. 
Gibson,  C.  J.,  decision  on  Hosier's  case,  41 ;  on  moral  Insanity,  303. 
Gooch,  gives  a  test  of  insanity,  129  ;  on  tlie  Davles  case,  570. 
Graborkwa,  case  of,  206. 
Grade,  case  of,  501. 
Greensmith,  case  of,  299. 
Greenwood,  case  of,  274. 

H. 

Habitual  insanity,  ground  of  interdiction,  581. 
Hadfield,  case  of,  15,  29  7. 

Hale,  Lord,  classification  of  the  insane,  8 ;  distinction  between  partial  and 
total  insanity,  8  ;  on  test  of  responsibility,  8  ;  case  of  homicidal  mania, 
235;  case  of  somnolentia,  492. 
Hallucinations,  explained,  151  ;  how  frequent,  152  ;  may  be  concealed,  152 ; 

instances  of,  157  ;  In  delirium  tremens,  517. 
Hansterin,  case  of,  240. 
Hardwick,  Lord,  on  unsoundness,  5. 

Haslam,  gives  a  case  of  concealed  Insanity,  22  ;  on  arithmetical  acquire- 
ments, 118;  on  lucid  Intervals,  382;  on  simulated  Insanity,  396,  410 ; 
on  the  Davles  case,  574. 
Head,  size  of,  in  idiocy,  54 ;  injuries  of,  their  effect  on  the  mind,  356. 
Henke,  on  sexual  evolution,  210. 
Henley,  Baron,  decision  on  medical  testimony,  609. 
Hinchman,  allusion  to  his  case,  374. 
Hoewe,  case  of,  442. 

Hoffbauer,  on  imbecility,  61  et  seq.;  on  stupidity,  72  et  seq.'^  conditions  of 
culpability,  116;  on  wills  of  Imbeciles,  119;  on  moral  mania,  170;  on 
the  torts  of  the  insane,  264  ;  on  the  exculpatory  eifects  of  partial  mania, 
281,  286  ;  on  somnambulism,  480, 4S2 ;  on  the  qualifications  of  witnesses, 
496  ;  on  Interdiction,  568. 
Holroyd,  J.,  on  the  legal  effect  of  drunkenness,  536. 

Homicidal  insanity,  generally  attended  by  physical  disorder,  220  ;  accompa- 
nying certain  physical  changes,  226  ;  compared  with  crime,   259 ;  Its 
characters,  258;  has  prevailed  epidemically,  294  ;  compared  with  moral 
depravity,  292;  simulation  of,  415. 
Homicide,  mutual,  465. 
Hood,  case  of  impaired  language,  161. 
Hope,  J.  C,  eschews  the  definitions  of  medical  men,  42. 
Hornblower,  C.  J.,  decision  In  Spencer's  case,  41 ;  on  moral  Insanity,  303. 
Horrors,  described,  518. 
Howlson,  case  of,  46. 

Humboldt,  case  of  homicidal  Insanity,  214. 
Hume,  Baron,  on  right  and  wrong,  20. 

50 


590  INDEX. 


Idiots,  defined  by  the  common  law,  4;  different  kinds  of,  55. 

Illusions,  151. 

Imbeciles,  classified  by  Hoff'bauer,  61;  Georget's  account  of,  76;  not  fit 
objects  of  punisliment,  115;  their  knowledge  of  numbers,  118;  their 
testamentary  capacity,  119  ;  their  capacity  to  make  contracts,  120;  to 
contract  marriage,  121 ;  to  give  testimony,  497  ;  interdiction  of,  563. 

Imbecility,  simulation  of,  411 ;  criterion  of,  566. 

Incoherence  of  ideas  not  essential  to  insanity,  398. 

Incubation  of  insanity,  131. 

Inquest,  435. 

Intermission  of  disease,  376. 

Interrogatory,  429. 

Intoxication  In  suspected  simulation,  417. 

Irritability  of  the  brain,  In  the  lucid  interval,  393  ;  characteristic  of  genuine 
mania,  407. 

Irritation,  the  initial  stage  of  disease,  1 24. 

Insurance,  in  connection  with  suicide,  464. 


Jahn,  relates  a  case  of  epilepsy,  442. 

Jean  Pierre,  case  of,  399. 

Jensen,  case  of,  223. 

Jones,  case  of,  504. 

Juvenile,  delinquency,  252  ;  suicide,  449. 

K. 

Kenyon,  decision  in  Hadfield's  case,  390. 


Lambert,  case  of,  425. 

Language,  Impairment  of,  161. 

Latham,  on  the  Davles  case,  571. 

Lawrence,  on  the  Davles  case,  570. 

Lecouffe,  case  of,  112. 

Levett,  case  of,  492. 

Lewis,  C.  J.,  on  moral  insanity,  303. 

Liberty,  moral,  essential  to  criminal  responsibility,  290. 

LIspenard,  case  of,  88. 

Locke,  on  the  essential  element  of  insanity,  315. 


INDEX.  591 

Lying,  propensity  to,  193. 

Lyndhurst,  Lord,  quashes  an  inquisition,  5 ;  decision  in  Offord's  case,  20 ; 
remarks  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  McNaughton  case,  37. 


M. 

M.,  Colonel,  case  of,  187. 

Mackinnon,  opinion  in  the  Davies  case,  576. 

Macmichael,       "         "  ."  575. 

Macnish,  cases  of  drunkenness,  520. 

McDonough,  case  of,  538. 

McGlue,  case  of,  552. 

McNaughton,  opinion  of  the  law-lords  in  case  of,  28 ;  discussion  In  House  of 

Lords,  on  his  case,  37. 
Mansfield,  Sir  James,  on  the  criminal  law  of  Insanity,  16. 
Marc,  on  pyromania,  210;  on  propensity  to  theft,  194;  cases  of  homicidal 

insanity,  214,  220  ;  case  of  simulation,  421 ;  on  monomaniacs,  410  ;  on 

dipsomania,  526. 
Marriage,  of  imbeciles,  121 ;  of  maniacs,  269  ;  followed  by  insanity,  270;  of 

somnambulists,  479. 
Marechal,  remarks  on  a  case,  100. 
Masturbation,  a  cause  of  insanity,  188. 
Maule,  J.,  gives  a  test  of  responsibility,  13,  26. 
Mayo,  case  of  moral  imbecility,  80.    ' 
Mechanical  ingenuity  of  maniacs,  22. 
Meister,  describes  his  own  attack  of  somnolentia,  493. 
Meinory,  how  aiFected  in  insanity,  324,  328 ;  revival  of,  in  acute  diseases, 

348  ;  affected  In  dementia,  328. 
Menstruation,  as  connected  with  homicidal  insanity,  226. 
Mende,  on  somnolentia,  494. 
Mercer,  case  of,  144. 

Metaphysics,  unable  to  explain  insanity,  49. 
Metzger,  case  of  moral  insanity,  181. 
Michu,  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  23  2. 

Mittermaier,  on  mutual  homicide,  465  ;  on  drunkenness,  530. 
MoUins,  case  of,  230. 
Moral  faculties,  seldom  escape  the  influence  of  disordered  intellect,  283, 

285. 
Moore,  case  of,  276. 

Motives  of  the  insane,  not  well  defined,  287. 
Mounin,  case  of,  222. 
Murray,  case  of,  553. 


592 


INDEX. 


N. 

Negretti,  case  of,  468, 

Neilson,  case  of,  241. 

Nichol,  Sir  J.,  on  the  proof  of  insanity  in  civil  cases,  12;  sanctions  Erskine's 
test,  23;  judgment  in  the  Portsmouth  case,  87;  decision  in  a  case  of 
marriage,  269;  on  partial  insanity,  275;  decision  in  a  case  of  demen- 
tia, 337;  on  lucid  intervals,  392;  on  delirium,  352;  on  suicide,  460; 
on  imbecility,  566. 


O. 

Old  age,  description  of,  334  ;  not  to  be  confounded  with  dementia,  336. 
Old  men,  their  passion  for  making  -wills,  345  ;  their  competence  to  testify, 

512. 
Oppel,  case  of,  444. 

Otto,  cases  of  homicidal  insanity,  231,  234,  241. 
Oxford,  case  of,  26,  35. 


Papavoine,  case  of,  292. 

Parchappe,  case  of  suspected  simulation,  425. 

Parent  Duchatelet,  on  moral  imbecility,  8  2. 

Paris  and  Fonblanque,  on  partial  mania,  272;  on  drunkenness,  537. 

Park,  decision  in  Greensmith's  case,  26. 

Parke,  Baron,  on  the  legal  effect  of  drunkenness,  536. 

Parker,  C.  J.  of  N.  H.,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  302. 

Parker,  C.  J.  of  Mass.,  decision  in  a  divorce  case,  269 ;  on  the  effect  of  sui- 
cide on  a  will,  460. 

Parkman,  case  of  homicidal  Insanity,  255. 

Pascal,  his  hallucination,  153. 

Passion,  distinguished  from  insanity,  25. 

Pathology  of  idiocy,  55  ;  of  mania,  127. 

Patterson,  Justice,  on  the  legal  effect  of  drunkenness,  536. 

Pechot,  case  of,  414. 

Perceptive  powers,  how  affected  in  dementia,  328. 

Periodicity  of  disease,  378  ;  of  drunken  fits,  521. 

Pierquin,  case  of  periodical  drunkenness,  523. 

Pinel,  reformed  the  treatment  of  the  insane,  1 ;  on  design,  as  a  test  of  respon- 
sibility, 22';  on  the  incubation  of  insanity,  131 ;  first  described  moral 
insanity,  168;  cases  of  moral  insanity,  180,  254;  case  of  aidoiomania, 
200;  on  cm-ability  of  insanity,  369. 

Portsmouth,  Lord,  case  of,  87. 


INDEX.  593 

Potliier  on  experts,  46. 

Predominant  idea,  its  effect  on  responsibility,  281. 

Prescott,  case  of,  107. 

Pricliard,  on  moral  insanity,  169;  with  cases,  184;  on  the  propensity  to 

steal,  192  ;  case  of  homicidal  insanity,  236. 
Prior,  case  of,  237. 

Procedure,  French,  in  criminal  trials,  46  ;  in  procuring  interdiction,  582. 
Proof  of  insanity,  not  the  same  in  civil  as  in  criminal  cases,  12. 
Provocation,  real  or  fancied,  not  the  true  measure  of  punishment,  34,  287. 
Puerperal  condition,  a  source  of  homicidal  insanity,  234. 
Pulse,  a  test  in  suspected  simulation,  403. 
Punishment,  not  used  in  hospitals,  40 ;  not  calculated  to  deter  the  insane 

from  criminal  acts,  39,  294,  295. 
Purrington,  case  of,  255. 
Pyromania,  202. 

R. 

Rabello,  case  of,  249. 

Reasoning  of  the  insane,  illogical  and  confused,  284,  287. 

Recovery,  sometimes  sudden,  sometimes  gradual,  3  70  ;  sometimes  imperfect, 

374  ;  proportion  of,  369  ;  as  connected  with  competence,  373. 
Recurrence  of  insanity,  373. 
Reid,  on  lucid  intervals,  385. 
Relapses,  373. 

Religious  fanaticism,  connected  with  homicidal  insanity,  254. 
Responsibility,  tests  of,   17,   21,  22,  23;  as  settled  by  the  law-lords,  28; 

remarks  thereon,  34  ;  defined  in  various  European  and  American  codes, 

43  ;  elements  of,  95. 
Richardson,  C.  J.,  decision  in  Cory's  case  and  Prescott's,  41. 
Rider,  Jane,  case  of,  471,  477,  473. 
Right  and  wrong,  knowledge  of,  17,  39. 
Rolfe,  Baron,  decision  in  Reg.  v.  Stokes,  26  ;  on  moral  insanity,  303  ;  on  lucid 

intervals,  378. 
Romilly,  notice  of  his  case,  453. 
Rush,  on  moral  imbecility,  83  ;  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  192  ;  on  the  pulse 

of  the  insane,  403. 
Russell,  on  right  and  wrong,  1 7  ;  on  design,  22. 


Schimardzig,  case  of,  489. 
Schmidt,  case  of,  99. 
Schwartz,  case  of,  499. 
Selves,  case  of,  568. 


594  INDEX. 

Shakspeare,  represents  a  feature  of  Insanity,  288. 

Shaw,  C.  J.,  decision  in  Rogers's  case,  41 ;  on  moral  insanity,  303  ;  on  tlie 

right  of  isolation,  586. 
Shelford,  on  suicide,  14, 
Simpson,  on  Howison's  case,  46. 
Sleeplessness,  a  test  of  simulation,  404. 
Smith,  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  192. 
Stephen,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  2. 

Story,  J.,  effect  of  insanity  on  contracts,  7 ;  on  drunkenness,  544. 
Stowell,  Lord,  decision  in  a  marriage  case,  269. 
Stupidity,  72. 
Swinburne,  on  the  wills  of  the  insane,  12;  and  of  imbeciles,  119. 


Taylor,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  38. 

Testamentary  capacity,  119,  344. 

Theft,  common  in  imbecility,  76  ;  propensity  to,  192. 

Thiel,  case  of,  549. 

Thurlow,  Lord,  on  lucid  intervals,  380,  388. 

Times,  the,  on  the  propensity  to  steal,  192. 

Tirrell,  case  of,  483. 

Tracy,  J.,  decision  In  Arnold's  case,  10. 

Transitory  mania,  136. 

Trespass,  action  of,  lies  against  the  insane,  264.' 

Trestel,  case  of,  248. 

Turn  of  Hfe,  an  occasion  of  dipsomania,  526. 

Tuthill,  testimony  in  the  Davies  case,  574. 

U. 

Unsoundness,  legal  definition  of,  5  ;  not  weakness,  5. 


Vatelot,  case  of,  539. 

W. 

Ware,  on  delirium  tremens,  518. 

Weber,  case  of,  204. 

Whiting,  J.,  on  moral  insanity,  303. 

Wigan,  on  juvenile  delinquency,  252. 

Wills  of  imbeciles,  119  ;  of  monomaniacs,  274  et  scq.;  of  the  demented,  336  ; 

of  the  delirious,  355;  of  paralytics,  360;  of  suicides,  460. 
Wilson,  case  of,  41,  545. 


INDEX.  595 

Witnesses,  medical,  how  their  opinion  should  be  asked,  607. 
Wynne,  on  lucid  intervals,  390. 
Wood,  case  of,  146. 

Woodward,  on  the  plea  of  insanity,  302  ;  case  of  a  will  made  in  delirium, 
351 ;  case  of  a  monomaniac's  will,  278  ;  on  proof  of  sanity,  315. 


Z. 

Zacchias,  on  a  test  of  idiocy,  411 ;  on  responsibility  of  epileptics,  441. 


6 


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